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Abstract
The movement of large amounts of venture capital funds across the globe seeking
extraordinary profits has a profound effect on investors, fund managers and economies.
With US$ 101 billion of venture capital funds under management in Asia as at June 2004
(2005 Guide to Venture Capital in Asia), such an important phenomenon is deserving of
extensive study, yet the existing literature is scarce and theories are limited. The majority
of research into global venture capital investing has been centred on the impact of the
external environment on the global venture capital firm.
However existing research has not studied "why" some global venture capital firms are
more successful than others or even defined the meaning of "success" in terms of global
venture capital firms. In particular, the literature on, and understanding of, global venture
capital investing from an Asian context is relatively scarce. This gap needs to be filled
particularly from an emerging venture capital market perspective in view of the
increasing importance of Asia to world trade, investment and growth, including venture
capital investments.
The central objective of this thesis is therefore to determine why some global venture
capital firms are more successful than others and this determination is made in the
South East Asian context in three emerging venture capital markets: Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand. Six different firms are studied in these markets, three
successful and two failed international firms, as well as one domestic Malaysian firm.
The research was conducted using an inductive, exploratory research design using the
Grounded Theory and case study methodology, reframed for use in this context. The
framework proved invaluable and is one of the contributions of this research. In the six
cases, 14 senior managers were interviewed, including multiple interviews with each
manager. The interview data was then triangulated with other qualitative and quantitative
data to ensure a robust research design and reliability of the findings.
The results show that firms are successful because of the intangible resources of the
firm and enabled the development of three meta-propositions based on three
management theories - Resource Based View, Core Competence theory and the
Dynamic Capabilities view of the firm.
The significant contribution of this thesis is to show that based on the three meta-
propositions there is a discernible shift in emphasis from what I term the classic view of
venture capital which is based on 'Resources', 'Institutions' and 'Environments' to a new
Knowledge Management view of Global Venture Capital investing. From the perspective
of this thesis, the success of global venture capital firms is based on Knowledge
Management and not on the classic views proposed by most existing venture capital
researchers.
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1. Introduction
With the opening up of world markets, global venture capital flows have increased
rapidly particularly in the last decade. New venture creation and the globalisation of new
ventures have led to the need for increased funding worldwide. According to Gompers &
Lerner (2001) between 1989 and 1999, venture capital activity outside North America
grew by more than 300%. This has led to a greater interest in academic research in this
field, yet theory development and analysis of what leads to the success or failure of
Global Venture Capital (GVC) investing is scarce. It is also important to note that as
GVC research is still in a nascent stage, a definition for globalisation is sketchy as will be
seen in the discussion in section 1.4.1. In this dissertation we will adopt Aylward's (1998)
definition of GVC, as "cross-border entry into emerging markets", which adequately fits
our research.
Between 1992 and 1998, fund raising in Asia and Australia grew more than 5 times and
in Taiwan it grew almost twenty times in the same period (Gompers & Lerner, 2001).
While the flow of investments into emerging markets in Asia has been increasing rapidly,
most of the research is still centred on the US and European markets, with only a
handful of researchers like Bruton et al. (2004), Wright et al. (2002) and Wang et al.
(2002) studying venture capital investments in China, India or Singapore.
Studies examining factors that contribute to successful GVC investing are limited. While
many authors (Black & Gilson, 1998; Bruton et. al.; 1999, Scheela, 1994) have
researched certain factors such as institutional environmental factors, which they deem
important for successful global investing, absent are studies specifically identifying why
some venture capital firms are successful while others are not. Even though GVC
investing is still a comparatively new phenomenon over the last 15-20 years (Gompers
& Lerner, 2001), this timeframe is adequate to search for and study the firms1 that have
been successful and the few firms that may have failed.
11n the context of this dissertation the word 'firm' refers to the venture capital firm. While a firm
connotes a 'partnership' and in most cases venture capital firms are limited partnerships, other
forms of organisation like funds, trusts and limited liability corporations are possible but this does
not affect the research. The use of the word 'company' will refer to the portfolio company or
investee of the venture capital firm.
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What is equally interesting is the absence of studies that define the meaning of
"success" in GVC investing. Success can be defined in many ways for venture capital
firms, but the main measure is financial success in terms of return on investment (Rol);
return on capital employed (RoC), and a target Internal Rate of Return (IRR) (Bygrave &
Timmons, 1992; Bygrave et al, 1999). Although there may be other reasons to determine
success, and some have been discovered in this dissertation, the selection of cases for
this dissertation has been based on financial success, which is currently the best way to
determine whether a firm was a success or failure (see section 3.8 for the full basis of
the selection).
Bygrave & Timmons (1992) also found that older VC firms had better returns, leading
one to conclude that longevity does have some impact on firm success although
longevity could be a result of success and not the other way around. Longevity was
another factor that was used to select successful cases for this dissertation. As success
can have many different meanings in the venture capital field, we will determine what
success means to the respondents in this study. Based on their views of success, we
will explore why some firms are successful and why others fail.
This thesis makes several contributions to the literature on GVC. Firstly, it is one of the
first studies on the factors that lead to successful investing and the causes of failure
amongst GVC firms. Secondly, this study fills the gap in emerging markets research by
conducting research focused on three of the larger South East Asian emerging markets
for venture capital investing - Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Thirdly, by using an
exploratory Grounded Theory (GT) and case study methodology for the research, the
thesis develops a methodological framework and from this a theoretical basis for
success, thereby contributing both to the methodological and theoretical knowledge in
this field.
1.1 Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation will follow the following structure.
This Chapter provides an introduction to the background for this research, the research
question, the objectives of the research, some important definitions and the reasons for
researching global venture capital in Asia.
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Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive review of the current literature on global venture
capital investing. The intention of this chapter is to "scope" the literature to ensure that
the research question hasn't been sufficiently well explored or answered. The chapter
will show that GVC is a field of study that is in an embryonic state with research in the
Asian context scare by comparison to research done in the American and European
context. It will also show that existing research does not answer the critical question of
why some firms are successful or why others fail.
Chapters 3 and 4 describe the methodology and research design of this dissertation.
Chapter 3 provides in-depth details on the methodology and research design employed
in this dissertation: the Grounded Theory and case study methodology. It will include the
reasons why this research design was chosen as well as details on the framework for
the methodology, which combines the different elements of Grounded Theory as well as
case studies. Chapter 4 provides an outline of how the methodology is actually applied
with selected examples.
Using this methodology and research design, Chapter 5 provides the analysis and
results of the study. It is here that the real value of the Grounded Theory and case study
design is demonstrated. Chapter 6 then reports the generation of propositions from the
results that were obtained from the research. Three aspects are important in generating
propositions. The first is shaping propositions from the results where several different
propositions are generated. The next step is to match the propositions with the literature
in the field, known as matching with enfolding literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). This enables
the researcher to use existing literature to verify the propositions and thus add
robustness to the study. The final step is to ensure that there is theoretical 'saturation',
an important element of this methodology. This is necessary to ensure that adequate
research has been done and that the findings are sufficient to support the generation of
propositions.
Chapter 7 shows the 'development' of theory from all the findings and from the
verification of the propositions in Chapter 6. While 'new' theories are not developed in
this dissertation, the propositions that have been discovered will be applied to global
venture capital research in the South East Asian context using three existing
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management theories: the Resource Based View, Core Competence theory and the
Dynamic Capabilities view. From these three meta-propositions we develop a new
Knowledge Management view of GVC investing.
Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation by discussing the findings, contributions of the
research, limitations of the research, a viewpoint on the global model of venture capital
and suggestions for future research.
1.2 Research Problem & Objectives of the Dissertation
The origin of the research problem was grounded in my intuitive approach and
background in the venture capital arena. As a consultant in venture capital for 4 years, I
was keen to establish why some prominent venture capital firms such as Softbank
Emerging Markets actually failed in South East Asia while others have flourished for
many years and continue to grow and invest successfully (Walden International, 3i,
H&Q, etc). This PhD thesis provided an opportunity to seek an answer to this question.
Scoping the literature showed that there was no adequate answer to this question. The
literature provided examples of factors that impact on success such as politics (Scheela,
1994, Megginson, 2004), laws and regulations (Bruton et al., 2004, Pohndorf, 1997),
financial aspects (Barger et al., 1996, Lemberg & Paist, 2000), culture (Tan, 1998) and
others (see section 2 for a detailed analysis). However, the literature does not provide an
adequate answer to the "why are firms successful" or "why do firms fail", question.
This led to the two research problems identified in this dissertation:
a) The need to determine "success" factors in GVC investing
b) The development of propositions which explain successful GVC investing
Based on these two research problems we can identify the following two objectives:
1.2.1 Determining Success
The element of individual firm "success" is not often mentioned or studied in GVC
research (Dotzler, 2001, Jeng & Wells, 2000) but this is a significant issue for all firms
that aspire to globalise. Even when success is mentioned in the literature it is on the
basis of how the environment impacts on the firm (White et al., 2002) or what
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governments have done to create successful venture capital industries rather than why
individual firms are successful or why they fail (Kenney et al., 2002). How does the firm
ensure the success of its globalisation effort, and what are the factors that not just lead
to firm success but what are the barriers that must be overcome to ensure that the firm
does not fail? A search of the literature reveals little at this time on the causes of
success or failure in venture capital firms, though Kenney et al. (2002) do mention some
successful firms, including H&Q Asia Pacific and Walden International, they do not
examine or explain why these firms are successful. A detailed examination of this will be
shown in section 2.
This element of firm success will be explored in this in-depth research by using multiple
case studies, researching both successful foreign venture capital firms and foreign
venture capital firms that have failed in the emerging markets they have entered. The
selection of extreme or polar cases (i.e. comparing successful and failed firms) is
recommended in the Grounded Theory methodology and will be explained further in the
methodology section (section 3.8.2).
The first objective of this study is to determine the factors that lead to successful GVC
investing in the three markets being studied. These markets were selected for several
reasons including the fact that they are three of the largest emerging venture capital
markets in South East Asia, they are within close proximity to each other making
research more viable and that global investors are actively investing there. Detailed
reasons for the selection of these markets are provided in section 3.8.1
1.2.2 Theory development
The two main theories expounded by researchers in the field of global venture capital
are Institutional Theory (Bruton et al. 2004, 2002, Barger et al., 1996) and the Resource
Based View of the firm (Heel & Kehoe, 2005, Bahn et al., 2002). In the case of
Institutional Theory, Bruton et al. (2004, 2002) specifically state that they use this theory
in their analysis while in the Resource Based View, although the authors do not
specifically mention the theory, their analysis is based on intangible resources of the
firm, thus fitting into the mould of this theory (Barney, 1991, Galbreath, 2005). Many of
the other research papers are conceptual and do not specify theory and in some cases
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even the empirical studies do not specify any particular theory (Megginson, 2004,
Patricof, 1989).
The majority of the Institutional Theory research has been centred on environmental
factors that impact on the GVC firm. For example, the research shows that the general
political climate, the regulatory and legal framework and tax laws have an impact on the
GVC firm (Black & Gilson, 1998, Bruton et.al., 1999), yet how much of an impact and to
what extent they affect the success of the firm has not been studied. Hence theory
development is still underdeveloped in this nascent field of research.
In terms of models of GVC investing, Megginson (2004) and Kenney et al. (2002) use
the "U.S. model" in their research but do not specify what this model entails and do not
provide empirical evidence to support the existence or validity of such a model,
especially in its use by global venture capital firms.
This lack of an agreed set of theories or models provides us with the basis for
exploratory research in this dissertation. One methodology for exploratory research is
Glaser & Strauss' (1967) Grounded Theory methodology. Grounded Theory allows a
researcher in a relatively new field of research to develop theory without using prior
hypotheses or opinions. It allows the data itself to lead to theory development and is thus
a useful methodology to use in GVC research in Asia. Additionally the use of case
studies is also encouraged in new fields of research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994). This
dissertation will therefore use a Grounded Theory and case study methodology for the
study. Details of the methodology are elaborated in chapter 3 on research design.
Hence the two objectives of this dissertation are firstly to determine "why" some firms are
more successful than others in GVC investing and secondly to use the results of the
research to develop propositions for successful GVC investing in emerging venture
capital markets.
1.3 Research Question
Based on the background mentioned above and the research problems and objectives,
the following research question has been identified:
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"Why are some venture capital firms more successful in global venture
capital investing than others and how do they ensure this success?"
This research question will be considered from the South East Asian regional context as
outlined in section 1.5. The research question also fits comfortably within the "big
question in international business research" that Peng (2004) identified. He states that
the "big question" is "What determines the international success and failure of firms?" He
believes that this is one element in international business research that has not been
adequately studied. Based on the literature review to follow, this is also true for global
venture capital research as it is a question that has not been adequately explored in this
field.
Thus answering this Research Question will provide new insight in the field of global
venture capital and will add to the knowledge in this field more so from 'an emerging
venture capital market in Asia' perspective.
1.4 Some Definitions
Before starting the process of examining the findings of the literature review, we shall
first consider some definitions that are particularly relevant to this research.
1.4.1 Venture Capital
There are many different definitions of venture capital and we shall consider several
possible definitions and later adopt one that is most suitable for this thesis.
In a synthesis of the venture capital and private equity industry, Wright & Robbie (1998:
521) defined venture capital as:
"... the investment by professional investors of long-term, unquoted, risk equity
finance in new firms where the primary reward is an eventual capital gain,
supplemented by dividend yield"
Tan (1998) refers to venture capital as:
"...the risky financing of small technology firms to commercialise their
technological inventions with the potential for a phenomenal return on the
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financial investment. Venture capital also refers to investments in businesses that
are based on expanding tested technology or concepts in new markets".
These definitions point to several key points on venture capital. The funds are
professionally managed, they are invested primarily for capital gains which means equity
investments, they are invested in risky ventures both to exploit technologies and to
expand businesses into new markets and they seek a large reward for taking these risks
and making such investments. Hence a definition of venture capital should have
elements of all these points and are clearly adopted in a recent definition by Megginson
(2004: 8) which we shall adopt for the purposes of this thesis as follows:
"... venture capital is ... a professionally managed pool of money raised for the
sole purpose of making intermediate-term, actively managed, direct equity
investments in rapidly growing private companies, with a well defined exit
strategy - preferably through an initial public offering".
The points that have been highlighted in the definition show that Megginson's definition
fit the requirements of a valid definition of venture capital.
1.4.2 Venture Capital Process
In studying venture capital, it is useful to understand the process of venture capital. A
good analysis of the venture capital process is found in Bygrave & Timmons (1992) and
is reproduced in Figure 1.1 below.
This process shows that venture capitalists go through a process of raising capital for
their funds, identifying deals for investment, adding value and then exit their investments
in return for a financial return. Returns are then used for new deals if they are not
returned to their investors.
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1.4.3 Globalisation or Internationalisation and defining GVC
While several researchers have provided a definition for venture capital, a definition for
GVC is not so straightforward. Global venture capital research is in such a nascent stage
that there has been very little attempt to specifically define it. Even the terms
internationalisation and globalisation are often used interchangeably with authors not
finding it necessary to confine it to one particular meaning (Patricof, 1989; Wright,
Lockett & Pruthi, 2002).
In the field of international entrepreneurship Zahra & George (2002) define
internationalisation as "the process of creatively discovering and exploiting opportunities
that lie outside a firm's domestic markets in the pursuit of competitive advantage". This
could equally apply to global venture capital firms that wish to expand abroad to seek
and exploit new opportunities as stated by Murray (1995), who found that foreign venture
capitalists sought more attractive opportunities outside the UK and thus limited their
investments in the UK in favour of mainland Europe.
Aylward (1998) viewed the globalisation of venture capital from the perspective of
substantial cross-border entry into emerging markets while Zalan (2004) took the
perspective of internationalisation of private equity as the process of international
operations across borders. Jeannet (2000) defined globalisation as "investing in at least
three countries in three different continents" (quoted in Haemmig, 2003). Wright et al.
(2005) consider international venture capital to involve "cross-country comparisons of
venture capital firms as well as cross-border flows into venture capital funds and
outflows of funds into investments in other countries".
As it is not the intention of this dissertation to seek exact definitions, it is sufficient to
accept the approximate definitions of globalisation and adopt Aylward's (1998) version of
globalisation of venture capital as cross-border entry into emerging markets, which
adequately fits the research in this dissertation.
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1.4.4 Emerging venture capital markets
The study is also of "emerging venture capital markets" and this should not be confused
with developing countries or emerging markets from an economic sense. In the context
of this thesis, it is not the country or economy that is being studied but a market for
venture capital. Thus Asia as a whole, excluding Japan, is a relatively new market for
global venture capitalists and will be considered an "emerging venture capital market".
Many other areas are also considered emerging markets including Eastern Europe,
Russia, Latin America and Africa. However, due to the many possible cultural and
developmental issues, this study is confined to a general Asian focus using Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand as the location for the study.
While it may be argued that Asia is not homogeneous and thus generalisation may be
difficult, the differences among Asian nations is less than the differences between Asia
and Europe or the USA hence some generalisation is possible. Sapienza et al. (1994)
even found differences in the way venture capitalists transact their business in Britain,
France and the Netherlands, demonstrating that there is no homogeneity even among
Western European venture capital markets, but could still make valid comparative
research. Thus the differences among these South East Asian nations should not
prevent valid generalisations from being made.
1.4.5 Success
Finally, in measuring success many possible methods can be used with different sets of
difficulties. Bygrave & Timmons (1992) mention some examples of success such as
financial success in terms of net earnings, Return on Investment (Rol) or revenue
growth. They also identify success with the longevity of the firms, their ability to
successfully raise additional funds and even their ability to IPO or list their investees on
stock exchanges or successfully sell them in a trade sale.
Buckley & Chapman (1997) found that in cross-cultural studies the researcher's
determination of categories could be different from what the respondents believe such
categories to be. Hence it is better in some cases to allow the respondents to determine
the relevant categories and for the researcher to use the respondent's description and
values of the category rather than use his own description. In this way, the real value of
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the category is obtained. They called this form of deriving the true value of a category
"native categories".
Following Buckley & Chapman (1997) the methodology in this thesis will not provide
respondents with a definition of what success means but will seek the definition from the
respondents themselves i.e. how do the venture capitalists themselves define or
measure their success in their foreign investments? This also supports the basis of using
the abductive research design as will be seen in section 3.1.2.
However for conceptual purposes we shall use the examples provided by Bygrave &
Timmons (1992) and define success in the venture capital industry as follows:
Successful venture capital firms are firms that yield high financial returns, have
been in the venture capital business for an extended period of time and have
been able to successfully raise additional rounds of funding from investors.
1.5 Reason For Researching GVC In Asia
We shall briefly consider some reasons for researching GVC in Asia and primarily
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.
1.5.1 Global Venture Capital Is A Growing Phenomenon
Financially, GVC is a sizable global industry with an estimated US$ 1 trillion raised
globally between 1998 and 2003 (2005 Guide to Venture Capital in Asia). Of this
amount, US$ 101 billion is currently under management in Asia, the majority by foreign
venture capital firms in Asia (2005 Guide to Venture Capital in Asia). Venture capital
firms are also more globalised than ever before with an estimated 5,162 professionals in
1,560 firms operating in Asia, of which only 47% are local funds (Asian Private Equity,
2003). (Table 1.1 on the next page details the size of the market in Asia).
Researchers have shown that GVC is also a growing phenomenon due to several
factors that include declining opportunities in Western domestic markets (Wright &
Robbie, 1998); maturing of western markets (Murray, 1995); greater competition in their
domestic markets (Hall & Tu, 2003); better opportunities due to incentives offered in
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emerging markets (Schilit, 1992); and higher growth rates in emerging markets (Gibbons
et al„ 1998).
Despite the huge sums under management and the increasing numbers of professionals
and firms, few studies have examined how these foreign venture capital firms can
successfully deploy these funds in emerging markets, particularly in Asia. Researchers
have also pointed out that the understanding of GVC and of venture capital in Asia is
scarce as is the literature (Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003, Wang et al., 2002) and this gap
needs to be filled in view of the increasing importance of Asia to world trade, investment
and growth.
1.5.2 Venture Capital in Asia and South East Asia
There is very little research on global venture capital investing in Asia and South East
Asia in particular and this is a gap that this dissertation will help to fill. South East Asia is
a growing area for venture capital investments. The amount of venture capital under
management in South East Asia comprises almost US$ 13.6 billion or 14.5% of the total
in Asia (Table 1.1, next page). The number of professionals in South East Asia is 17% of
Asia or 24.4% ex-Japan, while the number of firms is 15.5% of Asia or 18.5% ex-Japan.
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand alone comprise 90% of South East Asian funds, 76%
of its firms and 78% of its professionals.
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Australia 5,810 90 180 440
China 6,730 190 239 388
Hong Kong 26,725 50 181 625
India 2,860 150 81 272
Indonesia 1,050 0 31 105
Japan 24,220 652 258 1,581
Korea 7,000 150 165 458
Malaysia 900 80.7 44 103
New Zealand 660 25 45 77
Philippines 250 - 19 61
Singapore 10,690 70 119 515
Taiwan 6,455 30 170 448
Thailand 630 7 20 66
Vietnam 118 2.5 8 23
Total Asia 94,098 1,497 1,560 5,162
Malaysia, Singapore &
Thailand (MST)
12,220 157.7 183 684
Total South East Asia
(SEA)
13,638 160.2 241 873
SEA as % of Asia 14.5 10.7 15.5 17
SEA as % of Asia ex-
Japan
19.5 19 18.5 24.4
MST as % of SEA 90 98.4 76 78.3
MST as % of Asia 13 10.5 11.7 13.2
MST as % of Asia ex-
Japan
17.5 19 14 19
Table 1.1 Asian Venture Capital Industry Profile as at June 2003 (Source: Asian Private
Equity 300)
Additional information on Asian Venture Capital
The following charts provide some additional information on venture capital in Asia.
Sources of Funding
The sources of funding in Asia are primarily through corporations, banks and the
insurance industry with smaller amounts sourced from pension funds, government
agencies and private individuals (see Figure 1.2 below).
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Source: The 2004 Guide to Venture Capital in Asia.
Disbursements by Financing Stage
In terms of disbursements towards the different stages of investment, most of the funds
are invested in the expansion stage and for buyouts while investments in early stage
ventures comprise less than a quarter of investments (see Figure 1.2 below).







Source: The 2004 Guide to Venture Capital in Asia.
Disbursements by Industry
Most of the venture capital investments are in the Information & Communications
Technology industry followed by the services and consumer and manufacturing sectors
as shown in Table 1.2 below.
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Computer, Electronics & IT 14,561 27.8
Telecommunications 7,191 13.8
Medical & Biotech 2,133 4.1
Manufacturing 5,348 10.2
Construction & Infrastructure 3,881 7.4
Mining & Transport 2,175 4.1
Financial Services 7,010 13.4
Services Non-Financial 1,304 2.5
Consumer & Retail 4,903 9.4
Media & Entertainment 1,946 3.7
Agriculture & Ecology 871 1.6
Total 52,276 100 %
Source: The 2004 Guide to Venture Capital in Asia.
The above information indicates that from a venture capital in Asia perspective, South
East Asia is an important region while within this region; Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand are the three most important countries. This makes South East Asia an
important region to study global venture capital and Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand
the three most important countries within South East Asia.
1.6. Western Model of Venture Capital
Existing research in Asia often adopts the Western, mainly American 'model' or method
of venture capital investing (Bruton et al., 2005). Firstly, this is because it is accepted
that venture capital as an investment method was founded in the US and the first
venture capital type investment is generally credited to Professor Georges Doriot of
American Research and Development (known as the father of classic venture capital in
America) (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). Secondly this is the model used in the most
successful and mature venture capital market in the world, the USA and thirdly because
there really is no other model available.
Furthermore, the only models developed by researchers in the field of venture capital
are based on US and European data including the Venture Economics database, data
from the National Venture Capital Association of the USA and from the European
Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984, Fried & Hisrich,
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1988 and Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). Based on these data and on research conducted
in the US and Europe, researchers developed models of venture capital investment
primarily as a process of investing (an example was given in Figure 1.1 above). The
models describe the creation, management and liquidation of a single venture capital
investment (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984) or the process of investment including the
establishment of the fund, raising of capital, generation of deals, evaluation and
valuation of deals, adding value and exit or liquidation of the investment (Bygrave &
Timmons, 1992). Thus the existing models cannot exactly be described as anything
other than a Western model.
Researchers who have studied venture capital in non-western markets (Megginson,
2004, Leeds & Sunderland, 2003) have acknowledged this lack of a "global model",
while other authors often use the US model primarily for comparative reasons (Bahn et
al., 2002). However, none of the authors have determined whether this "model" has led
to successful investing globally or even whether there really is such a thing as a "global
model" of venture capital. No researcher has developed a "global model" and those that
have studied this phenomenon have stated that such a model does not exist
(Megginson, 2004).
In the context of this dissertation, in section 8.4 we also conclude that there is no global
model of venture capital investing.
1.7. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced the Research Question, determined the objectives of
this dissertation, provided relevant definitions and examined the reasons for researching
the three countries and the South East Asian region. We have determined that South
East Asia is a region that is growing in importance as an emerging venture capital
market and thus this study will provide additional data and information to fill the gap in
the literature on global venture capital from an emerging venture capital market
perspective.
The next chapter provides a review of the literature in the field and scopes the literature
to determine whether the question of why some venture capital firms are more
successful than others has been answered.
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2. Literature Review
The objective of this literature review is to 'scope' the literature in the field of global
venture capital to establish whether existing literature answers the research question. A
comprehensive review of existing literature was performed and key aspects of the
literature are reviewed in this section. The review will show that existing literature in the
field does not provide an answer to the research question and gives this dissertation the
opportunity to contribute additional knowledge to the field of global venture capital. In
keeping with the Grounded Theory and case studies methodology (details in section 3),
additional literature including on venture capital in general and internationalisation will be
considered under the 'Match with Enfolding Literature' heading in section 6.2.
Furthermore, according to the methodology, the researcher must come to the research
as "theory-free" as possible (Eisenhardt, 1989, Glaser & Strauss, 1967). While some
knowledge of the theory in the field cannot be avoided by doing a literature review, the
basic point of the review is not to seek or identify hypotheses or theories to test, but to
establish that the research question has not been answered and thereby ensure that this
dissertation makes a contribution to the field.
2.1 Introduction to the Literature Review
Current literature on the subject of the globalisation of venture capital and on venture
capital in relation to emerging markets of Asia is sparse but growing. Much of the
literature is also U.S. or Euro focused (Gibbons et al 1998). A search of the literature has
also revealed that there are no studies on the definition or measure of success in GVC,
although Bygrave & Timmons (1992) do make some contribution, albeit a very brief one.
The literature however highlights two main themes or theoretical strands that are
relevant to this study, primarily Institutional Theory and to a lesser extent the Resource
Based View. It does need to be emphasised here that the Institutional Theory strand is
specifically stated by several of the authors in the field (Ahlstrom et al., 2000, Bruton et
al. 2004, 1999) while the Resource Based View has been used to describe the various
research into the field which emphasise intangible resources and global venture capital
(Bahn et al., 2002, Heel & Kehoe, 2005, Sagari & Guidotti, 1992). As intangible
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resources fit a Resource Based View (Barney, 1991, Galbreath, 2005), I have
intentionally grouped this research into this broad heading or classification.
The majority of the research focuses on the impact of the external environment on GVC
firms using an Institutional Theory analysis. For example, Bruton et al. (1999) state that
the legal framework and market mechanisms in China impact on the success of venture
capital investments made there by foreign firms while Sagari & Guidotti (1992) found that
tax incentives made a significant difference to foreign venture capital investments in
developing countries. The Resource Based View strand of research though not as
extensive as Institutional Theory centres on the human resources of the firm. As
examples, Barger et al. (1996) discovered that the quality of the fund's managers are the
most important factor in a fund's performance, while Pruthi et al. (2003) state that
different levels of expertise between foreign and domestic venture capitalists affect the
performance of venture capital firms in India.
One important point to note is that the existing research is not from the "this is what
leads to successful GVC investing" angle, but rather from the "these are the factors that
can impact on GVC investing". This is an important point for this study because the
objective of this dissertation is to seek out the reasons why some firms are successful
while others are not. While current researchers look at different issues of GVC, none
have specifically looked at firms to determine why some are successful while others are
not or even why some firms have failed. This is an important concept, but not one that
has been studied in GVC research. Hence there is an opportunity to make a significant
contribution to the literature in this field.
Based on this initial analysis, the literature review will be done on a "theoretical strand"
basis starting with Institutional Theory and followed by the Resource Based View. The
review will scope the existing literature and will provide a conclusion on whether the
literature answers the Research Question.
2.2 Institutional Theory
Bruton et al. (2004: 75) define Institutional Theory in the global venture capital literature
as follows:
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"Central to Institutional Theory is the assertion that institutions in the
environment have an impact on a range of commercial activity including the
actions people take and those that they even consider possible. The institutional
aspects that shape organisational activity include regulatory, normative and
cognitive components..."
Thus according to them, the environment has a direct and significant affect on
commercial activity and this includes the activities of venture capital firms. However, do
any of these institutional elements make a difference to the success or failure of global
venture capital firms? We will explore this question based on the three elements that
they have identified: the regulatory, normative and cognitive.
2.2,1 The Regulatory Element
The regulatory aspect represents laws and sanctions that regulate the behaviour of firms
and individuals for example the setting of rules and their enforcement and include
financial and commercial rules of trade and business (Bruton et al., 2004, North, 1990).
This includes government support for venture capital; corporate governance; the legal
framework including tax laws; investment aspects including financial and accounting
requirements and exit opportunities (Bruton et al., 2004). The regulatory aspect can be
divided into three further elements: the political, legal and financial elements, which will
now be considered in further detail.
Political
As venture capital firms globalise, they have to choose both markets in which to invest
and countries in which to situate their offices. These choices will depend on several
aspects, one of which is the political element. Scheela (1994) found that political stability
in Asian countries leads to more venture capital investments. This might provide one
explanation why politically risky countries are generally avoided by venture capital firms
and explain why within South East Asia there are far more investments in Singapore,
Malaysia and Thailand than in the Philippines or Myanmar (AVCJ, 2004 and Table 1.1
above). This finding is supported by Bygrave & Timmons (1992) who concluded that the
political stability of western governments contributed to the growth of venture capital.
The role of a stable government has also been found to be important for the
establishment of stable government institutions, especially the legal and regulatory
institutions (Megginson, 2004, Sagari & Guidotti, 1992). However, while political stability
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can lead to more investments, it does not necessarily explain or lead to successful
investing by global firms.
Another political element is government support for venture capital. As governments
begin to realise the important role of venture capital in promoting entrepreneurship and
economic growth, they have increasingly started providing greater support for venture
capital (Dossani & Kenney, 2002). This includes the provision of public venture capital
funds, promoting the growth of the venture capital industry and creating policies that
foster the growth of the venture capital industry and entrepreneurship (Bygrave &
Timmons 1992). Some examples include the Small Business Investment Companies
programme (SBIC) in the USA2, Malaysian Venture Capital Management3 a Malaysian
government owned venture capital fund and the Technology Investment Fund4 of
Singapore.
Bahn et al. (2002) found that government promotion of the industry played a strong role
in the growth of the venture capital industry in Korea. The Korean government abolished
restrictive regulations on foreign venture capital investments in domestic venture capital
funds, invested public funds in venture capital firms, enacted laws that promoted the
venture capital industry and deregulated the venture capital industry to promote
competition and grow the industry.
Megginson (2004) though cautions that while government support is advocated, what is
necessary is a non-interventionist government. The government should create laws that
promote the venture capital industry and fosters entrepreneurship but should not take an
active part in the industry by setting up public sector venture capital funds. The EVCA
(2001) also discourages direct government venture capital funds as this may result in
funding of non-viable firms, creates unfair competition for private venture capital firms
and may result in the loss of public funds. While such support may obviously be
attractive to foreign venture capital firms, it still does not provide an answer to whether





Wang et al. (2002) state that weak regulatory institutions and regulations are a deterrent
to foreign venture capital investments. A good business and securities regulatory
structure promotes the orderly development and enforcement of rules and regulations
(including securities regulations) and encourages the growth of entrepreneurial firms, the
primary investment targets of global venture capital investors. Baygan & Freudenberg
(2000) found that overly complicated business establishment procedures and onerous
and costly compliance burdens are a deterrent to the formation of entrepreneurial firms.
Researchers have also shown that Chinese regulations are confusing, forbidding and
restrictive, especially for foreign venture capital firms (Lemberg & Paist, 2000). This
makes investing additionally difficult and costly and investors have to engage legal
assistance for even the smallest issue. Even with counsel, firms may still end up losing
their investments because of these restrictive practices. In India, ultra strict financial and
exchange control restrictions deter foreign Venture Capitalists. Thus researchers
propose that the removal or restructuring of such strict regulations will encourage greater
foreign venture capital participation in the growth of the Indian economy (Dossani &
Kenney, 2002).
Many of these issues will certainly benefit global venture capital investors but one point
to note is that the political and regulatory institutional structure affects all firms equally,
thus unless some firms have some special benefits, these issues do not demonstrate or
show why some firms are more successful or why some firms fail. While the research
generates some interesting ideas they are not coherent enough and do not provide
enough specifics to differentiate success and failure for firms. Hence the political
element does not provide an answer to our research question. The next element that we
shall consider is the legal element.
Legal
There are also several legal aspects that researchers believe are necessary for
successful global investing. One of these is a good legal framework i.e. not just a set of
laws but also the means to enforce them and seek compensation or protection. These
include rules that recognise and protect the interests of investors (Megginson, 2004) and
ensure that contracts can be enforced if they are breached (Bruton et al, 1999). In China
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for example it is currently difficult to enforce contracts including non-competition
agreements and other breaches (Pohndorf, 1997).
Another issue is the protection of intellectual property rights, including copyrights and
trademarks (International Developments, 2003). For example, China is home to a
thriving black market for pirated goods and is a constant problem for American and
Western companies, with firms losing more than US$ 150 million to Chinese made
imitation goods in year 2000 (Bhattacharya, 2001). Poor intellectual property protection
can therefore be a disincentive to venture capitalists who invest in technology centred
ventures (Kenney, 2002).
In another example, recent legal changes in China make it an offence for residents to
own shares in offshore companies (Borrell, 2005). Borrell (2005) states that venture
capital and private equity firms use offshore companies to invest in Chinese companies
as it enables them to list these offshore vehicles on any global stock exchange and also
to avoid tax and legal issues in China. However, by preventing Chinese citizens from
owning shares in offshore companies China is forcing investors to form Chinese
companies which have to abide by the often arcane and restrictive Chinese laws and tax
regulations (Borrell, 2005).
While researchers have stated the necessity for a good legal system the research has
not explored this from a global venture capital firm success or failure angle and thus
provides no support for the research question in this dissertation.
Taxation is another legal issue for GVC as restrictive tax regulations for both the venture
capital firms and their investors curtails the growth of the venture capital industry
(Dossani & Kenney, 2002). The double taxation of gains, where both the venture capital
firm and then their investors are taxed, limits the potential of venture capital investments
and prevents institutional and wealthy individuals from investing in venture capital funds
(EVCA White Paper, 2001). In studying globalisation of venture capital in both developed
(Europe) and developing markets (Israel, East and South East Asia), Schilit (1992) found
that many regions formulated new tax policies to successfully encourage the
development of the venture capital industry. Germany, Belgium, France and the UK all
provided new tax breaks to attract more foreign venture capital investments and
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encourage the development of domestic firms. Israel and many Asian nations also
adopted very liberal tax laws and this has helped to grow the venture capital industry
and has contributed to greater entrepreneurship and economic growth.
The research suggests that liberal tax structures and regulations encourage both the
growth of the venture capital industry and also promote economic growth in regions.
However, taxation is a generic issue that impacts equally on all firms and do not enable
firms to differentiate and create competitive advantages. This element of the legal and
tax issues also provide some interesting ideas but these are macro elements that impact
on all firms equally and once again are not coherent enough and do not provide any
specifics on f rm success or failure and hence do not answer the research question. The
third element under the regulatory element is financial aspects, which we shall now
consider.
Financial Aspects
Capital markets are shown to play a part in the success of venture capital investing.
Barger et al (1996) found that World Bank investments in venture capital funds returned
poor results in emerging markets with under developed stock markets. Under developed
stock markets make exits difficult thus curtailing investment returns (Ahlstrom et al,
2000a). The development of stock markets especially in emerging markets is a
prerequisite for attracting venture capital investments (Barger et al., 1996).
Black & Gilson (1998) found that countries with a viable stock exchange promote greater
entrepreneurial activity and thereby attract more foreign venture capitalists. According to
Bygrave & Timmons (1992) venture capital success is often measured by the returns on
investment and returns are only possible when venture capitalists exit their investments.
Their research showed that the preferred exit is the IPO, which provides the best return
on investment, but which requires a viable stock exchange. Even in an early conceptual
paper on international venture capital, Patricof (1989) expounded the need for strong
over the counter markets to enable venture capitalists to list their portfolio companies.
Lemberg & Paist (2000) attributed the success of Silicon Valley to the NASDAQ
Exchange because it is a viable and successful stock exchange that allows the listing of
technology firms, including many venture capital backed firms in Silicon Valley.
34
It would appear from this that the availability of a viable exit opportunity is a necessity for
successful venture capital investing and that global venture capital firms will be attracted
to markets that provide a viable exit. Thus the success of global venture capital investing
might be dependent on the markets that they select, but while important again this is a
generic issue and will affect all firms in the market equally. Can some firms however
differentiate themselves sufficiently to take advantage of markets with viable exits while
other firms cannot? The literature does not provide an answer. The researchers also did
not consider this from the success or failure of firms issue and while the ideas presented
may be relevant, they are not specific enough from the firm point of view and do not
provide a comprehensive answer to the research question.
Summary of the Regulatory Element
This discussion shows that the regulatory element is more of a macro element of
institutional structure that affects all firms equally. While the research generates some
interesting ideas they are not coherent enough and do not provide enough specifics to
enable firms to differentiate themselves sufficiently to be successful in particular
markets. None of these regulatory elements can of themselves lead to success or failure
for a particular firm, and hence do not provide an answer to the research question.
The next element to consider under the Institutional Theory banner is the normative
element.
2.2.2 Normative Element
According to Bruton et al. (2004) the normative element is represented by the roles or
actions that are derived from professional standards and the influences of practices from
the West including "what venture capitalists should be doing and how they should be
doing it" (2004:76). The main normative element is the set of normative rules within
markets. Normative rules are rules not governed by direct laws but by standard industry
practices and regulations. The main ones of interest to Venture Capitalists are
accounting practices and corporate governance.
Ahlstrom et al (2000a) found that there is poor corporate governance and questionable
accounting standards in China, which makes investing and monitoring of investment
portfolios extremely difficult for venture capitalists. Bruton et al (2002) however
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discovered that Singapore has evolved better normative institutions, one reason being
the openness of the government to foreign venture capital firms and more importantly
the influence of Western normative practices on business in Singapore. They contend
that the development of good normative rules will reduce risk, a positive factor for
investors.
While this may be of importance to venture capital in general, it does not contribute to an
analysis of why individual firms are successful. This element of Institutional Theory is not
coherent enough to provide a specific answer to the research question. We shall now
review the third and final element of the Institutional Theory strand, the cognitive
element.
2.2.3 Cognitive Element
These are the elements of business or investment that are closely associated with
culture, sometimes also known as socio-cultural norms. These include informal
constraints like traditions and cultural requirements, subconsciously accepted rules and
customs and taken-for-granted commercial conventions (Bruton et al., 2004). The
cognitive element develops over a long period of time and is often embedded within
culture, including social issues like "guanxi" (personal contacts and relationships) in
China.
Hofstede & Bond (1988) show that cultural issues have a significant effect on global
organisations due to the interaction of multiple cultures (sometimes also called cross-
cultural issues). Hence it is reasonable to expect that culture also play a role in GVC
investing. For example, Ahlstrom et al. (2000a) believe that social controls are far more
effective than economic or legal controls in collectivist countries such as China. In their
study of Chinese cognitive cultural issues Bruton et al. (1999) found that the "individual"
is the key to investments in Chinese entrepreneurial firms because of the need for
"guanxi". In Chinese business, personal contacts especially with people in power
(government, local councils) is sometimes far more important than management skills. It
is a case of "who you know" more than "what you know". Thus when venture capital
firms invest in portfolio companies, the founders or the management team must have
good guanxi with key officials or it may be difficult to do business in China (Bruton, et al.,
2002, Gibbons et al, 1998).
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Even in evaluating the investment, venture capitalists find it difficult to obtain accurate
information about founders or their firms. Such information is normally available through
relationships with key individuals and business networks but venture capital firms that
are new to the market will find this information difficult to obtain because they have not
built relationships with these individuals (Ahlstrom, et al, 2000b).
The Asian trait of "face" or pride also presents special problems in the negotiation
process, valuation of the company and restructuring of the company before investment
(Tan, 1998). Offering low valuations or raising your voice during negotiations could be
actions that are construed as insulting the founders, hence venture capitalists that are
unaware of such cultural norms may lose out on some deals and not even know why.
Additionally, in research conducted in Singapore, researchers have found that the
predominantly Chinese businesses have long-standing and deeply embedded cultures
that resist Western normative and regulatory practices, thus making it difficult for venture
capitalists to enforce conformity of their portfolio companies to such Western practices
(Bruton et al., 2002).
Pohndorf (1997) believes that grasping the cultural differences in dealing with Asians
can be a formidable barrier for Western venture capital firms and one that they have to
learn prior to globalising into these economies. Investors who have little or no
experience with Asian culture often find it baffling and complicated (Pohndorf, 1997).
Wright et al. (2002) believe that one way for global venture capitalists to minimise these
cultural barriers is to adopt local cultures, hire local managers who understand and can
work around these issues and invest in ventures that have a more forward thinking and
accommodating management team. These researchers believe that cultural issues can
affect the success of global venture capital investments in some countries and they have
had such impact in China (Bruton, et al., 2002) and India (Wright et al., 2002).
Cultural issues therefore may be one element that has an impact on success, but it has
not been determined whether the cognitive element of its own can cause success or
failure as none of the research conducted above made any such determination. While
this does not provide a clear answer to the research question it does present an
argument that is interesting though insufficient to answer the research question.
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2.2.4 Discussion & Conclusion on Institutional Theory
The discussion on Institutional Theory presented above has many interesting points that
will benefit global venture capital investors when they invest in particular markets.
However, with the exception of the cognitive element, these elements are primarily
macro elements that impact all firms equally and do not demonstrate or show why some
firms are more successful or why some firms fail. While the literature generates some
interesting ideas, these are generic in nature and do not provide enough specifics to
enable differentiation for firms. Furthermore, none of the researchers concluded that
these elements affect individual venture capital firms differently.
The cognitive element however, does present a possible differentiator for individual
firms, although none of the researchers considered their research from the individual
firm point of view. While relevant, this research was not comprehensive enough to
suggest that the cognitive element of itself can lead to the success or failure of individual
firms and hence does not provide an answer to the research question.
This literature on Institutional Theory and global venture capital was also not performed
on the basis of determining "why" some firms succeed or fail, hence while the ideas
presented may be interesting and relevant, they are not specific enough from the firm
point of view and do not provide a comprehensive answer to the research question.
2.3 Resource Based View
The idea behind the Resource Based View is that "firm-specific skills, competencies, and
other tangible and intangible resources are viewed as the basis for the competitive
advantage of a firm" (Maula, 2001). Barney (1991) is a strong proponent of the concept
of a Resource Based View and believed that long-term competitive advantage can only
be sustained with resources that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and without
strategically equivalent substitutes.
Galbreath (2005) divided resources into two fundamental categories - tangible and
intangible resources. He defines tangible resources as assets that are relatively easy to
identify and include financial and physical assets as well as its organisational and
technological resources. He divided intangible resources into two categories - assets
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and skills. Galbreath's (2005) definition of 'assets' includes unique routines and practices
that have evolved and accumulated over time. These include human resource
experience, skills and capabilities; innovation resources like technical or scientific skills
and reputation resources such as brand name and firm reputation for fairness and
reliability. He defined 'skills' as competencies or skills that a firm employs to transform or
leverage on its tangible and intangible resources to bring about a desired end. This
would ordinarily include outstanding customer service, excellent product development
capabilities or superb innovation processes.
For venture capital firms, tangible resources would include the funds that they have for
investment and their organisational and technological resources, which could include
their assessment skills, as defined by Smart (1999). Smart suggests that human capital
is not an 'intangible' factor but that it is a 'tangible' resource because like other forms of
capital it has properties that can be assessed and appraised. Thus to him human capital
has a value that can be determined based on the effectiveness of the assessment
methods that are used and this idea is endorsed by Erikson & Nerdrum (2001). Thus
organisational resources such as the assessment methods of the firm's managers are
tangible resources. However, their research was based on the venture capitalist's
assessment of their portfolio investment's management teams and not on the venture
capital firm itself, so this idea has to be developed further in assessing venture
capitalists themselves before it can be used to determine firm success or failure.
In the area of resources, global venture capital research seems to be centred more on
the intangible resources of the firm. Heel & Kehoe (2005) in their research on why some
private equity firms do better than others stated that the most important factor for firm
success was that the partners of the private equity firms seek out expertise before
committing themselves to a private equity deal. They found that in 83 percent of the best
deals, the initial step for investors was to secure privileged knowledge, which included
insights from the board, management or a trusted external source. This seems to
indicate that a "knowledge- based view" could be significant to the success of the deal.
Barger et al (1996) found that the quality of fund managers, their capabilities and skills
played a major role in the success of venture investing. Other authors cite the need for
managerial sophistication (Bruton et al, 1999), management skills (Sagari & Guidotti,
1992), venture capital experience and skills (Sapienza et al, 1996) and the need for
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specialists to evaluate and manage investment portfolios (Baygan & Freudenberg,
2000).
The research indicates that in globalising their firms, venture capitalists must ensure that
they are managed and staffed by competent, experienced and skilled managers to
ensure the success of their investments. This might however be considered a tautology
as it goes without saying that globalisation is a complex phenomenon and competent
management is necessary for success, but venture capital as a specialist field does
require special skill sets (Barger et al., 1996) and this may set it apart from the normal
global firm.
Other aspects that GVC firms need to consider are the networks of their managers as
this is of particular importance in the Asian context. In China this is particularly
complicated because of the concept of "guanxi" or the need for "connections" or
"networks" with important people (Bruton et al, 1999). In the South East Asian context,
Gibbons et al. (1998) found that venture capitalists in the region are attracted to the
networks of the predominantly Chinese businesses in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand
and Indonesia. This supports the notion that networks are important in the Asian context.
Additionally, Boocock (1995) found that in Malaysia, Chinese controlled companies have
traditionally sought to retain control within the family network thus making it more difficult
for venture capitalists to invest in these companies. It can be argued that networking
itself is a specialised skill and not many people are competent at it. It may also require
understanding of local knowledge and cultures, all part of the armoury of a global
venture capital firm manager.
Finally, Bahn et al. (2002) believe that the training and education of venture capitalists
also need to be considered when globalising, both for existing managers and new
managers who will be hired in their new foreign offices. In countries where there is
specialised training for managers, it may be possible to hire competent staff but when
this is not available then extra effort may be required to train staff in the intricacies of
venture capital fund management.
It is obvious from the above discussion that human resource skills and expertise are
considered an important resource of the successful GVC firm. These researchers
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provide a strong argument that the Resource Based View can make a difference in the
success of global venture capital investing. However, while they make several claims
about the need for skills and expertise, only Heel & Kehoe (2005) make a direct claim
that the knowledge base of the firm is necessary for success.
Thus while there is evidence, this evidence is not complete because the researchers did
not conduct their research on the basis of whether it actually led to success or failure,
thus leaving a gap in the research that needs to be filled.
2,4 Summary of the Literature Review
This initial literature review has shown that there are several aspects of global venture
capital that have been considered by researchers in different forms, both theoretical or
just as ad-hoc factors that they deem necessary for effective (but not necessarily
successful) globalisation. Many of the researchers present their research from the
'impact of the environment on investing' perspective, for example the claims about the
impact of political and legal factors on investing and the need for strong capital markets.
Thus most of the research is from a 'macro' viewpoint and thereby make claims that are
more often than not generic in nature and impact on all firms equally. Few of these
researchers have done their research from the 'what makes these firms successful'
viewpoint, the viewpoint that is taken in this dissertation. Hence fundamentally, most of
the research does not present a success or failure viewpoint other than Heel & Kehoe
(2005) who specifically point out factors that lead to success.
One point that also needs to be made is that many of the factors that have been
considered by these researchers affects venture capital investing in general and not just
global venture capital investing. Although they take the global venture capital
investments or cross-border investing perspective, many of their conclusions would also
apply to general venture capital investing and this does present a problem for this
dissertation. As this dissertation is about the success or failure of foreign venture capital
investors in emerging markets, the research must be more focused and targeted and
must present a view that applies particularly to global venture capital investors. There
isn't adequate evidence of this in the existing literature.
41
Thus we can conclude that existing research in the field of global venture capital is not
adequate to answer the research question and thus this study has the opportunity of
adding to the knowledge in the field.
2.5 Analysis of the Literature and Proposition for the Research
Design
Based on the literature review the following can been surmised:
a) Most of the research has been conducted from a 'macro' perspective with
conclusions that are generically applicable and do not offer an answer to the
research question.
b) There is a shortage of empirical work in relation to the perspectives of the actors
in the globalisation of venture capital, the fund managers themselves, which
provides this research an opportunity of developing empirical studies from a new
perspective, an "abductive" research strategy which uses the actor's own
language and meanings.
c) The literature reviews have not been very clear on the type of research strategy
used yet some authors like Bruton et al (2002, 2003) have mentioned that the
field is open to greater exploratory studies. This supports the notion that this
research has an opportunity to use an exploratory, inductive research strategy.
d) There is also no firm theoretical underpinning as only two major theoretical bases
have been used; Institutional Theory and Resource Based View. As the theory in
this area is limited, this research would be ideal for generating propositions.
e) While some of the literature on GVC have been qualitative and based on face to
face interviews, the interviews have been used as an avenue to "prove" a theory
or hypotheses, not as an avenue for discovery and understanding of the very
diverse aspects of successful venture capital investing.
We can therefore conclude that the following criteria are important elements that should
form part of the research design:
a) An exploratory form of research is desirable because it is a relatively new field of
research
b) Because of the lack of theory, there is a need for a research design that leads to
generation of propositions
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c) The research should be inductive to enable discovery of new themes, strategies,
thoughts or ideas
d) The research should not be overly structured to enable discovery
e) It should preferably be based on the social actors or practitioners own language
and meanings, as much of the current research is conceptual or based on the
researchers ideas, thoughts and hypotheses. Hence the use of an abductive
research strategy can be useful.
This dissertation will now proceed to the methodology and research design stage in
section 3.
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3. Methodology and Research Design
It has been determined from the literature review section that an exploratory research
design is suitable for this dissertation. This section will therefore explain the choice of the
research design and the basis of the methodologies that will be employed. It will be
followed in section 4 by an explanation of the use of the methodology for the actual
analysis with examples where the interaction between the research design and the
analysis will be shown in greater detail.
3.1 Requirements of the Research Design
The objective of the dissertation is to answer the following research question:
"Why are some foreign venture capital firms more successful in global venture
capital investing than others and how do they ensure this success?"
Thus the choice of a research design must be considered on several aspects.
a) Firstly, the research design must enable us to answer a broad research
question.
b) Secondly, as this dissertation is not about testing hypotheses or propositions,
the use of a qualitative methodology may be more appropriate than a
quantitative one.
c) Thirdly, the objective of this dissertation is to answer the above question and
this answer will be in the form of a proposition or propositions: hence the
research design must enable us to develop these propositions.
d) Finally, since global venture capital investing in South East Asia is a relatively
new phenomenon an exploratory methodology is desirable. Mintzberg (1977)
supports the use of an exploratory methodology in an emerging field of
research. He believes that in the early stages in the study of a phenomenon
there is a need to use more exploratory approaches and an inductive
methodology when there is a need to build theory.
Accordingly, this dissertation will use an inductive, open-ended qualitative research
design that will enable us to explore and discover propositions and theories. The main
method is the use of interviews conducted using the language of the social actors
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themselves, the global venture capital investors. However, in the interest of time,
especially the venture capitalists time, it will be conducted via semi-structured open-
ended interviews. This semi-structured interview will allow for better control yet will also
allow the respondents the freedom of expressing their thoughts and opinions. To ensure
robustness, the interviews will be supported with additional triangulated data from
multiple sources. The research design must also be robust, relevant and able to stand
the test of meeting the high standards required of a researcher in this challenging field of
work.
3.1.1 Inductive Research Strategy
The definitions and method of the inductive research strategy used in this dissertation
have been adopted from Blaikie (2000). He outlines three principles for this strategy -
accumulation, induction and instance confirmation. This requires the accumulation of
data through observations and experiments, producing general laws by applying
inductive logic to the data and generalisations based on the number of instances of it
that have been observed. The data is obtained using objective methods without
preconceptions.
The strategy itself consists of three main stages:
a) All facts are observed and recorded without selection or guesses as to
their relative importance
b) These facts are analysed, compared and classified, without using
hypotheses
c) Then generalisations are inductively drawn as to relations between the
facts
3.1.2 Abductive Research Strategy
In addition to the inductive research strategy this dissertation also uses an abductive
research strategy, which Blaikie (2000: 114) defined as "...constructing theory that is
grounded in everyday activities and/or in the language and meanings of social actors"
(i.e. in this case venture capital firm managers).
It has two stages:
a) Describing these activities and meanings; and,
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b) Deriving categories and concepts that can form the basis of an
understanding or an explanation of the problem at hand
Thus the research will generate accounts from the players in the field of venture capital,
the venture capital firm managers, using their own meanings and language to derive
both technical concepts and theories. The use of the actor's language and not the
researcher's assumptions opens up the research to the possibility of new discoveries.
This is however not easy to achieve as it requires the researcher to have a strong
understanding of the actor's language and knowledge of the different meanings that can
be attributed to the use of various concepts and issues.
Having spent 4 years as a consultant in the field of venture capital, advising international
venture capital firms in Malaysia and Singapore, I have been immersed as a practitioner
in this field and thus have better knowledge of the language used as well as the
meanings and inner mechanics of the field. This will be of great assistance in relating to
the social actors of this research and overcoming the handicap of researchers who have
either not been involved or have had very limited practical experience in this very
specialised field. Bringing one's prior experience to the research has been recognised as
beneficial and is advocated by Yin (1994).
Another benefit of being an 'insider' is that it enables the researcher to negotiate access
to research sites and top-level managers where the credibility of the researcher is
important and this is particularly the case in the 'society' of venture capitalists that this
dissertation examines. Top-level managers such as the Partners, Managing Directors
and Country Managers are often difficult to access for the novice researcher but being
an insider enabled me to obtain access to these managers.
Hence my experience and knowledge of the field and networks in the industry are a
source of strength and benefit in the research and analysis in this thesis as well as the
understanding of the deeper issues in this industry.
3.1.3 Inductive Research Strategy And Grounded Theory
The strength of using the inductive research strategy is that in a new under-explored
field such as this where theory development has been limited, this research strategy will
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provide an avenue for generating propositions, to either develop new theory or verify
existing ones, as it is open and exploratory. It also allows for the development of existing
and new concepts, which is the basic starting point of GT.
The methodology that is used in this inductive research strategy is Grounded Theory as
originally advocated by Glaser & Strauss (1967). Grounded Theory can also benefit
greatly from the use of the abductive strategy, as this is a good method of discovering
theory based on the respondents' own definitions and language, thus opening up the
discovery process necessary for this method.
To develop theory using GT, some basic concepts were used to provide initial direction
for the study. These include concepts of globalisation, firm internationalisation,
investment strategy, national and global environments, measures of success and other
concepts. However, the use of such concepts is only as a basic guide in beginning the
research and not to lead the respondents (Eisenhardt 1989, Glaser & Strauss 1967).
The concepts and categories that were discovered through interaction with respondents
and informants were the most important aspect of this research.
Many of these concepts will already be part of the psyche of the venture capital firm
manager, and they will normally have used some of these ideas as part of their strategy
for investment, so the use and understanding of these concepts may be relatively easy
for them (although the research later showed that some concepts were in fact not used
by them at all, like the concept of a GVC model).
While managers from Western nations, backgrounds or training may have some idea of
these concepts; their understanding of it may be different from others and from the
researcher. Also there is no such thing as one easily defined concept, as even the
literature and books have varying definitions of such concepts for e.g. globalisation and
internationalisation. Many studies use them interchangeably (Lockett & Wright, 2002) so
the venture capital managers' understanding of this too may vary. As it is an abductive
study, however, it is possible to establish their understanding of these varying concepts,
itself a valuable discovery.
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As advocated by Glaser and Strauss (1967), no theories or hypotheses were proposed
for the research design. Propositions were discovered from the data and empirical
evidence and will be presented in sections 6 (Generating Propositions) and 7
(Developing Meta-Propositions) of this dissertation.
3.1.4 Case Studies
The research could have been done in many ways including interviews with venture
capitalists, using surveys or studying documentary and archival evidence. A
methodology that uses a combination of these methods (triangulation) would also be
desirable. The methodology that has been selected for this dissertation is the use of
case study research using a combination of both qualitative and quantitative data.
Case studies have been advocated to answer "why" questions. Yin (1994: 1) states:
"... case studies are the preferred strategy when 'how' or 'why' questions are being
posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on
a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context"
Firstly, the question that we seek to answer is "why some foreign venture capital firms
are more successful than others and how that success is achieved. Secondly we have
no control over events especially why and how venture capital firm managers make
investment decisions or formulate strategies that lead to success or failure. Finally, the
focus is on a contemporary versus a historical phenomenon and the context is real-life,
as this dissertation seeks answers from venture capital managers in the field.
Eisenhardt (1989: 532) also advocates using case studies as it "is especially appropriate
in new topic areas". As the study of GVC in South East Asia is a new area of research
the use of case studies is thus an appropriate method. She also advocates the use of
case studies to develop hypotheses and theories in new fields of research which makes
case studies an especially suitable methodology for this dissertation.
Finally, the selection of case studies is very appropriate as we are studying the
phenomenon of why some venture capital firms are more successful than others.
Determining the success of firms can be best done by in-depth analysis of selected
venture capital firms, which are then made the case study. By interviewing the managers
of the venture capital firms, studying relevant documentation and archives, further
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interviewing their investee firm managers and then making the relevant comparisons we
can make viable and rigorous in-depth analysis of why they are successful. Thus we do
not just take them at their word i.e. because they 'talk the talk', but we can also verify
their comments using the other means to determine whether they also 'walk the walk',
i.e. through their actions and actual investments.
This triangulation of multiple data sources is an important element of this analysis. By
merely interviewing managers we may hear their opinions on why they are successful,
but to actually determine if that is the reason why they are successful we also want to
see whether the actions they have taken match their opinions. If they say one thing but
do another, then we have discovered something new. Too often survey questions take
the managers at their word but further study may betray those words to be meaningless
as their actions may be contrary to their words.
As an example, in the interviews the managers of Softbank Emerging Markets (one of
the cases in this dissertation) said that they have relevant expertise in their industry and
invest in markets that they have experience in. However, one manager has only had
corporate finance and consulting experience while the other two managers only have
telecommunications experience and none of them have any experience in India, yet they
were looking for investments in a business software firm and were seeking investments
in India, showing that their contention of relevant experience does not fit their actual
investment space or market space. Thus we have discovered something contrary that
may have important implications for the study.
The case study method allows for the construction of findings from multiple sources of
data and aids in the discovery process (the multiple sources of data will be explored later
in section 3.5.2 below). Furthermore, multiple cases enable comparative studies to be
made making the study more robust and add to the reliability of the findings.
3.2 Research Design Protocols and Procedures
To ensure a rigorous research design several protocols and procedures were adopted
and integrated into a new research framework. The basis of the research design is the
case study protocols as proposed by Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1994). The
methodology for the case studies was the GT procedures advocated by Corbin &
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Strauss (1990) and Locke (2001). These protocols and procedures provide the basic
structure for the framework.
This comparison and adoption of recognised procedures and protocols will enable the
research design to be properly structured incorporating all the elements proposed by the
various authors culminating in a rigorous design and reliable findings.
Table 3.1 details the different methodological designs and procedures advocated by
Eisenhardt (1989), Yin (1994) and Corbin & Strauss (1990) and the Methodological
Framework that has been adopted for this dissertation. The rest of section 3 will discuss
the use of these procedures in this dissertation with regular references to the Table 3.1
Methodological Framework.
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3.2.1 Grounded Theory, structured coding and creativity
While Glaser & Strauss (1967) were the first to introduce the concept of GT to research
methodology, the book itself did not introduce clear procedures or protocols that can be
followed by researchers to produce a rigorous design. Since then several authors have
written about GT, but the work of Corbin & Strauss (1990) and particularly Locke (2001)
in terms of management research, provide a clearer guide on the procedures to be
adopted for GT research. Glaser & Strauss have also gone their separate ways and
have introduced different methods of GT, with Strauss (Corbin & Strauss, 1990)
advocating a more formalised methodology while Glaser (2004) continues to advocate a
creative, less formalised methodology.
While this dissertation adopts Corbin & Strauss's (1990) formal procedures to set up the
research design, together with Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1994), the philosophy and
spirit of GT and creativity will continue to be adopted as well. Hence while the pattern
matching method of generating concepts, categories and theory is used, the more
structured coding procedure put forward by Corbin & Strauss (1990) will not be adopted
in line with Glaser's (2004) belief that GT as a creative methodology should not be overly
structured. Even without the structured coding procedures, GT is a viable and robust
methodology especially when combined with case studies and with the well-adopted
process presented by Eisenhardt (1989).
The research design will adhere to the steps given by Eisenhardt (1989) and incorporate
GT and case study protocols into these steps as follows.
3.2.2 Defining the research question
The first step in the Framework is to define the research question and this is shown by
row 'A' of Table 3.1 as follows:
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Eisenhardt (1989) Corbin & Strauss
(1990)
Yin (1994) Action Points for
Thesis




Define the Questions -
Most appropriate for How
& Why questions
Research Question:
"Why are some foreign
VC firms more successful
in global VC investing
than others & how do
they ensure this success"
The first step proposed by Eisenhardt (1989:536) is to define the research question as
this focuses the effort of the research. Yin (1994) also proposed that case study analysis
is most suitable for the "why" and "how" type of questions. Hence the decision to use the
case study methodology hinges on whether it is suitable for the research question on
hand and in this situation it is indeed suitable as will be seen below.
The research question has been stated earlier but is reproduced below for discussion.
"Why are some foreign venture capital firms more successful in global venture
capital investing than others and how do they ensure this success?"
This research question can be considered from two aspects. The first question is why
some firms are more successful than others. This is the core of the dissertation, the
"why" question, as this dissertation attempts to find the reasons that lead to successful
investing by venture capitalists globally. Thus the focus of the interviews and the a-priori
concepts will emphasise this aspect of the question.
The second aspect is to find out "how" they ensure this success. In selecting cases,
three "successful" cases were selected, based on the fact that they have been financially
successful and they have been leading players in these markets for an extended period
of time5. If venture capitalists are successful, they must be doing something to ensure
this success over a period of time, hence the "how they ensure success" question. To
verify if the reasons given for success are valid, it is also pertinent to study failed firms6.
If the firms that failed did not have the elements that were pointed out by the successful
firms or if they went counter to the strategies of the successful firms then we have
5 The criteria for case selection were primarily financial success and length of time the firm was
operating. Complete details and reasons for these criteria are provided in section 3.8.
6 Criteria for selection of failed firms are the closure of the firm in the country or region, details are
also provided in section 3.8.
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additional verification that it is a valid point. Hence we will also study two failed foreign
firms in this dissertation.
This research question allows for the development of a robust research design and
ensures that the findings and especially the interviews are focused and relevant. Also
being primarily "why" and "how" questions, the case study methodology is a suitable
methodology to follow.
In summary, the two elements of the research question are:
□ Why some foreign firms are more successful than others, and;
□ How they ensure this success
3.2.3 Possible a-priori constructs and categories
The next step is shown by row 'B' in Table 3.1 as follows:
Eisenhardt (1989) Corbin & Strauss (1990) Yin (1994) Action Points for Thesis
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To be discovered from
interviews
Eisenhardt (1989) advocates that the process starts with the use of possible a-priori
constructs as it provides better grounding of construct measures. Of constructs she says
(Eisenhardt, 1989:536):
"... it is valuable because it permits researchers to measure constructs more
accurately. If these constructs prove important as the study progresses, then
researchers have a firmer empirical grounding for the emergent theory".
However, it must be noted that these are only tentative constructs and may be discarded
at any time if they prove to be less useful or invalid.
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The use of constructs is equivalent to the use of concepts in GT methodology. Corbin &
Strauss (1990) and Glaser & Strauss (1967) stress that concepts are the basic unit of
analysis, the basic building blocks of GT methodology. As Corbin & Strauss (1990:7)
state, " A theorist works with conceptualisations of data, not the actual data per se."
Further, they stress that;"... incidents, events and happenings are taken as, or analysed
as, potential indicators of phenomenon, which are thereby given conceptual labels"
(Corbin & Strauss, 1990:7). Thus the use of concepts is the key to developing GT, and
empirical findings must be construed as appropriate concepts before being analysed in
GT.
Once constructs have been identified, then the constructs that pertain to the same
phenomenon will be grouped to form categories, which are higher in level and more
abstract than the concepts that they represent. According to Corbin & Strauss (1990:7),
"Categories are the cornerstone of a developing theory. They provide the means by
which a theory can be integrated."
3.3 Categories and the Constant Comparative Method of Glaser &
Strauss
Glaser & Strauss (1967) provided a procedure for the development of categories and
concepts called the constant comparative method. There are three stages to the
constant comparative method as follows:
a) Comparing incidents applicable to each category,
b) Integrating categories and their properties
c) Delimiting the theory
3.3.1 Comparing incidents
The three stages mentioned above involve coding incidents in the data into categories
as they emerge in the data. This does not require a formal process, as even a "noting of
categories on margins" is sufficient, even though more elaborate means can be used
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967:106). These coded incidents or categories are then constantly
compared with previous incidents in the same and different groups (or cases). These
constant comparisons then start to generate theoretical properties of the categories.
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As an example, in the cases that were studied in this dissertation, all participants
mention that experience and expertise are necessary ingredients for the success of the
firm to be sustained. This confirmation of the important category of the resource base of
the firm as a necessity for success leads to the proposition that the Intangible Resources
of the firm are one key to the success of the VC firm.
Glaser & Strauss (1967) also state that as categories and their properties emerge the
analyst will discover two types of categories, those that he has constructed himself and
those that have been abstracted from the language of the research situation. Again
using the example above, none of the participants specifically mention the Intangible
Resources of the firm, merely that experience and expertise are key components of
success. This construction of the Intangible Resources is the researcher's construction
based on literature review and prior research works.
However one category that has clearly been abstracted from the language of the
research situation is that "dealflow" is also a key component of their success. Dealflow
has not been specifically identified in prior research or in the literature review and was
not a category that could have been constructed other than from the language of the
research situation. In fact the word 'dealflow' is commonly used by the participants and
led to the development of a category called "dealflow" which would otherwise not have
been considered.
3.3.2 Integrating categories
The next step is the integrating of the categories and their properties via constant
comparisons. In this way several categories may over time be integrated into a more
precise category that makes more conceptual sense. Hence although several
participants do not mention specifically that the viability of an exit is important for
success, the fact that they speak of listing their investee companies, or seek acquisitions
for them or even when they speak of rates of return on an IPO, this leads to the
integration of the different categories of an IPO or acquisition or return rates into an
"Exit" category. This allows for easier analysis and comparisons.
Several categories can also be integrated into a major category if that allows for easier
analysis. This can happen when two or more categories can fit into one easily identified
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category. For example the constant comparisons of interview transcripts led to two
categories the first being "identifying and securing deals" and the second being
"availability of deals in the market". Being similar in principle, these two categories can
be placed under the major category of "Dealflow".
Similarly, the interview transcripts revealed the following five categories:
a) Management team experience
b) Expertise and knowledge base
c) Knowledge sharing
d) Market knowledge & continuous learning
e) Independence of the management team.
These five categories relate to management and human resource aspects and could be
classified under the major category of the Resource Base of the firm. It has to be stated
here that none of the major categories of "Exits", "Dealflow" or "Resource Base" were
taken from the literature review or were the researcher's creation, they are used in this
category development stage simply to group the categories to make them more
manageable and for ease of analysis. This is also necessary for the delimiting of theory
as explained in section 3.3.3 below. All the categories were extracted from the interview
transcripts (Appendix B). As the transcripts are colour coded, each of these categories
can be traced back to each individual interview.
Thus the constant comparison method is valuable in making sense of the large amount
of data, enabling the development of categories and sub-categories and through in-
depth analysis of the categories it allows one to better develop propositions out of
voluminous data.
3.3.3 Delimiting the theory
The objective of delimiting theory is to prevent the constant comparative method from
becoming an overwhelming task. According to Glaser & Strauss (1967) delimiting occurs
at two levels: the theory and the categories. As major modifications become fewer and
fewer as the comparisons progress the theory solidifies. The aim is to formulate theory
(or in this dissertation, propositions) based on a smaller set of higher level concepts
which is achieved by discovering "underlying uniformities in the original set of categories
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or their properties..." (Glaser & Strauss, 1967:110). This is also termed 'reduction' by
Glaser & Strauss and this enables the researcher to achieve "two major requirements of
theory: (1) parsimony of variables and formulation, and (2) scope in the applicability of
the theory to a wide range of situations" (Glaser & Strauss, 1967:111). It is also
important to reduce the original list of categories for coding.
Another factor for further limiting the list of categories is what Glaser & Strauss (1967)
call "theoretical saturation". Here the researcher has to determine whether the next
applicable incident points to a new aspect and if it does it is coded and compared, if it
does not the incident is not coded as it only adds to the bulk of data and nothing to
theory. Theoretical saturation suggests that what has been missed is probably minor and
will not have much affect on the theory anyway (see section 6.3 for a full discussion on
theoretical saturation). Theoretical delimiting also allows the researcher to focus only on
data that are relevant to the categories.
3.4 Additional methods for developing categories
While Glaser & Strauss (1967) provided some procedures for developing categories
through the use of the constant comparative method other writers have also made
significant procedural contributions. This is especially so in providing a more systematic
and practical process for the development of categories.
3.4.1 Developing Categories
The work of Turner (1981) is especially useful in developing categories in Grounded
Theory research especially in a more systematic analysis of the data and development
of the relevant categories and concepts. He provides a nine-stage sequence of
Grounded Theory analysis as follows, to which have been added examples from the
results of this research in italics. Full details of the categories as discovered from the
interviews are provided in Appendix A, with relevant examples given below.
a) After some exposure to the field setting and some collection of the data the
researcher starts to develop 'categories' which illuminate and fit the data well. In
this study beginning with the first interview with TS Yong, some categories like
experience, expertise and deal flow began to emerge.
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b) The categories are then 'saturated', meaning that further instances of the
categories are gathered until the researcher is confident about the relevance and
range of the categories for the research setting. There is recognition in the idea
of 'saturation' that further search for appropriate instances may become a
superfluous exercise. As more and more interviews were conducted similar
categories emerged in many of the interviews. Hence besides TS Yong almost
every other respondent also mentioned experience, expertise and dealflow in the
interviews leading to possible saturation because one can expect that further
interviews will continue to show similar categories.
c) The researcher then seeks to abstract a more general formulation of the
category, as well as specifying the criteria for inclusion in the category. Hence,
from the experience and expertise categories it is possible to abstract a more
general formulation of an Intangible Resources general category of which
experience and expertise are sub-categories.
d) These more general definitions then act as a guide for the researcher as well as
stimulating further theoretical reflection. This stage may prompt the researcher to
think of further instances which may be subsumed under the more general
definition of the category. Hence the general Intangible Resources category led
to the formulation of a Resource Based Theories and also to a Core Competence
theory, which also adopts many of the sub-categories like experience and
expertise.
e) The researcher should be sensitive to the connections between the emerging
general categories and other milieu in which the categories may be relevant.
Again here we can see the connections between the experience and expertise
sub-categories with core competency and dynamic capabilities.
f) The researcher may become increasingly aware of the connections between
categories developed in the previous stage and will seek to develop hypotheses
about such links. This led to the formulation ofpropositions in this dissertation.
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g) The researcher should then seek to establish the conditions in which these
connections pertain. /As an example connections made between categories like
knowledge sharing and the lack of expertise and the failure of firms like SBEM
and Transpac.
h) At this point the researcher should explore the implications of the emerging
theoretical framework for other, pre-existing theoretical schemes, which are
relevant to the substantive area. This is done by following the framework and
matching the findings to enfolding literature and related theories.
While Turner (1981) provided a procedure to develop categories, there is still the need to
identify which bits of the data are relevant to which category and how they will be
classified within the many categories. We also need a procedure for adapting these
categories to the data.
3.4.2 Classifying Data into Categories and Concepts
As further explained by Turner (1994); in defining categories and concepts, the
researcher has basically to look for and divide facets of the available data into segments
which are given labels, names or codes; then he has to look for and accumulate these
recurring codes, develop abstract definitions to specify the properties associated with
these codes and then identify links between the codes. Dey (1993) provides a clearer
explanation of how this can be done via his formulation of a circular or spiral process
involving three activities: describing, classifying and connecting.
Firstly, in describing the phenomenon we need to consider the context of the action, the
intentions of the social actors and the processes through which the social actions and
interactions are sustained.
Classification is however, slightly more complex and is achieved by creating categories,
assigning categories to the data and splitting and splicing categories. As Dey (1993: 44-
5) says:
"Classification is a conceptual process. We don't just break the data into bits; we
also assign these bits to categories or classes, which bring these bits together
again, if in a novel way. Thus all the bits belonging to a particular category are
brought together and in the process we begin to discriminate more clearly
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between the criteria for allocating data to one category or another. Then some
categories may be subdivided and others subsumed under more abstract
categories"
Dey (1993) has provided a clear and precise procedure for looking at all the bits of
information and to then take them apart, classify them into categories, re-classify them if
necessary and then develop a framework using the information that is now available.
In this dissertation this is precisely how the classification is done. Bits of information are
taken from the transcripts of different participants as they relate to a particular category,
say "experience" or "expertise". These bits are then tabulated and compared and then
may be subdivided, subsumed or better defined into other categories. Information that
are not relevant or those that are repeated are then discarded. This is firstly done on a
within case basis and as more cases are explored and the information within those
cases considered, more precise categories appear and after much comparison and
contrasting the final product appears.
The final step in the process is making connections between categories. The aim is to
"discover regularities, variations and singularities in the data and thus to begin to
construct theories" (Blaikie, 2000). The connections between categories in this analysis
are made for example when one participant says that a partner's experience is
necessary for success and this is corroborated by another participant from the same firm
saying the new CEO brings a lot of experience from America, then one can conclude
that experience is a necessary prerequisite for the success of the firm. This is further
enhanced when there is corroboration among the different cases. Other examples will be
provided in the data analysis section to follow. The final categories are then tabulated
and presented for discussion.
Based on the above methodologies and procedures it is possible to systematically
develop categories and concepts for this study. The actual development will be
discussed shortly, but the next stage in the analysis is that of matching patterns in the
categories that have been developed.
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3.5 Data Matrices and Pattern Matching
The next step in the case study methodology is to look for patterns from the data and
using these patterns to show the results of the study and formulate theory. Eisenhardt
(1991) explains that cases are a useful tool for analysis because they permit replication
and extension among individual cases. This means that individual cases can be used for
independent corroboration of specific propositions and thus avoid or eliminate chance
associations. Thus when all respondents within each case indicate that experience is a
necessary prerequisite for success, and this is repeated in the other five cases, there is
obvious replication of data and this means that it is a relevant point and not just a
chance association.
The second aspect is extension, which refers to the use of multiple cases to develop
more elaborate theory. Different cases often emphasise complementary aspects of a
phenomenon and by piecing together the individual patterns, the researcher can draw a
more complete theoretical picture. Thus patterns that appear from the use of several
cases enhance the development of theory. For example, if among the 6 cases most or
all of these cases indicate that say, a viable "exit" is a prerequisite for investment, then
one can safely presume that an institutional theory angle can be used to explain this
common pattern in VC investment strategy. The more common the pattern then the less
one can say that it is a chance association. The more common the pattern the greater is
the confidence that it is relevant to the theoretical proposition.
In using a pattern matching methodology it is also important to follow the
recommendations of Frechtling & Sharp (1997). Firstly it is necessary to determine the
patterns and common themes that emerge in responses dealing with specific items and
explore how these patterns (or lack thereof) help to illuminate the broader study
questions. Secondly we need to look for any deviations from these patterns and look for
factors that might explain these atypical responses.
We then look for interesting stories that emerge from the responses and explain how
these stories help to illuminate the Research Question. We must also establish whether
these patterns or findings suggest that additional data need to be collected. Finally, we
need to determine if the patterns that emerge corroborate the findings of any
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corresponding analyses that have been conducted, in this case the triangulation aspect
of the data and then explain any discrepancies that may appear.
These recommendations will assist in the development of the analysis and in formulating
theory based on this methodology. The use of a pattern matching analysis can thus
produce a robust analysis and by comparing it with other corroborating support including
prior research by other authors it enhances the findings and assists in the development
of rigorous theoretical analysis.
3.5.1 Matrix-Analysis for Pattern Matching
While the pattern matching methodology is used in determining the findings of case
study research, no preferred technique is recommended by any of the lead authors of
the methodology. However, one technique that has been used by several researchers
(Lillis, 1999, Averill, 2002, Palmquist, 1997) who have adopted pattern matching is the
matrix analysis technique. This is also the technique proposed by Miles & Huberman
(1994) for analysing qualitative data.
A matrix is "a set of numbers or terms arranged in rows and columns; that within which,
or within and from which, something originates, takes form, or develops" (Agnes, 2000:
887). Miles & Huberman (1994:239) described qualitative data analysis using matrices
as the "crossing of two or more main dimensions ... to see how they interact". Averill
(2002) believes that matrices are invaluable in searching for relationships between and
among categories of data or phenomena, in examining how categories relate to
particular theoretical concepts and in looking for propositions that link categories of
information. Thus the interaction of data can lead to patterns and the identification of
common patterns lead to the development of theoretical propositions in qualitative
research.
Averill (2002) also described how matrices are used in practice. Matrices allow the
researcher to display categorised data in individual cells. The data in individual matrix
cells is paraphrased, synthesised or quoted content from participant responses. Matrices
also "... streamline the process of noting simultaneously and systematically, similarities,
differences, and trends in responses across groups of informants (2002: 856).
64
Thus matrices assist in streamlining the data and presenting it in a way that enables the
researcher to systematically note patterns across the data set. It also provides a visual
impact and can draw the reader's attention to the overall trend or patterns that emerge
from the analysis.
There are also several important characteristics of data displays (Lillis, 1999:89). Firstly
the data displays use reduced data, i.e. the relevant data are condensed or re-written in
a clearer format for analysis purposes and not necessarily verbatim from the transcripts.
Hence each cell of the matrix consists of short blocks of text, quotations, phrases, etc.
Precise records are also kept of the actual criteria or decision rules used to select the
content of the cells whose parameters are determined by the nature of the research
question (s). Finally these displays highlight patterns across cases and across the data
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3.5.2 Trianqulation of qualitative and quantitative data using a Meta-Matrix
analysis
While a data matrix is used to search for patterns within similar types of data e.g.
interview data in one case with interview data in other cases, triangulation of different
data sets is slightly more complicated. As triangulation is a necessary part of this
dissertation in adding extra understanding and robustness to the study, the use of the
data has to be made meaningful especially in validating or confirming patterns that have
been discovered in the data matrices.
For example, if a VC states that his firm invests only in markets that have a viable capital
market especially for an IPO, one method of triangulating and verifying this claim is to
look at the investments that the firm has made and determine whether the countries that
they have invested in have viable capital markets. Hence if they have invested in
Singapore, their claim is validated but if they invest in Vietnam or Myanmar then that
claim is suspect or dubious, as these countries do not have viable capital markets,
especially a stock exchange.
The different data sets for triangulation are also used in a form of data matrices called
meta-matrix (Miles & Huberman, 1994, Wendler, 2001). These are similar to data
matrices except that they contain both qualitative and quantitative data and in this
dissertation will be used for within-case pattern matching purposes to validate the
interview information provided by the participants. The triangulation of the findings using
the meta-matrix approach allows "identification of surprising relationships that may
otherwise have been problematic to identify from the data. The methodology may be
useful when working with numerous sources of qualitative and quantitative data captured
from a variety of sources..." (Wendler, 2001:525).
In this dissertation there are a variety of data sources that will be used to verify the
primary VC interview data and this includes company archives, information from the
firm's website, IPO documentation, interviews with investee firm CEOs and other
sources of information. Thus meta-matrices will be used to triangulate and validate the
primary interview data sets. This adds to the robustness of the study. An example of this
analysis is given in Table 3.2 above.
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The category being explored is Intangible Resources and the sub-categories are
management team experience, expertise & knowledge base and knowledge sharing. To
determine whether there is support of say, experience, we look for corroboration in the
respondent's Biodata on the experience that he/she has had in the industry. If the
respondent's firm invests in the media industry but the respondent has no experience in
the industry or say has never worked or invested in the industry then we have to say that
there is no corroboration between the firm's investments & the experience of its
management and this means that we cannot confirm that the firm is successful based on
its managers' experience. However, using the case of BCEA above, the firm invests in
the media and telecommunications industry and both the partners do have such a
background, then there is confirmation that experience is a valid indicator of success
and the sub-category is validly corroborated.
The same is done for the other categories and sub-categories by using data obtained
from different qualitative (interviews with investees) and quantitative (Biodata,
investment focus, investments made, etc.) sources. This method of triangulation
provides good corroborative support and adds to the robustness of the findings.
Appendix C1 to C6 provides the complete list of sources of data that have been used for
this analysis and the full analysis using Meta analysis.
3.6 The Audit Trail
Another important issue in the use of qualitative data including in data matrices is that of
ensuring trust in the methodology. Miles & Huberman (1994) recommend the use of an
"audit trail" to track data from transcripts to the development of theoretical propositions.
Krathwohl (2004) explains the audit trail in data matrices as follows:
"Matrices ... provide an "audit trail" that others can follow to reconstruct how an
analysis developed, to check how well coding terms are grounded in the data,
and to determine the logical validity of conclusions... a clear audit trail helps
critics to track the steps of qualitative method and is likely to provide for greater
methodological rigor. Without in any way restricting the options available to the
researcher, an audit trail allows others to check the reasoning and makes the
process explicit"
The audit trail enables a reader to trace the entire process of the development of the
theory and in this dissertation is illustrated as follows:
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Figure 3.1 - Audit Trail
Thus a reader can follow the analytical process from the beginning to the end and at any
time can check the validity or reliability of both the data and the process to the discovery
of the theoretical propositions made in this dissertation.
3.7 Neither theory nor hypothesis to be used
The basic premise of GT is to formulate concepts and then proceed with data collection
but not use prior theory or hypothesis. Eisenhardt (1989) also advocates that theory not
be used in this form of case study analysis when she says (1989:536): "... most
importantly, theory-building research is begun as close as possible to the ideal of no
theory under consideration and no hypotheses to test". While it is virtually impossible to
start with this ideal of 'no theory under consideration' especially in an academic thesis,
which ordinarily includes a literature and a theoretical review, it is necessary to stay as
close as possible to this ideal and avoid preordained theoretical perspectives or
propositions that may bias and limit the findings (Eisenhardt 1989).
Hence the literature review is used mainly as a "scoping" exercise to establish whether
or not researchers have studied and provided answers to the Research Question. Once
it has been established that this has not been done adequately then this study will
proceed to seek answers to the question via the use of this research design. Whatever
theoretical considerations were provided in the literature review will not be adopted and
this research will continue on the assumption that no relevant theory exists especially to
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answer the Research Question of this dissertation. Therefore, in principle it is possible to
follow Eisenhardt (1989) and start the research on a "no theory under consideration"
basis, and this is made simpler in this dissertation because there isn't an adequate
answer to the Research Question.
GT as a methodology also does not advocate the use of prior theory or hypotheses as
theory is generated from the data itself and via concepts and categories generated from
the analysis of the data. Thus this dissertation and the research design adopts the
premise that there is no known theory and no hypothesis to test. It must be admitted
though that the lack of theoretical development in this field and the non-existence of
specific studies on the success of GVC does make this a little easier.
3.8 Selecting cases
This next section relates to row 'C' of Table 3.1 as follows:
Eisenhardt (1989) Corbin & Strauss
(1990)
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All three authors Eisenhardt (1989), Glaser & Strauss (1967) and Yin (1994) advocate
that case selection must be based on theoretical sampling. This is quite different from
the statistical sampling used in most quantitative methods and some qualitative ones
too. There are several stages to theoretical sampling starting with the specification of a
population.
3.8.1 Specify Population
While the statistical concept of a population and statistical sampling will not be used,
Eisenhardt (1989) does recommend consideration of the concept of a population as this
defines the set of entities from which the research sample will be drawn. This population
identification also controls for extraneous variation and defines the limits for generalising
the findings (1989: 537).
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There are two issues to consider in the selection of the population to meet the conditions
set by Eisenhardt (1989), firstly the country or countries in which the population is based,
since this is about foreign venture capitalists investing in emerging markets, and
secondly about the cases within this population.
The countries that have been selected for the research are Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand. They have been selected as the location of the population due to the following
reasons:
• They are all emerging venture capital markets in South East Asia. Although
Singapore is more advanced economically, venture capital investing is still in its
infancy there as it is in Malaysia and Thailand.
• All have active Government interventions in venture capital & Entrepreneurship,
although in Thailand it is not as extensive as the other two.
• Malaysia and Singapore have similar institutional structures, with legal systems
based on English common law. Thailand also has a common law system and
although it is slightly different from the English system there are no significant
structural differences.
• The state of innovation in Singapore is slightly more advanced than both the
others but Malaysia and Thailand are just as Entrepreneurial
• All foreign venture capitalists located in these three countries practise cross-
border investments, if not within the country office, then at least via the group
itself.
• Although Singapore does have a more open financial system, in venture capital
there are few differences as Malaysia and Thailand are as liberal as Singapore in
its regulations concerning venture capital investing
• The final reason for the selection is their close proximity to each other and the
cost of performing the research in three neighbouring countries is more
reasonable.
On the second requirement of cases within the population, to qualify as foreign venture
capital firms the firms must possess some of the following characteristics to be labelled
appropriate:
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• They must be international i.e. their parent organisation, sources of funds or
primary management office must be outside the three countries
• They must be investing in either one of the three countries in which they operate
- Malaysia, Singapore or Thailand
• They must have a track record; hence new firms with no existing investments will
be excluded
• The management team must either have investment experience outside their
home countries (Malaysia, Singapore or Thailand) or be guided by their parent
organisation's managers or policies
The final basis of the selection is the financial success of the firm. Hence where firms
have been selected as successes, they demonstrate that they have been financially
successful. Although it was not possible to obtain financial accounts of the firms, as they
are not required to provide this to the public, the successful firms were deemed
successful, based on available data from their websites and archives, because they
have raised funds successfully; they have many exits globally and have been in
existence for a long time, as longevity also demonstrates success (Bygrave & Timmons,
1992). The failed firms on the other hand have not managed to raise any funds recently;
either have no exits or very few exits in the last 5 years and have either closed down all
or many of their regional offices.
Foreign venture capital firms located in Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand are the
population for this study. There are approximately 47 foreign venture capital firms
operating and investing in Malaysia (8), Singapore (30) and Thailand (9). This number is
based on the foreign firms that are members of the Malaysian, Singaporean or Thai
Venture Capital Association (please see Appendix D). There is a difference in the
numbers of firms according to the Associations' members list and the Asian Private
Equity (2003) list, which lists all statistics of firms and funds in Asia. Asian Private Equity
(2003) lists a total of 183 venture capital firms in Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand but
the Associations only list 114, a difference of 69 firms or funds.
There could be several reasons for this difference. Firstly many firms may operate in
these countries but are not necessarily members of the Associations and secondly Asian
Private Equity (2003) lists both firms and funds. Some firms may list their funds
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separately and thus Asian Private Equity may list them as separate entities (it lists them
as Funds/Companies). Finally there may be differences due to attrition or additions to
the numbers of venture capital firms and differences can also be attributed to the
differences in dates when the statistics were obtained. The Asian Private Equity (2003)
statistics are based on the first half of 2003 about 2 years earlier than the Association
lists which were confirmed on 1st May 2005.
However this difference in the numbers of firms does not alter the validity of this
research or the methodology because of the use of the theoretical sampling process
according to GT. The firms selected for this study will be the firms listed in the
Association lists, i.e. the most up to date list.
3.8.2 Theoretical Sampling
The selection of the cases themselves will be based on theoretical sampling (Pandit,
1996) whose logic is to develop a theory about a substantial topic (Glaser & Strauss
1967), in this case a theory about what leads to successful GVC investing in emerging
markets. Glaser & Strauss (1967:45) define theoretical sampling as:
"...the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly
collects, codes and analyses his data and decides what data to collect next and
where to find them in order to develop his theory as it emerges."
Glaser & Strauss studied sociological phenomenon and in their early book did not
provide clear guidelines on the actual sampling process that can be used in
management studies. This was however provided by Locke (2001) who used GT in
management research. According to Locke, the rationale for theoretical sampling in
management research is:
"
... to direct all data gathering efforts towards gathering information that will best
support development of the theoretical framework. This means that researchers
enter into data collection with the supposition that it will be an open ended and
flexible process that will likely be modified over the course of the study as we
compose, and work to clarify, develop and refine our conceptual categories and
conceptual scheme" (2001:55).
Corbin & Strauss (1990:8) define theoretical sampling as follows.
"
Sampling in GT proceeds ... in terms of concepts, their properties, dimensions
and variations. When a project begins, the researcher brings to it some idea of
the phenomenon he or she wants to study. Based on this knowledge, groups of
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individuals, an organisation or community representative of that phenomenon
can be selected for study".
Eisenhardt defines theoretical sampling as choosing cases for theoretical not statistical
reasons (1989:537). Yin (1994) also advocates theoretical sampling, in his case using
the basis of replication not sampling logic. Hence, when selecting cases the appropriate
research design is one in which the same results are predicted for each case, thereby
producing evidence that the different cases did involve the same syndrome (or
phenomenon, using Corbin & Strauss (1990) phraseology). If the results were different,
then they must be different for predictable reasons.
Furthermore, it is also important to select cases that are deviant, extreme or polar types
(Eisenhardt, 1989, Mitchell, 1983) as this will provide many contrasts that lead to better
grounding of the research. Pettigrew (1988) for example, chose clearly successful cases
and failed cases to build theories of success and failure. In this research, failed cases
may be firms who have invested (or attempted to invest) before but no longer do
because they have failed or closed down their operations in the said markets. In this
study cases selected included 3 successful firms, 2 firms that failed (the deviant cases)
and 1 domestic firm to again provide a contrast with foreign firms.
However, finding deviant cases was a difficult process as there is in fact little public
information available on venture capital firms and this makes selection difficult.
Furthermore defining "deviant" cases among venture capital firms is more difficult than
"typical" firms except in cases of venture capital firms that have set up and then closed
down due to unsuccessful investing. Also not many managers of firms that fail will want
to speak about their failure, as was the case with Stanley Cheong of Transpac Capital
Singapore who refused a request to discuss the failure of the Transpac Group. Despite
that two cases of deviant firms were found, Softbank Emerging Markets and Transpac
Capital both based in Malaysia.
3.8.3 Case selection in this study
By selecting cases based on the qualifying criteria stated above, it is possible to meet
the stringent requirements of all these authors in terms of theoretical sampling. Cases
were thus selected based on the population criteria explained above in addition to the
following:
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□ In performing the research it will be an open ended and flexible process that will
likely be modified over the course of the study, hence the individual managers
must be willing to discuss this more than once if necessary and it must also be
possible to speak to more than one manager at each firm
□ The firms must be "representative of that phenomenon" being studied, i.e. they
must be foreign firms investing in an emerging Asian VC market
□ Cases must lead to similar results. By selecting successful foreign firms and
studying their reasons for success we should be able to find similar results for
their success
□ In selecting deviant cases, their results must show the opposite of the reasons
for success above, which therefore led to their failure and confirms the reasons
for success of the successful firms
□ To add a balance to these foreign firms one local Malaysian firm was selected
with the aim of discovering if there are any differences, which can affect this
study.
Based on these issues the six firms selected were as follows:
i) Three successful firms:
□ Bl Walden, the Malaysian office of Walden International, an American firm
□ Barings Communications Equity Asia, a Dutch/British firm located in Singapore
□ H&Q Thailand, the Thai office of H&Q Asia Pacific, an American firm
ii) Two failed firms:
□ Softbank Emerging Markets Asia Malaysia (SBEM), a joint venture between
Softbank Corp of USA and International Finance Corporation of the World Bank
based in Malaysia
□ Transpac Capital Malaysia, the Malaysian office of Transpac an American-Hong
Kong firm
iii) One local firm:
□ MSC Venture Capital Bhd, a local Malaysian firm
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3.8.4) Case Outlines
This section provides outlines of ail the cases in the study. A one-page outline of all the
key characteristics of the cases is provided in Appendix E.
A) Barings Communications Equity Asia (BCEA)
The firm was started in 1996 by the British based Barings Banking Group to invest in
Asian Media and Telecommunications companies. However after the collapse of Barings
Bank during the Asian Crisis and the subsequent takeover of the group by the Dutch
group ING, it's ownership became Dutch/British. The new Dutch owners however
decided that it would operate better as an independent venture capital fund and post
ING, BCEA has operated as an independent firm. ING-Barings are now only investors in
the fund.
Peter Chan and Yong Thian Sze started the US$ 100 million fund as the Managing and
Investment Partners respectively. Their base of operations is in Singapore and there are
4 regional offices - Taiwan, Korea, China and India. Initially Singapore was also a
regional office as their head office was originally in London, but after devolution by ING,
the operations are headquartered in Singapore. The firm invests throughout Asia,
especially South East Asia and North Asia.
The firm has a clear focus in the Media and Telecommunications industries especially in
broadcasting, Internet, wireless, broadband and content. It has several investments
throughout North Asia and Singapore in these industries for e.g. China Television
Company, TV station (Taiwan); CVD Entertainment Public Co Ltd, video publisher and
distributor (Thailand); Popular Holdings Ltd, a books publisher and retailer (Singapore);
Pacific Broadband Co Ltd (Taiwan); Weaver Group, financial software (Hong Kong); and
Youngjin, IT educational content (Korea).
BCEA is considered a successful firm as several of its investments have been listed
including China TV Company (Taiwan listed with a market capitalisation of US$ 575
million as at 6th May 2005), CVD Entertainment (Stock Exchange of Thailand) and
Popular Holdings (Singapore Exchange). The partners have also just started a new fund
called Crest Capital Partners Ltd to continue investing in this space.
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As the most senior managers of the firm, both the Founder Partners were interviewed for
the dissertation.
B) Bl Walden A/Valdenl
Walden International was founded in 1987 in the USA by Lip-Bu Tan a Malaysian living
in the US. The firm's headquarters is in San Francisco and it has several regional offices
in Asia - China, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan. The
size of the global fund is US$ 1.5 billion. In Malaysia it has three funds jointly funded with
Bank Industri & Teknologi Malaysia Berhad, a large state owned bank. Hence the
Malaysian operation is known as Bl Walden, but Bank Industri is only an investor in the
fund, the fund itself is fully managed by Walden International.
Walden investments are focused on four industry sectors: communications,
electronics/digital consumer, software and IT services and semiconductors. It has had
many investments in these sectors, for e.g. Semiconductor Manufacturing International
Corporation (Chinese firm, listed in New York and Hong Kong); Creative Technologies
Ltd (Singaporean firm listed on NASDAQ); Jobstreet Berhad and The Media Shoppe
(Malaysian firms both listed on MESDAQ) and SINA Corporation (Chinese firm listed on
NASDAQ). Walden has successfully exited almost 50 investments globally. Walden
International is considered successful due to its large number of successful exits and a
portfolio of more than 100 investments. It was also voted "2005 Venture Capital Firm of
the Year" for Asia by Private Equity International.
The three senior managers at the Malaysia office, Country Manager Kwee-Bee Chok
and the two Investment Managers Cindy Tee and Chee-Khen Chong were interviewed.
Cindy Tee is no longer with the firm and is currently an independent consultant. When
she was interviewed she had just left the firm.
C) H&Q Thailand (H&Q1
Dr. Ta-Lin Hsu founded H&Q Asia Pacific in 1987 when he was a General Partner at
Hambrecht & Quist Group. In 1990 it was incorporated independently and separated
from the Hambrecht & Quist Group. It is now run as an independent firm under the
Chairmanship of Dr. Hsu. The headquarters of the group is in Palo Alto in Silicon Valley,
USA.
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The group manages US$ 1.8 billion through 17 funds and has regional offices in Japan,
Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Taiwan. It invests as both a venture capital
and private equity fund in early stage as well as late stage deals. Its investment focus is
in technology, technology manufacturing, consumer brands and financial services. Some
of its successful investments include Transmedia Communications (USA, acquired by
Cisco Systems); Worldwide Semiconductor Manufacturing (Taiwanese firm now
acquired by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation); Fabrinet Company Ltd,
Thailand (listed in Thailand); Advanced Systems Automation Ltd (listed on SESDAQ,
Singapore); GDH, an animation and media firm (listed in Japan) and also owns the
Starbucks franchisee company in Beijing and Tianjin (China).
H&Q is considered a successful firm as it has had many successful exits in Thailand and
also globally and has a large portfolio of investments. The two senior managers of its
Thailand office, Managing Director Mr. Virapan Pulges and Investment Manager Mr.
Patan Somburanasin were interviewed for this dissertation.7
D) MSC Venture Corporation
The firm was founded in 1999 as a Malaysian government funded venture capital firm to
promote investments in the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), a technology and
strategic initiative of the Malaysian government to foster a move from the industrial to the
knowledge economy. The Malaysian government provided the entire capital of US$ 31.6
million for the fund and is still its sole investor. There have been no further investments
in the fund.
The firm has only one main office in Cyberjaya located 50 km from the capital Kuala
Lumpur. Cyberjaya is a Greenfield site developed to promote the MSC as a hub for
7 The Thailand office was recently closed, in June 2005. The original funds were fully
invested and H&Q decided not to raise a new fund for Thailand because of a lack of
dealflow in Thailand. The decision not to raise a new fund was based primarily on
opportunities, as China presented greater opportunities than Thailand. Although the Thai
office is closed for new investments, H&Q Thailand is still deemed a successful firm as
its original fund was fully invested and it had successful exits. H&Q Asia Pacific
continues to invest successfully. Virapan still works for H&Q in managing their existing
portfolio of companies while Patan now works for one of their portfolio companies, Ticon.
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technology research and development and technology based companies. However the
firm does invest outside Malaysia as well8.
Its investment focus is in telecommunications, e-commerce, medical systems and
devices, security enterprise software, multimedia content and services. It is a successful
firm with several successful IPOs all on MESDAQ market e.g. RedTone International in
telecommunications and Internet telephony; Karensoft in enterprise resource
management (ERM) solutions; Iris Corporation Berhad, in security devices and Palette
Multimedia in hardware and services. MSC Venture Corporation is a successful firm
because it has successfully exited several investments and has invested in several other
portfolio companies. The three senior managers of the firm were interviewed: Esmond
Goei, the CEO; Husni Salleh, the Chief Financial and Administrative Officer (formerly the
Chief Operating Officer) and Alan Tan, the Head Corporate Counsel.
E) Softbank Emerging Markets (SBEM)
SBEM was originally founded in 2000 as a joint venture between Softbank Corp of the
USA and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank. It was set up to
incubate Internet related investments in developing countries. The original plan was to
have five regional offices in the world, in South East Asia, Africa, Central Europe, Latin
America and the Middle East. The Malaysian office was the first to start operations in
March 2001 and the second office was set up in Poland later in 2001. However, both
offices were shut down in late 20019.
The fund size was US$ 200 million set up as a 50:50 joint venture between Softbank
Corp and IFC. The management was led by Softbank Corp from the US office in Silicon
Valley. Their investment focus was in Internet infrastructure, enabling technologies and
wireless communications. At time of closure the firm had no investments. The firm was
deemed a failure because although it was set up as a US$ 200 million fund, it made no
investments and was closed by the head office in the USA.
There were four known managers linked to SBEM. The CEO was Mr. Matt Rothman, he
was located in the US and the Regional Associate, Mr. Yoke-Kee Ang was at the
8 It has invested in a United States company, Farallon Medical Inc.
9 Unlike H&Q Thailand, the SBEM group completely closed its offices and no longer operates any
venture capital firm and does not have any investment funds. It had no investments or exits.
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Malaysian office. The Managing Director Mr. David Low, together with Mr. Karan
Ponnudurai as Investment Manager, led the Malaysian office. Two managers were
interviewed, Ang and Ponnudurai, while it was not possible to locate either Rothman or
Low.
F) Transpac Capital
The firm was founded in 1989 as a merger of two existing venture capital firms,
Transtech Venture Management Pte Ltd of Singapore and Techno-Ventures Hong Kong
Limited from Hong Kong. Transtech was established in 1986 by the Development Bank
of Singapore and Natsteel Group, the national steel company of Singapore, both
government linked companies. Techno-Ventures was started by Dr. Christopher Leong
and Dr. Victor Fung. The head office was in Hong Kong. Subsequent to the merger Dr.
Christopher Leong was made the President and CEO of the firm.
As at 2000 the firm was said to manage US$ 820 million in funds, but its current fund
size is unknown. The firm had several regional offices besides Hong Kong. They were in
Singapore, China, Taiwan, USA, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines.
However in 2001 the group closed most of its South East Asian offices in Malaysia,
Indonesia, Thailand and Philippines. It maintains the Singapore office to manage its
existing portfolio of companies. There is no information on the activities or position of its
other regional offices.
The firm invests in manufacturing companies and in industry and consumer related
service companies, including Information & Communications Technology, electronics,
industrial products, consumer products, health care, chemicals, food and the
environment. It was initially a successful firm with many successful exits including Acer
computers (Taiwan listed); Datacraft Asia, a distributor and integrator of data
communication equipment (listed in Singapore); Medical Imaging Australasia, a medical
diagnostic group (listed in Australia) and Systex, a financial systems software and
service provider (listed in Taiwan). Many of these investments were pre-2000. No
information on current investments or exits is available.
The firm is deemed a failed firm because it closed many of its South East Asian offices
and even its Singapore office is dormant. There is no current information available on
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the firm and no information on the activities of its other regional offices. Even Google
searches show no evidence. There were a few managers associated to the group. The
first is the President Dr. Christopher Leong. It was not possible to contact him, as no
information was available. The Singapore manager Mr.Stanley Cheong declined to
participate. The two former managers of the Malaysian office, Country Manager Mr.
Jason Ng and Mr. Tien-Kiong Yeo were interviewed.
3.9 Crafting Instruments and Protocols
Once the cases were selected based on theoretical sampling several other issues need
to be considered including crafting instruments and protocols, from the use of multiple
data collection methods and data sources to ensuring the quality of the research design.
This is shown by row 'D' in Table 3.1 as follows:
Eisenhardt (1989) Corbin & Strauss
(1990)
Yin (1994) Action Points for
Thesis
D Crafting Instruments and
Protocols
- Multiple data collection
methods
Multiple sources of data
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967)
Case study protocol
- Multiple data collection
methods
- Create a database














We shall consider these aspects in the following section.
3.9.1 Multiple Data Collection Methods - Trianqulation
In crafting instruments and protocols for the research, Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1994)
recommend combining multiple data collection methods, commonly known as
triangulation. Glaser & Strauss (1967:163) also specifically recommend using multiple
data sources to generate theory, when they say:
"... we shall detail some procedures for using various qualitative sources, alone
and in combination, to generate theory effectively through comparative analysis".
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The sources they mention include documentary sources besides interviews. Multiple
data collection methods provide stronger substantiation of constructs and hypotheses
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 538). Yin (1994: 45) also advocates using multiple case studies
because:
"...the evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling and the
overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust (quoting Herriott &
Firestone, 1983).
The use of quantitative data (as part of triangulation) according to Eisenhardt (1989:538)
can also keep researchers from:
"
being carried away by vivid, but false, impressions in qualitative data and it can
bolster findings when it corroborates those findings from qualitative evidence".
Accordingly, this research used multiple data sources including but not limited to
interviews with the venture capitalists, documents including media reports and articles,
financial records, IPO documents (especially where the firm has listed investments, e.g.
Walden has investments in Jobstreet), archives and also interviews with investee firms.
The data from all these sources will be used to validate and verify the statements made
by venture capitalists in interviews. However, obtaining the VC firms' financial records
was not possible as such records were not in the public domain and were extremely
confidential.
3.9.2 Data collection procedures, timing and protocols
The next step in the Framework is as shown by row 'E' of Table 3.1 as follows:
Eisenhardt (1989) Corbin & Strauss
(1990)
Yin (1994) Action Points for
Thesis
E Entering the field
- Overlap data collection
& analysis

















Memos to be kept
As the strategy being used is an inductive research strategy, the primary method being
used is qualitative and the main data collection method is via in-depth semi-structured
interviews. The use of semi-structured interviews instead of open interviews has been
selected because of the time constraints of venture capital firm managers. An open
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interview may be ideal for cases where respondents do not have time constraints but
where only an hour or so of the respondent's time may be available each time; a semi-
structured interview provides a better structure and enables the respondent to be more
focused in replying to questions. This also allows for better time management.
The interviews were conducted with senior managers and partners of the firms and each
interview lasted between 60 to 120 minutes despite the busy schedules of the managers
of venture capital firms. Interviews were conducted with several managers in each firm
and for each manager more than one interview was conducted in a few cases.
A total of 14 managers were interviewed from the 6 cases, with two of them interviewed
more than once. The interview chart including the respondents' names and designations
is provided in Table 3.3 below.
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Table 3.3: Case Studies & Management Teams - Fieldwork
Details
Ref No. Firm Name Designation Interview Date (s) No. of Interviews
A BCEA Management
1 Yong Thian Sze Investment Partner 20-0ct-04 1
2 Peter Chan Managing Partner 10-Jan-05 1
B Bl Walden
1 Chok Kwee Bee VP & Country Manager 21-Oct & 22-Nov 2004 &
6-Jan 2005
3
2 Cindy Tee Investment Analyst 29-Oct-04 1
3 Chong Chee Khen Investment Analyst 18-Nov-04 1
C H&Q (Thailand) Ltd
1 Virapan Pulges Managing Director 04-Dec-04 1
2 Patan Somburanasin Investment Manager 03-Dec-04 1
D MSC Venture Corporation
1 Esmond Goei CEO 04-NOV-04 1
2 Husni Salleh Chief Finance & Admin
Officer
22-Oct-04 1
3 Alan Tan Investment/Legal Analyst 13-Oct & 17-Oct 04 2
E Softbank Emerging Markets
1 Ang Yoke Kee Regional Associate 29-Sep-04 1
2 Karan Henrik Ponnudurai Investment Manager 19-Nov-04 1
F Transpac Capital
1 Jason Ng VP & Country Manager 17-NOV-04 1
2 Yeo Tien Kiong Investment Analyst 15-Nov-04 1
Table 3.3: Case Studies & Management Teams - Fieldwork Details
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The other problem of an open interview even one that is semi-structured is the issue of
researcher bias as this research is performed via personal face-to-face interviews. It
may lead to issues of leading questions, prompting or probing but as this is an
exploratory process, some probing or prompting was necessary. It was however
minimised by my awareness of possible bias and by continual analysis and re-
interviews. By using the spiral analysis technique and re-interview process, cases of
interviewer bias was limited and omitted in subsequent interviews of new cases or
managers. Bias is also limited as all information, notes and transcripts are available for
third party verification by the PhD Supervisor or others.
Finally, because multiple interviews can lead to a potentially voluminous amount of
information this was minimised with the use of semi-structured interviews and spiral
analysis on a continuous basis. The interview period for the case studies was
approximately 5 months and the interviews were conducted between September 2004
and January 2005.
A PC based external hard-disk MP3 recorder was used to record the interviews. This
made transfer to a PC and saving the interviews easier than using traditional cassette
recorders. However many of the managers did not want to be recorded as the interviews
were given on a confidential basis and they did not want it on the record. Due to this, all
interviews were prepared as ongoing memos in writing and were later transcribed. All
memos, transcripts and recordings are available for review.
The timing method is cross-sectional, confined to the present time in terms of the
managers' success analysis, investment strategies and attitudes. Although success is
also determined by past investments, the basis of the investments and strategies used
will be in terms of the "present time" analysis. Each respondent was asked to either
provide a Bio data or complete a bio-data sheet while the corporate information of the
firm was completed using information provided online at their websites supplemented by
data provided by the managers. It was not possible to include financial and investment
data which were confidential and not in the public domain, except for information on the




Following the first set of interviews with the first case study, the transcripts were
analysed and any changes made to the interview themes or questions. These were then
utilised for subsequent interviews with the other cases and also for additional interviews
with the first firm itself. Analysis was conducted on a continual basis and changes and
additions made to the interviews for every subsequent interview in accordance with the
GT methodology.
This spiral learning process is suitable for the GT and the inductive strategy as it enables
the interviewer to build on the understanding obtained at different points of the process.
Overall there were six (6) sets of questionnaires, which incorporated changes along the
way. This process is discussed in greater detail later in section 5.4.6, "Entering the field".
3.9.4 Criteria for judging the quality of research designs
Yin (1994) has also set certain criteria forjudging the quality of research designs and it
is appropriate to consider them here. He proposes four logical tests, only three of which
are applicable to exploratory studies such as this (Yin 1994:33). The three logical tests
are set out in Table 3.4.
Tests Case study tactic Phase of research in
which tactic occurs
Construct Validity - Use multiple sources of evidence
- Establish chain of evidence





External Validity - Use replication logic in multiple-case
studies
Research design
Reliability - Use case study protocol
- Develop case study database
Data collection
Data collection
Table 3.4 - Case Study Tactics for Three Design Tests For Construct Validity
The use of multiple sources of evidence has been covered above, but the two other
tactics that are applicable to case studies will now be considered. The first is the need to
establish a chain of evidence. The principle here is to allow an external observer to
follow the derivation of any evidence from the initial research questions to the ultimate
case study conclusions (Yin 1994:98). This should also enable this external observer to
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trace the steps in either direction, including backwards from the conclusions to the
sources of the evidence.
The recommended procedure is fourfold. Firstly, to provide adequate citation in the
report itself for the observer to trace the sources of the evidence, especially back to the
case study database (which will be discussed shortly). Secondly, the database should
reveal the evidence and sources including the circumstances under which the evidence
was collected, the time, date and place of the interview. Thirdly, these circumstances
must be consistent with the case study protocol to show that the data collection followed
the content of the case study protocol and the initial research questions. Finally, there
must be a link between the content of the protocol and the research question.
Thus the "chain of evidence" must show the link and cross-reference between the
research question, the case study protocol, the procedures that have been followed and
the resulting evidence. This dissertation will build in a chain of evidence as advised by
Yin and will ensure that the links and cross-references are clear and adequate to meet
the requirements of a robust research design. This will be seen in the sections on
analysis of the study.
The second tactic is to have key informants review the draft case study report. There are
two main objectives to this tactic:
• to obtain useful comments from the informants
• as a way of corroborating the essential facts and evidence presented in the case
report
Informants may disagree with the conclusions and interpretations of the researcher but
they must not disagree with the actual facts of the case. Any disagreements with the
facts of the case must be settled via a search for further evidence. Flowever any
additional comments and new evidence may still be used in the report or used as new
evidence for further analysis prior to completion. This dissertation accordingly adopted
this procedure and obtained feedback from all the key informants except for one. All the
informants vetted and approved the facts and conclusions as presented. One informant,
Yeo of Transpac, did not respond despite several attempts to contact him. This could be
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because he had moved on from his previous employment and tracing was difficult due to
the distance from Edinburgh and Kuala Lumpur. Hence the response rate was 93%.
External Validity
The second recommendation is to use replication logic in multiple case designs to show
that a study's findings are generalisable beyond the immediate case study (Yin
1994:35). This will be covered in a separate section below under 'shaping hypothesis',
but suffice to say that this is part of the research design.
Reliability
The objective of reliability here is that if another researcher were to conduct the same
case study all over again (with the same cases), then she should arrive at the same
findings and conclusions as this dissertation. This can be done if there are well-
documented procedures for the researcher to follow and this can be achieved by having
a detailed case study protocol and a case study database.
The case study database is a way of organising and documenting the data collected for
the case studies. It includes two separate collections; the data or evidentiary base and
the report of the investigator, in this case the thesis (Yin 1994:94). The case study
database should be formal and presentable and include all the evidence that has been
collected including case study notes, case study documents, tabular materials and
narratives.
The case study database includes notes of interviews, observations and document
analysis and may be in any form handwritten, typed, audiotapes (or MP3 in this case) or
in disks or CDs. They must however be stored in a form that is retrievable by future
researchers. The only essential characteristics of the notes are that they are organised,
categorised, complete and available for future access (Yin 1994:96). They also include
tables, documents and answers to questions (narratives), which in this case will be MP3
format recordings that are transcribed and filed. This dissertation takes these issues into




The interviews are transcribed and formatted in "Windows Word" format while the data
matrices were reduced using "Windows Excel" format. Comparing and contrasting data
was easier in the data matrix format using "Excel".
3.9.6 Entering the field
In entering the field, Locke (2001) recommends the overlap of data collection and
analysis as contrasted with the normal method of collecting all the data first and then
analysing it after data collection ends. This method of overlapping data collection and
analysis is in effect the basic methodology of GT, which Glaser & Strauss (1967: 102)
call the constant comparative method. In this method while the data is being collected it
is also being constantly analysed. This method leads to the generation of concepts,
categories, properties and hypotheses about general problems or the general issues
being researched. The method will be discussed further in the next section on analysing
data. Corbin & Strauss (1990) also require that analysis begin with the first data
collected.
The procedural aspect of entering the field is to consider what needs to be done in terms
of data collection and analysis while one is in the field and what needs to be done to
accomplish this overlap. One method to achieve this overlap is to keep field notes, a
commentary about what is happening in the research involving both observation and
analysis, preferably separate from each other. Eisenhardt (1989:539) notes two key
aspects of field notes as important:
(i) The researcher should write down whatever impressions occur, to react
rather than to sift out what may seem important.
(ii) The second key is to push thinking in these notes by asking questions such
as "What am I learning?" and "How does this case differ from the last".
Thus field notes are personal records not only of the cases, interviews or other data but
also notes on the observations, ideas, thoughts, hunches and anecdotes that come to
mind while conducting the research. This form of notes can lead to the formation of initial
categories, hypothesis or theories and also enable the researcher to seek additional
information or data as necessary. This method was used to make field notes as
interviews progress and during the interviews itself. This further assists in improving the
89
constructs and categories of the study and also allows for further comparisons and
changes for future interviews.
Another key feature of this methodology is the freedom to make changes, adjustments
and additions during the data collection process. It can include the addition of cases,
adjustments to data collection instruments such as changing or adding questions or
other changes that the researcher deems necessary to create better findings. This is the
creative process of GT and case studies. As Eisenhardt (1989: 539) says, "these
adjustments allow the researcher to probe emergent themes or to take advantage of
special opportunities which may be present in a given situation".
Thus in the early stages of the study and following from the literature review the initial
questions were open ended but somewhat related to questions on the environmental or
institutional aspects of VC investing as this is what earlier researchers deemed important
for successful GVC investing. However as the interviews progressed it was clear that the
venture capitalists themselves did not consider environmental or institutional factors as
important as their own experience and competencies. Thus subsequent interviews were
adjusted to take advantage of this emergent theme of the GVC firm success leading the
research away from an environmental impact on success towards a strategic view of
success.
Corbin & Strauss (1990) also call advocate something similar, which they call 'theoretical
memos'. These are not simply about ideas but involve the formulation and revision of
theory during the research process. These memos are written from the beginning of the
research till the end and the process of sorting and resorting during the writing process
provides a firm base for reporting on the research and its implications (Corbin & Strauss
1990).
This study does in fact incorporate these field notes and theoretical memos and follows
the procedures and recommendations of these authors including writing down
impressions, thoughts, observations and hypothesis as well as using them in the sorting-
resorting process when writing the findings and conclusions. It is also noted that this is a
creative process where changes and adjustments are allowed which led to the
formulation of six sets of questionnaires as the interviews progressed.
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3.9.7 Analysing data
The next step is to analyse the data as shown by row 'F' of Table 3.1 as follows:
Eisenhardt (1989) Corbin & Strauss Yin (1994) Action Points for
(1990) Thesis
F Analysing Data 1) Analysis makes use of 1) The logic linking data 1) Within Case analysis
- Within case analysis constant comparison to the proposition -Pattern - Build familiarity of each
- Cross case pattern 2) Patterns & variations matching. case
search must be accounted for 2) Criteria for interpreting - Pattern recognition &
3) Process must be built the findings matching
into theory - Contrasting patterns 2) Cross-case pattern
lead to contrasting matching
propositions 3) Look for contrasting
- Look for alternative patterns & rival
(rival) findings & propositions
propositions 4) Match patterns across




It is apt to begin by recognising that this is one of the most difficult aspects of the
methodology.
"Analysing data is the heart of building theory from case studies, but it is both the
most difficult and the least codified part of the process" (Eisenhardt, 1989: 539).
However there are several methods that have been proposed to make analysing more
structured and clearer. These can be separated into two aspects, within case analysis
and cross-case pattern searching.
Within Case Analysis
The reason for separating analysis into these two aspects is to deal firstly with the
voluminous data that often accompanies qualitative data especially with interviews.
Pettigrew (1988) (quoted in Eisenhardt, 1989) called this "death by asphyxiation".
However, within case analysis can assist with this deluge of data.
Within case analysis involves the detailed case study write ups for each case which may
be purely descriptive initially but will then be used for the generation of insight and
theory. The idea is to make the researcher intimately familiar with each case as a stand¬
alone entity and to allow the unique patterns of each case to emerge before they are
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used for generalising across cases (Eisenhardt, 1989:540). By becoming familiar with
each case the depth of knowledge of the case is increased and this allows the
researcher to recognise patterns and concepts in each case which can then be used for
cross case pattern matching.
GT requires that analysis and data collection must be a continuous comparative process
and this form of within case analysis fulfils this requirement as the researcher normally
only performs one case study at any one time even within a multiple-case study
research design. Corbin & Strauss (1990) emphasise that patterns and variations must
be accounted for and the within case analysis will account for these on a case-by-case
basis. Yin (1994) also states the need for pattern matching which can be done even with
only one case.
Hence the within case analysis is a good procedural method of looking for patterns in
each individual case, identifying them, analysing their importance and using them firstly
for forming concepts and categories within the individual case before moving to the next
step of comparing these patterns, concepts and categories with those of other cases.
This will be done in my analysis.
Cross-case Pattern Search
The key to good cross-case comparison is counteracting the tendencies of researchers
to reach premature or even false conclusions due to information processing biases like
leaping to conclusions based on limited data, being overly influenced by vividness or
elite respondents or inadvertently dropping disconfirming evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Eisenhardt (1989) proposed several tactics for good cross-case comparison:
□ Select categories or dimensions and then look for within-group similarities
coupled with inter-group differences
□ Select pairs of cases and then list the similarities and differences between each
pair
□ Divide the data by data source
These tactics will now be considered in detail. The first tactic is to select categories or
dimensions and then look for within-group similarities coupled with inter-group
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differences. These dimensions can be suggested by the research problem or existing
literature or the researcher can simply choose dimensions. In this thesis one dimension
could be the effect of regional political factors on venture capital firm success. The
researcher could look for similarities of this dimension within group and differences inter-
group. Of course it will also be dependent on the responses received from participants, if
none of them think this is a factor in success, then other dimensions that are mentioned
will be considered instead.
This is what in fact happened in the research. For example only two respondents
thought that political factors played a big role in investment success or failure. Although
the political factor was one aspect identified in the literature review, the fact that 12 other
senior managers did not think it was a big factor meant that it was not a significant
aspect of global venture capital investing success or failure. Hence it can be concluded
that this is not as important for their success and instead the research can focus on what
actually is important for success, leading to other emergent themes.
The second tactic is to select pairs of cases and then to list the similarities and
differences between each pair. The objective of this tactic is to look for subtle similarities
and differences between cases. Thus looking for differences between seemingly similar
cases or looking for similarities between seemingly different cases can lead to more
sophisticated understanding and also result in categories and concepts that were not
anticipated by researchers. This also fits in with the proposal by Corbin & Strauss (1990)
that data must be examined not just for regularity but also for an understanding of where
that regularity is not apparent. We can then extend this to groups of three or four cases
for comparison, which was done in this study.
The third tactic proposed by Eisenhardt is to divide the data by data source, for example
comparing interviews with other interviews or annual reports with other annual reports.
This tactic exploits the unique insights from different types of data collection. When a
pattern from one data source (say interviews) is corroborated by support from another
(say their actual investments) then the finding is stronger and better grounded
(Eisenhardt, 1989, examples added). Conflicts of evidence can then be reconciled
through deeper probing or it may expose a spurious or random pattern or biased thinking
in the analysis.
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In this study the interviews (one source of evidence) was compared with say their actual
investments (as evidenced by data on their website or via IPO documents) to determine
whether there was any conflict. Hence in the case of Barings, their focus as stated in the
interviews was on media investments and this was correctly corroborated by data on
their website. Eisenhardt's idea behind cross-case searching is to force the researcher
to go beyond initial impressions of the data through the use of this structured and
diverse lens.
Yin (1994:123) also states four principles for high quality analysis. Firstly the analysis
must show that it relied on all the relevant evidence. The analytic strategy must be
exhaustive, including the development of rival hypotheses, it must show how it sought as
much evidence as was available and the interpretation should account for all these
evidence and leave no loose ends. The use of triangulation and multiple data sources
will go some way towards addressing the exhaustiveness of the evidence although using
GT, this can only be fulfilled when there is theoretical saturation.
Secondly, the analysis should include all major rival interpretations i.e. alternative
explanations for my findings are considered rival interpretations. The evidence must then
be used to address this rival and the results and interpretations shown accordingly. If the
evidence is insufficient then it must be restated as a loose end to be further investigated.
Thus once categories and hypotheses (in our case propositions) have been discovered,
they have to be compared to the literature for rival interpretations and these have to be
addressed. Thirdly, the analysis should address the most significant aspect of the case
study the largest issues not minor ones.
Fourthly, Yin recommends bringing the researcher's prior expert knowledge to the case
study, whether the researcher has analysed such issues in the past or whether the
researcher is aware of current thinking and debates on the case study topic. Here prior
experience will certainly play a role but the researcher must guard against bias, forcing
her personal opinions on the case study participants or even the influence of prior
theory.
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While analysis is not the easiest issue of the case study, these operational and guiding
principles add structure to the analytical aspect and assisted in developing analyses that
are valid and robust.
3.10 Shaping hypothesis
Once analysis has been done the next stage is to form propositions as shown by row 'G'
of Table 3.1 as follows;
Eisenhardt (1989) Corbin & Strauss
(1990)
Yin (1994) Action Points for
Thesis
G Shaping hypothesis
- Sharpening of constructs




- Iterative tabulation of
evidence for each
construct








- Revise & recheck
relationship hypotheses
- Constant revision











bet data & constructs to
converge on single well
defined construct
2) Use of tables to
summarise & tabulate
evidence of constructs




Shaping propositions in theory building research involves measuring constructs and
verifying relationships (Eisenhardt, 1989). This is a judgemental process in theory
building research because researchers cannot apply statistical tests. It is a highly
iterative process where the emergent frame is compared with the evidence from each
case in order to ensure that there is a fit between theory and data. This 'fit' is a
necessary part of the GT methodology. Researchers must constantly compare theory
and data, iterating toward a theory that closely fits the data (Eisenhardt, 1989).
According to Eisenhardt (1989) one step in shaping propositions is the sharpening of
constructs and this is a two-part process involving (i) refining the definition of the
construct and (ii) building evidence which measures the construct in each case. This
involves the constant comparison between data and constructs so that the accumulating
evidence from diverse sources converges on a single, well defined construct. The
researcher attempts to establish construct validity using the multiple sources of evidence
to define the construct and distinguish it from other constructs. Thus the construct
definition and measurement emerges from the analysis process and is not specified a-
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priori. Tables will be used to summarise and tabulate the evidence underlying the
construct to ease clarity and enable proper comparison.
It is also necessary to verify that the emergent relationships between constructs fit with
the evidence in each case. The verification process is to examine each hypothesis for
each case and not for the aggregate of cases. The underlying logic is replication,
treating each case as a separate experiment and the series of cases as a series of
experiments to confirm or disconfirm a hypothesis (Yin, 1994). Thus if there are 3 cases
and the same results are obtained in all the cases replication has taken place. If the
cases are contradictory then the proposition must be revised and retested or dropped as
not confirming a hypothesis.
In this dissertation this part of the analysis will be conducted on an on-going basis as
multiple data (interview data triangulated with other quantitative and qualitative data) is
constantly compared within each case and also among the different cases. The pattern
matching process utilised in this dissertation as explained in Sections 4.3 (within case
pattern matching) and 4.4 (cross-case pattern matching), mean that this constant
iteration between the data and the cases fulfils the requirement for replication for each
case and also across cases. This process of going back to the data and constant
comparison approach is one of the strengths of Grounded Theory and makes this part of
the framework easier to fulfil. Hence section 6.1 on Shaping Hypothesis, will be made
easier through the use of the Grounded Theory approach. The next step in the process
is on matching with the enfolding literature as follows.
3.11 Enfolding literature
After the shaping of propositions the next step is to consider enfolding literature as
shown by row 'H' of Table 3.1 as follows:
Eisenhardt (1989) Corbin & Strauss
(1990)
Yin (1994) Action Points for
Thesis
H Enfolding Literature
- Compare with conflicting
literature
















-Also look for comparison
with literature in similar
fields - globalisation of
business, etc.
96
Eisenhardt (1989) believes that it is essential to compare emergent concepts, hypothesis
or theory with the extant literature and to ask what is similar and what is different. Thus
where extant literature corroborates the findings, it results in a theory with stronger
internal validity, wider generalisability and a higher conceptual level. This is enhanced
further where findings are similar in a very differing context. Hence if our findings are
corroborated by similar theory in other GVC literature the theory is confirmed, and if
additionally there is corroboration with literature on international business or strategic
management then the validity of my theory is enhanced further.
However if the generated theory conflicts with the existing literature then confidence in
the findings are reduced. However as Eisenhardt (1989) says:
"... conflicting literature represents an opportunity. The juxtaposition of conflicting
results forces researchers into a more creative, frame breaking mode of thinking
... The result can be deeper insight into both the emergent theory and the
conflicting literature as well as sharpening of the limits to generalisability of the
focal research".
Hence conflicting theory does have its benefits as well. This research does indeed show
that there is something of a "conflict" between existing GVC literature and the factors
that lead to success in GVC investing. This has however created an opportunity to
advocate new propositions for successful GVC investing. The key discovery that has
emerged is that while the supposed "conflict" with existing GVC literature exists there is
instead great corroboration and support to be found in other literature especially in
strategic management and international business literature. Thus the end result is that
there is no real "conflict" with the GVC literature but a gap in the literature that is being
filled by these findings.
Yin (1994:123) also adopts this aspect of comparing the theory with extant literature
when, in his four principles for high quality analysis, he suggests including all major rival
interpretations in the analysis stage. Further in composing the case study report he
encourages "...the examination of the evidence from different perspectives (Yin,
1994:149). These perspectives are found in alternative cultural views, different theories
or some similar contrasts. This is where the strength of the GT methodology lies and it is
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shown in this dissertation. Propositions for successful GVC investing can be matched to
different perspectives and theories in general management and international business
literature and will be shown in Section 6.2.
3.12 Reaching closure
The next step is reaching closure as shown by row T of Table 3.1 as follows:
Eisenhardt (1989) Corbin & Strauss
(1990)
Yin (1994) Action Points for
Thesis






Review of Draft Case
Study Report by
Participants & Informants
- Look for theoretical
saturation
- Draft case for
participant review
According to Eisenhardt (1989:545), two issues are important in reaching closure: "when
to stop adding cases and when to stop iterating between theory and data". In the first,
researchers should stop adding cases when theoretical saturation is reached, i.e. the
point at which incremental learning is minimal (Martin & Turner, 1986) or when category
development is minimal because there is no new data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967:61).
Hence when we see similar instances over and over again we can be confident that
theoretical saturation has been reached (Harris & Sutton, 1986). According to Glaser &
Strauss (1967:62), "The criteria for determining saturation are a combination of the
empirical limits of the data, the integration and density of the theory and the analysts
theoretical sensitivity".
During data collection further interviews lead to repetition of findings with no significant
differences, which led to a conclusion that possible saturation has been reached and no
further interviews were conducted. This was after 17 in-depth interviews with 14 senior
managers in 6 VC firms. While this may not ordinarily be thought to be enough, almost
all of them keep leading to the same conclusion; that successful GVC investing is
dependent more on the Intangible Resources categories of the firms. Even the
managers of the firms that failed believed this was important, thus saturation in this
study was somewhat achieved. Eisenhardt (1989:545) also states that while there is no
ideal number of cases, a number between 4 and 10 usually works well. Less than 4
cases may make generating propositions unconvincing while more than 10 may lead to
voluminous data. This research has six (6) cases, thus fitting very comfortably within the
4-10 cases proposed by Eisenhardt.
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The second closure issue is when to stop iterating between theory and data. While
saturation is the key, i.e. when the incremental improvement to theory is minimal
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 545) in a doctoral dissertation voluminous data, time limits and costs
also play a part in reaching closure. In this study we stopped at 6 cases to ensure that it
was possible to make it an in-depth study and also to complete within the set doctoral
time frame. Fortunately, as the analysis will later show, there was a lot of consensus in
the findings that approximates saturation as advocated by Eisenhardt (1989) and as
mentioned above.
Yin (1994) proposes that before reaching a final conclusion or writing the report, a draft
case study report is given to key informants for their review and comments. This will aid
in improving the final report and adding comments or suggestions as well as clarifying
errors or finer points made by respondents. As mentioned earlier they may disagree with
the interpretations and conclusions but not with the actual facts of the case. If there are
errors in the facts then this must be adequately addressed. As such feedback was
obtained from key informants in this study.
3.13 Final product - Meta Propositions
The final product of this thesis is to produce a meta-proposition or propositions that
provide an explanation for the Research Question. This is the final step in the
Framework as shown by row 'J' of Table 3.1 as follows:
Eisenhardt (1989) Corbin & Strauss
(1990)


















While Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1994) do allow for the development of theory, it is
submitted that for a PhD dissertation it is better to develop meta-propositions for two
reasons. Firstly, it would be more reasonable to expect meta-propositions from a 3 year
dissertation as the data that has been collected and analysed may not be as wide
ranging as to enable the development of theory. Secondly, while Yin (1994) and
Eisenhardt (1989) do state that theory development is possible, it is submitted that far
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more time and a wider scope of research may be better for the development of robust
theory that would stand the test of detailed analysis and further testing. Hence in this
dissertation the final product will be meta-propositions with additional suggestions for
future research.
These meta-propositions are developed by incorporating the propositions developed in
the dissertation in section 6 with existing theory. Three existing management theories
were applied to the propositions and used to explain the research question. The
incorporation of the research propositions into these theories provides us with the
contribution of this dissertation, the meta-propositions of the thesis. Section 7 provides
complete details of the three meta-propositions.
3.14 Generalisation from case studies
There are many thoughts on the use of case studies to generalise findings to the wider
population. However, I will follow the arguments of Yin (1989) and Mitchell (1983) in
generalising my findings. Basically Yin and Mitchell have argued that case studies can
be used on the basis of a different kind of logic used to test a theory which Mitchell
(1983) calls "logical inference" while Yin (1994) calls it "analytic generalisation or
replication logic".
Mitchell (1983: 199-200) says, " logical inference is the process by which the analyst
draws conclusions about the essential linkage between two or more characteristics in
terms of some systematic explanatory schema - some set of theoretical propositions".
He adds," We infer that the features present in the case study will be related in a wider
population not because the case is representative but because our analysis is
unassailable" (Mitchell 1983: 200).
Yin (1989:38), asserts, "... the method of generalisation is 'analytic generalisation' in
which a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the
empirical results of the case study. If two or more case studies are shown to support the
same theory, replication may be claimed. Analytic generalisation can be used whether
your case study involves one or several cases". The fact that 6 case studies are being
used (following the recommendation of Eisenhardt, 1989), it provides an acceptable
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method of comparison for generalisation especially as the majority of the cases support
a theory and on that basis the generalisation of the findings.
3.15 Summary of Methodology and Research Design
The use of GT in management research is still a new field of endeavour compared to
other qualitative and quantitative methods. While it is not an easy method to use, it does
allow for a more creative and explorative study and is being used here specifically
because it is suited for this under researched field of GVC
This research design and methodology has also been selected based on the literature
review and supported by leading researchers in this field such as Bruton et al (2002,
2003) and Wright (2002). As very little research has been done on the reasons for
success in the globalisation of venture capital, it is desirable that much more be learnt
through the use of an inductive research strategy adopting an explorative, grounded
theory methodology. Also the nature of the "newness" of venture capital in Asia provides
the opportunity of doing a more exploratory form of research.
In the next section we will consider the key aspects on how the methodology is applied.
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4. Use OfMethodology In Analysis
The objective of this section is to demonstrate how the Grounded Theory and case study
methodology will be used in two important aspects: how categories were identified and
developed and how the pattern matching was done for both the within case and cross-
case aspects. As this dissertation developed a new framework for the Grounded Theory
and case study methodology, it is necessary to demonstrate its use with examples from
the research before proceeding to the actual analysis and results in section 5.
4.1 Reviewing the Framework of Grounded Theory and Case study
Analysis
The framework for our analysis is reproduced below in Figure 4.1 (next page). The focus
in this section is on category development and pattern matching, as these are the two
key requirements of this methodology before we can proceed to generating propositions.
Only after categories have been discovered and finalised can the pattern matching
begin, and only after identifying these two aspects can the actual results be analysed.
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3) Cross-Case Pattern Match
Figure 4.1: Grounded Theory with Case Study Analysis Framework
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4.2 Concepts and Categories
The first part of this demonstration is to consider the Concepts and Categories aspect as
shown in Figure 4.2 extracted from Figure 4.1 above.




Fiaure 4.2: Concents & Cateqories - Framework Extract
There are two aspects to explore here: developing concepts and then developing
categories.
4.2.1 Developing Concepts
The primary concept is that of "successful global venture capital investing" by foreign VC
firms in emerging markets in Asia with a focus on the 3 main markets in South East Asia
- Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. We have defined foreign VC firms earlier but we
have not defined "success" as this theme has not been developed in the literature. We
therefore seek to define it from the view of the participants themselves. The concepts
itself are from the Research Question of this thesis:
"Why are some foreign venture capital firms more successful in global venture
capital investing than others and how do they ensure this success?"
Based on the participants' interviews, we determine what the concept of "success"
means to the VC participants and from there we seek to determine how they become
successful. It is very important to note here that it is not the objective of this thesis to
define or develop the concept of "success", that definition is merely a "prelude" to the
real objective of this dissertation - that of determining how foreign VCs ensure success
when investing in Asia.
Once we have determined what "success" means to the VCs we then ask them how they
become successful or in the case of failed firms why they failed and what they could or
should have done to be successful. We also seek to determine how successful firms
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sustain their success over the longer term because some of these VC firms have been
around for several years and have also made it through two major crises the first in
1997-1998 being the Asian financial and currency crisis and the second the bursting of
the dotcom bubble in the USA in 2000. From the answers to the interview questions we
can then determine the reasons for the success and from those reasons determine the
relevant categories.
4.2.2 Developing Categories
As this is a Grounded Theory methodology, we do not impose any categories or suggest
any categories to the participants. The questions are semi-structured but open-ended
and give them the opportunity to provide open answers to the questions, which are
conceptual questions based on "success". Examples of questions asked are as follows:
a) What are the primary reasons for your firm's success?
b) How do you sustain the success of the firm?
c) What do you see as the main threat to future success?
d) What strategy do you use to sustain the success of your firm?
e) Strategically how did you manage changes in the business environment e.g. the
NASDAQ crash, Asian financial & currency crisis, etc.?
f) What are the main factors that can impact on regional investments & how do you
manage these investments?
The open-ended questionnaire example is provided in Appendix F at the end of this
dissertation. The above questions are from the last interview done with Mr. Peter Chan
of Barings Communications Equity Asia (BCEA) (see transcript Appendix B Case
Reference A2). Based on the answers to these open-ended questions categories are
developed as shown in the next section.
4.2.3 Developing Categories from data in the dissertation
Based on the answers given by the participants we then look for common categories, i.e.
categories that appear through the use of specific words or sentences that convey a
particular meaning. This is a two-step process as shown in Figure 4.3 below.
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Step 1 \ \ Step 2
Developing
Developing \ \ Categories
Categories from \ \ from Cross-
Interviews / / Case Analysis
of Interview
Data
Figure 4.3: Two-step process of developing categories from data
In the first step, we look for categories from the interview data with each manager.
Hence we will look for common categories that appear when each manager of a firm is
interviewed. This step is shown below in the example of the interview with Peter Chan of
BCEA (For complete details see Appendix B - Interview Transcripts, Case Reference
A2).
a) Category 1 - Intangible Resources - Knowledge, experience and expertise
□ Team members are the most important. [Emphasis made by Chan],
□ They are also in constant touch with their counterparts in UK, India, USA, etc.
This allows them to share ideas, thoughts and also seek opinions on
investments.
□ Also noted his worry during the dotcom boom that they did not have enough
knowledge about ICT especially related to Internet investments. They were
worried that their knowledge was no longer relevant because Internet investing
was booming but they lacked the knowledge to invest in that particular industry.
q The team also had media experience. This strategy enables them to leverage on
their experience
□ Their focus on TMT also enables them to enhance the value of their investments.
This is again related to their experience in this sector
□ The team is continuously conceptualising and sharpening their product
differentiation. This relates to continuous learning and adapting to the market to
keep them relevant.
Throughout the interview there is a continuous emphasis on the management team, their
expertise in the technology, media & telecommunications sector and the experience that
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the firm and the team members have. The above excerpts are found throughout the 1
hour and 35 minute interview. From this it can be determined that there is a possible
category for knowledge, experience or expertise and this leads to the possibility of
theories based on the firm's resource base, which will be categorised as "Intangible
Resources". Full details of this form of category development are provided in Appendix
A1 - Development of Categories from Interviews.
Further categories were also discovered in the Chan interviews as follows:
b) Category 2 - Dealflow
□ Don't be a single country fund, so BCEA will do one ASEAN deal for every two
China deals
□ There are increased efforts towards early exits and also getting pre-fixed buyers
then finding the deals and structure them for a sale
□ ... can they uncover value in the deal
□ There are also innovative deal structures like asset securitisation deals.
Although there isn't as much emphasis on deals as there is on knowledge or experience,
the above statements indicate that deal making, structuring and finding deals is
important and as such can be categorised into the category of "Dealflow".
c) Category 3 - Exits
□ There are increased efforts towards early exits and also getting pre-fixed buyers
then finding the deals and structure them for a sale
□ In Malaysia they have to identify good Bumiputra companies and then fund their
IPOs
□ There are three main factors that can impact on investments... The third is exits.
Since exits are the key to successful investments, every market must have an
exit strategy.
The importance of exits is stated clearly in the interview, as it is one of three factors that
can impact on investments. Again there is repetition throughout the interview. Hence we
have a category called "Exit".
d) Category 4 - Networks
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□ BCEA has good regional contacts and validation of the technology within
different regions.
□ ... can they uncover value in the deal, show the investee firm's CEO the value
and build a relationship with the company
□ It is important to be able to bond with investors and build good relationships.
□ Both the LPs and team members are also all locals. They also use all local
partners e.g. local securities houses. Partners may also be investors or co-
investors.
The need for contacts, building of good relationships, the ability to bond with investors
and the use of local partners are all elements of networks and networking and is
therefore classified under the category of "Networks".
Categories 2, 3 and 4 will as a group be labelled as the classic venture capital factors as
these are factors that appear in the venture capital process shown in Section 1 and have
been identified in other venture capital research as shown in the literature review. This
also allows us to have two separate groups of categories, one being a category based
on the firm's intangible resources and the other on factors not specific to resources,
which we shall term the dominant or classic view of venture capital.
The second step is to perform a cross-case analysis of all the cases to discover if these
categories are repeated among the other cases and interviews. This second step
enables us to discover the commonality of occurrences of the categories. When these
categories occur throughout the cases then patterns are discovered and relevant
categories are discovered. This is shown in the section that follows.
4.2.4 Cross-Case analysis and iterative category development
The process of developing categories is an iterative process of analysis and re-analysis.
This is done through a multi-stage and multi-level analysis process by constantly
comparing the interview data of each respondent not just with another respondent in the
same firm but also with other respondents in other firms. It is a complex process of
comparing and re-comparing data, which is why Glaser & Strauss (1967) require that the
analysis be done very in-depth rather than very broad across many cases.' This is also
why only 6 cases were chosen for this dissertation.
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An example of this process of iterating and comparing data across many respondents is
shown in Figure 4.4 below. This figure shows the respondents statements on
"experience" and shows just four respondents, but includes the first interview, the last
interview and two interviews in-between. The "arrows" show how the iteration and
comparison happens. Text which indicate a particular category is placed in the matrix
"cells" and as each interview progresses these text are compared to text from other
respondents and from there categories are found. In this example, statements on
"experience" as a factor that is important for success is made by different respondents
and as these statements are compared as an ongoing process, back and forth and when
many respondents keep saying the same things "categories" appear. These
appearances of categories are then recorded based on their occurrences in Appendix
A2 and from them categories are developed (also see Table 4.1 in section 4.2.5 below).
























































































4.2.5 Cross-Case Occurrences of the Categories
Based on the above and on the 14 participant interviews in 6 cases, the above
categories are a common occurrence in many of the interviews and across the different
cases; hence in this second step we will look for categories using a cross-case matrix.
However, there is a need to provide a more viable method of showing how often the
categories occur among the many interviews.
The method that will be used in this dissertation is the "evidentiary method" used by
Hargadon & Sutton (1997). Here the occurrences are indicated by how much evidence
there is of the category in the interviews on a case-by-case basis. They used the method
in their meta-matrix to track evidence supporting the process of technology brokering at
a technology design firm. They classified the evidence as follows:
□ Sporadic evidence = a theme that appears now and then in the data source and
is consistently supported
□ Moderate evidence = a frequent but not constant theme in the data source that is
consistently supported
□ Strong evidence = a dominant theme in the data source that is consistently
supported
This dissertation will adopt a slightly modified version of Hargadon & Sutton (1997) by
including the use of the number of occurrences of the category. The use of a number
allows for a more systematic method and also reduces the potential for bias. However as
this is not a scientific method, the use of the word evidence in this thesis may not be as
appropriate and will be substituted with the word "support". This method strengthens the
audit trail for other researchers. The "support" classification is as follows:
□ "No support" means there is no mention of the category in the interview and
hence there is no support.
□ "Some support" means there is some mention of the category in the interviews,
at least 1 mention and it is consistently supported
□ "Moderate support" means there are at least 2 mentions of the categories, and
they are consistently supported
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□ "Strong support" indicates that the participants repeat the category very often
throughout the interviews with at least 3 or more mentions and they are
consistently supported.
A detailed analysis of the transcripts show that there are several categories that appear
in the interviews. Any category that appears at least once in the 6 cases will be included
in the matrix in Appendix A2 - Developing Categories from Cross Case Analysis of
Interview Data (an extract of which is shown below as Table 4.1) and classified using the
"support" method above. However the categories that will be selected for detailed
analysis and pattern matching will be those where there is a consistent pattern that is
shown mostly as "strong support" and some as "moderate support" in all the case
interviews.
In categories where there is some "strong support" from the cases but also in other
cases either "no support" or "some support" then at best the conclusion is that this is
classified as "moderate support" and will not be considered as a significant category.
This again is not a scientific methodology and some intuition and creativity will be used
in the analysis.
































































Support No support Some support No support
Moderate
support Some support Some support Some support
Table 4.1: Sample for Deriving Categories Based on Case Interviews
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From the above it can be seen that for "Management Team Experience" the interviews
show "strong support" in 5 cases and "some support" in one case, so the overall
conclusion is that it shows "strong support" and will be used for detailed analysis as a
category. However, for "Depth of Capital Markets" there is "strong support" in 3 cases
but in the other 3 cases it ranges from "no support" to "moderate support" so at best we
can conclude that there is "moderate support" overall so this is not a significant category
for in-depth analysis. In the category "Government Policy/Support" it ranges from "some
support" to moderate support" only so clearly it is not significant and will not be used for
detailed analysis.
This method of selecting the categories for in-depth analysis is in keeping with the
recommendation of Yin (1994) that the analysis should address the most significant
aspect of the case study; the largest issues not the minor ones. Thus only when the
support appears strongly in many of the cases will it be taken as a significant aspect and
used as a significant category. For the complete categories and the final selections
please see Appendix A2: Developing Categories from Cross Case Analysis of Interview
Data.
4,2.6 Selection of Significant Categories
From the analysis as shown in full in Appendix A2, there is confirmation of four
significant groups of categories that are consistently supported as follows. It has to be
noted that the major category headings of Intangible Resources, Dealflow, Exits and
Networks are just headings used to show groups of categories and are not meant to be
categories in themselves. Hence the four significant groups of categories that were
found by the iterative and comparison process are as follows:
a) Intangible Resources categories:
• Management team experience
• Expertise and knowledge base
• Knowledge sharing
• Market knowledge and continuous learning
• Independence of management team
b) Dealflow categories:
• Identifying and securing deals
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• Availability of deals in the market
c) Exits category:
• Viability of exits in the market
d) Networks category:
• Value of networks
For the sake of simplicity, these will henceforth be used as categories and sub¬
categories in the more detailed within case and cross-case pattern matching.
4.3 Within Case Pattern Matching
Once the categories have been formed as above, the second part of the framework is to
conduct the pattern matches to discover common patterns. There are three steps
involved in within case pattern matching as shown in Figure 4.5 below: the first is to
match patterns from the interviews conducted with managers in the same case and to
discover from these matches the patterns that are common to them. The second step is
to match these common patterns with data from other relevant sources in a meta-matrix,
the triangulation aspect of the data. The third and final step is to look for corroboration
and contradictions in the patterns.
Figure 4.5: Within Case Pattern Matching - Framework Extract
4.3.1 Within Case Pattern Matching - Multiple Interviews Within Case
In this section we will review the first step in the process: pattern matching of the
managers' interviews. For each case between 2 to 3 senior managers or firm partners
have been interviewed. In some cases where their time has permitted more than one
interview has been conducted for each manager. These interviews were then
transcribed. For the pattern matching the most significant categories have been selected
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based on the category occurrences as mentioned above. To reiterate the four categories
that are significant and have been selected are - Intangible Resources, Dealflow, Exits
and Networks.
Pattern matching for the cases are done by comparing selections of the statements that
relate to each category from the transcripts of each interview. These selections are then
placed into cells in the matrix and compared for common patterns. By using the
Grounded Theory methodology of constant comparison, common patterns are slowly
discovered. The process of constant comparison also results in the elimination of
statements where there are no patterns or where there is duplication. Where there is
duplication, duplicate statements are eliminated or combined. Where there are no
common patterns the statements are deleted, as the objective is to look for common
patterns. The final product is a series of cells with common patterns between the
different managers. This is demonstrated as shown in Table 4.2 (following page), using
a sample of the Data Analysis for the BCEA case study (Appendix G1).
As the data-matrix sample shows there are five common patterns that emerge in the
Intangible Resources category in this particular case. The patterns relate to the following
sub-categories of the Intangible Resources:
a) Experience
b) Expertise and knowledge base
c) Knowledge sharing
d) Market knowledge & continuous learning
e) Independence of the Management Tearn and team building
These are the common patterns that emerge after constant comparisons between the
transcripts of the two partners in BCEA, Mr. T.S. Yong and Mr. Peter Chan. The same
comparison method is done individually for each of the other 6 cases and the common
patterns for those cases are also identified. It must be noted that the patterns that
emerge for each individual case are not necessarily the same as those for BCEA here or
even among the different cases. Some are similar but others are not, as should be the
case. However this is still only the first of several more comparisons and matches before
we get to the final patterns. The next step is a within case meta-analysis for triangulation
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4,3.2 Within Case Pattern Matching - Trianqulation of Data Sources for Meta-
Analysis
The second step in the process is to validate the interview patterns by doing a within
case meta-analysis for each case, i.e. by triangulating and matching what has been
discovered in the interviews with other data including quantitative data. This step in the
process is highlighted in bold in Figure 4.5, as reproduced below:
Figure 4.5: Within Case Pattern Matching Framework Extract
The matching and comparisons must however be classified by looking for relevant data
to match. We have many different types of data sources as follows, mostly quantitative &
one qualitative:
a) Biodata on the management team - including experience, expertise,
qualifications, firms where they worked and association memberships if any.
b) Portfolio of investments (type of investments made)
c) Exits - IPO and M&As
d) Information on the firm's investment space or focus
e) Geographic focus of the firm
f) Geographic reach including network of offices and regional investments; and,
g) Investee company interviews for some of the cases (qualitative)
While there are many different sources of data that can be used for triangulation, not all
sources are relevant for each category. Hence in matching the sources of data to each
category and sub-category, we have to take into consideration the relevance of the data
and the contribution that it makes to the particular category. Some sources of data can
provide validation for several categories but may be irrelevant for other categories.
For example the Biodata of the managers and the wide spread of their offices can
provide validation for the following categories of the Intangible Resources:
a) Management team experience - by looking at their experience in their respective
fields, whether their previous work or fund experience was in their relevant focus
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area, whether they have IPO'd any investee companies or done any M & As or
trade sales.
b) Expertise & knowledge base - by looking at their past experience, their
qualifications and expertise, we can gauge their expertise and knowledge base in
their respective focus areas. For example, in the case of BCEA, Mr. T.S. Yong
has worked as Country Director for Singapore Telecommunications, the largest
telecommunications company in Singapore (or even in South East Asia) so he
will have vast expertise in the telecommunications field, one of the focus areas of
BCEA.
c) Knowledge sharing - here, having a wide network of offices in the region and
having regular meetings (based on their interview comments) can be validation of
knowledge sharing. This is not a perfect science, as knowledge sharing is not
easy to validate, but by having regular meetings with a wide network of
managers is one means of verifying this.
d) Market knowledge & continuous learning - again this can be verified by basing it
on several aspects. One important element of market knowledge is the use of
external experts especially a separate Advisory Committee or Board, such as the
ones that Walden and H&Q have. Such experts provide a wider knowledge of
markets not currently available to the managers and as such extend their market
knowledge base. Use of other external experts further enhances this particular
knowledge. The Biodata of the managers interviewed as well as the Biodata of
other managers in their firm or group even those not interviewed are also
relevant to show additional knowledge. Also where there are managers with wide
qualifications this can also provide some validation of knowledge & continuous
learning and if they attend particular learning seminars or courses like the VC
Institute, this also is evidence of continuous learning. Again this is not a perfect
science but it does provide a good gauge of this sub-category.
e) Independence of the management team - this can be validated from the
perspective of the experience and expertise of other managers within their
regional offices. If they are managers with wide experience both in VC funding as
well as industry experience and they are given appropriate titles, say Country
Manager or Managing Director, then it can indicate independence.
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However, the Biodata information cannot provide validation for say the availability of
dealflow. This has to be validated through other data sources.
There is no guarantee that the above are 100% validation of any of the categories. In
some cases it may be virtually impossible to validate, for example, how do we confirm
that they have good networks in a particular focus area? We can make assumptions that
the fact that they have a wide network of regional offices or that they have worked in
many different funds or industrial companies before or even that they have memberships
in VC Associations can amount to having good networks. Perhaps even the fact that
they have listed many companies can amount to being well networked. Some
assumptions will be made to enable triangulation and validation of data.
The methodology used will be similar to that made for classification of categories as per
section 4.2.4 above i.e. a modified version of Hargadon & Sutton (1997). Hence we will
use the criteria of "no support" to "strong support" in the within case pattern matching of
triangulated data to come up with the final conclusions for each of the six cases.
A complete list of the assumptions made for triangulation of data and validation of the
interviews is provided in Appendix H with an extract provided here as Table 4.3 showing
three aspects of the management team's Biodata and how it affects the different
categories. For example in terms of their experience and domain knowledge, this will
have an impact on the categories related to Intangible Resources, Dealflow and
Networks but not the Exits category. Also from their Biodata we can see their Society
memberships which again can affect categories like Intangible Resources and Networks
because leadership positions in say the Malaysian Venture Capital Association (for
example Chok of Bl Walden is a Past President) would equate more experience, can
validate expertise and would create an avenue for better networks.
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Management Team - Biodata
Experience, Domain Knowledge &
Expertise Worked in Variety of Firms
Association / Society
Memberships
Content of Information of
multiple data sources and
link to categories
The Management Team Biodata will
provide details of experience,
qualifications and expertise as well
as other pertinent data. Check for
Advisory committees & use of
external professionals
Based on the experience of the
team & whether they have wide
working experience in VC funds
or in industry








Look for experience within their area
of investment focus
Greater experience in other VC
funds or in cos. related to their





b) Expertise & Knowledge
Base
Wide expertise in focus industries &
strong knowledge base in the team
is strong support
Greater experience in other VC
funds or cos. related to their
focus - more valid the






Spread of management team around
the region, wide experience &
regular meetings indicate propensity
to share NR NR
d) Market Knowledge &
Continuous Learning
Strong support if team is diversified
with wide expertise & knowledge.
Advisory committees & external
professionals necessary. Multiple
qualifications also indicate
propensity for continuous learning.
The wider their experience &
scope of firms worked in the
greater their market knowledge
esp. if worked in industry.
Membership of associations
can mean continuous
learning & more market
knowledge
e) Independence of the
Management Team
Management independence is
assumed if they have appropriate
titles like Country Manager. NR NR
(ii) Dealflow
a) Identifying and securing
deals
Work in multiple successful firms or
having successful investments &
exits at prior firms is evidence of
ability to identify & secure deals
The more experience in different
successful firms with successful
investments & exits is evidence
of ability to identify & secure
deals NR
b) Availability of deals in the
market NR NR NR
(iii) Exits
Viability of Exits in the
Market NR NR NR
(iv) Networks
Value of Networks
Work in multiple successful firms or
having successful investments &
exits at prior firms is evidence of
good networks
The more experience in different
successful firms with successful






Table 4.3: Assumptions - Trianqulation of Multiple Data Sources - Within Case Pattern
Matching
Another set of data that has been used for validation is interviews with investee
companies. This is qualitative data and will be used for validation only for the cases that
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the investee companies relate to. However, there is no investee interview data for
several companies, as some respondents requested that no interviews be conducted.
In the case of BCEA we could not interview any investee company, as the BCEA
partners discourage this and in keeping with the privacy and request of the partners this
process was not done. For Softbank, as they never made any investments there were
none to interview although they did consider investing in The Media Shoppe (TMS) and
interview data is available here. There are no interviews for H&Q Thailand because of
distance and language problems while for Transpac Capital their investments were in
Singapore and East Asia. Their office in Singapore declined cooperation and East Asia
was geographically distant. Hence investee company interview data is only available for
Bl Walden, Softbank and MSC Venture Corporation.
4.3.3 Within Case Pattern Matching - Corroboration & Contradiction
The third step in within case pattern matching is to find corroboration and contradiction in
the meta-matrix analysis of interview data and triangulated data. This step in the process
is identified with the box in bold below in Figure 4.5, which is reproduced here for
convenience.
Figure 4.5: Within Case Pattern Matching Framework Extract
By comparing the interview patterns with other data mentioned above, we can find
corroboration and contradiction for the patterns. Where there is contradiction in the
patterns then there is no confirmation of the data and this cannot be used for matching
with other cases in the cross-case pattern matching or to formulate theory, unless it is
used as a negative for the theory.
One example is that the managers of SBEM state in their interviews that there is a lot of
knowledge sharing between their firm and their headquarters, but there is no evidence of
such sharing as none of the headquarters managers were involved in the firm and none
were even shown to be part of the firm. This is unlike Bl Walden where their US office
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and partners as well as their CEO was actively involved in the firm. Interview data with
one of their investees shows the involvement of their US partners and confirms
knowledge sharing. However, in SBEM there were no indications of such involvement,
hence the assumption will be that there is no evidence of knowledge sharing. This
contradicts their interview data but is nevertheless valid in theory formulation.
However where the interview patterns are a match to the other data then there is
confirmation and the confirmed patterns will then be used in the next stage of the
process for cross-case pattern matching. An example of the within case pattern
matching conclusions for interview data was given earlier in Table 4.2 for the BCEA case
for the Intangible Resources. The full within case matching of interview data is provided
in Appendix G1 to G6, while full matching of interview data with triangulated data for all
cases are given in Appendix C1 to C6. The conclusions of the within case pattern
matching using triangulated data will then be used for the cross-case pattern matching,
the next stage of the matching process as follows below.
4.4 Cross-Case Pattern Matching
Once the within case pattern matching has been done the next stage is cross-case
pattern matching as shown in Figure 4.6 below as extracted from the Analysis
Framework provided in Figure 4.1 earlier.
Figure 4.6: Cross-Case Pattern Matching Framework Extract
In this stage, the conclusions reached for the within case pattern matching which
includes meta analysis of triangulated data for each case is collated and placed in a
matrix for cross-case analysis. By comparing the results of the different cases in a cross-
case analysis we will be able to determine the reasons for success or failure of the firms
and this provides us with robust conclusions that can be used for generalisation amongst
the cases and for the development of theory. The use of matrix-analysis allows
comparisons to be made across different cases.
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In the first stage of the cross-case analyses two separate analyses will be made:
a) The first analysis (as shown in the first box in Figure 4.6, i.e. A) Match successful
vs. successful cases) is comparisons between the four successful firms - BCEA,
Bl Walden, H&Q Thailand and MSC Venture Corporation. This analysis allows us
to establish commonalities between the four successful firms and what led to
their success.
b) The second analysis (as shown in the second box in Figure 4.6, i.e. B) Match
failed vs. failed cases) is the comparisons between the two failed firms in this
case i.e. between SBEM and Transpac Capital. This analysis allows us to find
commonalities between these two failed firms and enables us to establish if there
were reasons for their failure.
The second stage is to compare the findings of the analysis for successful firms vs.
failed firms (box C) in Figure 4.6) and the final stage is to look for corroboration and
contradictions (box D) in Figure 4.6). This will then lead to generation of propositions and
later theoretical formulation. We will now look at examples of each of these stages
separately.
4.4.1 Example of Cross-Case Pattern Match - Successful Firms
As an example say if we choose the Intangible Resources category and compare the
findings for the experience of the management team and find say, that in the successful
firms they have a lot of relevant experience but in the failed firms the management has
little or no experience, then we have a proposition that experience is a necessary
condition for firm success. This proposition can lead to the formulation of meta-
propositions based on the Intangible Resources. As in the earlier analyses, we will use
the evidential analysis method of Flargadon & Sutton (1997), as modified, to perform the
analysis.
As shown by the example in Table 4.4 below, all the four successful firms have
management teams with a lot of experience. There is thus 'strong support' of experience
in all the firms and this leads to an overall conclusion that there is "strong support' of
experience (Full details are given in Appendix 11). This conclusion will then be used to
compare with the conclusion obtained in comparing the failed firms as seen in section
4.4.2 below.
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Cross Case - Successful Firms



































& CEO have vast
experience in VC
& industry
There is strong support
that the 4 successful
firms have very
experienced mgt. Most
have VC & investment
experience & also vast
industry experience. Most
also have experience in
their selected investment
space.
Table 4.4 - Cross Case Pattern Matching - Successful Firms
4.4.2 Example of Cross-Case Pattern Match - Failed Firms
An example of the cross-case pattern matching for failed firms is given in Table 4.5
below. Using the table we can see that for management team experience in SBEM's
case there is only "some support' of experience because although the team have
industry experience, they don't have any VC experience. In the case of Transpac, there
is "moderate experience" because although the Vice President has some VC
experience, due to the change of strategy of Transpac from venture capital to private
equity style investing this experience is not fully relevant. Also as the firm has been
changing its investment focus, even their industry experience is not always relevant.
Hence their experience only provides "moderate support" of management team
experience. (Full details are given in Appendix 12). This conclusion will then be used to
compare with the conclusion obtained in comparing the successful firms as seen in
section 4.4.1 above. This comparison is shown in the next section 4.4.3.
Cross Case - Failed Firms




Some support of experience.
None of Mgt team had




experience and low industry
experience.
Only moderate to low experience
shown by management team. Some
industry experience shown but
unable to prove mettle based on
investments.
Table 4.5 - Cross Case Pattern Matching - Failed Firms
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4.4.3 Example of Cross-Case Pattern Match - Successful vs. Failed Firms
The next step is to compare the results of the successful and failed firms. By comparing
the patterns of the successful vs. failed firms (Table 4.6 below and Appendix 13 for the
full details) we can see that there is a gulf in the level of experience between the
successful and failed firms. A possible conclusion from this analysis is that experience is
necessary for success and the lack of experience led to the failure of the two firms. This
is only an example; the full analysis in the results section (Section 5) will further develop
these findings.
Cross-Case Successful v Failed Firms
Category/Type of




There is strong support that
the 4 successful firms have
very experienced mgt. Most
have VC & investment
experience & also vast
industry experience. Most
also have experience in their
selected investment space.




Transpac VP has VC
experience but little experience
in their changing market space.
Lower levels of experience in
both cases could have impacted
on their success.
Experience matters. The successful
firms have a clear advantage over the
unsuccessful ones due to the
experience of their mgt teams in their
investment space. This is especially so
in having VC & investment experience.
Industry experience is also clearly
present in successful firms. Both failed
firms have less experienced mgt & in
one case while they have experience it
is not in their investment space.
Table 4.6 - Cross Case Pattern Matching - Successful vs. Failed Firms
4.4.4 Summary of Cross-Case Pattern Matching
As can be seen from the examples given, this methodology is a very robust and viable
methodology for qualitative analysis especially in explorative studies. It is very precise,
has a proper flow and strategy and provides valid findings that are easy to corroborate.
Also, because of the audit trail, it can be traced back through its entire path by another
researcher to look for failings or shortcomings and if necessary another researcher can
use the same methodology to test the findings among a different group of cases.
4.5 Conclusion on Methodology and Research Design
We have seen from Chapters 3 and 4 that this is a robust and reliable methodology. The
methodology is suitable for this dissertation for several reasons. As was shown in the
literature review in section 2.5, we have determined that the existing literature on global
venture capital is scarce and does not answer the research question and we have
therefore concluded that an exploratory form of research is desirable to achieve our
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objectives. We also concluded that we need a research design that enables the
development of propositions or meta-propositions due to the lack of theory in the
literature relating to global venture capital from a South East Asian context. This
research design has to be an inductive design to enable the discovery of new themes
and ideas in this under-explored field and it should not be overly structured. Finally we
concluded that as an exploratory research design it would be better to seek answers
using the respondents' own language and meanings.
Based on these requirements, we sought an open exploratory methodology and
research design and decided that the Grounded Theory and case study methodology
was the most suitable for this dissertation. It was suitable as it enabled in-depth analysis
to be done using a few cases but these cases were studied in greater depth to produce
new ideas and propositions. This methodology gave the researcher the opportunity to
really explore and by not constraining the researcher or the respondents interesting
ideas could develop. However, care must be taken that the methodology is both viable
and would stand the test of robustness.
As shown in Chapters 3 and 4 above, we have achieved these goals. The Grounded
Theory and case study methodology is open, exploratory, viable and robust. Chapter 4
also demonstrated the workings of the methodology and how it will be used with the data
that has been obtained in this dissertation. It is also robust because it uses both
qualitative and quantitative data in the form of triangulation of the data sets. Its
robustness is also demonstrated by the Audit Trail which enables the reader or future
researchers to follow every step of the data back to its origins, thus enabling the reader
to reconstruct the findings if necessary from the very beginning of data collection to the
analysis and results.
The constant comparative methodology espoused by Glaser & Strauss (1967) has been
used extensively in this dissertation and can be viewed by the reader in the multiple
stages and levels of matrices and pattern matching that have been performed. While the
Grounded Theory methodology is complex, the use of data matrices has made the data
analysis more manageable and understandable for the researcher as well as the reader.
Thus the methodology and research design meets the requirements of this dissertation
and enables us to move forward to the next stage of the dissertation: the analysis and
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results of the study. Section 5 provides a complete analysis and results of the data using
the Grounded Theory and case study methodology.
t
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5. Analysis & Results
This section deals with the results of the data collection and the complete analysis using
the Grounded Theory and case study methodology. The data will be incorporated into
several matrices on which 'within case' and 'cross-case' pattern matching analyses will
be performed. The key details of the analyses from the pattern matches will be
presented here and the findings and conclusions analysed on a case-by-case basis as
part of the methodology. Through this detailed analytical methodology corroborations
and contradictions will be highlighted and conclusions will be made on the factors that
determined the success or led to the failure of the cases in this study. These conclusions
will then be utilised in section 6 to generate propositions.
The discussion in this section will be as follows. Section 5.1 will show the pattern
matching for successful firms. There are two parts to this section in which analysis of
cases will be done on a category-by-category basis. The first part consists of within case
pattern matching where each firm will be analysed using both interview data and the
triangulated data. This will be followed by the second part where the four successful
firms will be compared to each other in a cross-case pattern matching. This cross-case
pattern matching will enable the discovery of factors or reasons that lead to the group's
success.
Section 5.2 will follow the same format but for the two failed cases. Here we will discover
the factors or reasons that lead to the group's failure. This will then be followed by
section 5.3 where the conclusions from the results of the pattern matching of successful
and failed firms will be compared from which we will discover why firms are successful or
why they failed. It is also worth noting that in this section the analysis will not be related
to the wider literature at this stage as that is done very comprehensively in section 6.2
"Match with Enfolding Literature". This is in keeping with the Grounded Theory and case
study methodology format. We start the process with the pattern matching for successful
firms.
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5.1 Pattern matching for successful firms
The objective of this section is to identify the role that each category plays in the success
of each case and then to compare the cases to each other. The Grounded Theory and
case study methodology requires detailed study of each individual case to identify
common patterns for individual cases before these patterns are used to compare to the
other cases.
We will again use Hargadon & Sutton's (1997) evidentiary method as adopted for this
dissertation (explained in section 4.2.4 above) to show support of whether the category
played a strong, moderate or even no role in the firm. The analysis will first look at the
interview statements and then will match the statements with the triangulated data.
Hence for each case within this study there are two types of pattern matching:
• Within case pattern matching of the interview data (full details provided in
Appendix G1 to G6) and;
• Within case pattern matching of the interview data with other triangulated data
(full details provided in Appendix C1 - C6).
5.1.1 Intangible Resources- Management Team Experience
The first category among the categories grouped under the heading of Intangible
Resources is Management Team Experience.
a) Within Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching data indicates that management team experience is an
important aspect of a firm's success. This is initially shown by the interview data as the
managers indicate that experience is necessary for success. Based on the interviews
this point is used in the within case meta-analysis and triangulated with other data for
each firm as will be seen below.
i) Barings Communications Equity Asia (BCEA)
The analysis shows that there is strong support of experience in the BCEA management
team.
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The BCEA managers specifically mentioned the need for experience. T.S. Yong
mentioned that BCEA invested in their focus areas successfully in Europe and wanted to
replicate their success in Asia. He also specifically mentioned the need for their
managers to have the skills and experience to be successful. Peter Chan indicated that
the team had a lot of experience because they had gone through troughs and peaks in
the investment cycle. He also mentions specifically their media experience and their
strategic focus on TMT or technology, media and telecommunications, a strategy which
enables them to leverage on their experience.
Based on triangulated data BCEA had a management team that had vast and long-term
experience in their industry space. BCEA has a media and telecommunications focus
and both the senior partners have many years experience in this space. Chan also has a
lot of VC experience while Yong was Country Director of Singapore's and South East
Asia's largest telecommunications firm Singapore Telecommunications. They also made
many investments in the space and have exited these investments successfully.
ill Bl Walden
Bl Walden and the Walden group also demonstrate strong support of experience in the
management team. Experience is one aspect of management that is often mentioned by
the managers in their interviews. Kwee-Bee Chok, the Country Manager, states that
Walden learns from their partners and their experience. For example one of their
investments, Sina.com survived the dotcom bust because the Walden partners knew
what was necessary to survive as they learnt from their experiences in the past. Another
example was that they learn how to fund adequately from their US counterparts; for
example they know from experience that to design a chip requires at least US$ 20
million, so any firm without this amount of funding will not be able to successfully design
a chip.
Cindy Tee, an Investment Manager, states that they identify their strategic focus via the
history of the group which started in semiconductors and evolved into software, Internet
and Business Process Outsourcing, indicating the value of their past experience. Chee-
Khen Chong, another Investment Manager, says that how they look at deals is different
because they have experience of prior deals done by other global offices to guide them.
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Walden has a particular focus on semiconductors and have listed the second largest
semiconductor firm in Malaysia (Unisem) as well as the largest in China and one of the
largest in the world, SMIC, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation,
which is listed in Hong Kong and NASDAQ. PrivateEquityOnline.com and the publication
Private Equity International also voted Walden as the "VC Firm of the Year in Asia" for
2004 (Private Equity Online, 2005). Their CEO has been a VC for 18 years. The country
manager for Malaysia is also vastly experienced as a corporate finance manager having
listed almost 100 firms in Malaysia. The triangulated data shows that the team is vastly
experienced and has been very successful for almost 2 decades.
iii) H&Q Thailand
The analysis shows that there is strong support of experience in the H&Q group
management team but there is some limitation in the experience of the Thai country
team. The Managing Director, Virapan Pulges, does not specifically mention
management team experience in the interview but confirmed its importance in a follow-
up email. Investment Manager, Patan Somburanasin, states that the US management
team and the regional Managing Directors meet quarterly to formulate strategy. They
also meet to share experiences and fund performances. In a follow up email Patan also
mentions that management team experience is crucial for their success.
Triangulated data shows that the H&Q group also has an experienced management
team. The CEO has listed many investments successfully in the USA and Asia. They
have vast experience in the venture capital industry and a very experienced regional
team. They have also had many successful regional and global IPOs including on
NASDAQ, indicating there is a lot of experience in the group. The Managing Director of
H&Q Thailand was a senior executive in one of Thailand's largest seafood
manufacturers and exporters and was also the President of the Thai VC Association.
While the experience of the Investment Manager is less, it is made up for by the varied
experience of the H&Q partners.
However, the country team experience is limited to industry experience and not to
venture capital experience, although with three successful IPOs they would have gained
more experienced.
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iv) MSC Venture Corporation
The analysis shows that there is strong support of experience in the management team.
The CEO Esmond Goei states that the investment model is based on their experience
and knowledge. As an example he says that when they look at a deal, they have to "look
beyond the deal". He is implying that that their experience allows them to do this and to
see what others do not see in potential deals. The COO, Husni Salleh alludes to the
value of experience by saying that personal success to him is to have managed a
successful fund, to have that experience. Alan Tan, the Investment Manager measures
the value that the CEO brings to the firm through the depth of experience that he brings
from America. He also mentions the experience that Esmond has working for a
Singapore VC fund.
From the triangulated data and from the Biodata of the team we can see that the firm
has an experienced management team with a CEO who was a successful VC and
entrepreneur and a COO who was formerly a senior manager with Walden. The
managers have worked in a variety of firms and have been successful VCs and even
entrepreneurs and bring this experience with them to the firm. They have also
successfully listed many investments on the stock market bringing much IPO experience
to the team. There is strong support of experience in the firm.
b) Cross-Case Pattern Matching—
The within case pattern matching is summarised in Table 5.1 below to enable ease of
cross-case comparisons.





















there is validation that
experience is necessary
for firm success. The
firm overall has vast
experience though
country team











There is strong support
that the 4 successful
firms have very
experienced mgt. Most
have VC & investment
experience & also vast
industry experience. Most
also have experience in
their selected investment
space.
Table 5.1: Cross Case Pattern Matching Successful Firms - Management Team
Experience
10 The complete analysis and pattern matching for successful cases is given in Appendix 11.
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Overall there is strong support that the four successful firms have very experienced
management teams. Most have venture capital and investment experience and also
vast industry experience. They also have a lot of experience with successful exits. All the
managers also have experience in their selected investment space. This cross-case
analysis shows that managers believe experience is an important factor in the success
of these firms. Not only do the managers state that experience is necessary for success,
this statement is backed up by the actual experience in the management teams of each
firm as shown by the triangulated data. We can therefore conclude that experience is a
necessary element of success in these firms.
5.1.2 Intangible Resources- Expertise and Knowledge Base
The second category under this group heading is expertise and knowledge base and we
shall now explore this category.
a) Within Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching data indicates that expertise and knowledge base is an
important aspect of a firm's success. This is initially shown by the interview data as the
managers indicate that it is necessary for success. Based on the interviews this point is
used in the within case meta-analysis and triangulated with other data for each firm as
will be seen below.
i) Barings Communications Equity Asia
The analysis provides strong support that management has vast expertise and
knowledge in their selected focus areas. In the interviews the managers specifically
mention expertise and knowledge. Yong stated that the partners were confident (of
success) because of the knowledge base within the firm and their expertise in the
markets and industries. Chan emphasises the need for the "right people" in the
management team, that the fund must be supported by the "team's expertise". He also
mentioned their worry during the dotcom boom when they didn't have enough
knowledge about the Information and Communications Technology industry especially
related to Internet investments; that they lacked knowledge to invest in Internet
businesses. There is a strong emphasis on their knowledge base and expertise.
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In BCEA, based on their Biodata and investment data, there is strong support that
management has vast expertise and knowledge in their selected focus areas. Their
investment space is in the media and telecommunications industry and both partners
deem expertise in their investment field important. They have multiple investments and
also industry and VC expertise related to their investment space.
ii) Bl Walden
The analysis shows strong support of expertise and knowledge base in the Walden
management team. Chok emphasises that the firm must have the right partners to
become a Tier-1 VC firm. She says that Walden partners are industry people and know
the industry well. For example, one of their software partners Mary Coleman was from
Baan a leading enterprise software company. All of their partners have built companies.
Walden wants people with domain expertise. She also states that local VC firms lack
knowledge and exposure. When Walden invests they depend on the domain expertise of
the partners stating that in semiconductors Walden is in the top 5 in the world and no. 1
in Asia.
Tee states that there are five sectors in Walden and an industry expert heads each
sector. Chong mentions that the founder of Walden is a long-term visionary alluding to
his experience and also his expertise in making Walden a success. Also when they
invest, they invest in areas they know best, confirming that their knowledge base is an
important tool in their investment strategy. He also states that the expertise of other
offices and partners is used often.
The triangulated data indicates that the Walden management team are highly qualified
and have expertise in their investment space having done many prior investments and
exited successfully. For example in software their senior venture consultant was a
successful entrepreneur who sold his own software firm to a market leader and later
joined the buying firm as a VP and General Manager. He is also very qualified with an
MBA and a PhD. They also have many successful regional investments, which fit their
knowledge base and expertise.
iii) H&Q Thailand
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The analysis shows strong support of expertise and knowledge base in the H&Q group's
management team but this is tempered by less expertise at the country level in Thailand.
Virapan again does not specifically mention management team expertise in the interview
but confirms this by email. However, Patan states that the industry they pick to invest in
is important. If the VC has no expertise or uses the wrong strategy then it can lead to
failure. They will also do business development and use their networks to help grow the
company and also need to study the company's markets. He alludes to the value of the
managers' expertise and knowledge base in business development and understanding
the investee's markets. In a follow up email Patan also mentions that management team
expertise is crucial for success.
From triangulated data we can see that H&Q Thailand has less expertise at the country
level but more expertise at the group level. Their senior managers have expertise within
their investment space having successfully exited many large investments including
IPOs on NASDAQ, in Hong Kong, Tokyo and also Thailand. In Thailand the Managing
Director has successfully exited 3 companies on the Thai Stock Exchange. While there
is a lot of expertise in the group it is somewhat limited at the country level although the
group does play a significant role in each country as well as the region.
iv) MSC Venture Corporation
The analysis shows strong support of expertise and knowledge base in the management
team. Goei states that the firm's Investment model is based on the experience and
knowledge of the management team. Husni believes that expertise is important because
they need to do business development and even project manage their deals if
necessary. They also do fund raising for their investee companies. The expertise of the
firm is summed up by Tan when he states that "what works best is what we know best",
that they invest in things that they understand; in companies that they can value-add.
They must be comfortable with the industry. However he does say that in Malaysia there
isn't sufficient expertise in the VC industry. There is recognition of the value of expertise
to the firm.
The triangulated data shows that MSC Venture Corporation is one of the most
successful VC firms in Malaysia. It has listed 5 fiims successfully on MESDAQ. It was
also one of the earliest to invest in early stage technology companies having started
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investing in 1997. The CEO and management team have a lot of expertise and the CEO
was also a successful entrepreneur. There is strong support of expertise in the firm.
b) Cross-Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching is summarised in Table 5.2 below to enable ease of
cross-case comparisons.
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Table 5.2: Cross Case Pattern Matching: Successful Firms Expertise & Knowledge Base
There is again strong support that all the successful firms have expertise and knowledge
that fits their investment space. Most also have vast venture capital expertise as well as
IPO and M&A expertise. Also, due to their past success in their investment space they
have built up a strong knowledge base in their teams. This cross-case analysis shows
that expertise and knowledge base is an important factor in the success of these firms.
Not only do the managers state that it is necessary for success, this statement is backed
up by the actual expertise and knowledge base in the management teams of each firm
as shown by the triangulated data. We can therefore conclude that expertise and
knowledge base is a necessary element of success in these firms.
5.1.3 Intangible Resources- Knowledge Sharing
The third category under this group heading is knowledge sharing and we shall now
explore this category.
a) Within Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching data indicates that knowledge sharing is an important
aspect of a firm's success. This is initially shown by the interview data as the managers
indicate that it is necessary for success. Based on the interviews this point is used in the
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within case meta-analysis and triangulated with other data for each firm as will be seen
below.
it Barings Communications Equity Asia
There is strong support of knowledge sharing in the BCEA group. Yong mentions that
the team can leverage on their regional offices' expertise and knowledge base in their
respective markets and industries. They also depend on their people on the ground to
look at issues like regulations and other factors. They also call their fellow fund
managers for opinions, indicating the sharing of knowledge. Chan specifically mentions
the support from the extended Barings group including the US and UK where their
partners globally have an agreement to support each other. They are also in constant
touch with their counterparts in UK, India and USA, allowing them to share ideas,
thoughts and also seek opinions on investments.
In BCEA, there was strong support of knowledge sharing among the different regional
offices and the partners also indicated this in the interviews. There was also informal
sharing of knowledge between the larger ING Barings group although there were no
formal links among the international firms showing that they recognised the value of
knowledge sharing even if it was done informally.
ii) Bl Walden
There is also strong support of knowledge sharing in the Walden group. Chok mentions
that they learn from their partners and their experience, confirming that there is
knowledge sharing in the group. Their strategy is to meet regularly and they have
quarterly management meetings (or QMM as they call it) at which they look at dealflow,
syndicating and other issues. They also do weekly conference calls and she specifically
mentions the sharing of views and knowledge among the partners.
Tee states that there is a lot of sharing of information between the various partners and
they have quarterly industry group meetings. The industry heads also meet half yearly to
look at the development of the industry and also perform an annual review of the
industry. There is also a yearly strategy meeting and even at the lower levels, individual
sub-committees also meet regularly to share information. Chong also mentions that
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there are regular meetings by the respective country heads, the industry experts and by
the CEO to formulate strategy.
The triangulated data indicates that regular knowledge sharing is enhanced by the wide
spread of offices and the vast expertise and knowledge base of their many partners and
their special advisory committee. The firm has many successful IPOs globally, and
based on their success and the managers' confirmation of regular sharing, it can be
concluded that knowledge sharing plays a big role in their success.
iii) H&Q Thailand
H&Q also show strong support of knowledge sharing in the group. Virapan states that
the Managing Directors meet regularly on a quarterly basis. When there is a crisis like
the Asian financial and economic crisis, the Managing Directors will also meet to study
their strengths and weaknesses as well as the opportunities and threats (SWOT) to their
business and will look at strengthening their SWOT. They also do conference calls when
making investment decisions and for deals larger than US$20 million then 2 members of
the regional Investment Committee will also visit the investee company. This again
shows the sharing of knowledge within the group. Patan also states that the US
management team and the regional Managing Directors meet quarterly to formulate
strategy. They also meet to share experiences and fund performances.
The wide spread of offices and vast knowledge of the regional partners and their special
Advisory Committee alludes to the fact that the group most likely does share knowledge.
The fact that both managers indicate that there are regular meetings to share knowledge
and strategise on their investment focus and portfolio companies shows that the partners
play an active role in knowledge sharing.
iv) MSC Venture Corporation
There is moderate support of knowledge sharing in the firm. Goei believes that the firm
has a lot to contribute to the industry hence his interest in being engaged in domestic
policy and the hope that the policymakers will solicit his views. Husni explains the
requirement to talk to people overseas, to their networks. They will make more use of
their networks to find out examples of the things that their contacts did. This is part of the
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knowledge sharing at the firm. Alan states that Goei brings a lot of experience from
America. Since he became CEO its not just about what they do but how they do it.
The interview data indicates that there is regular knowledge sharing among the
management team, especially between their experienced CEO and the rest of the team.
However it is difficult to obtain triangulated data to verify sharing as the firm is a single
country fund. While there can be no group sharing because it is a single country fund the
evidence of sharing within the firm is strong based on interview data.
b) Cross-Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching is summarised in Table 5.3 below to enable ease of
cross-case comparisons.
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Table 5.3: Cross Case Pattern Matchina - Successful Firms - Knowledae Sharinq
In this category all the firms exhibit strong support of knowledge sharing among the
management teams. Generally there is strong support that all the successful firms share
knowledge on a regular basis. There is diversity in the management teams and they
meet regularly to share knowledge and experiences. The firms' managers deem sharing
of knowledge important and among the cases there is strong support of active sharing of
knowledge between the partners of their different global and regional offices.
This cross-case analysis shows that knowledge sharing is an important factor in the
success of these firms. It is stated by the managers as necessary for success and
although it is not easy to back this up with triangulated data there is adequate support of
this as well. We can therefore conclude that knowledge sharing is a necessary element
of success in these firms.
5.1.4 Intangible Resources - Market Knowledge & Continuous Learning
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The fourth category under this group heading is market knowledge and continuous
learning and we shall now explore this category.
a) Within Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching data indicates that market knowledge and continuous
learning is an important aspect of a firm's success. This is initially shown by the interview
data as the managers indicate that it is necessary for success. Based on the interviews
this point is used in the within case meta-analysis and triangulated with other data for
each firm as shown below.
i) Barings Communications Equity Asia
There is strong support of market knowledge and continuous learning in the BCEA
group. Yong stated that it was important for the investment partners to have on the
ground presence, to "know the market and the players" and for their partners to have the
ability to "smell out a deal", alluding to the importance of market knowledge. They also
need to have people on the ground to look at market regulations in their different
markets. Chan was also worried that they did not have enough knowledge of "Internet
investing" especially when investing in that space was booming prior to the Dotcom bust
in 2000. That led to the firm continually sharpening their product differentiation and
continuously learning about the market in which they operate. This relates to continuous
learning and adapting to their market.
The triangulated data shows that BCEA does have wide market knowledge. From their
numerous regional offices to their successful investments and exits, they demonstrate
good market knowledge. They also have access to the global offices of the ING-Barings
group which provides them with additional sources of market knowledge.
ii) Bl Walden
The Walden group also shows strong support of market knowledge and continuous
learning. Chok says that their partners are industry people and know their industry well.
Partners must also have good financial background and must read and learn all the time
indicating the active role of continuous learning. They choose the industry to invest in
and this choice may change depending on the market, for example they now look for
digital consumer products and mobile technology investments. They are investing 3
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years ahead of what they think the future will be, indicating that they are aware of what is
happening in the market. They anticipate trends and change the business model if
necessary and will also refocus their strategy depending on external events like their
refocus after the Internet bust in 2000. They also benchmark not just against other VC
firms but also other individual VCs showing market awareness and learning. They also
get second opinions form experts. Continuous learning is confirmed because the firm
sends their managers to the VC Institute in California to enhance their knowledge. She
also states that local VCs lack exposure and don't invest in their own training.
Tee says that third party endorsements also help in deciding to invest in a deal, alluding
to the importance of market knowledge of outside experts. When there is a deal, they
check out the deal by using their contacts, industry and market players, so they actively
learn from outside parties. Chong states that the expertise of their regional offices also
helps in deal making.
Triangulated data shows that there is a lot of market knowledge available through the
firm's wide spread of regional offices. They also have a very experienced and
knowledgeable Technical Advisory Committee consisting of seasoned professionals,
PhDs and successful entrepreneurs showing that they value market knowledge and are
willing to learn from outside experts.
iii) H&Q Thailand
There is strong support of market knowledge and continuous learning in the H&Q group.
Virapan indicates that the group changes their strategy when necessary. For example
pre- Asian crisis they used to make smaller investments but after the crisis they started
to make larger investments because there was an opportunity with restructuring deals.
They also changed their strategy to take control of their investments. Patan confirms this
strategy and also states that they take an active involvement in their investments, which
is important for their success. They will also do business development and use their
networks to grow the business. They also study their investee company's markets. This
is an indication of market knowledge and continuous learning.
The triangulated data shows that they have a wide network of offices and many
successful investments and a large portfolio of companies. They also spend time doing
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market development and learning about their investee's markets and as they have an
active involvement in the management of their investee firms they will also develop more
market knowledge. They show continuous learning by actively study the market for their
investments and rely on improving their market knowledge to assist their investee firms.
With IPOs in multiple countries, and a strong and vastly experienced Advisory
Committee, they have a lot of market knowledge as well.
iv) MSC Venture Corporation
There is strong support of market knowledge and continuous learning in the firm. Goei
believes that the firm is very successful because they have successfully taken their
Malaysian investees to the US and China and brought an American firm to Malaysia.
They have also listed several companies on MESDAQ the technology exchange. He
states that they look at deals differently for example one investee that does TV
programming is now doing programming in Chinese for the China market. He also
believes that the key part of the ecosystem is the state of mind, the people in the US
have a different state of mind and they are not afraid to venture out or to invest money
for a future return. All this stems from his market knowledge of multiple countries
including the US.
Husni says that their investment strategy is to invest based on the life cycle of the fund.
They decide how to capitalise at each timeline. For example the need to pick the
industry at different timeline for e.g. Biotech takes too long to give a return whereas
electronic devices are easy to ramp up. This shows that they are aware of the cycles of
business and of their fund. Alan states that they must be able to pilot the boat when
necessary. In Malaysia entrepreneurs are young first-timers. So MSCVC must be able to
solve their problems if entrepreneurs cannot. Thus there is a need to have wide market
knowledge.
From triangulated data it is difficult to show market knowledge, as it is single country
firm. However they have listed 5 firms on MESDAQ and are one of the most successful
local firms in Malaysia. However, the interviews indicate that the management, team
plays an active role in the management of their investee firms. They spend time studying
the markets and the ecosystem including their investee firm's market. They also help
their investee firms with problem solving, indicating the need for good market
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knowledge. These are indications of continuous learning though there is no support of
any formal learning and no advisory committees.
b) Cross-Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching is summarised in Table 5.4 below to enable ease of
cross-case comparisons.







































Table 5.4: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Successful Firms - Market Knowledge &
Continuous Learning
There is also strong support of market knowledge and continuous learning among these
firms. The successful firms obtain market knowledge via industry expertise by having
external Advisory Committees. Multiple exits and the success of IPOs and M&A's among
these firms also provide more market knowledge. There is also support of continuous
learning among the firms and in one case, Walden; managers also attend the VC
Institute to improve their skills, lending credence to the continuous learning of the firm.
The cross-case analysis shows that market knowledge and continuous learning is an
important element in the success of these firms. The managers believe that it is
important and the triangulated data backs this up as well. We can therefore conclude
that market knowledge and continuous learning is a necessary element of success in
these firms.
5.1.5 Intangible Resources - Independence of the Management Team
The fifth and final category under this group heading is independence of the
management team and we shall now explore this category.
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a) Within Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching data indicates that independence of the management
team is an important aspect of a firm's success. This is initially shown by the interview
data as the managers indicate that it is necessary for success. Based on the interviews
this point is used in the within case meta-analysis and triangulated with other data for
each firm as shown below.
i) Barings Communications Equity Asia
There is only moderate support of management team independence in the BCEA group.
Yong states in his interview that BCEA runs autonomously. They used to have a
common Investment Committee for their global funds but this is no longer the case. The
partners make all their own investment decisions and have their own Investment
Committee. Chan also says that the management team is decentralised.
Showing management team independence is not easy from triangulated data. As BCEA
has a wide regional network of offices with senior and experienced personnel managing
the offices, some level of independence is shown. Also there is no more management
link with their British office as stated by the partners so independence is fairly well
confirmed.
ii) Bl Walden
There is also only moderate support of management team independence in the Walden
group. Chok states that each country manager plays a strategic role by providing a
roadmap of investments for the next 3-5 years. Their investment strategy also depends
on the expertise of the partners. Partners are fairly independent as they are all
successful industry people and some were even successful Entrepreneurs. However,
Tee does say that Walden is a bureaucratic organisation with clear hierarchies.
However, each country does formulate a local strategy and sees what works and what
does not. What works in the US might not work in Asia, so there may be some
independence for regional offices. Chong also states that the respective country heads
formulate strategy.
While it is again difficult to show support of independence, the fact that there are many
regional offices with highly experienced country heads does give some indication of
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independence. Also, the fact that the managers indicate that the country heads
formulate their own strategy does show some form of independence.
iii) H&Q Thailand
There is moderate support of management team independence in the H&Q group.
Virapan confirms that the headquarters does not play much of a role in the strategy. The
Exco and the Investment Committee make their own decisions. Each local fund has a
local Investment Committee and they make the decisions. The strategy is also to have
local managers in each country. Patan states that the local management will propose the
industry strategy and will identify the different industries to invest in based on each
country. They also give each country leeway to decide on the industries and don't place
limits on each country. Local offices also identify their own opportunities and dealflow.
The fact that they have multiple regional offices and senior managers to head each
office shows some independence for each office. As the country heads also formulate
their own strategy lends some weight to independence. Hence there are indications of
some management independence in H&Q Thailand.
iv) MSC Venture Corporation
There is strong support of management team independence in the firm. There is less
mention of independence during the interviews but this can be attributed to the fact that
they are a single country fund and only have to report to their investors, there is no
further hierarchy. Husni states that the local venture capital structure is different. There
is no partnership structure and senior managers earn a salary as employees. Hence
there is an employee - employer structure unlike most other VC funds. Alan says that
the original CEO didn't want to take the loss of loss making investments even though the
management team was recommending that they write off the loss. However when Goei
came in he cut off all the loss making companies. In the early days there was a lot of
indecision but Goei is very decisive.
The interview data shows that Goei made some hard decisions without recourse to other
parties and this shows that there is management independence in the firm. Although
triangulated data is unable to verify independence because it is a single country fund,
interview data provides the confirmation.
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b) Cross-Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching is summarised in Table 5.5 below to enable ease of
cross-case comparisons.
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Table 5.5: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Successful Firms - Independence of
Management Team
In the successful firms there is moderate support of management team independence.
Most firm management have some independence though complete independence is not
easy to verify. These firms have the ability to make investment decisions, formulate and
execute strategy and contribute to the overall group by sharing their knowledge and
expertise. Their independence is validated by the active roles they play in the group as a
whole, in regional companies meetings, in formulating long-term strategy and in the
sharing of knowledge.
The cross-case analysis shows that independence of the management team is an
important element in the success of these firms. The managers believe that it is
important and the triangulated data backs this up as well. We can therefore conclude
that independence of the management team is a necessary element of success in these
firms. One important point to note is that all these firms have been around for more than
10 years with the exception of MSC Venture Corporation, which has been around since
1999. All these firms have also been through the dotcom bust of 2000 and the 9-11
terrorist attacks and have survived and have continued to prosper. Their managements
have also remained independent and have been able to get through these difficult
events.
5.1.6 Dealflow - Identifying and Securing Deals
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There are two elements under the major category of 'Dealflow', the first of which is
identifying and securing deals. Without deals the firm cannot provide a return to its
investors, hence the respondents have stated that it is important to not just identify but
also secure deals for the firm. We shall now examine each case in detail.
a) Within Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching data indicates that the ability to identify and secure
deals is an important aspect of a firm's success. This is initially shown by the interview
data as the managers indicate that it is necessary for success. Based on the interviews
this point is used in the within case meta-analysis and triangulated with other data for
each firm as shown below.
i) Barings Communications Equity Asia
There is strong support of the ability to identify and secure deals in the BCEA group.
Yong mentioned that it is important that the investment partners have the ability to 'smell
out a deal'. By this he means that this is an important role for the partners of the firm.
Chan specifies one example of how they identify deals. For example, in Malaysia they
have to identify good Bumiputra companies11 and then fund their IPOs. Both partners
identify the need for deals.
In terms of the triangulated data there is clear support that BCEA has the ability to
identify and secure deals. The group has many investments throughout the region and
has also successfully exited some of the deals through IPOs or acquisitions. There are
many deals in their investment space and within their geographic focus. There is strong
evidence of deal flow in their regional offices as shown by their portfolio of investments.
ii) Bl Walden
There is also strong support of the ability to identify and secure deals in the Walden
group. Chok states in the interview that it is a requirement for each manager to identify
10 contacts that can bring in dealflow for the firm. Tee says that managers must have
the ability to spot good opportunities to take to an exit. In deal origination they have to
11
Bumiputra companies are given favourable treatment by the Malaysian government in their
affirmative action plan. They are normally given special privileges for contracts and all companies
listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange must have 30% Bumiputra ownership (Wikipedia,
2005).
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interact with all parties, they have to check out the deal, use their contacts, industry and
market players. She also states that in early stage deals there is a lot of handholding,
introduction to potential customers and even hiring of staff. Chong mentions that the
expertise of other offices and partners is used often in deal making. The local office does
the same for the overseas offices too. The managers have identified that this is an
important area for them.
In terms of the triangulated data there is clear support that Walden has the ability to
identify and secure deals. The group has many investments throughout the region and
has successfully exited many of the deals regionally and globally including IPOs in
Malaysia, Hong Kong and NASDAQ. There are many deals in their investment space
and within their geographic focus. There is strong support of deal flow in their regional
offices as shown by their portfolio of investments.
iii) H&Q Thailand
H&Q also shows strong support of the ability to identify and secure deals. Virapan says
that they will invest in any good deals. The regional model is successful because H&Q
go for the best deal within the region. They are also considering investing in Thai
companies setting up manufacturing plants in China or selling to Chinese consumers.
They source deals via their networks. Patan states that among the success factors for
his firm is the ability to pick the right industry to invest in. What is important is the right
industry, the right company, at the right price. The local offices will identify their
opportunities and dealflow and find a company that is growing and has a competitive
advantage.
In triangulated data there is strong support that the group as a whole has been
successful in identifying and securing deals as there is a large portfolio of investment
companies and successful exits. However, the dealflow in Thailand itself seems to be
limited as they have only 3 investments although they have successfully exited them on
the Stock Exchange of Thailand. According to media reports they are planning on raising
additional funds for investment in Thailand. Overall there is strong support that the firm
has the ability to identify and secure deals.
iv) MSC Venture Corporation
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There is strong support that the firm has been successful in identifying and securing
deals. Goei makes the point that when they look at a deal; they have to "look beyond the
deal". He is speaking of the ability of the firm's managers to identify specific aspects of a
deal that may not be as obvious to others. The example he gave is that of Cosmos
Discovery, one of their investee companies which produces TV programmes. As a
producer of TV programmes it is not an exciting prospect, but it also produces TV
programmes in Chinese, which enables it reach a much larger market in China. Data
from the company shows that Cosmos is now producing programs for over 60 TV
stations in Southern China and is planning on entering the pay TV market in China.
Husni states that one of the factors for success is "the ability to find the right deal and
the right people" - dealflow. Tan also confirms this viewpoint by stating that the firm's
investment strategy depends on a few factors one of which is "good dealflow".
Triangulated data shows that the firm has a large portfolio and is a successful VC firm,
having listed 5 companies on the MESDAQ market. There are a variety of investments
from TV programme producers to software and service firms. They have been able to
identify and secure deals within their investment space. The firm has also been securing
deals on a regular basis in the last 6 years since their formation, showing that what the
managers' state in their interviews is backed up by support of actual deals identified and
secured. There is strong support that the firm has been successful in identifying and
securing deals in its market.
b) Cross-Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching is summarised in Table 5.6 below to enable ease of
cross-case comparisons.
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Table 5.6: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Successful Firms - Identifying & Securing
Deals
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There is strong support that the successful firms have the ability to identify and secure
deals. All these firms have a large portfolio of investments and many successful exits.
The managers also state the need for the ability to do this and have proven their
capabilities through their successful investments. Only H&Q Thailand has shown some
limitation in the number of deals although among the deals secured it has been
successful in exiting the deals. H&Q on a regional basis however has shown great
success in identifying and securing deals as it has a large portfolio of investments and
exits.
The cross-case analysis shows that the ability to identify and secure deals is an
important element in the success of these firms. The managers believe that it is
important and the triangulated data backs this up by showing that the firms have a wide
portfolio of companies and many exits as well. We can therefore conclude that
identifying and securing deals is a necessary element of success in these firms.
5.1.7 Dealflow - Availability of Deals in the Market
The second element under the major category of 'Dealflow' is the availability of deals in
the market.
a) Within Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching data indicates that the availability of deals in the
market is an important aspect of a firm's success. This is initially shown by the interview
data as the managers indicate that it is necessary for success. Based on the interviews
this point is used in the within case meta-analysis and triangulated with other data for
each firm as shown below. We shall now examine each case in detail.
i) Barings Communications Equity Asia
There is strong support of deal availability in their markets. Yong says that one reason
why the firm started to look at investing in Asia was because the European market was
starting to consolidate and there were fewer opportunities there as the market started to
mature. The communications infrastructure also had been built so there were fewer
opportunities in that area. However the content industry was starting to grow, for
example in online travel in China. The partners have also just set up a new fund for Asia,
as there is now a window of opportunity to invest and take the companies to market.
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There is a gap in the market. Chan indicates that it is an important ingredient for success
not to be a single country fund, so BCEA will do one ASEAN deal for every two China
deals. He is indicating the necessity of spreading the investments geographically.
Triangulated data shows that BCEA has multiple investments in multiple countries. They
have also successfully exited many of their investments. They have a large portfolio of
investments within their investment and geographical focus showing strong support of
deal availability in their focus markets.
ib Bl Walden
Bl Walden also shows strong support of deal availability in their markets. Chok asserts
that dealflow is the main problem for VCs and for Walden it is a major problem. If there is
no dealflow, then Walden may leave the country. From a global perspective Malaysian
deals are too small for Walden. She believes the problem is whether Walden Malaysia
can get a big enough regional deal that can compare with China and North Asia. Tee
also believes that there is insufficient dealflow in Malaysia. She says that it is better in
Singapore, Hong Kong and China. Even if you manage to raise funds but cannot get
deals and cannot exit, it defeats the purpose of being a VC. She also believes that
Walden needs to get into early stage deals. Chong says that there are no factor
considerations, as Walden will go where the deal is. It is clear from this that availability of
dealflow is a big consideration for Walden as all the managers agree that dealflow is so
important that, as Chok the Country Managers says, the firm will leave the country if
there are no deals.
Triangulated data shows that Walden is a successful VC firm. It has multiple investments
in multiple countries. They have also successfully exited their investments in many
countries including in Malaysia and even listed investments in the US. This wide portfolio
of investments shows that there is deal availability within their geographic and
investment focus. However, the number of deals in Malaysia is small as they have only 4
deals listed. Perhaps this is an indication that there is inadequate deals in Malaysia
hence the statement by the managers that dealflow is a problem in Malaysia. Overall




H&Q shows strong support of deal availability in their markets. Virapan states that the
dealflow in Thailand for their size of deals is not many so they look for more
Management Buy-Out (MBO) deals. MBO deals are regarded as bigger as they are
normally related to larger firms in which the existing management buys out the existing
shareholders and then manage the company. Patan also confirms that dealflow in
Thailand is quite limited. He says that the new H&Q Asia Pacific fund is focused on
North Asia, mainly China and also on deals in Korea and Japan. Also the region may be
limited for e.g. the Asean market may be small (compared to China).
According to triangulated data, there is justification for their statements because H&Q
Thailand has only 3 deals in Thailand. Although they are successful, as they have listed
the three firms on the Thai Stock Market, the number of deals is not large. According to
the firm's regional data, every other office has more deals than the Thai office. On a
regional basis however, the H&Q group has multiple investments in multiple countries
showing that there is deal availability within their geographic and investment space.
Overall there is strong support of deal availability in their markets for the group, although
it is slightly limited in Thailand itself.
iv) MSC Venture Corporation
There is strong support of deal availability in their markets. Goei believes that the
dealflow is strong especially in the US. There are a lot of big deals there thanks to the
"word of mouth" network. Tan says that for the firm investments outside Malaysia must
have a tie or a link to Malaysia, it must benefit Malaysia. For e.g. they funded a US
marketing company to help market one of their Malaysian investee companies Nexus
Edge. So there must be a Malaysian angle. From the interviews there appears to be no
indication of a shortage of deals for MSC Venture Corporation in their geographic focus
unlike Walden where the managers all indicate that dealflow may be a problem.
Triangulated data shows that the firm has a large portfolio of investments within their
geographic and investment space. Although it is only a single country fund it has also
invested in the US. There is strong support of the availability of deals in market for the
firm and from interview data this is a factor that the managers believe is important to
their firm.
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b) Cross-Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching is summarised in Table 5.7 below to enable ease of
cross-case comparisons.
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Table 5.7: Cross Case Pattern Matching Successful Firms: Availability of Deals in
Market
There is strong support that there is availability of deals in their market as all the firms
have large investment portfolios indicting they have been able to find many deals in their
focus markets. The successful firms also have a wide and diversified portfolio of
investments throughout their geographic focus and among their different regional offices.
However, in the interviews with Walden and H&Q Thailand there are indications that
deals in Malaysia and Thailand may be less going forward and this may impact on their
future success in these markets.
The cross-case analysis shows that the availability of deals in the market is an important
element in the success of these firms. The managers believe that it is important and the
triangulated data backs this up by showing that the firms have a wide portfolio of
investments in their focus markets. A point to note is that it is availability of deals in the
market that leads to the success of these firms and not the other way around. For
example it could be said that successful firms will attract dealflow but the support in
these cases does not show that. Walden and H&Q are very successful and have many
listings globally yet both have stated that dealflow is insufficient in their markets. Hence
we can conclude that it is dealflow that leads to success and not success that attracts
dealflow.
We can therefore conclude that this is a necessary element of success for these firms.
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5.1.8 Exits - Viability of Exits in the Market
The third aspect that has been highlighted in the results is "Exits", which has also been
identified by all the managers as essential for the firm's success. The interview data
showed that the managers of the firms believed that the viability of exits in the market is
an important aspect of firm success. This section centres on whether the firms are
located in markets with an exit opportunity and whether they show support of exits. This
combination shows the viability of exits in their markets.
a) Within Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching data indicates that this aspect is important for the
firm's success. This is initially shown by the interview data as the managers indicate that
it is necessary for success. Based on the interviews this point is used in the within case
meta-analysis and triangulated with other data for each firm as shown below. We shall
now examine each case in detail.
i) Barings Communications Equity Asia
There is strong support of exit viability for BCEA. Yong claims that the key decision for
them to invest is the availability of an exit. There must be an active capital market for
either an IPO or a strategic acquirer available (in a merger and acquisition). Chan
corroborates his partner by stating that exits are the key to successful investments so
every market where they invest must have an exit strategy.
There is clear corroboration among the partners that there must be a viable exit in their
focus market before they make an investment.
The key point of this discussion is whether their investments are in countries with active
capital markets especially markets with viable stock exchanges. The triangulated data
shows that their portfolio of investments are all located in the Asian markets of
Singapore, China, Taiwan, Korea, Japan and Malaysia. All these markets have active
and viable stock exchanges proving the point of the partners' statements that they only
invest in markets in which an exit is available. BCEA also has successful exits in multiple




Bl Walden also shows strong support of exit viability. Chok says that the availability of an
exit mechanism is one of the first considerations for the firm. For example in Malaysia
the IPO market is good but Malaysia needs to develop the trade sales market especially
for the private equity industry. Tee identifies success with the ability to spot good
opportunities to take to an exit, indicating that the exit is an important factor in VC firm
success. To Chong, success means meeting the expectations of investors especially the
number of companies that get listed. If companies that you work with go for a listing or a
trade sale then you are a successful VC. Again the exit is an important factor of success
for him.
Centred on the point that the availability of an exit in their investment markets is
important for this category, the triangulated data shows that all Walden offices are
located in countries with viable stock exchanges. They have offices in Silicon Valley,
Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, China/Hong Kong and the Philippines. They have also
exited many investments in markets throughout the countries in which they invest both
IPOs and mergers and acquisitions. Thus there is strong support of exit viability for
Walden.
iii) H&Q Thailand
There is strong support of exit viability for H&Q. Virapan mentions the returns from some
of their investment companies that went IPO in Thailand as indicators of successful exits
in their Thailand market. Patan also speaks of the average return from those
divestments, which is 2.5 times, a figure that although is not high by international
standards is good by Thai standards. Although they do not specifically mention the
viability of exits in their market, throughout the interview there is a focus on IPOs,
acquisitions and return on exits showing that exits are an important proposition for the
firm.
The triangulated data shows that the firm has had many successful exits in all their
investment markets. They have offices in Silicon Valley, Japan, China, Thailand,
Singapore, Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines all countries with viable exchanges.
There is strong support that the viability of exits in their focus markets is essential for the
firm's success.
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iv) MSC Venture Corporation
MSC also shows strong support of exit viability. Goei believes that Mesdaq is the jewel
in the crown for Malaysia as it is a good exit opportunity for investee firms and there is
good liquidity in the market. He verifies this by stating that they have listed a few
companies on Mesdaq including RedTone, and Karensoft Technologies. Husni states
that for their China investment, the exit may not be in China, so they will exit outside
China for e.g. in Singapore or Hong Kong. Tan says that the firm is a successful firm and
has already broken even. On a regional perspective, it is probably one of the more
successful. At least two of the managers specifically speak of exits as important aspects
of their investments. The CEO in particular is very specific about the value of the
Mesdaq market to Malaysia.
Although the firm is a single country firm, it does have one China based investment and
another American investment. They are however open to listing their investments
outside their particular markets especially where there is a viable exchange available like
in Singapore or Hong Kong. Most of their investments are however in Malaysia and all
prior IPOs have been in Malaysia. Hence there is strong support of the viability of exits in
their markets for MSC Venture Corporation.
b) Cross-Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching is summarised in Table 5.8 below to enable ease of
cross-case comparisons.
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exits in their space
& geographic focus
There is strong support of
the viability of exits in their
markets. All firms have
successfully exited
investments in all markets
they invest in.
Table 5.8: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Successful Firms - Viability of Exits
There is strong support of the viability of exits in their markets for the successful firms.
The viability of exits in their geographic markets was important, as that was where most
of the exits took place. For example H&Q Thailand IPO'd all their investments in
Thailand while Walden Malaysia exited their investments in Malaysia and Singapore, the
two main markets in which they invest. This shows that the markets in which they invest
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have viable capital markets to exit their investments. The geographical spread of the
firms in the different Asian markets also coincides with countries and markets with an
active stock exchange. However as stated by Chok of Walden, in some markets like
Malaysia, the merger and acquisition market is weaker and this does add a constrain to
their exits.
The cross-case analysis shows that the viability of exits in their focus markets is an
important element in the success of these firms. The managers believe that it is
important and the triangulated data backs this up by showing that the firms have
successfully exited many of their investments in their focus markets. An important point
to note is that the viability of exits is not a measure of success, but that the markets that
these firms invest in must have viable exit opportunities otherwise they will not invest in
those markets. We can therefore conclude that this is a necessary element of success
for these firms.
5.1.9 Networks - Value of Networks
The fourth and last aspect that has been highlighted in the results is "Networks",
specifically the value of networks, which has been identified by all the managers as
necessary to identify deals and ensure the firm's success.
a) Within Case Pattern Matching
The interview data showed that the managers of the firms used their networks to identify
and secure deals and also to do business development for their investees. They
believed that networks were an important part of the VCs and the firm's success. We
shall now examine each case in detail.
it Barings Communications Equity Asia
There is strong support that BCEA has good networks in their investment markets. Yong
states that for their firm it is more important for their investment partners to have "on the
ground" presence, to know the market and the players. He states that among the
partners, their "roots are deep", indicating that they are fully networked into their
markets. Chan says that the firm has good regional contacts within different regions.
They also use local partners in each market, e.g. local securities houses. Partners may
also be investors or co-investors. There is corroboration between both the partners on
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the value of their networks and the fact that the firm has good contacts and networks in
their investment markets.
The triangulated data shows that among the managers and partners they have wide
work experience in different regions indicating the greater possibility of good networks.
They also have a wide portfolio of investments and successful exits in many of their
regional markets demonstrating that they are able to invest regularly, another indication
that they have possibly good networks. They also have a wide network of offices, which
enables them to have a wider network and contacts in the region. There is strong
support that BCEA has good networks in their investment markets.
ii) Bl Walden
Walden also shows strong support of good networks in their investment markets. Chok
states that the firm chooses partners with good local contacts. Partners must be able to
connect the CEO, Lip-Bu, with all the right people and must have a good network. Each
manager must also identify 10 contacts that can bring in dealflow. Tee mentions that
demographics in Asia are based on strong individual contacts. The strong Asia - Silicon
Valley connection in Walden made Asian companies successful in the USA. Chong
points out that the Singapore government has created a better ecosystem and more
networks that help their companies. All the managers mention networks and the value
that good networks bring to the firm. In fact the firm even selects partners based on their
networks, their contacts and the Country Manager even states that each partner must
even provide a minimum number of contacts for the CEO in each market. There is a
clear indication in the interviews that contacts and networks are a necessary ingredient
for the success of the firm.
The triangulated data shows that the firm's partners have wide work experience in
different regions and industries indicating the greater possibility of good networks. The
Country Manager of the Malaysian office has vast experience in one of the largest
Investment Banks in the country and has been involved in almost 100 IPOs on the
Malaysian exchange. They also have a wide portfolio of investments and successful
exits In many of their regional markets demonstrating that they are able to invest
regularly, another indication that they have possibly good networks. They also have a
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wide network of offices, which enables them to have a wider network and contacts in the
region.
Chok was also the President of the Malaysian Venture Capital Association and the group
CEO Lip-Bu is actively involved in many industry, charitable and university organisations
in America and in their investment regions, indicating greater possibility of having vast
contacts and networks. Hence there is strong support that Walden has good networks in
their investment markets.
iii) H&Q Thailand
There is strong support that H&Q has good networks in their investment markets.
Virapan says that they source deals via their networks and in fact all three of their deals
were due to personal networks. Patan also says that they will use their networks to help
grow the company. There is corroboration among the managers that networks are
valuable to their company, in fact it is a strong statement when the Managing Director
says that all of their investments were due to their personal networks.
The triangulated data shows that among the group's managers and partners they have
wide work experience in different regions indicating the greater possibility of good
networks. They also have a wide portfolio of investments and successful exits in many of
their regional markets demonstrating that they are able to invest regularly, another
indication that they have possibly good networks. They also have a wide network of
offices, which enables them to have a wider network and contacts in the region. The
Managing Director of the Thai office was also a Founder and Past President of the Thai
Venture Capital Association indicating greater possibility of having better contacts and
networks. Therefore there is strong support that the firm has good networks in their
investment markets.
iv) MSC Venture Corporation
MSC also shows strong support of good networks in their investment markets. Goei
states that dealflow is strong for the firm especially in the US because of his networks.
There are a lot of big deals thanks to the "word of mouth" network. Husni says that they
will make more use of their networks to find out examples of the things that their
contacts did. The customs and the networks are all local. Tan states that the firm's
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investment strategy depends on a few factors one of which is good networks saying that
they must have good networks in their investment field. There is corroboration between
the managers that they value their networks and that the firm has good contacts and
networks in their investment markets.
The triangulated data shows that among the managers they have wide work experience
and the CEO also has wide experience in different regions indicating the greater
possibility of good networks. They also have a wide portfolio of investments and
successful exits and have also invested outside Malaysia even though they are a single
country firm. This demonstrates that they are able to invest regularly, another indication
that they have possibly good networks. There is strong support that the firm has good
networks in their investment markets.
b) Cross-Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching is summarised in Table 5.9 below to enable ease of
cross-case comparisons.





































There is strong support of
good networks among
the firms. Most managers
have vast work
experience & have
shown the ability to invest
in many portfolio firms
using their networks.
Table 5.9: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Successful Firms - Networks
There is strong support of good networks among the successful firms. Most managers
have vast work experience and have shown the ability to invest in many portfolio firms
using their networks. In at least one case (H&Q Thailand) the Managing Director stated
that all their investments were made through their personal networks. The ability to
successfully invest and exit and their vast work and venture capital experience show that
the successful firms have good networks and use them to be successful.
The cross-case analysis shows that good networks are an important element in the
success of these firms. The managers believe that it is important and the triangulated
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data backs this up by showing that the firms have wide networks and have used these
networks to identify and secure deals as well as successfully exit them. We can
therefore conclude that this is a necessary element of success for these firms.
5.1.10 Conclusion on Pattern Matching for Successful Firms
This section on the pattern matching for successful firms provides a complete discussion
on a case-by-case basis for each of the successful firms in this dissertation. This case-
by-case analysis is an important part of the Grounded Theory and case study
methodology. The objective of this analysis is to delve into the details of each case and
to 'scope' out the important statements made by the respondents on the reasons for
their success and to match this to triangulated data to ensure that these statements are
verified by their actual actions. This process of verification is important to ensure that
what they say and what they do actually match. Once we have done this, the next step is
to make conclusions on their strengths or weaknesses for each category. We conclude
for each case by making a statement on whether there is say, strong support of
experience in the management team in that category.
The next step was to do cross-case analysis of all the successful cases for each
category. Here the initial conclusions for each case were matched with other cases in
the successful group and a final conclusion on whether there was corroboration or
contradiction was made. Using the experience category as an example, we found in
section 5.1.1 that overall all the successful firms had very experienced management
teams and this contributed to their success. Again, it is worth noting that this conclusion
was not based just on the interview data, that is, not just on what they said, but also on
triangulation with other datasets including quantitative data.
The conclusions that are reached for each category will then be used in section 5.3
where the patterns for the successful firms will be matched with the patterns of the failed
firms in this study, from which we will be able to determine any corroborations or
contradictions between the two sets of firms that can give us an answer to the research
question.
We summarise the findings of this section as follows. In the Intangible Resources
categories, we have found that all the successful firms have very experienced
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management teams with strong expertise and knowledge base in their focus industries
and they also share their knowledge extensively with each other. They also have wide
market knowledge either within the firms or through the use of external Advisory
Committees and there is strong support of continuous learning in the firms. Finally, there
is also support of management team independence in all the firms as they have the
authority or ability to make decisions on investments and also on the strategies that they
pursue and have survived intact through difficult crises like the dotcom bust of 2000 and
the 9-11 terrorist attacks in the USA.
In the category of 'Dealflow', in terms of identifying and securing deals all the firms have
been able to identify and secure many deals in the market and have a wide portfolio of
investee companies. The firms also show that there is availability of deals in their focus
market for all the firms. For the category 'Exits', these firms also show that there is
viability of exits in all the markets that they invest in as they have exited many of their
investments successfully in their markets. Finally, in the 'Networks' category, all the firms
show strong support of the value of networks and have good networks in their focus
markets, supportd by the large number of portfolio companies and successful exits. The
next step in this analysis is the pattern matching for the failed firms as follows.
5.2 Pattern matching for failed firms
The objective of this section is to identify the role that each category plays in the case of
each failed firm and then to compare the cases of the two failed firms to each other. As
stated in section 5.1, the Grounded Theory and case study methodology requires
detailed study of each individual case to identify common patterns before these patterns
are used to compare to the other cases. The same method used in section 5.1 will again
be used here.
5.2.1 Intangible Resources- Management Team Experience
a) Within Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching data indicates that management team experience is an
important aspect of a firm's success. This is initially shown by the interview data as the
managers indicate that experience is necessary for success. Based on the interviews
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this point is used in the within case meta-analysis and triangulated with other data for
each of the failed firms as will be seen below. We shall now explore each case in detail.
i) Softbank Emerging Markets
The analysis shows that there is only some support of experience in the SBEM
management team but this is insufficient to match to their industry focus. The managers
of Softbank mention aspects of management team experience in their interviews though
not in much detail.
Yoke-Kee Ang, the Regional Associate states that their foreign partners have worked
globally and are seasoned professionals. He states that Softbank also has a huge
portfolio of investments so it can benchmark and learn from previous successes and
failures of their portfolios in other markets like the US and Korea. Also important is the
role that Softbank plays in the management of the company. They will influence the
company and shorten the path to success. Softbank also has seasoned professionals
who work globally and can advise their companies. Karan Ponnudurai, the Investment
Manager, highlights the fact that both he and the Managing Director, David Low, had
experience in building ecosystems and networks and were able to connect with key
people. He mentions their industry expertise compared to other VCs who do not have an
industry background. There are strong suggestions in the interviews that Softbank
managers have a lot of experience to offer the firm and its investees.
However, the triangulated data offers less information and does not fully verify the claims
of experience other than the industry experience of the managers. None of them had
any VC experience while both Ponnudurai and Low only had telecommunications
experience. Ang is a corporate finance and management consultant with no background
in VC or the technology industry. They also did not have any investment experience and
there was no other person in the Softbank office that appears in any documents to
present any experience or assistance to the Malaysian based firm. Although they were
reporting to their headquarters in Silicon Valley, there was no one else who played a
management role in the firm. The only other office was opened in Poland in 2001 but
closed within 6 months of operations.
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A search of the archives for the Softbank Emerging Markets original website through the
US archive database on the Wayback Machine12 brought up the homepage of the
website but unlike their main Softbank Inc. website does not provide any information on
the management teams at the SBEM entities, hence no other management team
member's data was available to verify experience or expertise. The available data
therefore shows that there is actually insufficient experience in the firm.
ii) Transpac Capital
The analysis here also shows that there is moderate support of experience in the
Transpac management team. The Vice President and Country Manager of Transpac
Malaysia, Jason Ng, says that in 1997 after the Asian financial crisis the firm shifted
focus from VC to build 'platform companies' equating this to Private Equity like investing.
However he stated that they don't have the relevant experience and the knowledge for
such investments. Transpac people have MNC experience but in entrepreneurial firms it
is not the same.
Tien-Kiong Yeo, the Investment Manager states that Transpac had about 30 members of
staff in the investment team with a lot of experience including cross-border industrial
focus and cross-border evaluation teams. In the US VCs often have entrepreneurial
experience but in Asia most VCs are ex-bankers. Transpac however kept changing its
focus from a technology focus to low technology manufacturing and then to Internet
investments during the dotcom boom. However when the dotcoms went bust they shifted
to private equity type investing. However the managers did not have the experience in all
these industries. The requirement was to adapt to the market and he felt this was not
making use of their managers' experience.
Based on triangulated data, Ng had good VC experience as he was formerly a senior
executive at Walden and other investment firms but he didn't have any industry or
entrepreneurial experience. Yeo had limited industry experience but no VC experience.
Also the firm kept changing focus and finally ended up trying to do private equity
investing though on a smaller scale and this did not fit the experience of the
management. There isn't even a website to provide data on the firm and all the support
12 This is an archive service which archives websites from the mid-1990s and almost every
website since then is archived, (http://www.archive.org/web/web.php1
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was gleaned from news reports. In all documentary evidence the only name that crops
up is that of the Founder and CEO of the firm Christopher Leong.
Based in the interview data and on the managers' Biodata there is moderate support of
some VC experience in the firm. However due to the changing nature of the firm's
investment focus, and their current Private equity focus, the experience of the
management team would not fit the strategy of the firm and the conclusion is that there
is inadequate experience in the firm, a conclusion supported by the interview data.
b) Cross-Case Pattern Matching—
The within case pattern matching is summarised in Table 5.10 below to enable ease of
cross-case comparisons.
E) SBEM F) Transpac Conclusion
Some support. There was
insufficient support of management
experience. Overall experience was
inadequate & only in finance & telco.
No VC or investment experience &
esp. no Internet experience, their
focus area.
Moderate support. Team
has VC experience &
some industry experience
but no other indication of
overall experience esp. in
their investment space
Only moderate or some experience
shown by management team. Some
industry experience is shown.
Transpac VP has VC experience but
little experience in their changing
market space. Lower levels of
experience in both cases could have
impacted on their success.
Table 5.10: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Failed Firms - Management Team
Experience
Overall there is only moderate to some support of experience at the two firms but the
levels of experience are inadequate for their market and industry focus.There is some
industry experience but no venture capital experience with only the Transpac Country
Manager having some venture capital experience. Both firms have little experience in
their selected market space with Transpac having problems coping with the constant
changes in their selected market space which lead to them having inadequate
experience in their new market space.
5.2.2 Intangible Resources- Expertise and Knowledge Base
a) Within Case Pattern Matching
13
The complete analysis and pattern matching for the failed firms is given in Appendix 12.
168
The within case pattern matching data indicates that expertise and knowledge base is an
important aspect of a firm's success. This is initially shown by the interview data as the
managers indicate that this is necessary for success. Based on the interviews this point
is used in the within case meta-analysis and triangulated with other data for each of the
failed firms as will be seen below. We shall now explore each case in detail.
i) Softbank Emerging Markets (SBEM)
The analysis shows only some support of expertise and knowledge base in the SBEM
management team, which is insufficient for their market and industry focus. Ang states
that Softbank has networks, expertise and seasoned professionals who work globally
and can advise their companies. He also says that there is a lot of information sharing
with experts at their US headquarters, which helps them to benchmark their deals
against their existing database of deals as well as their existing portfolio of investments.
Ponnudurai states that the difference between Softbank and the competition was the
industry expertise and domain knowledge within Softbank. They are industry experts.
However he also states that Softbank did not have an investment strategy but based its
strategy on discussions with individuals in each Softbank office.
The triangulated data provides little support of expertise at the firm other than the
corporate finance expertise of Ang and the telecommunications expertise of the other
two managers. There are no other parties who provide any expert advise and the
managers themselves are limited only to their industry expertise. They invest in Internet
technologies but none of the managers have Internet, entrepreneurial or VC expertise.
The lack of any other party offering such expertise is also obvious as there are no other
senior managers or partners linked directly to the firm.
The conclusion here is that although the managers state that there is expertise in the
firm and it is necessary for success, the data does not support this proposition. There is
insufficient expertise among the managers of Softbank.
ii) Transoac Capital
The analysis shows some support of expertise and knowledge base in the management
team at Transpac, which is inadequate for their investment space. Ng indicates in the
interview that Transpac didn't have enough domain expertise because most of the team
169
were electronics based and the new intakes were telecoms based. After the 1997 Asian
crisis they shifted focus to build 'platform companies' like Private Equity but they don't
have the knowledge or expertise for such investments. Yeo adds that the team has to
change to adapt to the market and the managers were not very happy with this strategy
as the firm should not expect professionals to change to adapt to the market as their
expertise was not put to use. Changing all the time meant that they did not develop an
expertise and whatever expertise they had was wasted.
The triangulated data shows that Ng had venture capital and investment experience
while Yeo had limited industry expertise, but because of the continuous change in their
investment focus, they did not have enough expertise and knowledge in their focus
industries. Yeo also only had expertise in the building materials industry and no
expertise in the venture capital sector. Neither did he have technology expertise. They
also did not make any investments and hence did not build up any further expertise or
knowledge base. None of the other managers in the group showed particular knowledge
or expertise either other than Leong who was named as Director in several investments.
It can only be concluded from the triangulated data and from the interview data that
there was a lack of expertise and knowledge base at the firm.
b) Cross-Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching is summarised in Table 5.11 below to enable ease of
cross-case comparisons.
E) SBEM F) Transpac Conclusion
Some support. There is
insufficient expertise & knowledge
in VC or Internet industry their
focus area. Only expertise is in
finance & telco
Some support. Inadequate
evidence of expertise &
knowledge in their investment
space
Some support of industry
expertise but low VC expertise
except for Transpac VP.
Knowledge base acknowledged to
be very low in one case.
Table 5.11: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Failed Firms - Management Expertise &
Knowledge Base
There is only some support of management expertise and knowledge base at both the
firms. There is also little venture capital expertise in the firms except for the Transpac
Country Manager. Even the Transpac managers acknowledge that their knowledge base
is very low. Overall the expertise and knowledge base at the failed firms is inadequate.
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5.2.3 Intangible Resources- Knowledge Sharing
a) Within Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching data indicates that knowledge sharing is an important
aspect of a firm's success. This is initially shown by the interview data as the managers
indicate that it is necessary for success. Based on the interviews this point is used in the
within case meta-analysis and triangulated with other data for each firm as will be seen
below.
i) Softbank Emerging Markets (SBEM)
The analysis shows that there is no support of knowledge sharing in the SBEM group.
Ang states that there is a lot of sharing of information between their experts at their US
headquarters and the firm's managers. This helps them to benchmark their deals with
the existing database of deals as well as their existing portfolio of investments.
Ponnudurai says that they do not have a fixed strategy and their strategy is based on
discussions with individuals in each Softbank office.
A review of the triangulated data shows that there is no support of any knowledge
sharing in the firm with their headquarters or with other parties. There seems to be a
reporting structure where the team reports to their US office (based on the interviews)
but there is no particular management team that meets regularly to share knowledge. In
fact none of the documents provides any indication of Softbank partners in Silicon Valley
or elsewhere, sharing knowledge with the Asian office. They appear isolated and even in
the interviews do not indicate any real sharing or mention any other Softbank managers
or partners.
Unlike the other foreign firms they do not mention holding regular meetings to strategise
or share knowledge with their global offices. Hence there is no support of knowledge
sharing in the firm.
iit Transpac Capital
There is no support of knowledge sharing in the Transpac group; in fact the evidence
shows that the managers deliberately do not share knowledge due to intense regional
rivalries. Ng states that there are quarterly meetings but that they are only useful for
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personal networking and not for knowledge sharing because of the rivalry among
managers. The individual managers do not work together and are only protecting their
own interests not that of the firm or the group. There is also a fortnightly deal meeting
where the investment managers must defend deals. He believes that VCs also need to
have good industry contacts, so that they can share knowledge about the industry
including problems in the industry. Yeo says that the firm is a "one man show" - the
Founder President Dr. Christopher Leong. The Exco makes the strategic decisions
especially the President ... and the rest of the team has to follow. There was no
mechanism to make strategy. They had 30 members in the investment team with a lot of
experience, including cross-border industrial focus and cross border evaluation teams
but there was no decision-making ability.
The triangulated data shows little support of knowledge sharing. Although they had
many regional offices there is no documentary verification of any sharing. Other than
Leong, there are no other managers mentioned anywhere and little information on
investments, management teams or portfolio successes. This lack of information shows
little interest in sharing of knowledge and this lack of sharing is supported by the
interview data. As the respondents state there are regular meetings but the company is
structured in a competitive manner leading to active withholding of information by
regional partners. The interviews indicate that they rarely share information and hence
the regional offices do not benefit from any knowledge sharing. There is hence no
support of knowledge sharing in the firm.
b) Cross-Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching is summarised in Table 5.12 below to enable ease of
cross-case comparisons.
E) SBEM F) Transpac Conclusion
No support. There is no evidence of any
knowledge sharing as the only other
office in Poland closed within months. No
indication of other Softbank partners
being active in SBEM either.
Some support. There is
inadequate support of
knowledge sharing in the
group
No support of knowledge sharing.
Strong evidence of lack of sharing
in both cases, confirmed by
interview data.
Table 5.12: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Failed Firms - Knowledge Sharing
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There is no support of knowledge sharing among the management teams of both failed
firms. In Transpac, interview evidence shows that the management team purposely do
not share knowledge because of the competitive structure of each office's position in
investing for self-gain. There is strong evidence of lack of sharing in both cases.
5.2.4 Intangible Resources- Market Knowledge and Continuous Learning
a) Within Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching data indicates that market knowledge and continuous
learning is an important aspect of a firm's success. This is initially shown by the interview
data as the managers indicate that it is necessary for success. Based on the interviews
this point is used in the within case meta-analysis and triangulated with other data for
each firm as will be seen below.
i) Softbank Emerging Markets (SBEM)
There is only some support of market knowledge and continuous learning in the firm.
Ang makes the point that Softbank has a huge portfolio of investments so it can
benchmark and learn from previous successes and failures of their portfolio in other
markets. This critical mass of portfolio allows this comparison and learning and is one of
the unfair advantages that Softbank has. Ponnudurai states that they have the
experience of building ecosystems and networks and were able to connect with key
people.
The triangulated data does not provide any further evidence to support their contention
that they have a lot of market knowledge or that there is continuous learning. Softbank
as a group has made many investments and would have a portfolio that could be used to
benchmark hence their contention is possible but other than that there is no evidence of
greater knowledge. The managers do not have the benefit of the knowledge of any other
specific Softbank partner or any Advisory Committees. There was also no indication of
the use of outside experts or continuous learning either. Hence the data does not show
support of market knowledge and continuous learning in SBEM.
ii) Transpac Capital
173
There is only some support of market knowledge and continuous learning in the
Transpac group. Ng states that they were investing like Private Equity but VCs have no
expertise in this type of investments. They don't have the knowledge for such
investments. To make such investments they must have industry knowledge and domain
expertise. He also says that the firm has in-house experts and worked with multinational
corporations. Yeo says that they had about 30 members in the investment team with a
lot of experience, including cross-border industrial focus and cross border evaluation
teams. However the strategy was to adapt to market opportunities. They should not
expect professionals to change to adapt to the market, as their expertise was not put to
use, whatever expertise they had was wasted.
The triangulated data shows little evidence of adequate market knowledge in the firm.
While a greater number of offices should increase market knowledge this is not evident
as there is very little documentary evidence. They did have a few IPOs and would have
increased their market knowledge based on this success. There is however no data to
support a claim of continuous learning.
While there is some evidence of market knowledge based on their wide regional offices,
the change of investment style to private equity investing was not within their market
knowledge and obtaining the market knowledge was a problem as the strategy kept
changing. There was no evidence of the use of outside experts and no evidence of
continuous learning. The only conclusion is that there is only some support of adequate
market knowledge in the firm but no continuous learning.
b) Cross-Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching is summarised in Table 5.13 below to enable ease of
cross-case comparisons.
E) SBEM F) Transpac Conclusion
Some support. Only some
industry knowledge is relevant.
There were no IPOs or exits & no
knowledge of their investment
space in the Internet industry.
Some support. There is some
market knowledge but overall
inadequate evidence of market
knowledge & continuous learning
Some support shown of adequate
market knowledge or continuous
learning. Both teams had very
little experience of exits & little
market knowledge.
Table 5.13: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Failed Firms - Market Knowledge &
Continuous Learning
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In the failed firms there is no evidence shown of adequate market knowledge or
continuous learning. Both teams had very little experience of IPOs and M&As. There
was no evidence of external Advisory Committees or use of external professionals to
provide additional market knowledge or expertise. There was also no indication of
continuous learning in these firms.
5.2.5 Intangible Resources- Independence of the Management Team
a) Within Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching data indicates that the independence of the
management team is an important aspect of a firm's success. This is initially shown by
the interview data as the managers indicate that it is necessary for success. Based on
the interviews this point is used in the within case meta-analysis and triangulated with
other data for each firm as will be seen below.
i) Softbank Emerging Markets (SBEM1
There is no support of management team independence in SBEM. Ang states that
SBEM was closed after the 2001 Sept. 11, terrorist attack in New York. The earlier
dotcom crash in 2000 also contributed to the decision to close the firm. At time of closure
they were ready to offer terms to 8 companies. Ponnudurai says that Softbank, the
parent company closed all its operations to focus in Korea, Japan and on broadband in
North Asia. However no mention was made about the fact that SBEM was actually a
joint venture with the World Bank, whose name did not come up in the interviews.
The triangulated data shows no evidence of management independence. From the
interviews and from the fact that closure was made unilaterally by their US headquarters
with no input from the management despite them having between 5 to 8 investments
almost confirmed, the evidence is that there was no independence of the management
team at SBEM.
iit Transpac Capital
There is no support of management team independence in Transpac. Ng says that in
Transpac much depends on the President liking the deal. It is a very autocratic way of
deciding on deals. Even the country heads have no decision-making authority. But the
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President was too dictatorial and this caused a lot of infighting within the team. Yeo
states that one reason for the failure of the firm is that it is a "one man show". The
Executive Committee makes the strategic decisions especially the President and the rest
of the team has to follow. There was no particular mechanism to make strategy as this
was left to the Exco.
The triangulated data shows that there is no evidence of independence. Even in all
regional documentation only Leong's name comes up in all news reports and no other
country manager appears. Indicates a possible autocratic system confirming the
interview data. In the regional context as well there is no evidence that country
managers have any independence.
The conclusion is that there is no independence based on the lack of other data to
support independence and the clear indication in interview data that there is no
independence. Also the fact that the closure of the firm's regional offices including the
Malaysian office was made unilaterally without the input of the managers as indicated by
the interviews shows lack of management independence.
b) Cross-Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching is summarised in Table 5.14 below to enable ease of
cross-case comparisons.
E) SBEM F) Transpac Conclusion
No support. There is clearly
no evidence of management
independence. Firms closed
by head office & team had no
say in the decision.




without consultation by HQ.
No support shown. Both teams clearly have
no independence at all either in investing or
decision-making. Even the decision to close
the firms was made by external parties at
their HQ with no input from the
management.
Table 5.14: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Failed Firms - Independence of
Management Team
There is no support of management independence in the failed firms. Both teams clearly
have no independence at all either in investing, decision-making or strategising. None of
the firms or managers has indicated any of these roles in the interviews, which contrasts
with that given by interviews of managers in successful firms. Most significantly, even
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the decision to close the firms was made unilaterally by external parties at their HQ with
no input from the management.
5.2.6 Dealflow- Identifying and Securing Deals
The first element under the major category of 'Dealflow' is identifying and securing deals.
a) Within Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching data indicates that the ability to identify and secure
deals is an important aspect of a firm's success. This is initially shown by the interview
data as the managers indicate that it is necessary for success. Based on the interviews
this point is used in the within case meta-analysis and triangulated with other data for
each firm as shown below.
il Softbank Emerging Markets (SBEM)
There is some support that the firm has been successful in identifying deals although it
was not able to secure any deals. Just because a firm can identify a deal does not mean
that it can secure the deal, i.e. invest in the deal. Hence just identifying a deal alone
does not fully satisfy this criterion in this category but cognisance is given to the fact that
at least they have been able to identify deals which shows some ability in this category.
Ang says that at the time of closure of the firm, they were ready to offer terms to 8
companies (which includes companies in India and outside Malaysia). Ang also says
that dealflow at that time (1999 to 2001) was good with many younger companies in
Malaysia. Ponnudurai states that in Malaysia they were close to completing 5
investments before SBEM was closed.
The only triangulated data available to confirm these claims is that of two entrepreneurs
Mr. Christopher Chan, the CEO of The Media Shoppe (TMS) and Mr. Lau Kin-Wai, the
CEO of Viztel Solutions Bhd (Appendix J1 & J2). Both the companies are listed on
MESDAQ. These were two of the companies identified by SBEM for investment before
they were closed and both CEOs confirm this in interviews. Hence, the claims of the two
SBEM managers that they did identify deals before they were closed can be verified.
There is no other information available to confirm that SBEM has the ability to identify
deals. However, they did not secure any deals prior to closure and there is no assurance
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that even among the deals that they have identified they would have secured those
deals including the two deals above. In the case of TMS, the CEO did state that the
valuation given by SBEM was very low and they probably would not have done the deal
anyway.
Based on this there is some evidence of their ability to at least identify deals if not secure
them. The other office in Poland closed within months and there is no information
available on their ability to identify or secure deals. One point to note is that both the
managers state that the firm was closed despite them having deals and that the
justification for the closure was the 9-11 terrorist attacks in the US. It is not possible to
verify these statements, as triangulated data is not available. However it is pertinent to
note that 9-11 affected all other VC firms and not just SBEM and none of the other firms
in this dissertation considered closing their offices because of the 9-11 attacks.
Furthermore the businesses of the firms that SBEM was investing in were in Asia
including the two companies mentioned above, so it is not possible to justify the closure
based on just 9-11. This is however difficult to verify.
ii) Transoac Capital
There is some support that the firm has been successful in identifying and securing
deals. Ng identifies personal success as a VC as the ability to spot good investments
and seeking out the best returns from this investment. Coincidentally, Yeo also
measures success by the ability to identify investments. He also states that VCs need to
have good industry contacts, so that they can share knowledge about the industry
including problems in the industry and thereby identify good investments.
Triangulated data shows that while the firm does have some investments in Hong Kong
(for e.g. UN International Ltd) and Taiwan (Eastern Multimedia Company) there is almost
no information on more recent investments. Data is only available until December 2000
at which time they had many investments and had since inception listed 56 companies in
markets all over Asia and also in the US (NX News, 2004). This shows that in the early
days at least, the firm had the ability to identify and secure deals but not in recent years
even though according to Ng the firm still did have funds to invest. Overall there is some
evidence of the ability to identify and secure deals.
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b) Cross-Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching is summarised in Table 5.15 below to enable ease of
cross-case comparisons.
E) SBEM F) Transpac Conclusion
Some support. Team had
identified some deals prior to
closure but firm closed before any
investments made. Regional
office also closed without
investments. Shows some ability
to identify deals though none
secured prior to closure
Some support. There are very few
recent deals, the last one was in
year 2000. Firm closed many
offices in Dec 2001. However firm
had many deals in the 1990s
indicating that it had the ability to
identify & secure deals, but has
lost that ability or has lost the
propensity to invest.
There is some support of ability to
identify deals but in the case of
Transpac the latest deals were
prior to the dotcom bust. There
were no recent deals & in
Transpac case the last Malaysian
deal was 10 years ago. Both firms
did not make any investments
prior to closure.
Table 5.15: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Failed Firms - Identifying & Securing Deals
There is some support of ability to identify deals but in the case of Transpac the latest
deals were prior to the dotcom bust. There were no recent deals and in Transpac's case
the last Malaysian deal was 10 years ago. Both firms did not make any investments prior
to closure but the managers of SBEM did confirm that they had a few deals in hand,
showing that they had the ability to identify deals, but none were secured prior to
closure.
5.2.7 Dealflow - Availability of Deals in the Market
The second element under the major category of 'Dealflow', is availability of deals in the
market.
a) Within Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching data indicates that the availability of deals in the
market is an important aspect of a firm's success. This is initially shown by the interview
data as the managers indicate that it is necessary for success. Based on the interviews
this point is used in the within case meta-analysis and triangulated with other data for
each firm as shown below.
i) Softbank Emerging Markets (SBEM)
There is only some support of deal availability in their market. Ang says that one of the
most important factors for him is the availability of adequate dealflow and many potential
investments. He believes that there must be good demand and supply in the economy
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as this ensures that there will be a lot of dealflow. For Ponnudurai one measure of
success is the number of deals done. For Softbank this target was 10 deals in 2 years
per Investment Manager. Both managers consider that the availability of dealflow is an
important factor for the firm to be successful.
Triangulated data does not provide any evidence of adequate dealflow because as
mentioned in (a) above, the firm did not do any deals before closure. Flowever from
interviews with two entrepreneurs they did confirm that SBEM were considering
investing in their firms. This can lead to a conclusion that there is at least some evidence
of the availability of deals in the market for SBEM.
ii) Transpac Capital
Transpac shows no support of deal availability in their markets. Ng says that in Asia
there are very few deals to spot and that the dealflow is very small. He also believes that
Investing in Asia is difficult. In Asia top management is expensive but the dealflow is not
there. Also Transpac's minimum deal size was US$ 5 million, which was difficult to
invest in Malaysia at that time. This limited the number of deals that could be done.
However Yeo contradicts Ng because he says that doing deals in Malaysia is not
difficult.
Triangulated data shows that Transpac had many deals in the early days but not in
recent times (as mentioned in (a) above). On a regional basis in the early days they did
have many deals. Hence there is no evidence of dealflow for Transpac. There are no
new deals in the last 5 years and the only Malaysian deal was 10 years ago, while the
last regional deal was in year 2000. This is a possible indication of lack of availability of
deals in their market or of the inability of the firm to invest.
b) Cross-Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching is summarised in Table 5.16 below to enable ease of
cross-case comparisons.
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No support. There are no new deals in the
last 5 years. The only Malaysian deal was
10 years ago & the last regional deal was
in year 2000. Possible indication of lack of
availability of deals in market or of inability
of firm to invest.
Some support. There were no recent
deals but Softbank did identify
between 5-8 deals before the decision
to close while Transpac did have deals
in the early years. There is evidence of
deal availability but not enough for the
firms to show success.
Table 5.16: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Failed Firms - Availability of Deals
There is only some support of deal availability. Softbank did identify between 5-8 deals
before the decision to close showing that there were deals in their geographic focus.
While there were no recent deals for Transpac, they did have deals in the early years,
indicating that availability in their markets may not be an issue. There is evidence of deal
availability even for these failed firms so their failure cannot be attributed to the lack of
dealflow in their markets.
5.2.8 Exits- Viability of Exits in the Market
The third aspect that has been highlighted in the results is "Exits", which has also been
identified by all the managers as essential for the firm's success. The interview data
showed that the managers of the firms believed that the viability of exits in the market is
an important aspect of firm success. This section centres on whether the firms are
located in markets with an exit opportunity and whether they show evidence of exits.
This combination shows the viability of exits in their markets.
a) Within Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching data indicates that the viability of exits in the market is
an important aspect of a firm's success. This is initially shown by the interview data as
the managers indicate that it is necessary for success. Based on the interviews this point
is used in the within case meta-analysis and triangulated with other data for each firm as
shown below.
i) Softbank Emerging Markets (SBEM)
There is no support of exit viability for SBEM as the firm was closed before it could
invest or exit. Ang mentions that although the availability of an exit is important, because
SBEM is global, they can list their investments elsewhere (other than in Malaysia) so
they were not as concerned. But if an exit were available in each market it would be
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better. Ponnudurai speaks of the value of Mesdaq in the National context indicating its
importance to investors. While one manager does not specifically mention the value of a
viable exit the other manager does state that the availability of an exit in each of their
investment markets would be better. However even the other manager does value the
importance of a viable exchange to the national interest.
SBEM was set-up in Malaysia but it had the liberty of investing anywhere in the
emerging markets of greater South East Asia as stated in its mandate (Business Editors,
2001). As it did not have any investments it is not possible to speculate on the
availability of an exit market for its investments. However, as the first office was set up in
Malaysia and there is confirmation that there were at least two potential investments in
Malaysia, this adds credence to the fact that they were investing in at least one country
with a viable exchange, providing viability for an exit. Those two potential investments
are now listed on MESDAQ. There is therefore some evidence of viability of exits in the
market for SBEM but as they did not actually make any investments the conclusion can
only be that there is no support.
ii) Transpac Capital
There is moderate support of exit viability for Transpac. Ng states that exits were also a
factor for their failure to invest because between 1996 and 2001 the Mesdaq market for
growth and technology companies was just formed and was not active. Hence exits were
difficult and Transpac did not manage many exits so success was limited. Yeo measures
success by the ability to identify investments and then manage to exit profitably. While
Ng is cautious about the viability of an exit in Malaysia and states that that is one reason
for their lack of investments, it provides recognition that a viable exit is valuable to the
firm. Yeo also notes the value of exits to VC managers.
Triangulated data shows that although there were very few exits in Malaysia and the last
one was 7 years prior to their closure, there were other exits in other countries where
their other offices were located. The offices were located in China, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, The Philippines, Thailand and Taiwan (NXNews, 2004).
There are viable exchanges in each of those countries and the tirm has in fact exited
investments in all those countries via IPOs or mergers and acquisitions. This shows that
there is viability of exits in their focus markets.
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There is moderate support of the viability of exits in the market for Transpac as they
were successful in the early years of investing. Although recent evidence of successful
exits is less this does not affect the finding of moderate support for the viability of exits in
their chosen markets.
b) Cross-Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching is summarised in Table 5.17 below to enable ease of
cross-case comparisons.
E) SBEM F) Transpac Conclusion
Some support. Firm did not have any
investments prior to closure. Their
office was located in a market with a
viable stock exchange, but firm did
not have opportunity to invest & exit.
Moderate support. The




Moderate support. While SBEM did not
have any investments & hence no exits
Transpac did in the early years. It does
show that there is viability of exits in their
markets but SBEM did not get a chance
to invest to show viability.
Table 5.17: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Failed Firms - Exits
There is moderate support that the failed firms managed to exit successfully in their
investment markets. SBEM did not have any investments and hence no exits prior to
their closure. Transpac, however, did exit successfully in the early years. It does show
that there is viability of exits in their markets but SBEM did not get a chance to invest to
show viability. They were however located in geographic areas which did have viable
markets as shown by the successful firms.
The conclusion is that there is moderate support of viability of exits in their markets
based on their geographic locations where there are viable stock exchanges and also on
the fact that Transpac did have many exits in those markets in their early years.
5.2.9 Networks-Value of Networks
The fourth and final aspect that has been highlighted in the results is "Networks", which
has also been identified by all the managers as essential for the firm's success. The
interview data showed that the managers of the firms believed that the value of networks
is an important aspect of firm success.
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a) Within Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching data indicates that the value of networks is an
important aspect of a firm's success. This is initially shown by the interview data as the
managers indicate that it is necessary for success. Based on the interviews this point is
used in the within case meta-analysis and triangulated with other data for each firm as
shown below.
i) Softbank Emerging Markets (SBEM)
There is only some support that SBEM has good networks in their investment markets.
Ang says that the Softbank group has networks globally and can advise their investee
companies. They can also match their emerging market investees with others that they
have in America or Korea and can create greater synergies and grow the businesses.
Ponnudurai states that the managers had the experience of building ecosystems and
networks and were able to connect with key people. There is corroboration between both
the managers on the value of their networks and the fact that the firm has good contacts
and networks.
The triangulated data however shows that among the managers and partners they may
have wider work experience in different industries but they have limited investment
experience and do not have wide regional experience either indicating that their
networks would be more limited. They would however have good networks in the
telecommunications industry as two of the managers were from that industry.
SBEM also does not have a single investment although there is evidence that several
were identified. While this is indication that they have some networks there isn't sufficient
evidence to show that they have good networks. Although the Softbank group is large,
there is no indication that there was wide support given by the group to SBEM. They
also do not have a wide network of offices as their only other office in Poland was closed
within a short time of opening. Hence while there is some support of networks in SBEM
this support is inadequate to indicate the strength of their contacts in their investment
markets.
ii) Transpac Capital
Transpac shows only moderate support of good networks in their investment markets.
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Ng says that the spotting of investments, the good deals, come from personal contacts,
and from the VCs networks. Yeo states that to be successful VCs need to have good
industry contacts, so that they can share knowledge about the industry including
problems in the industry. He says that the firm has industry contacts to source deals.
The most important lesson - Contacts and networks are important. There is
corroboration between both the managers on the value of their networks and good
contacts in their investment markets.
The triangulated data however shows that the managers may have work experience in
different industries but only the Country Manager has any investment experience while
the Investment Manager only has some industry experience. The group as a whole
would have had good networks based on their previous success with their investments
but in recent times their investments have been far less and almost none since year
2000. This could indicate that their networks are weaker or that their contacts are not as
good as before. Although they did have many regional offices there were few
investments indicating possibly weak networks so their regional offices do not seem to
add much to their networks. Hence while there is moderate support of networks in
Transpac this evidence is inadequate to indicate the strength of their current contacts in
their investment markets.
b) Cross-Case Pattern Matching
The within case pattern matching is summarised in Table 5.18 below to enable ease of
cross-case comparisons.
E) SBEM F) Transpac Conclusion
Some support. Although there
were no successful investments
some were identified prior to
closure. Team also did work in
related telco industry & finance
so would have some networks.
Moderate support. There were
investments with successful exits
in early years & team had wide
work experience showing good
networks then. But recent years
investment has been poor.
Moderate support. Transpac does
show evidence of some networks
with earlier investments & exits
but Softbank had less evidence. It
is not easy to show that the firms
had good networks prior to
closure.
Table 5.18: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Failed Firms - Networks
There is only moderate support for the failed firms. Transpac does show evidence of
some networks with earlier investments and exits but Softbank had less evidence. It is
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not easy to show that the firms had good networks prior to closure except based on the
interviews. Softbank did manage to find a few deals for investment so there is evidence
of networks.
Transpac had investments prior to the year 2000 but not in the last 5 years. That showed
that they were able to identify and secure deals and shows that they had the networks to
do so in the early years. However in the latest 5 years they showed less ability to invest.
This lack of investments could be due to other factors such as the inability to invest14 in
the first place and not so much to their networks. There is evidence for this statement
because Jason Ng, the former Country Manager of Transpac had gone on to form his
own venture capital firm Expedient Equity and has invested in 6 companies between
2003 and 2005 (Appendix K, Case F: Jason Ng Biodata). This shows that Ng has the
networks to invest as a venture capitalist but as a firm Transpac did not have the
networks.
5.2.10 Conclusion on Pattern Matching for Failed Firms
This section on the pattern matching for failed firms also provides a complete discussion
on a case-by-case basis for each of the failed firms, similar in format to that for
successful firms in section 5.1 above. The conclusions that are reached for each
category will be used in section 5.3 where the patterns for these failed firms will be
matched with the patterns of the successful firms from section 5.1 above, from which we
will be able to determine any corroborations or contradictions between the two sets of
firms that can give us an answer to the research question.
We summarise the findings of this section as follows. In the Intangible Resources
categories, we have found that all the failed firms have less experienced management
teams and in one case none of the team had any experience in venture capital at all. In
both the cases the management teams also did not have sufficient expertise and
knowledge base in their focus industries. In the third category of knowledge sharing
there was little evidence of sharing while in one case the regional teams intentionally
withheld knowledge due to the competitive structure of the regional firms. Each regional
firm was competing to be better than the other; hence they did not want to share
information. Both firms also did not have adequate market knowledge within the firm and
14 This inability is not due to lack of funds because Ng states that the firm has the funds.
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did not use external Advisory Committees. There was no evidence of continuous
learning in the firms. Finally, there is no evidence of management team independence in
both the firms as they did not have the authority or ability to make decisions on
investments and crucially, the firms were unilaterally closed down by their head offices
with no input from the teams, showing that they had no independence at all.
In the category of 'Dealflow', in terms of identifying and securing deals both the firms
show inadequate ability to do this. Although in the case of SBEM they managed to
identify deals they did not close any deal and the firm itself was closed before deals
were completed. Just identifying deals alone is not sufficient because they must also
show the ability to secure the deals and both firms did not show this. The two firms also
show some support that there is availability of deals in their focus market, and this is
shown by the fact that they have identified deals. For the category 'Exits', these firms
also do not show that there is viability of exits in all the markets that they invest in, as
SBEM did not have any exits while Transpac only had exits prior to 2000 but for the last
5 years they did not have any exits. Finally, in the 'Networks' category, both firms only
show moderate support of their networks. This is only because there is some evidence
that they managed to identify some deals, but without evidence of wider investments the
strength of their networks are difficult to establish.
The next step in this analysis is the cross-case pattern matching of the successful and
the failed firms as follows.
5.3 Cross Case Pattern Matching - Successful vs. Failed Firms
This is an important aspect of the pattern matching methodology. The objective of this
section is to compare the conclusions between the successful and failed firms and
establish where the differences lie in both groups. From the differences we can make
valuable conclusions on why one group of firms succeeded while the other group failed.
The complete matching of the analysis and comparison is given in Appendix 13, extracts
of which are given for each category below.
5.3.1 Intangible Resources - Management team experience
The findings for the successful and failed cases have been summarised in Appendix 13
the extract of which is as follows:
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Successful firms Failed Firms Conclusion
There is strong support
that the 4 successful
firms have very
experienced mgt. Most
have VC & investment










Transpac VP has VC
experience but little
experience in their changing
market space. Lower levels
of experience in both cases
could have impacted on their
success.
Strong support that experience matters. The
successful firms have a clear advantage
over the unsuccessful ones due to the
experience of their mgt teams in their
investment space. This is especially so in
having VC & investment experience.
Industry experience is also clearly present in
successful firms. Both failed firms have less
experienced mgt & in one case while they
have experience it is not in their investment
space.
Table 5.19: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Successful v Failed Firms - Management
Team Experience
Key result: This analysis shows strong support that experience matters.
i) Successful Firms
There is strong support that the four successful firms have very experienced
management teams. Most have venture capital and investment experience and also
vast industry experience. They also have a lot of experience with successful exits. All
also have experience in their selected investment space.
ii) Failed Firms
In the failed firms there is only moderate to low experience in the management team.
There is some industry experience but no venture capital experience with only the
Transpac Country Manager having some venture capital experience. Both firms have
little experience in their selected market space with Transpac having problems coping
with the constant changes in their selected market space which lead to them having
inadequate experience in their new market space.
iifl Discussion and Conclusion
The evidence shows that management team experience is a significant factor in the
difference between success and failure in the cases being studied. The successful firms
have a clear advantage over the unsuccessful ones due to the greater experience of
their management teams in their investment space. This is especially so in having
venture capital and investment experience. Industry experience is also clearly present in
successful firms. Both failed firms have less experienced management and even if they
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have experience it is not in their investment space. The experience or the lack thereof is
very pronounced. In the successful cases the firms have both industry and venture
capital experience and are also experienced in their investment space.
5.3.2 Intangible Resources - Expertise and Knowledge Base
The findings for the successful and failed cases have been summarised in Appendix 13
the extract of which is as follows:
Successful firms Failed Firms Conclusion
There is strong support




Most also have vast
VC expertise as well as
IPO & M&A expertise.
Some evidence of industry
expertise but low VC
expertise except for
Transpac VP. Knowledge
base acknowledged to be
very low in the Transpac
case.
The successful firms have Mgt with wide expertise
& knowledge base in their investment space. They
also have a lot of VC as well as IPO & M&A
expertise & knowledge. The Mgt of Transpac didn't
have any expertise in their new investment space,
which was closer to private equity while another
firm had no VC or IPO expertise. Both failed firms
had limited knowledge base.
Table 5.20: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Successful v Failed Firms - Expertise &
Knowledge Base
Key result: This analysis shows strong support that only the successful firms have
management teams with wide expertise and knowledge base.
i) Successful Firms
There is also strong support that all the successful firms have expertise and knowledge
that fits their investment space. Most also have vast VC expertise as well as IPO and
M&A expertise. Also, due to their past success in their investment space they have built
up a strong knowledge base in their teams.
ii) Failed Firms
While there is some evidence of industry expertise in these firms it is inadequate. There
is also little venture capital expertise in the firms except for the Transpac Country
Manager. Even the Transpac managers acknowledge that their knowledge base is very
low.
iii) Discussion and Conclusion
The evidence shows that expertise and knowledge base is an important factor in the
difference between success and failure in these cases.
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The successful firms have management teams with wide expertise and knowledge base
in their investment space. They also have a lot of venture capital as well as IPO and
M&A expertise and knowledge. The management of Transpac also didn't have any
expertise in their new investment space, which was closer to private equity while the
SBEM team had no venture capital or IPO expertise. Both failed firms had limited
knowledge base for their industry focus.
There is a wide gap in the expertise and knowledge base between the successful and
failed firms. This is a significant issue and provides another reason for the success or
failure of these firms.
5.3.3 Intangible Resources - Knowledge Sharing
The findings for the successful and failed cases have been summarised in Appendix 13
the extract of which is as follows:
Successful firms Failed Firms Conclusion
Generally there is strong
support that all the firms
share knowledge on a regular
basis. There is diversity in the
Mgt teams & they meet
regularly to share knowledge
& experiences.
No support of knowledge
sharing. Strong evidence
of lack of sharing in both
cases and in Transpac
intentional lack of sharing
due to regional rivalries.
Knowledge sharing is more prevalent among
the successful firms. There is diversity of
Mgt & regular meetings to share knowledge.
In failed firms there is no real sharing of
knowledge & in Transpac even when they
do meet, there is intense rivalry among the
different offices & sharing is never done.
Table 5.21: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Successful v Failed Firms - Knowledge
Sharing
Key result: This analysis shows strong support that knowledge sharing is more
prevalent and extensively utilised by the successful firms compared to the failed firms.
i) Successful Firms
Generally there is strong evidence that all the successful firms share knowledge on a
regular basis. There is diversity in the management teams and they meet regularly to
share knowledge and experiences. This sharing of knowledge is deemed important by
the firms and among the cases there is strong evidence of active sharing of knowledge
between the partners of their different global and regional offices.
ii) Failed Firms
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In the failed firms there is no support of knowledge sharing. In Transpac, interview
evidence shows that the management team purposely do not share knowledge because
of the competitive structure of each office's position in investing for self-gain. There is
strong evidence of lack of sharing in both cases.
iii) Discussion and Conclusion
The evidence shows that the firms that actively share knowledge are more successful
indicating that knowledge sharing is another necessary ingredient for success. As a
corollary, actively not sharing knowledge appears to be a reason for failure, at least in
one of the two failed cases we have studied.
Knowledge sharing is more prevalent among the successful firms. There is diversity of
management and regular meetings to share knowledge. Partners also share knowledge
on a regular basis on a regional/global basis. In the failed firms there is no real sharing
of knowledge and in Transpac even when they do meet, there is intense rivalry among
the different offices and sharing is never done.
5.3.4 Intangible Resources - Market Knowledge and Continuous Learning
The findings for the successful and failed cases have been summarised in Appendix 13
the extract of which is as follows:
Successful firms Failed Firms Conclusion
There is strong support of
wide market knowledge &
continuous learning.
Market knowledge is also
obtained via industry
expertise & multiple exits
as well as the use of
Advisory committees and
external experts.
No support shown of
adequate market knowledge
or continuous learning. Both
teams had very little
experience of exits & little
market knowledge. There is
no evidence of the use of
Advisory committees or
external experts.
Successful firms have diverse Mgt teams &
wide market knowledge due to their VC &
industry expertise, multiple successful exits &
Advisory Committees. Failed firms have no
experience with exits, little or no VC expertise
& have limited industry expertise & in one case
their expertise was not relevant to their
investment space. Successful firms also make
use ofAdvisory committees and external
experts
Table 5.22: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Successful v Failed Firms - Market
Knowledge & Continuous Learning
Key result: This analysis provides strong support that the successful firms have wider
market knowledge and continuous learning compared to the failed firms who show no
evidence of this category.
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i) Successful Firms
There is strong evidence of wide market knowledge and continuous learning among the
successful firms. The successful firms obtain market knowledge via industry expertise by
having external Advisory Committees. Multiple exits and the success of IPOs and M&A's
among these firms also provide more market knowledge. There is also evidence of
continuous learning among the firms and in one case, Walden; managers also attend the
VC Institute to improve their skills, lending credence to the continuous learning of the
firm.
ii) Failed Firms
In the failed firms there is no evidence shown of adequate market knowledge or
continuous learning. Both teams had very little experience of IPOs and M&As. There
was no evidence of external Advisory Committees or use of external professionals to
provide additional market knowledge or expertise. There was also no indication of
continuous learning in these firms.
iii) Discussion and Conclusion
The evidence shows that market knowledge and continuous learning is necessary for
success. Firms that show greater evidence of these elements are successful while those
with no evidence have failed. Market knowledge from external sources also plays an
important role in the successful firms.
The analysis shows that successful firms have diverse management teams and wide
market knowledge not only due to their VC and industry expertise but also to their
multiple successful exits. They also have external Advisory Committees and actively use
external professionals to assist in their investments. Successful firms also show a
propensity for continuous learning, which increases their market knowledge.
Failed firms have no experience with exits and also little or no VC expertise and this
limits their market knowledge. They also have limited market knowledge because they
have little or no IPO and M&A experience. They show no evidence of using external
advisory committees or professional expertise. There was also no evidence of
continuous learning.
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5.3.5 Intangible Resources - Independence of Management Team
The findings for the successful and failed cases have been summarised in Appendix 13
the extract of which is as follows:
Successful firms Failed Firms Conclusion
There is moderate





is not easy to verify.
No support shown. Both teams
clearly have no independence
at all either in investing or
decision-making. Even the
decision to close the firms was
made by external parties at
their HQ with no input from the
management.
While there isn't strong support of Mgt
independence, the successful firms have
moderate levels of independence while the
failed firms had no independence at all. The
complete lack of independence & decision
making capability & responsibility is clear in
the closure decision which was made
entirely by HQ without consultation with Mgt.
Table 5.23: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Successful v Failed Firms - Independence
of Management
Key result: This analysis shows moderate support that the successful firms have more
management team independence than the failed firms which show no evidence at all of
this category.
i) Successful Firms
In the successful firms there is moderate support of management team independence.
Most firm management have some independence though complete independence is not
easy to verify. These firms have the ability to make investment decisions, formulate and
execute strategy and contribute to the overall group by sharing their knowledge and
expertise. Their independence is validated by the active roles they play in the group as a
whole, in regional companies meetings, in formulating long-term strategy and in the
sharing of knowledge.
ii) Failed Firms
There is no support of management independence in the failed firms. Both teams clearly
have no independence at all either in investing, decision-making or strategising. None of
the firms or managers has indicated any of these roles in the interviews, which contrasts
with that given by interviews of managers in successful firms. Most significantly, even
the decision to close the firms was made unilaterally by external parties at their HQ with
no input from the management.
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iii) Discussion and Conclusion
The evidence shows that the independence of the management team is an important
factor in the success of these firms. Lack of independence was one factor that led to the
failure of the firms in this study.
While there isn't strong evidence of management independence, the successful firms
have moderate levels of independence while the failed firms had no independence at all.
The complete lack of independence and decision-making capability and responsibility is
clear in the closure decision of the failed firms, which was made entirely by HQ without
consultation with management.
The successful firms also have independence in making investment decisions. This is
not the case with the failed firms. SBEM for example had 5-8 deals but did not make
any investments because the HQ shut them down. This shows that they had no capacity
to invest on their own. In Transpac the Country Manager specifically said that investing
was difficult due to the fact that they had to defend their investment proposals at
committee meetings but that it was too tough, showing that he had no decision-making
capacity.
5.3.6 Dealflow - Identifying and Securing Deals
The findings for the successful and failed cases have been summarised in Appendix 13
the extract of which is as follows:
Successful Firms Failed Firms Conclusion
There is strong
support that the firms
have been able to
identify & secure
deals. Most firms




There is some support of ability
to identify deals but in the case
of Transpac the latest deals were
prior to the dotcom bust. There
were no recent deals & in
Transpac case the last
Malaysian deal was 10 years
ago. Both firms did not make any
investments prior to closure.
The successful firms show a clear ability to
identify & secure deals with a wide portfolio of
investments & many successful exits. The failed
firms do not show the same capability although
in one case the team did manage to identify
deals but were closed before they could secure
the deals. In the other failed firm there were no
recent deals, which could mean that they did
not have the ability to identify deals or that they
incapable of investing due to other reasons.
Table 5.24: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Successful v Failed Firms - Identifying &
Securing Deals
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Key result: This analysis shows strong support that the successful firms have the ability
to not just identify but also to secure deals whereas the failed firms only show some
evidence of this ability.
i) Successful Firms
There is strong support that the successful firms have the ability to identify and secure
deals. All these firms have a large portfolio of investments and many successful exits.
The managers also state the need for the ability to do this and have proven their
capabilities through their successful investments.
ii) Failed Firms
There is some support of ability to identify deals but in the case of Transpac the latest
deals were prior to the dotcom bust. There were no recent deals and in Transpac's case
the last Malaysian deal was 10 years ago. Both firms did not make any investments prior
to closure but the managers of SBEM did confirm that they had a few deals in hand,
showing that they had the ability to identify deals.
iii) Discussion and Conclusion
The evidence allows us to conclude that the ability to identify and secure deals is
another important factor that leads to successful firms. However, even the failed firms do
show some ability to identify deals although they show a lower capability to secure the
deals.
The successful firms show a clear ability to identify and secure deals with a wide
portfolio of investments and many successful exits. The failed firms also show some
capability. In SBEM, the team did manage to identify deals but were closed before they
could secure the deals. In Transpac there were many earlier deals but no recent deals,
which means that they did have the ability to identify deals earlier but that they were
incapable of doing the same in recent times due to other reasons.
5.3.7 Dealflow - Availability of Deals in the Market
The findings for the successful and failed cases have been summarised in Appendix 13
the extract of which is as follows:
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Successful Firms Failed Firms Conclusion
All firms show strong
support that there is
adequate availability





Some support. There were no
recent deals but Softbank did
identify between 5-8 deals before
the decision to close while
Transpac did have deals in the
early years. There is evidence of
deal availability but not enough
for the firms to show success.
Successful firms have a wide range of portfolio
investments indicating that there is adequate
deal availability in their market. The failed firms
did not have any investments indicating they
were unable to secure deals although one firm
did have a few deals in the pipeline before they
were closed down. As these firms invest in the
same country as 2 of the successful ones,
dealflow availability alone could not have
resulted in their failure.
Table 5.25: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Successful v Failed Firms - Availability of
Deals in the Market
Key result: This analysis also shows strong support that for the successful firms there is
availability of deals in their focus markets whereas the failed firms only show some
evidence of this category.
i) Successful Firms
All firms show strong support that there is adequate availability of deals in their focus
markets. Most firms have many deals in their investment space. The successful firms
also have a wide and diversified portfolio of investments throughout their geographic
focus and among their different regional offices.
ii) Failed Firms
There is only some support of deal availability. Softbank did identify between 5-8 deals
before the decision to close showing that there were deals in their geographic focus.
While there were no recent deals for Transpac, they did have deals in the early years,
indicating that availability in their markets may not be an issue. There is evidence of deal
availability even for these failed firms so their failure cannot be attributed to the lack of
dealflow in their markets.
iii) Discussion and Conclusion
The evidence enables us to conclude that the successful firms show wide availability of
deals in their markets. However, as the successful firms invest in the same country as
the failed firms and have been able to invest successfully, dealflow availability alone
could not have resulted in the failure of SBEM and Transpac. Hence this is not a valid
reason for the difference between success and failure.
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Successful firms do have a wide range of portfolio investments indicating that there is
adequate deal availability in their market. The failed firms did not have any recent
investments indicating they were unable to secure deals although SBEM did have a few
deals in the pipeline before they were closed down. Transpac on the other hand did
have deals prior to the Dotcom bust. This does show that in the markets that they were
operating in, all the firms could show that there was dealflow.
5.3.8 Exits - Viability of Exits in the Market
The findings for the successful and failed cases have been summarised in Appendix 13
the extract of which is as follows:
Successful Firms Failed Firms Conclusion
There is strong support of the
viability of exits in their
markets. All firms have
successfully exited
investments in all markets
they invest in.
Moderate support. While SBEM did
not have any investments & hence
no exits Transpac did in the early
years. It does show that there is
viability of exits in their markets but
SBEM did not get a chance to
invest to show viability.
There is strong support of exit
viability in their markets for the
successful firms & at least one failed
firm. The other failed firm did not
have a chance to exit as they were
closed before any investments were
made.
Table 5.26: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Successful v Failed Firms - Exits
Key result: This analysis shows strong support of the viability of exits for the successful
firms and only moderate support for the failed firms.
i) Successful Firms
There is strong support of the viability of exits in their markets. The viability of exits in
their geographic markets was important, as that was where most of the exits took place.
For example H&Q Thailand IPO'd all their investments in Thailand while Walden
Malaysia exited their investments in Malaysia and Singapore, the two main markets in
which they invest. This shows that the markets in which they invest have viable capital
markets to exit their investments.
ii) Failed Firms
There is moderate support that the failed firms managed to exit successfully in their
investment markets. SBEM did not have any investments and hence no exits prior to
their closure. Transpac, however, did exit successfully in the early years. It does show
that there is viability of exits in their markets but SBEM did not get a chance to invest to
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show viability. They were however located in geographic areas which did have viable
markets as shown by the successful firms.
iii) Discussion and Conclusion
The analysis enables us to conclude that there is strong support that the viability of exits
is an important factor for success but does not differentiate between the successful and
failed firms and thus cannot contribute to either the success or failure of the cases.
The analysis shows strong support of exit viability in their markets for the successful
firms and at least one failed firm (Transpac). The other failed firm (SBEM) did not have a
chance to exit as they were closed before any investments were made. The success of
many of the case study firms in exiting their investments within their geographic
locations serves to confirm that there is viability of exits in the market in which these
firms operate.
5.3.9 Networks - Value of Networks
The findings for the successful and failed cases have been summarised in Appendix 13
the extract of which is as follows:
Successful Firms Failed Firms Conclusion
There is strong support of
good networks among the
firms. Most managers have
vast work experience &
have shown the ability to
invest in many portfolio
firms using their networks.
Moderate support. Transpac
does show evidence of some
networks with earlier
investments & exits but
Softbank had less evidence. It
is not easy to show that the
firms had good networks prior
to closure.
The successful firms show that they have
good networks & many even secured their
deals through their networks. One failed
firm did indicate good networks at least in
its earlier days but post dotcom bust it
showed less evidence of good networks, as
it did not have any recent investments.
Again this lack of investments could be due
to other factors & not weak networks.
Table 5.27: Cross Case Pattern Matching - Successful v Failed Firms - Networks
Key result: This analysis shows strong support of the strength of the networks of the
successful firms and only moderate support for the failed firms.
i) Successful Firms
There is strong support of good networks among the successful firms. Most managers
have vast work experience and have shown the ability to invest in many portfolio firms
using their networks. In at least one case (H&Q Thailand) the Managing Director stated
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that all their investments were made through their personal networks. The ability to
successfully invest and exit and their vast work and venture capital experience show that
the successful firms have good networks and use them to be successful.
ii) Failed Firms
There is only moderate support for the failed firms. Transpac does show evidence of
some networks with earlier investments and exits but Softbank had less evidence. It is
not easy to show that the firms had good networks prior to closure except based on the
interviews. Softbank did manage to find a few deals for investment so there is evidence
of networks.
Transpac had investments prior to the year 2000 but not in the last 5 years. That showed
that they were able to identify and secure deals and shows that they had the networks to
do so in the early years. However in the latest 5 years they showed less ability to invest.
This lack of investments could be due to other factors such as the inability to invest in
the first place and not so much to their networks. There is evidence for this statement
because Jason Ng, the former Country Manager of Transpac had gone on to form his
own venture capital firm Expedient Equity and has invested in 6 companies between
2003 and 2005 (Appendix K, Case F: Jason Ng Biodata). This shows that Ng has the
networks to invest as a venture capitalist.
Discussion and Conclusion
The analysis enables us to conclude that although networks are an important factor in
the success of these firms they do not make the difference between success and failure
of the cases as all the firms show some similar ability to network.
The successful firms show that they have good networks and many even secured their
deals through their networks. One failed firm did indicate good networks at least in its
earlier days but post dotcom bust it showed less evidence of good networks, as it did not
have any recent investments. However as seen above this may not just be due to their
networks but perhaps due more to their inability to invest and not networks.
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5.3.10 Conclusion on Cross-Case Pattern Matching - Successful vs. Failed Firms
The cross-case pattern matching in this section has allowed us to determine the factors
that have a significant effect on the success or failure of the cases in this dissertation.
Based on the above we have determined that all of the four categories: the Intangible
Resources (management team experience, expertise and knowledge base, knowledge
sharing, market knowledge and continuous learning and independence of the
management team), Dealflow (identifying and securing deals and availability of deals in
market), Exits (viability of exits in market) and Networks (value of networks) are all
factors that played a role in the success of the firms in our study.
However, to answer our research question, we need to find the differentiating factors
that made the difference between success and failure of the cases in our study. This is
done in the next section where the success factors above are matched to the objectives
of this dissertation and the differentiators are identified. These differentiators are then
used to generate and develop propositions in sections 6 and 7.
5.4 Objective of the Dissertation & Differentiating Factors
We have concluded that the above four major categories (Resource Based categories,
dealflow, exits and networks) are all important for the success of global venture capital
investing in the markets we have studied - Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. However,
before we can consider generating propositions from these findings, it is important that
the results meet the requirements of our objectives, the research question in this
dissertation. We need to generate propositions that will answer the question:
"Why are some venture capital firms more successful in global venture
capital investing than others and how do they ensure this success?"
While all the above categories have been determined to be important for success, we
need to establish why some firms are more successful than others; we need to find the
differentiating factors between success and failure. If for example, networks are
important to all the firms and both successful and failed firms show the same or similar
type of networks or use of networks then this does not provide a reason why one firm is
successful while the other failed. This cannot lead to valid propositions for this
dissertation. If however, in the successful firms there is strong support of management
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team experience but this same support is not found in failed firms, then we have shown
a factor that has made a difference between successful and failed firms and these
factors can lead us to valid propositions.
The following discussion will compare the results thus far to our objectives and
determine which of the factors show differences between successful and failed firms and
from that which factors will be used for proposition generation.
5.4.1 Intangible Resources - Management Team Experience
We will start with the first category in this group: management team experience.
We concluded earlier in section 5.3.1 that management team experience is an important
factor in the success of the firms in our study. All the successful firms had managers that
were very experienced individuals both in their focus industry and in the venture capital
industry. Many of them had vast regional experience and in all cases their global
partners also had vast international experience. Even in the case of the local Malaysian
firm their CEO had global experience having been a VC in the US and Singapore. The
failed firms however showed much less in terms of experience. In SBEM, none of the
managers had any venture capital experience whereas in Transpac one manager had
venture capital experience but this was found to be inadequate because the firm was
moving into private equity investing, an area in which the managers had no experience
at all. Thus while the partners and managers of the successful firms had a lot of
experience in their investment space, the same could not be said of the managers in the
failed firms.
The managers of the successful firms also have a lot of experience with successful exits
both in IPOs and M&As. A review of the Biodata of the partners and managers of
successful firms indicates that most have had numerous successful exits. In the failed
firms none of the managers had any experience with exits. The venture capital industry
profits only on successful exits, so this is valuable experience for a Venture Capitalist.
This analysis shows that experience is a significant factor and differentiator between
successful and failed firms. We can conclude from this that management team
experience is one factor that makes a difference between successful and failed firms in
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our study and contributes towards the objectives of the dissertation. This category will
therefore be used for generating propositions in section 6.
5.4.2 Intangible Resources - Expertise and Knowledge Base
In section 5.3.2 we concluded that the management team's expertise and knowledge
base was an important factor in the success of the firms in our study. All the successful
firms have management teams with wide expertise and knowledge base in venture
capital, industry and within their investment space. The failed firms showed far less
expertise and knowledge base in venture capital and in their investment space. Among
the failed firms, in SBEM, none of the managers had any venture capital expertise
whereas in Transpac one manager had venture capital expertise but again this was
found to be inadequate because the firm moved into private equity investing, an area in
which the managers had no expertise at all. Furthermore, while the partners and
managers of the successful firms had a lot of expertise in their investment space, the
same could not be said of the managers in the failed firms.
The country teams and their regional counterparts in the successful firms also had wide
expertise and knowledge base of their respective geographic space. Their global
partners were also actively involved and actively contributed their expertise to the
regional offices and brought with them their vast international expertise and knowledge.
There was however a lack of knowledge in their geographic space in the failed firms. In
SBEM the managers had to rely on their limited geographic knowledge while investing
regionally, including in countries where they had no local knowledge. Hence they would
have been at a disadvantage to the successful firms because of this limited knowledge
base. None of the global partners appeared to contribute their expertise to the failed
firms and in Transpac contribution was further limited because of rivalry among their
regional offices.
The managers of the successful firms also have a lot of exit expertise having listed or
sold many of their investments successfully. A review of the Biodata of the partners and
managers of successful firms indicates that most have had numerous successful exits.
In the failed firms none of the managers had any exits. Transpac as a firm did have
many exits but those were prior to year 2000 and did not involve the country managers
as they were done much earlier, before their term of office. The venture capital industry
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profits only on successful exits, so managers who have done this before would have
gained much expertise and knowledge, which would have been useful for their future
investments. This was not evident in the managers of the failed firms.
On a comparative basis the successful firms had far more knowledge within their firms
than the failed firms. This analysis shows that there is a significant difference between
the successful and failed management teams in terms of expertise and knowledge base.
Just like management team experience, there is a real difference between the firms
here. We can conclude from this that the expertise and knowledge base of the
management team is another factor that makes a difference between successful and
failed firms in our study.
5.4.3 Intangible Resources - Knowledge Sharing
Another important factor from section 5.3.3 was knowledge sharing. This research
shows that knowledge sharing is far more prevalent and deemed more important among
the successful firms. There is diversity of management and regular meetings to share
knowledge. Partners also share knowledge regularly on a regional and global basis. The
successful firms have regular management meetings to formulate strategy, share
experiences and fund performances. Whenever there are changes in the environment
like the Asian Financial Crisis, these managers also meet regularly to review their firm's
strategies and to manage risks. Management staff from other regional offices also help
with portfolio companies especially in business development. This shows that there is
very active and regular knowledge sharing in the successful firms.
This contrasts with the failed firms where even when there are meetings, inter-office
rivalry means that no sharing takes place. Even in formulating strategy, in Transpac
there was no process or sharing as the President alone formulated strategy. The
President decides the strategy and the rest of the team has to follow the decision. There
was a distinct lack of knowledge sharing at Transpac. In SBEM there was no evidence of
knowledge sharing as no Softbank partner or senior manager was actively involved with
the firm, providing no evidence of sharing globally. In SBEM strategy formulation was
done at the headquarters level during the formation of the firm and no other evidence
was found of knowledge sharing.
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The analysis shows that the firms that actively share knowledge are more successful.
As a corollary, actively not sharing knowledge appears to be a major factor in failure, at
least in one of the two cases we have studied. Based on this evidence, we can conclude
that knowledge sharing among the management team is another factor that makes a
difference between successful and failed firms in our study. Active and regular
knowledge sharing is therefore a necessary ingredient for success.
5.4.4 Intangible Resources - Market Knowledge and Continuous Learning
A fourth category that we concluded in section 5.3.4 as important for successful firms
was market knowledge and continuous learning. Successful firms have diverse
management teams and wide market knowledge not only due to their venture capital
and industry expertise but also to their multiple successful exits. They also make
extensive use of external professionals and special Advisory Committees to provide
additional market knowledge, which the managers of the firms may lack. Successful
firms also show a propensity for continuous learning, which increases their market
knowledge.
In the failed firms the lack of investments and successful exits means that there is
inadequate market knowledge gained by the managers. There is also no support of
continuous learning in the failed firms. They also don't have any Advisory Committees
and none of the managers mention the use of external professionals either, making it
more obvious that there is less reliance on external market knowledge.
Based on the evidence in this research, we can conclude that market knowledge and
continuous learning is another factor that makes a difference between successful and
failed firms in our study. Enhancing their market knowledge and emphasis on continuous
learning are necessary ingredients for success.
5.4.5 Intangible Resources - Independence of the Management Team
The final category in the Intangible Resources group that we concluded as important in
section 5.3.5 for successful firms was independence of the management team. The
management teams of the successful firms have significantly more independence than
the failed firms. The successful firms show independence through their contribution to
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strategy formulation and firm management. They also decide on their own industry focus
and investment strategies and contribute their ideas actively to the group.
The failed firms however appear to have no independence at all. The best example of
this was that each of the failed firms was shut down unilaterally by their headquarters
with no input by the country managers. In Transpac the autocratic leadership style of the
Founder President meant that the managers did not have much independence either.
The analysis shows that the firms that have independent management teams are more
successful indicating that independence is another necessary ingredient for success.
Based on this we can conclude that independence of the management team is another
factor that makes a difference between successful and failed firms in our study.
5.4.6 Dealflow
In sections 5.3.6 and 5.3.7 we considered two areas under the major category of
dealflow: the ability to identify and secure deals and the availability of deals in the
market. We shall consider both of these categories here.
The successful firms have all been able to identify and secure deals as seen in their
large number of portfolio companies and many successful exits. Even the failed firms did
show some ability to identify deals, as Transpac had many deals prior to 2000 showing
that even they did have the ability to identify deals even though that ability was not as
evident in recent years. However the fact that they had deals to defend at management
meetings showed the ability to identify deals. Even SBEM had several deals identified
prior to closure. Hence, while there are some differences between successful and failed
firms in their ability to identify and secure deals, these differences were not major and
were not the primary factor for one's successes and the other's failure.
The availability of deals in the market is also not a major issue. Three of the successful
firms were in the same markets as the failed firms - Malaysia and Singapore. Since they
managed to secure deals in these markets, it is confirmation that deals are available in
those markets. The failed firms also managed to identify some deals confirming deal
availability in those markets. Hence availability of deals did not make the difference
between successful and failed firms either.
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Based on this, we can conclude that dealflow, while an important factor for success, is
not the reason why one firm is successful and the other a failure. The difference
between a successful and failed firm is not dealflow and hence this factor does not
satisfy our objective of determining why some foreign venture capital firms are more
successful than others. This is not a differentiating factor and hence will not be used for
formulating propositions.
5.4.7 Exits - Viability of Exits in the Market
In section 5.3.8 we concluded that the viability of exits is an important factor for success.
Based on the research, the geographical focus of the firms has been in markets with
viable stock exchanges. Even the failed firms were focused on the same markets. The
successful firms have all had many successful exits in their markets and even Transpac
had many exits prior to 2000. Only SBEM did not have any exits although at least two of
the firms that they identified for investment were ultimately listed showing that there was
viability of exits in their market.
The analysis shows that there is strong support of exit viability in all the markets in which
our case study firms were located and where they were investing. Hence this is an
important factor for success. However, as all our firms were in the same markets, this
factor alone cannot be the difference the sets apart the successful from the failed firms,
if all are investing in the same geographical area, they will all benefit from the same
factor and this factor cannot assist one firm to be successful while causing another to
fail.
We can conclude therefore that viability of exits in the market, while an important factor
for success, is again not the reason why one firm is successful and the other a failure.
Hence this factor also cannot satisfy our objective of determining why some foreign
venture capital firms are more successful than others. This is not a differentiating factor
and hence will not be used for formulating propositions.
5.4.8 Networks - Value of Networks
We have concluded in section 5.3.9 that the successful firms have good networks and
many even secured their deals through their personal networks. However, the failed
firms also showed some evidence of having networks although we did conclude that
206
they were not able to show that their networks were as good as those of the successful
firms. However, Ng of Transpac has shown that since leaving Transpac he has
managed to secure six investments thus showing that he has fairly good networks and
the ability to use his networks to secure deals. The success of those investments is a
different question but it does validate his networks in this area. Even SBEM did show
several deals prior to closure indicating that they too had networks that worked.
While we can conclude that networks are an important factor in success, again we
cannot say that such networks make the difference between successful and failed firms.
Hence this factor also cannot satisfy our objective of determining why some foreign
venture capital firms are more successful than others. This is not a differentiating factor
either and hence will not be used for formulating propositions.
5.5 Summary and Conclusion - Differentiating Factors
The above discussion shows that among the four categories explored, only the
categories grouped under the Intangible Resources show a significant difference
between successful and failed firms. These categories are the key differentiators
between successful and failed firms. Dealflow, exits and networks, while being important
categories for successful investing in emerging markets did not show any differences for
both types of firms. So even though they were important, they affected all firms in similar
ways and could not account for one firm being successful while the other ended up a
failure. The only categories that could account for this was the resource based
categories. There is strong support that the firm's resources and how those resources
were managed and structured made the difference between the successful and failed
firms.
This means that the Resource Based categories are the most important categories
contributing to the objective of this thesis of determining why some firms are
more successful than others in global venture capital investing in the three
emerging markets of South East Asia.
The next step of the thesis is to generate propositions around this discovery.
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6. Generating Propositions
As discussed in the methodology in section 3 above, based on our Framework and the
methodology proposals of Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1994), there are three steps to
generating propositions:
• Shaping propositions
• Matching with enfolding literature and,
• Reaching closure (ensuring theoretical saturation)
This is shown in the following Figure 6.1 (extracted from Figure 4.1).
Figure 6.1: Formulating Propositions
This section of the dissertation will look at Generating Propositions and then section 7
will continue with Developing Meta-Propositions based on the finding that the Intangible
Resources categories have made the only significant difference between success and
failure of the global venture capital firms. We will begin with the shaping of propositions.
6.1 Shaping Propositions
According to Eisenhardt (1989: 541-542) shaping propositions is a two-step process:
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• Firstly sharpening of constructs through constant comparison between data and
constructs so that accumulating evidence from diverse sources converge on a
single well-defined construct and,
• Secondly by verifying that the emergent relationships between constructs fit with
the evidence in each case.
It needs to be clarified here that Eisenhardt (1989) was describing the process of
inducting theory using case studies but her process did NOT describe the use of
Grounded Theory. In our case, we have pre-empted these two steps by using the
Grounded Theory methodology, which already uses constant comparison between data
and constructs from diverse sources of evidence. In doing so, we have already
converged onto well-defined constructs i.e. Intangible Resources, dealflow, exits and
networks. This simply means that the use of the Grounded Theory methodology has
enabled us to fulfil this first step in shaping propositions.
The second step in shaping propositions is verifying that the emergent relationships
between constructs fit with the evidence in each case. According to Eisenhardt (1989),
each proposition is examined for each case, not for the aggregate of cases. Quoting Yin
(1984) the underlying logic here is replication, i.e. the logic of treating a series of cases
as a series of experiments with each case serving to confirm or disconfirm the
propositions. Hence, the more cases that fit the proposition the better is the confirmation
of the proposition. If there aren't enough cases that confirm the proposition or if there are
a mix of confirmations and contradictions, then the proposition is not proven and has to
be discarded.
Again in this dissertation the use of the Grounded Theory methodology and the constant
comparison approach as well as the within case pattern matching and cross-case
pattern matching means that the emergent relationships were discovered from the
evidence in each case and across the cases, thus fulfilling this requirement as well.
Hence the methodology employed in this dissertation has fulfilled the two-step process
for shaping propositions and we can therefore do away with the requirement to once
again match the findings to the cases.
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As the requirement for shaping propositions has been met with the use of the Grounded
Theory methodology, we can now restate the findings in section 5 above as initial
propositions as follows:
Proposition 1:
The experience of the management team of the global venture capital firm is a relevant
and important factor in the success of the firm
Proposition 2:
The expertise and knowledge base of the management team of the global venture
capital firm is a relevant and important factor in the success of the firm
Proposition 3:
The sharing of knowledge within the management team of the global venture capital firm
is a relevant and important factor in the success of the firm
Proposition 4:
That market knowledge and continuous learning within the global venture capital firm is
a relevant and important factor in its success
Proposition 5:
That the independence of the management team in the global venture capital firm is a
relevant and important factor in its success
The next step in the process of generating propositions is to match the propositions with
the enfolding literature and find support for these propositions in the literature.
6.2 Match with Enfolding Literature
The objective of this section is to link the findings of this study with the wider literature in
other areas or contexts. This matching with enfolding literature will result in propositions
with stronger internal validity, wider generalisability and a higher conceptual level as well
as strengthening the confidence of the findings (Lindgreen et al., 2000). As Eisenhardt
(1989) states, "An essential feature of theory building is comparison of the emergent
concepts or propositions with the extant literature". In comparing with the extant
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literature it is important to ask " what is this similar to, what does it contradict and why".
Asking these questions and comparing with existing literature enables the researcher to
establish the validity of the results of the study and strengthens the confidence that the
findings are valid and generalisable (Pare, 2002).
In this section we will review several areas of the literature: global venture capital, the
general venture capital literature, entrepreneurship and international management
literature and finally literature on management and organisations. This comparison of the
literature in many different areas will enhance the robustness of the findings.
6.2.1 The experience of the management team
a) Global Venture Capital Literature
There is a lot of support on the importance of experience in the management team of
global venture capital firms. Based on the venture capital investment experience of the
International Finance Corporation of the World Bank, Barger et al. (1996) found that the
quality of the fund managers is the most important factor in the fund's performance. The
main problem faced by the IFC was finding experienced, high quality venture capital
fund managers to manage their funds and this is mainly from the emerging markets
perspective including South East Asia. In similar vein, Baygan & Freudenberg (2000)
also found that in making decisions to invest in venture capital funds, investors typically
care more about the experience, reputation and performance of the fund more than
other aspects. This indicates that from the fund investors' perspective, when they want
to invest in the global venture capital firm itself, they look for experienced venture capital
managers.
This is also recognised as important in the study by Pruthi et al. (2003) who found that
successful foreign venture capital firms in India tend to have a significant percentage of
Indian executives with some experience in their foreign parent's domestic market.
Cornelius (2005) lends credence to the importance of experience in global venture
capital firms when he states that venture capital experience is an important element in
ensuring that firms both invest successfully and manage risk well. These authors
recognise the importance of experience and the findings lend support to the fact that
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experience is an important element of the global venture capital manager including from
the Asian perspective.
b) General Venture Capital Literature
There is a lot of support on the need for experience in this part of the literature. Smart et
al. (2000) found that venture capitalists believed that experience was critical to
succeeding as a venture capital firm manager. In fact experience was more important
than all other aspects of the managers skills including education and financial skills.
Bygrave & Timmons (1992) considered the relationship between the experience level of
a venture capital firm and the performance of its funds and found that venture capital
firms with more experience outperform those with less. They also found that the
investment community recognises experience as the majority of new funds in 1988
(64%) and 1990 (56%) went to firms with one or more senior partners who had at least
10 years experience. Only 6% of capital raised went to funds in which the senior partner
had less than 3 years experience. Furthermore, the more experienced funds were able
to raise much larger amounts of money. This is evident in the fact that both Walden and
BCEA have managed to raise follow-on funds. Just in Malaysia alone Walden has raised
3 funds, while the managers of BCEA have just raised a new fund named Crest Capital.
Bygrave & Timmons (1992) also show that investors can expect higher returns from
funds managed by top firms rather than funds managed by newer, less-experienced
firms. This is confirmed by Arthurs & Busenitz (2005) who found that venture capitalists
experience and reputation were positively related to 1-year stock price returns. This
confirms the finding that experience is a very important criterion for not just individual
success but also firm success. Gompers & Lerner (2001) also recognise the importance
of experienced venture capitalists when they found that many venture funds do not
accept additional capital investments because they are limited by the number of
experienced venture capitalists in the firm. They also found that one reason for
syndication is to add experienced venture capitalists on investees' board of directors.
Schertler (2002) found that experienced venture capitalists that have financed a
multitude of high-technology start-ups in the past have more experience than venture
capitalists that have financed only some start-up enterprises. There is clear
acknowledgement that experience is also related to the number of deals made, hence in
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our study the firms with multiple deals are more experienced and tend to perform better
than inexperienced venture capitalists. Schertler (2002) also found that the low level of
venture capitalists' experience in the early stage of the venture capital market could
cause extraordinarily high failure rates, in this case in their investee companies. This can
then impact on the venture capitalists' reputation and their ability to raise further funds
from investors. In our study the experienced firms have all been highly successful in
making their investee companies flourish despite operating in emerging venture capital
markets.
Next, in exploring the venture capitalists' role in their investee companies, Fried &
Hisrich (1995) found that both the venture capitalist and the managers of their investee
companies state that the most significant input of the venture capitalist is their general
business knowledge and experience. Arthurs & Busenitz (2005) also found that venture
capitalists experience and reputation are positively and significantly related to a new
venture's dynamic capabilities. They assist the investee firm in maximising their
resources and adapting their business and technologies to the changing business
environment. In our analysis we found that the more experienced firms had managed to
overcome many crises that have affected the region like the Asian Financial Crisis and
9-11 and have continued to assist their investees to be successful. However, in the case
of SBEM one reason given for the closure of their firm was the 9-11 crisis, which seems
to indicate that they were unable to manage change, indicating that their lack of
experience could have been one reason for this.
Research by Shephard et al. (2003) shows that while increasing experience is
associated with improvements in reliability and performance, there is evidence that
highly experienced venture capitalists have streamlined their decision process to the
point where it is highly automatic and driven by intuition and heuristic processing. This
results in decisions that may be susceptible to various forms of bias and errors. They
found that the optimal level of experience for venture capitalists is 14 years after which
their performance begins to decline. In our research Lip-Bu Tan of Walden, Dr. Ta-Lin
Hsu of H&Q and even Peter Chan of BCEA all have more than 14 years experience but
their firms continue to do well. More research will be needed to prove that the hypothesis
of Shephard et al. (2003) is correct, as the three venture capitalists in this study are not
representative enough.
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Many other studies also express the importance of experience; the value of past
experience as a human factor in venture investment (Sweeting & Wong, 1997); the lack
of experience of Singapore venture capitalists in monitoring their investments and
executing IPOs (Wang & Sim, 2001); how their experience assists entrepreneurs in
improving their decision making by providing a more accurate picture of the environment
and their competitive situation (Arthurs & Busenitz, 2005) and that most general partners
in the US have a decade or more of experience (Gompers, 1998).
The venture capital literature abounds with research on the value of experience to
venture capitalists generally. All the above researches show that experience is a
valuable and necessary aspect of firm success. The only research that indicates
otherwise is Shephard et al. (2003) who found that venture capitalists with more than 14
years experience show a decline in performance. Based on this dissertation study this
does not seem to be the case. Our proposition that experience is an important element
in success is extensively supported within the general venture capital literature.
c) Entrepreneurship and International Management Literature
The entrepreneurship and international management literature also shows that
experience is an important resource for the success of firms. Shane & Venkataraman
(2000) state that in the new ventures field of study it is important for researchers to focus
on managers' special capabilities and experiences when it comes to opportunity
recognition and exploitation. This follows on from work developed by McDougall et al.
(1994) and Oviatt & McDougall (1997) who found that new ventures internationalise
because their internationally experienced and globally networked managers have unique
knowledge and competencies that make entering foreign markets attractive. They found
that managers' experiences and competencies are critical to the decision to
internationalise.
In studying the survival of new ventures Mudambi (2000) found that the multinational
firm's level of experience significantly enhances the probability of its survival. In an
earlier study Mudambi (1998) also found that multinational experience increases the
probability of investment occurring in the first place. This could have significant value
especially for a new venture capital firm like SBEM, which is similar to a new
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entrepreneurial venture that Mudambi (2000) studied. The lack of experience of the
SBEM managers did not assist in enhancing their probability of survival, supporting
Mudambi's (2000) finding.
Experience has also been found to be important in other studies of multinationals and
internationalisation. McEnrue (1988) found that managerial experience is a key factor in
superior performance, Sambharya (1996) identified that experience in international
settings is a key factor in multinational activity while Smith, et al. (1996) found that it was
important in the success of multinational ventures. Like the global venture capital
literature, entrepreneurship and international management literature also shows that
experience is an important resource for the success of firms.
d) Management and Organisational Literature
There are many aspects of the management and organisational literature that support
the findings of this research. Firstly, Barney (1995) defines the human resources of the
firm as "... all the experience, knowledge, judgement, risk taking propensity and wisdom
of individuals associated with the firm" (1995: 50). According to this definition, the
experience and the wisdom that is embedded in the management team are an important
resource of the firm.
Secondly, Galbreath (2005) divided resources into two categories, tangible and
intangible resources of which it is the intangible resource that interests us here. He
further divided intangible resources into assets and skills. An asset is a resource that the
firm "has" while a skill is something that it "does". Based on this analysis, the experience
and expertise of the management team is an asset while the use and sharing of
knowledge and firm learning are skills. Galbreath (2005) goes on to say that the
capabilities within the firm, the experience of the management team and its knowledge
base are arguably the 'pre-eminent' sources of firm success. Teece et al. (1997) also
argued that capabilities are the highest order and most important of the firm's resources.
They state that capabilities would reside within the experience of the firm's management
team.
Coyne et al (1997) said that core competency is a combination of complementary skills
and knowledge bases embedded in a group or team that results in the ability to execute
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one or more critical processes to a world class standard. The team's skills and
knowledge bases would be embedded in their experience as successful venture
capitalists, thus experience is a part of core competency. Within the dynamic capabilities
view, one aspect of the definition of 'capabilities' is the skills, resources and functional
competences of the management team (Teece et al. (1997), aspects that would be
embedded within the experience of the managers. Thus the management and
organisational literature also supports the finding that experience is an important
resource for success.
Experience of the Management Team - Summary & Proposition
The analysis of the literature shows strong support for the notion that experience is a
very important element of firm success. Thus management team experience within the
four successful firms BCEA, Walden, H&Q and MSC Venture Corporation all played an
important role in their success. The failed firms had far less experience in their team with
almost all of them not even having venture capital experience except for Ng of Transpac.
Even the experience that they had in industry was not sufficiently relevant for the failed
firms in terms of their investment focus.
The successful firms had management teams that had venture capital experience as
well as relevant industry experience. They also had the benefit of age, having been
involved in venture capital for many years - Lip-Bu Tan (Walden) and Ta-Lin Hsu (H&Q)
for almost 2 decades, Peter Chan (BCEA) 16 years and Esmond Goei (MSC) almost 10
years. In contrast only Ng had about 15 years experience (in investing but not in
industry) but because of his lack of decision-making ability within the firm, this
experience was not utilised.
In terms of industry experience the successful firms could all show high levels of
experience but both SBEM and Transpac had lower levels of experience. Ng of
Transpac even had no technology industry experience as he only worked in the
investment industry and Smart et al. (2000) state that accounting and corporate finance
knowledge are less important for venture capital success.
216
There is therefore support in the literature including in the global venture capital literature
which has provided some Asian perspectives which enables us to conclude the
following:
i) Venture capital experience is a necessary prerequisite for firm success
ii) Industry experience (based on the firm's focus) is also necessary for firm
success.
iii) The lack of experience in both venture capital and within the firm's industry
focus can lead to the failure of the firm
While we cannot conclude that lack of experience will ensure firm failure, such lack has
contributed to some extent to the failure of the firms in our study.Hence our first
supported proposition is as follows:
P1: A higher level of relevant venture capital and industry experience
within the management team is positively associated with firm success in
global venture capital investing in the emerging markets of South East
Asia.
6.2.2 The expertise and knowledge base of the management team
a) Global Venture Capital Literature
There is a lot of support in the global venture capital literature on the need for
specialised skills and knowledge within venture capital firms. Firstly, in their study of
venture capital activity in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Baygan & Freudenberg (2000) state that the disparities of venture capital activity across
countries stems from among others, the availability of sufficient numbers of venture
capital specialists who can provide the value added that is required in the industry. In an
Indian study Pruthi et al. (2003) discovered that there are different levels of expertise
between foreign and local venture capitalists. The local Indian venture capitalists tend to
have closer involvement and offer more operational input and expertise while the foreign
venture capitalists offer mostly strategic and growth expertise. This shows that there are
differences in the levels of expertise between domestic and foreign venture capitalists
and recognises the need for expertise in venture capitalists. This is where foreign
partners in firms like Walden and H&Q play a big role by providing the additional
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expertise, which their domestic partners or country managers may lack. This was not
found in the failed firms in our study.
Zalan (2004) also highlighted several highly specialised skills for venture capitalists (e.g.
finance and valuation, due diligence, restructuring, strategic planning, etc.) and states
that their knowledge base comprises a complex and highly specialised bundle of
resources. She questions (but does not answer) how international firms are able to
leverage knowledge internationally even though their competitive advantage may be
highly localised. For example this would apply to Walden and how they are able to
leverage their US knowledge in the very different Asian scenario. It is an area that
requires further research but Zalan's research recognises the value of expertise.
Additionally, Barger et al (1996) found that the quality of fund managers, their
capabilities and skills played a major role in the success of venture investing. Other
authors cite the need for managerial sophistication (Bruton et al, 1999), management
skills (Sagari & Guidotti, 1992), venture capital experience and skills (Sapienza et al,
1996) and the need for specialists to evaluate and manage investment portfolios
(Baygan & Freudenberg, 2000).
This shows strong support on the need for specialised skills and knowledge within
venture capital firms. It is this specialised skill set that leads to the success of the global
firms and it is also where the foreign partners of the firms with specialised skills play a
major role in assisting the regional offices of the group.
b) General Venture Capital Literature
There is a lot of support in the general venture capital literature for the expertise and
knowledge base of venture capitalists. "All venture capitalists are not created equal",
state Elango et al. (1995: 171). They found that there are major differences in the ability
of venture capital firms to add value after the investment is made especially based on
the venture capitalists' business knowledge.
In 1992, Bygrave & Timmons recognised the value of expertise and knowledge base
when they acknowledged that venture capital is an information-intensive business where
venture capitalists become experts by specialising in niches, not by being generalists.
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They believed that through specialisation firms develop the expertise that makes them
valuable members of the information network. They recognised that the depth of
knowledge of the venture capitalist in several industries is instrumental in testing the
realities of a business plan, its goals and assumptions. They also state that the know-
how that an experienced venture capitalist can provide is not available anyplace else.
Further, their propositions are supported by Jungwirth & Moog (2004), who define two
types of venture capitalists according to the knowledge that they own - specialists who
own industry-specific knowledge and generalists who lack such knowledge. Generalists
own general knowledge concerning the process of founding and financing a new
enterprise and act as the intermediary between outside investors and portfolio
enterprises. They don't own deeper insights into a particular industry and succeeding in
such industries would incur prohibitive knowledge transfer and agency costs. Specialists
on the other hand besides owing founding and financing skills also have knowledge
concerning special industries, processes and products such as biotechnology. Their
specialisation lowers knowledge transfer and costs. In our study firms like BCEA,
Walden and H&Q would be regarded as specialists while the others would be regarded
as generalists. This is one reason why Transpac had problems, as they were more akin
to generalists trying to invest as specialists and found such investing a difficult process
as attested by the managers.
Additionally, in studying what venture capitalists really do, Dotzler (2001) found that a
broad range of skills is required to perform the many tasks of a venture capitalist. Many
of these skills are honed by making investments, working with portfolio companies and
by interacting with experienced investors. Gompers & Lemer (2001) also state that
partners' education, previous employment or years of investment experience allows
venture capital firms to acquire 'a deep understanding' of a particular set of industries.
This specialised knowledge enables the firm to gauge an opportunity's promise and
supports the due diligence and screening process.
Expertise also covers many aspects of skills found in venture capitalists including
technical knowledge, operational experience, the ability to strike a smart deal and an eye
for skilled portfolio-firm managers (Gompers & Lerner, 2001). They found that most
European and Asian venture capitalists with investment banking or management
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consulting backgrounds have yet to develop these unique skills. This ties in with our
finding that Ang, the Regional Associate in SBEM who has only investment banking and
consulting experience probably has not developed these skills sufficiently to be a skilful
venture capitalist. Some venture capital firms also depend on syndication to obtain
additional knowledge for themselves and their investee firms, an acknowledgement that
knowledge is a very important commodity for venture capital firms (Bygrave et al., 1999).
Venture capitalists also tend to do better in more focused or specialised industry
ventures instead of high industry diversity as it is more difficult to develop specialised
industry knowledge and expertise and to expend effort in closer interaction with their
ventures if venture capitalists are more diversified (Gupta & Sapienza, 1992). The
successful firms in our research are more industry focused (e.g. Walden in
semiconductors, software and electronics and BCEA in media and telecoms) whereas
Transpac didn't really have any particular focus. The firms' expertise and knowledge
base is deemed important in Gupta & Sapienza's research.
Arthurs & Busenitz (2005) found that venture capitalists with specialties in specific
industries combine a superior knowledge base with industry specific ties that allow for
the development and deployment of dynamic capabilities and provide insight into the
needed internal resource base changes. Also those venture capitalists with more IPO
experience have a base of knowledge to better understand the influencers of their
investee's products in their markets. This is where the firms like BCEA, Walden and
H&Q excel because they have so many IPOs that they have these additional skills,
which are missing in SBEM and Transpac.
Additionally in terms of specific skills, several have been highlighted. Fried & Hisrich
(1995) highlighted the moral support that venture capitalists provide their portfolio firms;
Hellman & Puri (2002) show that venture capitalists also act as coach or mentors to their
investees; Sapienza et.al. (1994) state that interpersonal skills are even more important
than their operational skills, Ueda (1992) found that finance and valuation skills in this
field are distinct and different and are often bundled with scientific and technical skills
and Sweeting & Wong (1997) found that even building mutual investor - investees trust
is a requisite skill for the venture capitalist.
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This long list of specialised skills confirms that venture capitalists are a unique group of
people for whom these skills play a big role in their ability to invest and exit successfully.
Thus there is a lot of support in the general venture capital literature for the expertise
and knowledge base of venture capitalists.
c) Entrepreneurshio and International Management Literature
The entrepreneurship and international management literature supports the view that
expertise and knowledge base play a significant role in successful internationalisation.
Firstly, in studying entrepreneurship, Watson et. al. (2003) found that skills, knowledge
and abilities are important for the growth of the entrepreneurial firm. Similarly, the
accretion of knowledge and resources over time leads to increased competence, which
is an important facet of entrepreneurial success (Erikson, 2002). Thus younger venture
capitalists who have not accumulated knowledge over time may have less competence
and may have less ability to succeed like the SBEM managers.
Secondly, in researching the internationalisation of young firms, Sapienza et. al (2003)
found that the survival and growth of these firms depend on the knowledge intensity of
the firm. Knowledge intensity in their research relates to the extent to which the firm's
inputs, transformation processes and outputs are dependent on brainpower rather than
traditional physical factors of production. Autio et al. (2000) and Zahra et al. (2000) also
support the notion that knowledge plays an important part in new venture
internationalisation.
Furthermore, in the field of multinational corporation internationalisation Kogut & Zander
(1993) state "...the primary advantage that a firm brings to foreign markets is its
possession of superior knowledge" (1993: 627) and that "firms compete on the basis of
the superiority of their information and know-how..." (1993: 640). Similarly, Yli-Renko
et.al (2000) state "...the very knowledge-intensity of the firm's core resources may play
an important enabling role on the internationalisation of firms" (2001:20). It is evident
from this that the entrepreneurship and international management literature strongly
supports the view that expertise and knowledge base play a significant role in successful
internationalisation.
d) Management and Organisational Literature
221
Literature in this field also provides support on the importance of expertise and
knowledge base in the success of firms. Firstly, Galbreath's (2005) categorisation of
resources into assets and skills includes the expertise and knowledge base of the firm
as an asset, i.e. something that the firm 'has'. Grant (1996) believed that the success of
any firm is solely dependent upon the knowledge and know-how (expertise) of its
employees, offering a strong opinion on what is required for firm success.
Secondly, other authors also offer support for Grant's opinion. These include findings
that that firm performance is critically linked to the skills, expertise and know-how of
managers (Castanias & Helfat, 1991), that know-how generates more durable
advantages than any other resources of the firm because it is largely complex,
specialised and tacit (McEvily & Chakravathy, 2002) and that capabilities are the highest
order and most important of a firm's resources because of their high levels of causal
ambiguity and strong barriers to duplication (Teece et al., 1997). Additionally, Teece
(1998) also states that knowledge has emerged as the key driver of competitive
advantage because the rapid expansion of goods and factor markets has left "intangible
assets as the main basis of competitive differentiation in many sectors".
In core competence theory, core competence is defined as a combination of
complementary skills and knowledge bases embedded in a group or team (Coyne et al.,
1997). Bartlett and Ghoshal (1993) view this knowledge and expertise as a scarcer
resource than capital. Prahalad & Hamel (1990) state that top executives will be judged
on their ability to identify, cultivate and exploit the core competencies that make (firm)
growth possible, hence expertise and knowledge base are a key component for firm
growth and success. They also distinguish between individual competencies or
capabilities and core competencies. It is the collective organisational and managerial
competencies that really matter, hence while individual expertise is important, for the
firm to be truly successful it is the entire expertise and knowledge base within the whole
firm that matters to success. Hence even if individually some managers may have
expertise, if this expertise is not utilised collectively within the firm, it cannot lead to core
competency. Thus in Transpac, Ng may be competent but because the firm is run
autocratically and there is no collective use of the capabilities, the firm will not be
successful.
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In the Dynamic Capabilities view the term 'capabilities' emphasises the key role of
strategic management in appropriately adapting, integrating and reconfiguring internal
and external organisational skills, resources and functional competences to match the
requirements of a changing environment (Teece et al., 1997). One reason for the closure
of SBEM was the 9-11 terrorist attacks which they believed changed the environment for
investments, but this is a change that affected other firms and the others managed the
changes and continued to be successful. Hence the lack of skills and competencies may
have been the real problem for the failed firms and not merely the changes in the
investing environment.
Managerial competence also depends on the mutual and intertwined knowledge and
capabilities of the entire management team (Knudsen & Madsen, 2002). The same
authors also state that the creation and coordination of new knowledge within exporting
firms is a crucial part of internationalisation and is an important determinant of export
performance. There is strong support in the literature here on the importance of
expertise and knowledge base in the success of firms.
Expertise and knowledge base of the management team - Summary & Proposition
The analysis of the literature shows strong support for the view that the expertise and
knowledge base of the firm is a very important element of its success. Thus the
expertise and knowledge base within the four successful firms BCEA, Walden, H&Q and
MSC Venture Corporation all played an important role in their success. The failed firms
had far less expertise and knowledge in their selected focus industries.
For example SBEM wanted to invest in the Internet industry but none of the managers
had any expertise in this industry. Transpac was investing in industries in which none of
their managers had any domain knowledge. For example they were looking at
technology businesses but Ng, the Country Manager, did not have much domain
knowledge of this industry while Yeo, the Investment Manager, only had building
materials industry knowledge, something that is vastly different from technology. Walden
for example was investing in software and had several software experts on the senior
management team.
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The successful firms also had management teams that had venture capital expertise
while the failed firms had limited expertise with only Ng of Transpac having some
expertise. In terms of industry expertise and relevant knowledge base the successful
firms could all show high levels of expertise and knowledge but both SBEM and
Transpac could not. Even in managing change with issues like the 9-11 terrorist attacks
the successful firms have the skills and knowledge base to manage these risks and have
continued to prosper unlike the failed firms, which could not, especially SBEM which
cited this as one reason for their closure.
Hence our second proposition is as follows:
P2: A higher level of venture capital and industry expertise and knowledge
base within the management team is positively associated with firm
success in global venture capital investing in the emerging markets of
South East Asia.
6.2.3 Knowledge Sharing
a) Global Venture Capital Literature
There are no particular studies in the global venture capital literature that contribute to
this aspect of knowledge sharing.
bl General Venture Capital Literature
There is support for the view that sharing is important for venture capital firms. Gompers
& Lemer (2001) state that as venture capital firms grow, it is important for them to invest
in formal modes of knowledge sharing as this leads to the efficient use of their partners'
time and energy. In our study the successful cases all have formal modes of sharing
including regular management and strategic meetings for the formulation of strategy and
to share ideas and knowledge. The failed firms did not do this and even when they did
like Transpac there was no sharing due to regional rivalries. Bygrave & Timmons (1992)
even point out that one reason for the formation of syndicates is to share knowledge.
Additionally, their experience in prior investments, proposals that they may have
analysed and investments that they have made gives venture capitalists knowledge that
is useful to others, hence the reason why venture capitalists always talk to each other
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(Fried & Hisrich, 1994). This is one reason why the venture capitalists in our study feel
that knowledge sharing is necessary among the different partners in the group, but is
something that is not obvious in the failed firms. Thus literature in this area supports our
proposition.
c) Entreoreneurship and International Management Literature
There is a lot of support in the entrepreneurship and international management literature
for knowledge sharing as an important part of firm success. In studying technological
networks and internationalisation of new ventures, Zahra et al. (2003) found that
technological sharing within their networks can positively influence sales growth for
newly internationalising ventures. Sharing in this sense includes both social sharing as
well as other types of information disseminated within a network. This has some
similarities to sharing within the networks of the venture capitalists, within their firms as
well as within the group and also among their networks.
Kogut & Zander (2002) studied the importance of the sharing and transfer of the
knowledge of individuals and groups within an organisation. They argue that the
knowledge that is held by individuals is also expressed in the way in which members
cooperate in a social community such as an organisation, group or networks. They state
that firms create new knowledge by recombining their current capabilities and by building
on the social relationships that exist in a firm. The cumulative knowledge of the firm
provides options for the firm to expand in new or uncertain markets.
One obvious point to note here is that knowledge sharing includes social relationships
and Ng of Transpac made this point when he stated that their meetings were only useful
for personal networking although the main point of the meeting, to share knowledge, was
not adhered to in their firm. Hence in our study the firms that have managed to do this
using regular meetings and the networking between partners and managers tend to be
successful whereas those that do not like Transpac tend not to be able to leverage and
build on the existing knowledge. Hence the social relationships within the firm are also
important for knowledge sharing in firms. Additionally, in their research into the effects of
human capital and interpersonal processes on venture teams (entrepreneurial ventures)
Watson et al. (2003) found that sharing information is an important part of the
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interpersonal process. Where there was a higher level of interpersonal process
effectiveness, there was a corresponding level of firm growth.
Finally, Inkpen & Dinur (1998) examined business alliances and the processes used by
the alliance partners to share knowledge and identified four key processes of sharing -
technology sharing, alliance-parent interaction, personnel transfers, and strategic
integration. This study showed different processes of sharing knowledge that are
effective in alliances which can also be used by venture capitalists to share knowledge
within their group of companies. Our study shows some processes are applicable
especially alliance - parent interaction, in this case between the parent and regional
venture capital firms, technology sharing between the partners and strategic integration
where the managers meet and formulate plans and strategies for investing. There is
however, no evidence in our study of personnel transfers.
Thus there is a lot of support in the entrepreneurship and international management
literature for knowledge sharing as an important part of firm success.
d) Management and Organisational Literature
There is plenty of support in the literature that sharing is necessary for firm success.
Firstly, in the core competency literature, Prahalad & Hamel (1990) define core
competence as the organisation of work and delivery of value and the communication,
involvement and a deep commitment to working across organisational boundaries,
involving many levels of people and all functions. This is one of the clearest
endorsements of the need for knowledge sharing within a firm.
Additionally, core competency requires firms to actively share knowledge among all
levels of the firm's staff and not just the management team. Sharing of knowledge is the
essence of core competence, as Prahalad & Hamel (1990) believe that core
competence does not diminish with use and are enhanced by application and sharing.
They view key employees and top managers as "competence carriers" and contend that
they can build and share their competencies for the benefit of their firm by being
regularly brought together from across the corporation to trade notes and ideas. All the
successful firms in our study actively get together, meet and share ideas, knowledge and
competencies confirming Prahalad & Hamel's belief on how competencies are
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enhanced. This view is supported by Scarborough (1998) who states that the core
competencies approach is about the interaction of people, skills and technologies that
drives firm performance.
In their theory of Dynamic Capabilities, Teece et al. (1997) emphasise the dynamic
nature of firms. This refers to the capacity to renew competences so as to achieve
congruence with the changing business environment. It requires innovative responses
especially when time-to-market and timing are critical, when rate of technological
change is rapid, and the nature of future competition and markets difficult to determine.
The term 'capabilities' emphasises "the key role of strategic management in
appropriately adapting, integrating and reconfiguring internal and external organisational
skills, resources and functional competences to match the requirements of a changing
environment" (1997: 515). It is proposed here that it is not possible to be dynamic and to
meet the requirements of dynamic capabilities if firms do not have a mechanism to share
the required knowledge and skills, hence sharing would be a prerequisite for this view.
Furthermore, this proposition is supported by Knudsen & Madsen (2002: 492) who state
that managerial competence depends on the mutual and intertwined knowledge,
capabilities and viewpoints of the entire management team. To 'intertwine' the
knowledge of the entire management team will require sharing among them. Thus the
management and organisational literature supports the result that sharing is necessary
for firm success.
Knowledge sharing - Summary & Proposition
The analysis of the literature shows a lot of support for the view that knowledge sharing
is an important element of firm success. All the successful firms in our study actively and
purposefully meet and share knowledge, opinions, ideas and deals within their
management teams.
The failed firms showed less propensity to share, for example in Transpac although
there were quarterly meetings the management teams refrain from sharing due to the
competitive nature within the organisation and the autocratic style of management. This
lack of sharing meant that competences were not developed and firm knowledge was
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not utilised to the maximum. SBEM on the other had showed no evidence of sharing
between the domestic operations and their other offices.
Hence our third proposition is as follows:
P3: A higher level of knowledge sharing within the management team is
positively associated with firm success in global venture capital investing
in the emerging markets of South East Asia.
6.2.4 Market knowledge and continuous learning
There are two interlinked aspects to this category: market knowledge and continuous
learning. Market knowledge is different from the firm's or the managers' knowledge. It is
the knowledge that comes from outside the firm, knowledge that managers may not
already have and seek to obtain from external sources. This can be obtained from
outside professionals, special Advisory Boards or Committees, networks or obtained
from external learning both formal and informal. Additionally market knowledge is also
knowledge that they gain from specific experience like listing experience from having
performed many exits, knowledge gained from their networks and connections and
knowledge gained from continuous learning.
Formal learning includes attending special classes, seminars or like the managers from
Walden, the VC Institute in Silicon Valley. Informal learning are all other forms of
learning and can include discussions with other venture capitalists, outside professionals
and other sources. Thus this category is a combined category that reviews not just
market knowledge but also how this is obtained via continuous learning.
a) Global Venture Capital Literature
There is a lot of support in the global venture capital literature on the need for market
knowledge and continuous learning within global venture capital firms. Firstly, Heel &
Kehoe (2005) determined that the most important aspect in determining success in
private equity investing was to seek out expertise before committing themselves to a
deal. They found that in 83 percent of the best deals, the initial step was to secure
privileged knowledge, which included insights from the board, management or a trusted
external source. This can be related back to our study where the successful firms make
extensive use of outside professional advice and expertise, thereby increasing their
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knowledge of the market and the investment. The same cannot be said of SBEM or
Transpac as neither of the firms have Special Advisory Committees and do not
specifically state the use of external professional sources to obtain expertise.
Secondly, Lockett et al. (2002) found that US venture capital firms understand the value
of local market knowledge. Thus, they use the inpatriation strategy where the national of
an Asian country is trained in the US and then taken back to her domestic market to
work in their Asian office. This allows the firm to use her local market knowledge
especially in understanding the sources of information venture capital firms can trust in
developing markets. All the cases in our study use local managers leading to the
conclusion that this is one aspect that they understand is necessary and have adopted.
However, only Walden specifically mentions training at the head office.
In terms of continuous learning, the training and education of venture capitalists needs to
be considered when globalising, both for existing managers and new managers who will
be hired in their new foreign offices (Bahn et al, 2002, Bruton et al, 1999). In countries
where there is specialised training for managers, it may be possible to hire competent
staff but when this is not available then extra effort may be required to train staff in the
intricacies of venture capital fund management.
Additionally, Bruton et al. (2002a) show that when globalising, it is better for foreign
(mainly Western) venture capital firms to use a phased approach by first opening an
office in Singapore and then slowly expand into the rest of Asia. This allows them to
learn about the region while being located in a country that has stable institutions and
laws. Learning can also be speeded up through partnerships with local firms. Many
foreign firms can avoid costly lessons by going through this learning process.
Another form of learning and adapting is through syndication, especially cross-border
syndication where venture capital firms learn from their partners who operate in those
domestic markets. One of the main objectives of syndication is to obtain and share
information and networks with other partners and hence to learn about markets and
businesses in territories outside their normal scope of operations (Bygrave & Timmons,
1992).
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The global venture capital literature shows that successful firms need market knowledge
and should adopt continuous learning as part of their strategy for success. This research
shows that this is indeed the case as the successful firms in our study actively pursue
market knowledge and use continuous learning processes within their organisations.
The failed firms however show little evidence of actively seeking external market
knowledge or of a process of continuous learning within their firms.
b) General Venture Capital Literature
This literature supports the view that venture capitalists recognise the need for market
knowledge in ensuring the success of their firms. While there is less support on
continuous learning in venture capital firms, there is evidence in the literature that
venture capitalists need to learn to improve their knowledge and expertise.
Firstly, Gompers & Lerner (2001) state that there is recognition in the venture capital
literature for the value of market knowledge using external experts because such experts
provide critical reviews of potential new investments. Venture capitalists also need to be
well informed and if necessary they need to obtain this information both from their
investee companies and also from outside sources, thus acknowledging the requirement
for knowledge acquisition using external experts (Bygrave et al., 1999).
Secondly, besides just using outside experts, Gompers & Lerner (2001) believe that a
more formal structure of enlisting outside professionals also assists the firm to better
leverage their partners' time and resources. They term these professionals "venture
partners", specialists who provide expert assistance in specialised fields like marketing,
IT systems, strategy, etc., areas which may be outside the field of expertise of the
general partners.
Additionally, venture capital syndication, the co-investment of several venture capital
firms in a particular deal is also commonly done to obtain additional knowledge from
many different experts (Bygrave et al., 1999). Bringing in expertise from other venture
capital firms creates synergy for the investee and allows the investee as well as the
venture capital firms to build up a depth of expertise. Venture capital firms also provide
industry knowledge, external contacts and strategic and managerial advice to their
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investees confirming that other than expertise other forms of market knowledge are also
important to venture capitalists (Gupta & Sapienza, 1992).
Fried & Hisrich (1994) provide examples of different sources of market knowledge. In
their paper they found that early stage investors have formal affiliations with technology
experts including consulting firms well known for technology assessment. Another firm in
their study also used "technology partners", consultants who are formally affiliated with
the firm and draw a retainer but do not participate in profits or make investment
decisions. Other early stage investors also do this on an informal or ad hoc basis. There
are similarities here with the successful firms in our study who have formal Advisory
Committees or Technology Advisors. The use of outside experts is a common
occurrence among venture capital firms. It is clear from the above research that market
knowledge is an important aspect of venture capital firms.
Gompers & Lerner (2001: 127) state that most venture capitalists don't learn their trade
through formal education but that "they develop their knowledge and skill through a
process of apprenticeship" alluding to the learning aspect of venture capitalists. Fried &
Hisrich (1994) also found that venture capitalists benefit from the learning curve when
information produced for one proposal is useful for subsequent proposals, thus reducing
the information gathering costs for many venture capitalists that specialise by industry.
Schertler (2002) also discussed the role of learning in the provision of public equity
schemes where inexperienced venture capitalists are aided in gaining technology
specific experience and thereby supporting the development of a powerful venture
capital industry. Learning is thus essential for venture capitalists.
The genera! venture capital literature shows that successful firms acknowledge the need
for market knowledge. Although the literature does not specifically state that firms must
adopt learning processes, there is evidence in the literature that venture capitalists need
to learn to improve their knowledge and expertise.
c) Entrepreneurship and International Management Literature
The literature here does not cover this aspect in much detail. However, in a study on the
internationalisation of young firms, Sapienza et al. (2003) found that market knowledge
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and market commitment influence allocation decisions of newly internationalising firms.
The success of these firms is dependent on the management's competencies and
market knowledge. Additionally, Oviatt & McDougall (1994) also emphasise the
importance of learning in the process of early internationalisation by new venture firms.
Firms increase their knowledge through a learning process as they internationalise. Thus
there is some support for the continuous learning aspect in this literature.
d) Management and Organisational Literature
There is a lot of support in the literature on management and organisations that market
knowledge and continuous learning are both important aspects for firm success. Firstly,
in his study on the management and organisations, Rumelt (1984) stated that the firm's
competitive position is defined by a bundle of unique resources and relationships and
that the task of general management is to adjust and renew these resources and
relationships as time, competition and change erode their value. It is precisely because
of this potential to erode the value of the firm's resources that market knowledge and
continuous learning is necessary for firms.
Secondly, Teece (1998) states that knowledge has emerged as the key driver of
competitive advantage because the rapid expansion of goods and factor markets has left
"intangible assets as the main basis of competitive differentiation in many sectors". This
acknowledgement of the expansion of goods and factor markets recognises the fact that
markets change and together with that change market knowledge also changes, thus
requiring the firm to keep abreast of changing market knowledge.
Additionally, knowledge and expertise is viewed as a scarcer resource than capital by
Bartlett & Ghoshal (1993). They believe that in a highly competitive, technologically
driven environment (such as that in which our case studies operate) this is a scarce
resource that can constrain the growth and strategic success of firms. Hence market
knowledge, or knowledge that is external to the firm but important for its success has
support in the management and organisations literature.
Next, there are several views on the learning aspects of the organization. Firstly, one of
the aspects determined to be important to their theory of core competency is the
collective learning in the organisation (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). They believe that firms
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must have the ability to identify, cultivate and exploit the competencies that make firm
growth possible and one way of doing this is through organisational learning. Core
competencies have several definitions but ultimately relate to three issues which have
been identified by Prahalad & Hamel (1990): there must be collective learning in the
organisation, this learning must be organised and delivered or implemented within the
firm by creating competitive advantages and both the collective learning and
implementation must involve everyone in the organisation at all levels.
Secondly, Prahalad & Hamel (1990) also view key employees and top managers as
"competence carriers" and contend that they can build and share their competencies for
the benefit of their firm by being regularly brought together from across the corporation
to trade notes and ideas. Another way in which managers learn about market knowledge
is by travelling regularly and talking frequently to customers and their peers. They can
also discover new market opportunities for their firm (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990).
Learning has to be continuous and not on a one-off basis because Prahalad & Hamel
(1990) contend that core competencies are build through a process of continuous
improvement and enhancement that may span a decade or longer. Hence the need for
continuous learning in the firm. Additionally, Flood & Olian (1995) lend further support for
this view as they found that human resources have the potential for skill renewal and
avoidance of obsolescence through training and education. So even though knowledge
may become obsolete, the process of continuous training and education enables human
resources to continue to learn new skills and obtain new knowledge even in an ever-
changing world.
Furthermore, the above two views can be expressed by considering the observation of
Kogut & Zander (199-3) when they state that firms compete on the basis of the
superiority of their information and know-how, and their abilities to develop new
knowledge by 'experiential learning'. Here the authors acknowledge that superior
information and know-how is important but that learning can develop such knowledge.
Hence it is important for the firms in our study to obtain market knowledge and to do so
by having the propensity to learn on a continuous basis.
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Additional support for this view can be found in the concept of dynamic capabilities.
Teece et al. (1997) state that the term 'dynamic' refers to the capacity to renew
competences so as to achieve congruence with the changing business environment or
when the rate of technological change is rapid, and the nature of future competition and
markets difficult to determine. They state that the practice of dynamic capabilities
involves three factors one of which is 'processes', which are the managerial and
organisational processes or how things are done in the firm, its routines or patterns of
current practice and learning. Kylaheiko et al. (2002) stated that successful routines
could effectively be replicated within an organization through learning activities. Thus
this capacity to renew competences is through the process of organisational learning.
The term 'capabilities' emphasises the key role of strategic management in appropriately
adapting, integrating and reconfiguring internal and external organisational skills,
resources and functional competences to match the requirements of a changing
environment. This changing environment can be expressed in terms of market
knowledge for venture capital firms.
Thus the Dynamic Capabilities approach stresses both internal as well as external firm
specific competences and capabilities to address changes in the firm's environment.
Teece et al. (1997) stress that the greatest potential for contribution to strategic
management is to be found in "skill acquisition, learning and accumulation of
organisational and intangible or invisible assets" (1997: 514). Thus market knowledge
and continuous learning are both important aspects of the management and
organisations literature.
Market knowledge and continuous learning - Summary & Proposition
The analysis of the literature shows strong support for the view that market knowledge
and continuous learning is an important element of firm success. All the successful firms
in our study actively and purposefully seek to increase their market knowledge and many
also seek to do so via continuous learning.
The failed firms showed less propensity to obtain market knowledge as they do not
actively use outside experts and do not have even have Advisory Committees unlike the
successful firms.
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Hence our fourth proposition is as follows:
P4: A higher level of market knowledge and continuous learning within the
management team is positively associated with firm success in global
venture capital investing in the emerging markets ofSouth East Asia.
6.2.5 Independence of the management team
a) Global Venture Capital Literature
This is not an aspect in which there is a lot of research in this field. However, in their
study on foreign venture capital investing in India, Pruthi et al. (2003) found that parent
firms tend to set policy only after discussion with the local subsidiary. Hence the foreign
parents do not constrain the discretion of their local subsidiary to make decisions and to
monitor their investments. They do however attempt to institutionalise local executives
into their way of conducting business. This is done is by inpatriation, where a significant
percentage of their Indian executives have some experience or spend some time in the
foreign parent's domestic market. This shows that there is a lot of independence given to
the local subsidiary.
b) General Venture Capital Literature
There are no studies in the general venture capital literature that contribute to this
finding.
c) Entrepreneurship and International Management Literature
There are no specific studies in the entrepreneurship and international management
literature that show whether the independence of management teams contributes to
greater success, growth or profitability. However, some literature is relevant to show that
management team independence is important for firms. Firstly, in internationalisation
studies, multinational corporations have been found to share the core capabilities of the
parent company with their subsidiaries and partners abroad by developing close external
relationships with their partners. Especially in cases where the multinational corporations
work with partners, Mascarenhas et al. (1998) found that developing these close
relationships are the best way to ensure the success of the company's international
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business and to build on the parent's core competencies. The independence of the
partners is not infringed but the mutual partnership is instead built on close relationships.
Our studies show that the successful firms like Walden, BCEA and H&Q all meet the
criteria of having managers who are older, more experienced and have high educational
levels. They corroborate these assumptions by indicating in their interviews that they
have more independence. The failed firms however show less propensity for
independence and have managers who are generally younger, have less experience
and are also less or only similarly educated. The final criterion is that the failed firms
indicated much less levels of independence in their interviews thus confirming the view
that success is closely related to independence.
Additionally, in research on top management teams, Carpenter et al. (2004) found that
top management team construct and membership are often identified by title or position,
since individuals in higher positions are expected to have greater influence on strategic
decision-making and are more likely to influence the strategic outcomes of the firm. In
our study, we have used the title and positions of the managers in our case studies to
indicate greater influence on the firm's strategy and also its independence. We made the
assumption that managers with higher titles like Managing Director or Country Manager
equate greater levels of independence. This assumption finds some support from the
study of Carpenter et al. (2004)
In general terms however, one of the earliest studies on top management teams is by
Hambrick & Mason (1984) who stated that organisational outcomes - strategic choices
and performance levels - are partially predicted by managerial background
characteristics. These characteristics include age (young managers are more inclined to
pursue risky strategies and will also experience greater growth); career experiences (in. a
stable environment, firms in which managers have more experience will have greater
profitability and growth); education (the amount, but not type, of formal education is
positively associated with innovation) and group heterogeneity (homogenous teams
make strategic decisions faster than heterogeneous teams but in turbulent environments
team heterogeneity is positively associated with profitability).
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Furthermore, recent research on top management teams has served to extend this
model, for example, studies that show that top management team characteristics affect
new venture success (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990), the effect of their
characteristics on the strategies of technology IPOs was dependent on the
characteristics of their boards of directors, the experience of their venture capitalists and
even the form of their compensation (Carpenter et al, 2003) and that the founders'
participation in the team and managers' past experience in the industry contribute to the
competence of the team in seizing new growth opportunities (Kor, 2003).
We have used many of the aspects endorsed here in our study and methodology.
Especially in determining the independence of the management team, we have followed
Carpenter et al. (2004) in giving additional weight to the fact that managers with
important titles and higher positions show greater propensity for independence. The
same assumptions were made for managers who are older, have greater levels of
experience and those who are more educated.
It must be noted however that there are no specific studies in the entrepreneurship and
international management literature that show whether the independence of
management teams contributes to greater success, growth or profitability. This is a gap
in the literature that needs to be filled.
d) Management and Organisational Literature
Research in the field of the management and organisations and management team
independence in international or cross-border firms is sparse but the available research
shows that independence can be a valuable asset in success. Firstly, in terms of human
resources in the management and organisations literature, Newburry & Yoram (1999)
suggest that permitting an international joint venture to develop local human resource
policies and to implement business plans independently of the parent company
contribute to the joint venture's effectiveness. Additionally, in terms of the firm itself,
there are several studies that explore independence. Baker (2004) states that the board
of directors, management and the CEO make up the team that is responsible for the
success of a company and to ensure this success the board must be independent.
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In their study on core capabilities and the competitiveness of companies, Stalk et al.
(1992) state that in becoming a capabilities-based competitor, the firm cannot delegate
the process of transformation to middle management. It requires the hands-on guidance
of the CEO and the active involvement of top line managers. They believe that this
process of change and strategy are too important to be left to lower level managers and
also that the leading role of the CEO shows the commitment of the senior management
to the change process. While this proposition seems to imply that the top management
cannot let the subsidiary's management have full independence, the study was not
based on international subsidiaries. This is an area that requires further study.
While management team independence in terms of international businesses has not
been given extensive treatment within the management and organisations literature
available research shows that independence can be a valuable asset in success.
Independence of the Management Team - Summary & Proposition
The analysis of the literature shows some support for the view that the independence of
the management team is an important element of firm success. The cases in this
research have shown that independence contributed to success while the lack of
independence can contribute to failure. Both the failed firms in our study showed no
evidence of independence.
While research in this field in relation to global venture capital is sparse there is
adequate support for our fifth proposition as follows:
P5: Management team independence at the regional office level is
positively associated with firm success in global venture capital investing
in the emerging markets of South East Asia.
6.2.6 Summary - Enfolding Literature
The above analysis of the enfolding literature in the four different fields of global venture
capital, general venture capital, entrepreneurship and international management and
management and organisational literature has enabled us to confirm our initial findings
and our five propositions. We have seen from this discussion that taken together the four
areas of management literature provide a lot of support for our findings. Through this
support, the propositions that we have generated are viable and robust and we can use
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these propositions for the formulation of meta-propositions in section 7. However, before
formulating meta-propositions the next step in our process is to first determine if enough
work has been done, i.e. whether there is theoretical saturation.
6.3 Theoretical Saturation
In reaching closure for the research we need to ensure that we have done what is
necessary to fulfil the conditions of the Grounded Theory and case study methodologies.
We need to be sure that we have done enough work in terms of having enough cases
and data so that our findings are valid and robust. Here we will summarise the
requirements for reaching closure by studying what several authors' state is necessary.
In building propositions from case studies, Eisenhardt (1989) states that there are two
aspects to reaching closure - theoretical saturation and determining when to stop
iterating between propositions and data. For both aspects saturation is the key.
Theoretical saturation is "...the point at which incremental learning is minimal because
the researchers are observing phenomena seen before" (Eisenhardt, 1989: 545). Glaser
& Strauss (1967) stated that when no additional data are being found to develop
properties of the categories or when the researcher sees similar instances over and over
again, the researcher could be confident that a category is saturated.
In management research Locke (2001) added that development is complete when
categories reach a point where subsequent data results in no new naming activity
regarding that category. Thus theoretical saturation is reached when subsequent data
provide "no new information, either in terms of refining the category or of its properties,
or of its relationship to other categories". Eisenhardt (1989) also stated that the second
aspect to theoretical saturation is when the incremental improvement to propositions is
minimal. The above recommendations will be applied to the research that has been
done here to determine if theoretical saturation has been reached.
6.3.1 Observing similar instances
In developing categories for this research I have used two methods:
i) The iteration between the data and the development of categories and,
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ii) The evidentiary method of Hargadon & Sutton (1997) to determine the
commonality of occurrences of the different categories and sub-categories
within the data
Categories were first developed from the data sets beginning with the first interview and
ending with the last, including the multiple interviews with some managers. As each
interview progressed, notes and memos were made and categories were discovered
and highlighted. For example, the sub-category of expertise and knowledge base of the
management team was discovered in the first interview with Ang and the other
managers repeated these throughout the many interviews. Table 6.1 below shows the
progression of the expertise and knowledge base category development from the
different interviews on a chronological basis.
As can be seen there is repetition of the same category by almost all of the participants.
All the managers identify that expertise and knowledge base are important. Only two
managers did not mention expertise or knowledge base in the interviews, but in a
subsequent follow up email and when they responded to the findings of their interview
they confirmed the need for this category as well. We can conclude that we have
theoretical saturation if:
• We are "observing phenomena seen before" (Eisenhardt, 1989)
• If we "see similar instances over and over again" (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and,
• When subsequent data provide "no new information, either in terms of refining
the category or of its properties Locke (2001)
Using the expertise and knowledge base category above and based on the above
requirements, we can conclude that we have theoretical saturation in the category
b9C3USS!
• There is repetition in the interview data as the interviews progress, so we are
observing phenomena seen before;
• We are seeing similar instances over and over again, and;
• There is no new information in terms of refining the category or its properties.
As we meet all the criteria for theoretical saturation the conclusion is that in this category
we have theoretical saturation. Similarly we also have theoretical saturation for all the
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other categories as they also show the same progression as for expertise and
knowledge base. The complete category development evidencing theoretical saturation
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6.3.2 Minimal Incremental Improvement to Propositions
The second observation made by Eisenhardt (1989) is that the iteration process stops
when the incremental improvement to propositions is minimal. We have seen in section
6.2 that based on the findings we have been able to make five propositions. The five
propositions have also been compared to the enfolding literature and we have
determined that there is strong validity.
The question that must be asked here is will further iteration improve the propositions?
Will there be significant improvement to propositions? There is strong evidence of
support for these propositions based on all the available data, the 17 interviews, the
triangulated data and the positive responses to the findings by the respondents
themselves. It has also been compared to enfolding literature and found strong support
there. Based on this it is safe to conclude that incremental improvement to propositions
will be minimal and hence there is no further need for iteration between the propositions
and data.
6.3.3 Summary for theoretical saturation
We have met all the requirements for theoretical saturation that have been put forth by
Eisenhardt (1989), Glaser & Strauss (1967) and Locke (2001). Hence we can conclude
that we have reached saturation and that the five propositions are valid and strongly
supported by the data and the methodology.
6.4 Conclusion on Generating Propositions
In this section we set out to generate propositions that were valid and robust based on
the Grounded Theory and case study methodology. This was achieved through this
methodology via the constant comparative approach and the pattern matching of
categories within each case and across the cases. The propositions were then matched
with the enfolding literature in four areas of management: the global venture capital
literature, the general venture capital literature, entrepreneurship and international
literature and finally the management and organisational literature. By matching with the
extant literature, the propositions were validated by showing that the literature supported
the findings and this gave additional credence to the validity of the propositions. The final
step was to ensure that there was theoretical saturation and this was also verified.
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Based on this we have five valid propositions as set out in sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.5 above.
The next step is to develop meta-propositions from these five propositions that will
provide an answer to our research question.
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7. Developing Meta-Propositions
The primary objective of the Grounded Theory and case study methodology that we
have employed in this dissertation is to develop meta-propositions from the data using
an inductive method of analysis. Glaser & Strauss (1967) state that by starting with raw
data (as has been done here), the analyst can end up with substantive theory, or in our
case meta-propositions, for the substantive area on which the research has been done.
The reasons for developing meta-propositions and not theory were stated in section
3.13.
In section 6 we developed five propositions and in this section we will use these
propositions to develop meta-propositions. The difference between propositions and
meta-propositions is that propositions were developed from the analysis of data but do
not provide us with a complete answer to our research question. Meta-propositions are
therefore formulated by incorporating the propositions into or with existing theoretical
strands and by using this discovery find an answer to the research question.
In section 6.2 on enfolding literature we matched propositions to the enfolding literature
and in so doing we discovered that the propositions found support within three strands of
management theory; the Resource Based View, Core Competence theory and Dynamic
Capabilities view. Based on this discovery, it can be inferred that these three theoretical
strands may be relevant for this dissertation. We shall therefore analyse these three
theoretical strands by looking at our data and what other researchers state and from that
reach a conclusion on the validity of our propositions and develop relevant meta-
propositions to answer our research question. We start with the Resource Based View
theoretical strand.
7.1 Resource Based View
In section 6 we had five propositions each of which will be considered in turn in terms of
the Resource Based View theoretical strand.
7.1.1 Experience
The first proposition, P1 was:
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"A higher level of relevant venture capital and industry experience within
the management team is positively associated with firm success in global
venture capital investing in the emerging markets of South East Asia"
(a) Input from Data
We have seen from the examples of the successful firms that all the firms have
experienced management teams. The senior partners or founders have between 10 and
20 years venture capital and investing experience and many also have relevant industry
experience. Tan Lip-Bu of Walden has almost 2 decades of industry experience
investing in semiconductor and electronic manufacturing while T.S.Yong of BCEA has
17 years experience in telecommunications including as Country Director at Singapore
Telecommunications and almost 10 years telecom investing experience. By contrast in
the failed firms Ang and Ponnudurai of SBEM had zero years experience in venture
capital and did not have any experience in the Internet industry while Ng of Transpac
had venture capital investment experience but because the firm moved into private
equity investing, he personally felt that his experience was not relevant. Ng also did not
have relevant industry experience, as he had only been in the investment industry all his
life.
(b) Input from other Research
Other authors have identified specific attributes of experience as it relates to the human
capital of the firm confirming that it is a valuable resource for the firm. Hitt et al. (2001)
have found that experience of the firms' top managers can affect firm outcomes, are
deemed among the firm's most important resource and that more experienced partners
have been found to contribute more returns to the firm than new partners. Experience
also contributes to competitive advantage (Harris & Helfat, 1997) and can reduce
information asymmetries when firms enter new geographic markets (Nayyar, 1993). Hitt
et al. (1997) also suggest that firms with little experience in managing diversity may
suffer performance declines especially in initial geographic diversification. This could be
equally applicable to managing significant changes like 9-11 and the dotcom bust.
Cooper & Bruno (1977) also found a positive relationship between prior experience in
the industry and firm success.
(c) Conclusion
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Both the data and other research in similar fields shows that firms with the more
experienced management teams are better able to invest successfully and manage
change and have shown greater success than those with less experience. Hence there
is strong support for our first proposition (P1) that experience is an important aspect of
the Resource Based View.
7.1.2 Expertise and knowledge base
The second proposition, P2 was:
"A higher level of venture capital and industry expertise and knowledge
base within the management team is positively associated with firm
success in global venture capital investing in the emerging markets of
South EastAsia"
(a) Input from Data
Our study of the firms again shows that this proposition is relevant. In the successful
firms, the senior managers and partners had extensive expertise and knowledge base in
their investment focus while the failed firms' managers did not. For example, in H&Q Dr.
Ta-Lin Hsu, the founder and Chairman has a PhD in Electrical engineering while the
Managing Director of the Thai office, Virapan Pulges had a Masters in Electrical
Engineering. The firm's focus is in the field of electrical and electronics manufacturing
and their Thai investments included Fabrinet, a contract electronics manufacturer and
SVI Public Company another electronics manufacturer. Thus this firm focuses on its
expertise and invests in related industries. The same applies to the other firms.
In the failed firms, the managers of SBEM only had telecommunications and corporate
finance expertise but were investing in the Internet and software industry. While there is
no doubt that telecommunications expertise does have some value such knowledge is
still insufficient to understand say, enterprise software firms like The Media Shoppe, a
firm they were interested to invest in. The Transpac managers also had little relevant
expertise, for example Yeo had building materials expertise but they were investing in
the technology industry, hence his expertise was of little relevance to the firm.
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(b) Input from other Research
Galbreath (2005) stated that "capabilities are argued to be the pre-eminent sources of
firm success", Grant (1996) believes that the success of any firm is solely dependent
upon the knowledge or know-how of its employees and Castanias & Helfat (1991)
suggest that firm performance is critically linked to the skills, expertise and know-how of
managers.
Hitt et al. (2001) have identified the skills of the firm's top managers as an important
aspect of human capital that affects firm outcomes. Partners' skills and know-how also
enable the firm to identify market opportunities in foreign markets and ensure survival
and development of their ventures as well as enable them to undertake more promising
competitive strategies (Westhead et al., 2001). Storey (1994) states that skills and
competences are a key factor influencing business survival and development. Partners
with expertise also enable the firm to identify and obtain more resources from their
external environment (Cooper et al., 1994).
(c) Conclusion
This study has also shown that the partners and senior managers in the successful firms
have more expertise and knowledge than the managers of the failed firms especially in
their focus industries. This finding is in concurrence with the findings of the authors
mentioned above and also in the literature review.
Thus it is clear from the above that expertise is a very important element of the
Resource Based View of the firm and is a key part of firm success. Hence there is strong
support for our second proposition (P2) as well.
7.1.3 Knowledge Sharing
The third proposition, P3 was:
"A higher level of knowledge sharing within the management team is
positively associated with firm success in global venture capital investing
in the emerging markets ofSouth EastAsia"
(a) Input from Data
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The analysis shows that in the successful firms there is extensive knowledge sharing
while this is less evident in the failed firms. In Walden for example, there are regular
quarterly meeting, there are other partner meetings and also strategy meetings. These
meetings involve the senior managers from all the different offices and they regularly
share knowledge and strategise for the future. This is less evident in the failed firms and
in Transpac the managers actively don't share knowledge because of rivalry among the
regional offices resulting in the failure of knowledge sharing in the group as a whole.
(b) Input from other Research
Knowledge sharing has been identified as important for the maintenance of unique firm
competencies and in promoting and maintaining socially complex relationships
characterized by trust and teamwork (Wright, et al. (2001). It is also important to enable
firms to realise the economic value of their knowledge assets especially in a technology
centric economy (Gold et al., 2001), while identifying and cultivating the process of
knowledge sharing can also improve firm profitability (Kearns & Lederer, 2003).
Prahalad & Hamel (1990) contend that key employees and top managers are
"competence carriers" and they can build and share their competencies for the benefit of
their firm by being regularly brought together from across the corporation to trade notes
and ideas.
(c) Conclusion
This study has shown that successful firms regularly engage in knowledge sharing within
the management team. The failed firms on the other hand do not show evidence of
knowledge sharing and even when they do meet in some cases they actively avoid
sharing knowledge thereby creating a greater propensity for failure.
This shows that proposition three (P3) knowledge sharing, is another important element
of the Resource Based View and a key part of the success of the firms in this study.
7.1,4 Market Knowledge And Continuous Learning
The fourth proposition, P4 was:
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"A higher level of market knowledge and continuous learning within the
management team is positively associated with firm success in global
venture capital investing in the emerging markets of South East Asia"
(a) Input from Data
This analysis shows that the successful firms realise the need for additional market
knowledge and use external professionals and experts to obtain this knowledge. For
example Walden and H&Q both have Advisory Committees consisting of very
experienced and knowledgeable experts while BCEA uses the vast ING-Barings global
network to seek knowledge that they need. All these firms also use outside professionals
when necessary. The failed firms however do not have Advisory Committees and don't
show evidence of the use of external professionals.
The successful firms also actively seek knowledge by continuously learning through
informal means like the use of external professionals and by formal means like attending
the VC Institute (Walden).
(b) Input from other Research
In studying new venture internationalisation, Cooper et al. (1995) state that information is
a key resource for the new venture. However many newly globalizing firms do not have
detailed information about markets and this can act as a barrier to their plans to
internationalise. Westhead et al. (2001) found that external professional advisors provide
advice, counsel and knowledge not available among the management team and can
help identify critical resources from the environment not otherwise available to the
managers of the firm. External advisors can also draw the attention of managers to a
variety of opportunities in foreign markets (Chaudhry & Crick, 1998).
Firms can also increase their market knowledge through a process of continuous
learning. Prahalad & Hamel (1990) believe that firms must have the ability to identify,
cultivate and exploit the competencies that make firm growth possible and one way of
doing this is through organisational learning. They state that there must be collective
learning in the organisation, this learning must be organised and delivered or
implemented within the firm by creating competitive advantages and both the collective
learning and implementation must involve everyone in the organisation at all levels.
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Another way in which managers learn about market knowledge is by travelling regularly
and talking frequently to customers and their peers (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990).
Flood & Olian (1995) lend further support for this view as they found that human
resources have the potential for skill renewal and avoidance of obsolescence through
training and education while Kogut & Zander (1993) state that as firms compete on the
basis of the superiority of their information and know-how, their abilities to develop new
knowledge by 'experiential learning' is a key factor in success.
(c) Conclusion
This study has shown that obtaining market knowledge and continuous learning is
something that the successful firms do. The successful firms make extensive use of
external professionals and have special Advisory Committees from which they get extra
knowledge, which is not available within their firms. This fits in with the findings of other
researchers above. There is also a process of learning within the successful firms.
From the above analysis it can be concluded that the fourth proposition P4, market
knowledge and continuous learning is a very important element of the Resource Based
View of the firm and is a key part of firm success.
7.1.5 Management Team Independence
The fifth proposition, P5 was:
"Management team independence at the regional office level is positively
associated with firm success in global venture capital investing in the
emerging markets of South EastAsia"
fal Input from Data
The analysis shows that management team independence is an important prerequisite
that differentiates between the successful and failed firms. The successful firms have
management teams that have been endowed with high levels of independence. This is
reflected in the fact that firms like H&Q and Walden depend on their regional managers
to provide input on their industry focus and on what happens in their respective regions.
The failed firms like SBEM and Transpac have their investment decisions including their
investment focus thrust on them by their headquarters or by their CEO and Founder in
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the case of Transpac. The regional managers are also unable to make investment
decisions, as all decisions are dependent on their headquarters or their CEO in the case
of Transpac. The ultimate lack of independence is proven by the unilateral decision of
their headquarters to shut down their offices despite them having several investments in
hand likeSBEM.
(b) Input from other Research
Henderson & Leleux (2002) found that among corporate venture capital firms, the firms
that were more independent from their corporate office were more sustainable and were
better accepted by the business units than those with less independence. While
researching corporate groups, Campbell et al. (1995) discovered that many corporate
parent companies destroy value. They surmised that businesses in corporate portfolios
would be better off as independent companies. The parent company's influence caused
subsidiary managers to make poorer decisions than if they were independent.
Foss & Pedersen (2004) state that independent subsidiaries of multinational companies
do provide a number of benefits to the group such as the ability to tap into local systems
of innovation, integrating local competencies and introducing more dynamism into the
parent company. This is supported by Ghoshal et al. (1994) who found that greater
autonomy also enables the subsidiary's managers to deal appropriately with the local
market and task environment as they are in a better position than the headquarters to
evaluate the needs and demands of the particular markets they serve. Venaik et al.
(2001) also show that MNCs that provide greater independence and autonomy will
enhance innovation, performance and motivation of the subsidiary's managers.
(c) Conclusion
Thus there is strong support to show that management team independence is important
for firm success. As seen in this study, the firms with greater independence show greater
propensity for success while those with no independence failed. This shows that to
enable regional offices to have a greater chance of success the parent venture capital
firms must give the regional office adequate autonomy and the management teams
sufficient independence to make investment decisions as well as strategic decisions on
investment and market focus.
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This analysis enables us to conclude that the fifth proposition P5, management team
independence, is another important element of the Resource Based View of the firm and
is a key part of firm success.
7.1.6 Meta-Proposition - Resource Based View
This section shows that the study and analyses provide strong support that the
Resource Based View as a theory of the firm has great relevance to our study on why
some global venture capital firms are more successful than others. It shows that firms
that have experienced managers with the relevant expertise and knowledge base and
who share knowledge with each other on a regular basis generally will be more
successful. Success is also enhanced when these firms continually seeking additional
market knowledge from external sources and have a program for formal or informal
forms of continuous learning. The final requirement is that the parent firms provide their
regional offices with sufficient independence to make strategic and investment decisions.
This theoretical analysis provides us with our first meta-proposition:
MP1: "The Resource Based View, encompassing the management's
experience; expertise and knowledge base; knowledge sharing; market
knowledge and continuous learning; and independence; is positively
associated with firm success in global venture capital investing in the
emerging markets of South East Asia"
We will discuss this further in the conclusion section 7.4.
7.2 Core Competence
In section 6.2 on the enfolding literature, we used elements of the core competence view
to review the five propositions discovered in section 5 and found that it provided
theoretical support for the propositions. This leads us to a possible conclusion that this
strand of management theory can provide valid input to answer our research question by
allowing us to apply this theory to our specific context and thereby develop a meta-
proposition. The following discussion will incorporate the five propositions into the core
competence view in search of an answer to our research question. We start the analysis
with a discussion of the definitions of core competence.
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Prahalad & Hamel (1990) defined core competence as:
□ The collective learning in the organisation
□ The organisation of work and delivery of value
□ Communication, involvement and a deep commitment to working across
organisational boundaries, involving many levels of people and all
functions
Coyne et al (1997) define core competence as:
"... a combination of complementary skills and knowledge bases embedded in a
group or team that results in the ability to execute one or more critical processes
to a world class standard" (1997:43).
When we consider these two definitions in greater detail, it is possible to restate the
important elements of core competence as:
'A combination of complementary skills and knowledge base, embedded in a
management team through a process of collective organisational learning, that
results in the ability to deliver and execute critical processes across organisational
boundaries by communicating with and involving many levels of people and all
functions'
This restatement of the definition of core competence exhibits elements that are part of
our five propositions. We shall now explore the details of the above restatement and
determine whether there is any relevance to our five propositions.
7.2.1 Core Competence and the Five Propositions
Firstly we can break down the restatement into the following elements:
a) A combination of complementary skills and knowledge base;
b) Embedded in a management team through a process of collective organisational
learning;
c) That results in the ability to deliver and execute critical processes across
organisational boundaries;
d) By communicating with and involving many levels of people and all functions
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We can now explore the restatement in terms of the five propositions that we have
established.
a) A combination of complementary skills and knowledge base:
Our second Proposition (P2) states that a higher level of venture capital and industry
expertise and knowledge base within the management team is positively associated with
firm success. This fits in very well with the need for complementary skills and knowledge
base in the restatement and thus fulfils the first element.
b) Embedded through a process of collective organisational learning;
The fourth Proposition (P4) indicates that a higher level of market knowledge and
continuous learning within the management team is positively associated with firm
success and thus again fits well with the need for organisational learning in the core
competence concept.
c) Ability to deliver and execute critical processes across organisational boundaries:
This ability to deliver and execute critical processes has been shown by the firms that
have experience at successfully investing and exiting their investments across their
regional offices. Organisational boundaries can mean outside the firm and the group as
a whole. The failed firms do not have such experience and thus do not show such ability.
Hence we can say that Proposition one (P1), a higher level of relevant venture capital
experience positively impacts on the ability to deliver and execute these critical
processes across organisational boundaries, therefore P1 is an important aspect of the
restatement.
Additionally in global venture capital firms in particular, this ability to execute critical
processes is best performed by management teams that have high levels of expertise
and management independence as shown by Propositions two (P2) and five (P5).
d) By communicating and involving many levels of people and all functions
The final element of the restatement is best evidenced by our third Proposition (P3) that
a higher level of knowledge sharing within the management team is positively associated
with firm success. The communication with and involvement of all people is shown in the
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knowledge-sharing component in our study and thus P3 is also another important aspect
of the restatement.
7.2.2 Meta-Proposition - Core Competence
This analysis shows that our propositions fit comfortably within the concept of the core
competence of the firm thereby lending weight to the fact that we can develop a possible
meta-proposition of the core competence of the successful global venture capital firm.
By incorporating our propositions into the Core Competence view we can make the
following statement:
"Successful global venture capital investing in South East Asian emerging markets
requires a combination of experience and complementary expertise and knowledge
base, embedded in an independent management team through a process of
collective organisational learning, resulting in the ability to deliver and execute critical
investment strategies and processes across organisational boundaries by
communicating and sharing knowledge with all levels ofpeople across all functions"
This statement provides strong support for a meta-proposition that the concept of the
core competence of the firm is very relevant for the success of global venture capital
investing in the emerging markets of South East Asia. As can be seen, all the
propositions that have been discovered in this study lend strong support to this
statement. This leads us to conclude that Core Competence is valid for the success of
global venture capital investing and hence we can state with confidence that we have a
valid and reliable meta-propositions based on the Core Competence view as follows:
MP2: The Core Competence of the Global Venture Capital firm makes a
significant contribution to successful investing in the emerging markets of
South East Asia.
This is the second meta-proposition that has been discovered by the research in this
dissertation. We will discuss this further in the conclusion in section 7.4.
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7.3 Dynamic Capabilities
The third potential meta-proposition is based on the concept of the dynamic capabilities
of firms. In section 6.2 we discussed this theoretical strand and found that it provided
support for our findings. Therefore similar to core competence in section 7.2 above, this
leads us to the conclusion that it may have relevance as a meta-proposition for this
dissertation and we shall explore this possibility here. We begin with a definition of
dynamic capabilities.
Teece et al. (1997: 515) defined the elements of dynamic capabilities as:
"'Dynamic' refers to the capacity to renew competences so as to achieve
congruence with the changing business environment. 'Capabilities' emphasises
the key role of strategic management in ... adapting, integrating and
reconfiguring internal and external organisational skills, resources and functional
competences to match the requirements of a changing environment"
They also stress that skill acquisition, learning and accumulation of organisational and
intangible assets are highly relevant to the firm and emphasise the firm's internal
processes, assets and market positions. Dynamic capabilities are especially important
when business environments change rapidly and the future of industry difficult to
determine, both highly relevant points in the global venture capital industry.
Knudsen & Madsen (2002) state that managerial competence cannot be isolated from
the firm's existing capabilities and informational architecture and is dependent on mutual
and intertwined knowledge, capabilities and viewpoints of the entire management team.
Kylaheiko et al. (2002) also regard firms "primarily as knowledge repositories" analysing
knowledge in terms of knowledge creating, transferring and integrating processes.
Based on the above, we can restate the Dynamic Capabilities concept as follows:
Dynamic capabilities is the capacity of the management team to match the
requirements of a changing environment by renewing firm competences based
on the informational architecture of mutual and intertwined knowledge and
capabilities and by transforming internal and external organisational skills,
resources and functional competences through a process of skill acquisition and
learning.
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This restatement of the definition of dynamic capabilities exhibits elements that are part
of our five propositions. We shall now explore the details of the above restatement and
determine whether there is any relevance to our five propositions.
7.3.1 Dynamic Capabilities and the Five Propositions
Firstly we can break down the restatement into the following elements:
a) Capacity of the management team to match the requirements of a changing
environment.
b) By renewing firm competences;
c) Based on the informational architecture of mutual and intertwined knowledge and
capabilities;
d) By transforming internal and external organisational skills, resources and
functional competences
e) Through a process of skill acquisition and learning
We can now explore the restatement in terms of the five propositions that we have
established.
a) Capacity of the management team to match a changing environment
The capacity of the management team can relate to three aspects of our propositions:
firstly the experience of the management team (P1), secondly to the expertise and
knowledge base of the team (P2) and thirdly to their independence in responding to the
changes (P5). Management teams who have little or no experience in the venture capital
and technology industry will find it hard to understand much less respond to the
changing business environment. Teece et al. (1997:528) state that "competitive success
occurs in part because of policies pursued and experience and efficiency obtained in
earlier periods", thereby alluding to the importance of experience in adapting to changes
in the environment. Understanding and responding to changes also requires expertise
and skills as well as an in-depth knowledge base of the industry and investment
strategies. Thirdly, the management team must have the independence to determine
what strategies are required to make these changes. If there is too much control from a
faraway headquarters that might not understand the changes taking place or the
strategies necessary to adapt to these changes, then the team's capacity is constricted
and it will not be able to make the necessary changes.
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This study has shown that the successful venture capital firms have been able to
respond to and overcome the many significant changes in the industry in the last eight
years from the Asian financial and currency crisis of 1997 to the dotcom bust of 2000
and the impact of the 9-11 attacks in the USA. The failed firms on the other hand have
succumbed to these changes with the closure of both firms attributed to a large extent to
these changes. The successful firms have also been given the independence of
formulating the necessary changes including changing their industry focus if necessary.
Thus management team experience, the expertise and knowledge base of the firm and
management team independence are crucial aspects of the capacity of the management
team to make changes, lending support to the contention that Propositions one (P1), two
(P2) and five (P5) are relevant propositions for this aspect of dynamic capabilities.
b) Renewing firm competences
The process of renewing firm competences is related to Proposition 4 (P4) - a higher
level of market knowledge and continuous learning within the management team. The
process of continually improving the market knowledge of the management team and
the continuous learning process of the firm will assist the firm in renewing its
competences. The successful firms have been able to match the changes in the
business environment by using outside experts and learning all the time, showing that
renewing competences is an important component of the success of the firms in our
study. Hence P4 lends strong support to this aspect of dynamic capabilities.
c) Informational architecture of mutual and intertwined knowledge and capabilities:
Informational architecture was used by Knudsen & Madsen (2002) to denote the
organization of knowledge through stable connections both internal and external.
Internal connections are links within and between organisational subunits while external
connections are links to parties in the market and the wider institutional environment.
Connections are defined as "direct and stable information flows between members of an
organisational subunit" (Knudsen & Madsen, 2002: 845). Based on this Propositions 2, 3
and 4 are all relevant.
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The knowledge base of the firm as described in P2 relates to this aspect of dynamic
capabilities, the intertwined knowledge and capabilities of the firm, as endorsed by the
authors. P3 relates to the level of knowledge sharing, the 'information flows' among and
within the management teams at all levels of the group and thus relates to the 'internal
connections' mentioned above. P4 relates to market knowledge and obtaining
knowledge from sources outside the firm, thus they are related to the 'external
connections' to parties in the market and the wider institutional environment mentioned
by Knudsen & Madsen (2002).
We can see from this that the three Propositions, P2, P3 and P4 are all relevant
components of this aspect of our restatement of the dynamic capabilities view.
d) Transforming internal and external organisational skills, resources and functional
competences
The transformation of internal and external skills, resources and competences are all
related to firstly the expertise and knowledge base of the firm and secondly to the
experience of the management team in being able to manage and understand the need
for such transformation. Thus P2 is relevant to the aspect of skills, resources and
competences of the dynamic capabilities view while P1 is related to the experience
needed to do this in the first place.
We have seen from the study that the successful firms have been able to transform their
firms right through the many significant changes in the environment and have
successfully navigated the different crises that impacted all firms in emerging Asia. This
was done by adapting to the changes, acquiring new knowledge and skills and by
strategising and changing their investment and market focus if necessary. The failed
firms did not manage the changes well, did not acquire new skills and competences and
in the end had to close their operations. Thus we can see that P1 and P2 are relevant
components of this aspect of the dynamic capabilities view.
e) Through a process of skill acquisition and learning
The last aspect that was identified was the process of skill acquisition and learning for
which P4 has strong relevance. Proposition 4 relates to the process of market
knowledge and continuous learning and how this enhances the knowledge base of the
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firm. In the dynamic capabilities view as restated here, the need for skill acquisition and
learning are clearly identified. The successful firms in our study also demonstrated
clearly the value and need for both of these elements showing that P4 strongly supports
this element of the dynamic capabilities view.
7.3.2 Meta-Proposition - Dynamic Capabilities
This analysis shows that our propositions fit comfortably within the concept of the
dynamic capabilities view of the firm thereby lending weight to the fact that we can
develop a possible meta-proposition of dynamic capabilities of the successful global
venture capital firm. By incorporating our propositions into the Dynamic Capabilities view
we can make the following statement:
Successful global venture capital investing in emerging markets requires the
dynamic capabilities of an independent management team that manages a
changing business environment by renewing internal and external firm
competences and skills based on an informational architecture of mutual and
intertwined knowledge and capabilities through a process of skill acquisition and
learning.
This statement shows that the concept of the dynamic capabilities of the firm is very
relevant for the success of global venture capital investing in the emerging markets of
South East Asia. As can be seen, all the propositions that have been discovered in this
study lend strong support to this statement. This leads us to conclude that Dynamic
Capabilities are valid for the success of global venture capital investing and hence we
can state with confidence that we have a valid and reliable meta-propositions based on
the Dynamic Capabilities view as follows:
MP3: The Dynamic Capabilities of the Global Venture Capital firm makes a
significant contribution to successful investing in the emerging markets of
South East Asia.
This is the third meta-proposition that has been discovered by the research in this
dissertation. We will discuss this further in the conclusion in section 7.4 as follows.
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7.4 Meta-Propositions and Relevance to Research Question
As seen in the discussions above, we have formulated three meta-propositions that have
shown high levels of relevance towards providing an answer to the research question in
this dissertation. We shall now review these meta-propositions as they apply to our
cases and make a determination on whether these meta-propositions do provide an
answer to our research question, which is reproduced below:
"Why are some venture capital firms more successful in global venture
capital investing than others and how do they ensure this success?"
We shall begin the review with the meta-propositions based on the Resource Based
View.
7.4.1 Resource Based View
We found that all five propositions that we discovered in section 6 above fitted within the
theoretical strand of the Resource Based View. Hence our meta-proposition based on
this theoretical strand was:
MP1: "The Resource Based View, encompassing the management's
experience; expertise and knowledge base; knowledge sharing; market
knowledge and continuous learning; and independence; is positively
associated with firm success in global venture capital investing in the
emerging markets of South East Asia"
The Resource Based theory of the firm has important ramifications in answering our
Research Question in determining the difference between success and failure. The data
and analysis has shown that the five propositions have all played a role in the success or
failure of our firms. This analysis is strongly supported by research not only in the field of
global venture capital but also in venture capital generally and in other management
literature. Why are some venture capital firms more successful than others and how do
they ensure this success?
The Resource Based View provides a compelling theoretical framework for analysing
and determining the reasons why firms succeed or fail in the context of the emerging
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venture capital markets in South East Asia. The data shows that the resources of the
firm, in the case of the venture capital firm, its human resources are the most important
element in its success. This includes not just the quality and experience of the
management team but also how they employ their expertise through knowledge sharing
and how they continue to improve their knowledge base by acquiring knowledge from
external sources and through a process of continuous learning.
The successful firms in this study have excellent management teams, with wide
experience and relevant expertise in their focus markets and industries. They also share
their knowledge within the group and where this knowledge is inadequate they employ
external sources to enhance this knowledge. They are also continually learning to
improve their knowledge base. Finally, the evidence shows that management team
independence is critical for success. The failed firms had very little independence. One
firm had a very autocratic leader who makes all the decisions and another had to report
to their headquarters even for investment decisions.
The literature review in section 2 showed that many researchers have determined that
regional, national or environmental factors in the emerging markets of Asia have an
impact on firm success. While we do not discount the fact that other factors can impact
on firm success the data analysis shows that the difference between success and failure
in the venture capital firm does not reside in external factors. The difference is within
each firm, in its resource base. Thus such factors like the external shocks of the Asian
Financial Crisis, September 11 terrorist attacks and the dotcom bust do have an impact
on firms, but these factors affect aj] firms not just some firms. Hence any firm investing in
the technology sector in Asia will have been affected by these factors, yet not all firms
failed. In fact only a few failed and this failure can be traced back to internal factors, not
externa! factors. How the firms handled these crises were dependent on the firm's
human resources not just on external factors.
Hence the first conclusion is that the internal resources of the firm in the form of the
Resource Based View provides one answer to our question of why some firms are more
successful than others and how they sustain their success. They are successful because
they have experienced, capable and independent management teams and they can
sustain their success because they share their knowledge and are continually learning
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about the industry to improve themselves. The firm's resources made the difference
between success and failure.
Therefore we can conclude that our meta-proposition based on the Resource Based
View is fully supported by our data and our in-depth analysis and provides a valid and
supported answer to our research question. The next meta-proposition to consider is
based on the core competence of the firm.
7.4.2 Core Competence
The second meta-proposition is in the area of the core competence of the firm:
MP2: The Core Competence of the Global Venture Capital firm makes a
significant contribution to successful investing in the emerging markets of
South East Asia.
The core competence theory is based on the skills and knowledge base of the firm, its
process of collective organisational learning, the ability to deliver and execute critical
processes and the process of communication with all levels of people in the firm. These
are all elements that were found in our five propositions. This study shows that all the
successful firms possess relevant skills and experience while the failed firms do not.
Successful firms also have a process of continuous learning within the management
teams.
Their previous experience in the venture capital industry also enables them to deliver
and execute critical processes including investment decision making and strategising on
their industry focus. The critical process of a venture capital firm is to make successful
investments, manage their portfolios well and then successfully exit them either via a
trade sale or an IPO. The successful firms have shown their ability to do this while the
failed firms have not even been able to invest successfully.
Finally and importantly the successful firms share knowledge positively among the
management teams. There are regular meetings to decide on firm strategy, make
decisions on their industry and market focus and plan for the future. Thus successful
firms have shown their competences and capabilities to do what is necessary to ensure
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sustained success unlike the failed firms and this made the difference between success
and failure.
Therefore we can conclude that our meta-proposition based on the Core Competence
view is fully supported by our data and our in-depth analysis and provides a valid and
supported answer to our research question. The next meta-proposition to consider is
based on the dynamic capabilities of the firm.
7.4.3 Dynamic Capabilities
The third theoretical proposition is in the area of the dynamic capabilities of the firm. A
combination of our five propositions has also shown that the dynamic capabilities view is
relevant to our findings and our meta-proposition is:
MP3: The Dynamic Capabilities of the Global Venture Capital firm makes a
significant contribution to successful investing in the emerging markets of
South East Asia.
Firms that have dynamic capabilities have the following capabilities. Management must
have the capacity to match the requirements of a changing environment by renewing the
firm's competences based on its knowledge base and its capabilities. It does this by
transforming the firm's internal and external organisational skills, resources and
functional competences through a process of skill acquisition and learning.
We can see that the successful firms in our study are vastly experienced and have a
wide knowledge base and skills set. They are also fairly independent and are able to
make decisions when there are changes in the environment or their markets. The
successful firms have been shown to track changes and trends in the market and have
adapted to changes in their environment despite several crises in the last 8 years from
the Asian Financial Crisis to the dotcom bust to 9-11. The failed firms however could not
adapt to these changes and in the case of SBEM closed the firm after 9-11.
The successful firms adapted and changed and have continued to invest and exit
successfully. They do this through a continuous process of knowledge sharing and
learning and ensure that they have the necessary competences to succeed. They
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acquire these competences through a process of formal and informal learning as well as
by using external professionals. The successful firms have used dynamic capabilities to
ensure continued success while the failed firms did not have the necessary capabilities
to do so.
Therefore we can conclude that our meta-proposition based on the Dynamic Capabilities
view is fully supported by our data and our in-depth analysis and provides a valid and
supported answer to our research question. In the next section we shall briefly review
the impact of the external environment on the success of the firm, as this has been one
constant theme in the literature on global venture capital.
7.4.4 Impact of the External Environment on Success
The final point that needs clarification in relation to the research question was what
impact regional, national or environmental factors in the emerging markets of South East
Asia have on the firms' success, as this is one aspect many researchers have studied.
This study has shown that some external environmental factors do have an impact on
firm success. This includes the availability of dealflow, viability of exits in their investment
markets, the networks of the partners and even the impact of external crises.
Two points have to be considered here. Firstly, while external factors can impact on firm
success, they are not the most significant factor in success or failure. How the firm
handles the external environment has less to do with the environment and more to do
with the firm's internal resources, primarily its human resources. Thus firms with more
experienced and skilled teams can overcome external problems better than firms with
less experienced and less skilled teams. The successful firms have been more adept at
this than the failed firms.
The three meta-propositions expounded here can provide an answer to how different
firms handle these factors and why some are successful while others are not. As an
example, even though the 9-11 attacks and the dotcom bust had a severe impact on
technology investing, the superior core competencies of Walden, BCEA and H&Q still
enabled them to continue investing in technology and continue to show positive results.
The same cannot be said about SBEM and Transpac. This also applies to other factors.
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Similarly when these crises started affecting investments, the dynamic capabilities of
these firms meant that they were 'dynamic' in their ability to change their strategies and
adapt their industry focus and they had the right 'competencies' to continue successful
investments. For example, H&Q changed focus to invest in distressed companies after
the Asian Financial Crisis, as there was an opportunity to do this. They were 'dynamic' in
changing their focus and also had the capabilities to invest like private equity investing,
something Transpac could not do. Transpac also changed focus to invest in distressed
companies but did not have the capabilities to do so and failed.
The second point is that these external factors impact all firms equally in the market.
Hence as all the firms were investing in the same region, South East Asia, the Asian
Financial Crisis and 9-11 would have impacted them all equally, yet Walden, BCEA,
H&Q and even MSC Venture Corporation continued to invest and exit successfully but
SBEM and Transpac both failed. So external factors alone cannot make the difference
between success and failure. The differentiating factor is the internal factor, the human
resources within the firms.
In conclusion, the answer to the question of why some firms are more successful than
others resides in the internal resources of the firm with three valid and supported meta-
propositions as restated below:
MP1: "The Resource Based View, encompassing the management's
experience; expertise and knowledge base; knowledge sharing; market
knowledge and continuous learning; and independence; is positively
associated with firm success in global venture capital investing in the
emerging markets of South East Asia"
MP2: The Core Competence of the Global Venture Capital firm makes a
significant contribution to successful investing in the emerging markets of
South East Asia.
MP3: The Dynamic Capabilities of the Global Venture Capital firm makes a
significant contribution to successful investing in the emerging markets of
South East Asia.
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In the next section we shall consider a combination of these three meta-propositions into
a single meta-proposition.
7.5 Consolidating the RBV, Core Competence and Dynamic
Capabilities Meta-Propositions and the Success of GVC
We concluded in section 7.4 that the success of GVC investing in the emerging markets
of South East Asia resides in the internal resources of the firm and provided three meta-
propositions based on three management theories, the Resource Based View, Core
Competence and Dynamic Capabilities views. These three meta-propositions be can
used either independently or jointly as propositions for firm success and later research
can test them as possible hypotheses.
However, each of these meta-propositions also exhibits similar elements related to the
internal resources of the firm, more specifically its intangible resources. As such it is also
possible to combine these three meta-propositions into one meta-proposition as the
following discussion shows.
The Resource Based View meta-proposition includes the following elements:
□ quality and experience of the management team
□ their expertise and knowledge base
□ how this expertise is employed through knowledge sharing
□ how management improves their knowledge base by acquiring knowledge from
external sources and through a process of continuous learning, and;
□ finally the independence of the management in making investment decisions
The Core Competence meta-proposition has the following elements:
□ it is premised on the skills and knowledge base of the firm
□ the ability to deliver and execute critical processes (this ability is improved
through prior investment experience).
□ the process of communication with all levels of people in the firm or what we can
call knowledge sharing
□ its process of collective organisational learning
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The Dynamic Capabilities meta-proposition has the following elements:
□ management must have the capacity to match the requirements of a changing
environment (as shown by the SBEM case, the capacity of the management
includes management independence)
□ by renewing the firm's competences based on its knowledge base and its
capabilities
□ by transforming the firm's internal and external organisational skills, resources
and functional competences (the ability to transform is improved with prior
experience)
□ through a process of skill acguisition and learning
Based on the above we can surmise the following:
□ That the Resource Based elements of experience, skills and knowledge base are
contained within the Core Competence of the firm as well as the Dynamic
Capabilities view;
□ That the knowledge sharing and continuous learning aspects of RBV are also
contained both in the Core Competence and Dynamic Capabilities views;
□ However, although the Dynamic Capabilities view aspect of the capacity of the
management does have elements of independence, this view is not sufficient to
cover independence and as the Core Competence view does not specifically
mention independence, this element of independence needs to be separately
mentioned in a combined meta-proposition.
Hence we can now develop a combined meta-proposition, which will include all the
necessary elements of the findings in this section as follows:
The success of Global Venture Capita! investing in the emerging markets of
South East Asia is positively associated with the Dynamic Capabilities and
Core Competence of an Independent Management Team within the Global
Venture Capital firm.
This combined meta-proposition allows us to study other cases in emerging markets to
determine whether new cases conform to our findings. Based on our findings however,
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we have also discovered an important and new conclusion that can be developed into a
new proposition for studying GVC.
The elements of experience, expertise and skills, knowledge sharing and continuous
learning are related to a field of study now known as the Knowledge-based view or also
known as "Knowledge Management". Kerssens-Van Drongelen et al. (1996) define
knowledge as " . . . information internalized by means of research, study, or experience
that has value for the organization". Davenport et al. (1998) describe knowledge as
information combined with experience, context, interpretation, and reflection and
knowledge production as comprising value addition to information. Grant (1995) states
that knowledge comprises information, technology, know-how and skills and he believes
that knowledge is "the key productive resource of the firm in terms of the contribution to
value added and strategic significance" (Grant, 1995: 18).
Thus, knowledge includes all the elements of expertise and skills, knowledge learnt from
prior experience, sharing of this knowledge with other members of the firm and also
continuous learning to increase and improve the knowledge of the members of the firm.
As our study shows, the three meta-propositions show the importance of these elements
but there is now an increasing field of research into how this knowledge is utilised and
managed for strategic advantage and this is known as Knowledge Management. In light
of this, we shall now explore the possibility of a new meta-proposition for GVC investing
based on Knowledge Management.
7.6 A New Knowledge Management View of GVC
We have seen above that the three meta-propositions contribute answers to our
Research Question and are valid based on the data, case studies and enfolding
literature. However, the greater contribution of these three meta-propositions is that they
exhibit elements of, and support, a Knowledge Management view that can provide us
with a different approach to research on GVC. This approach can lead to a repositioning
of GVC from the current dominant or classic view of GVC, which relies on the external
environment or the Resource Based View, to a new view centred on Knowledge
Management as a significant theme for GVC research.
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Jarrar (2002: 322) defined knowledge management as "the process of continually
managing knowledge of all kinds, to meet existing and emerging needs, to identify and
exploit existing and acquired knowledge assets and to develop new opportunities". Wiig
(1997: 6) states that the overall purpose of knowledge management is "to maximize the
enterprise's knowledge-related effectiveness and returns from its knowledge assets and
to renew them constantly". Peter Drucker brings us a more concise definition: "the
coordination and exploitation of an organization's knowledge resources, in order to
create benefit and competitive advantage" (Perseus Publishing, 2002, quoted in Call,
2005).
Knowledge assets or resources relate to the intellectual capital of the company which
comprises the experience and expertise of their personnel as well as specific intellectual
assets of the firm including patents, technologies, operational and management
practices and even customer relations (Wiig, 1997). Knowledge management includes
knowledge creation, which includes knowledge learning, research and development, and
lessons learned to obtain new and better knowledge that will lead to improved
competitiveness; and knowledge transfer, which includes knowledge sharing,
deployment and distribution of knowledge and adopting best practices (Wiig, 1997,
Jarrar, 2002). Knowledge Management is also "a term applied to techniques used for the
systematic collection, transfer, security and management of information within
organisations, along with systems designed to help make best use of that knowledge. In
particular it refers to tools and techniques designed to preserve the availability of
information held by key individuals and facilitate decision making and reducing risk"
(Wikipedia, 2006).
Based on the above definitions, this thesis shows that Knowledge Management is
relevant to GVC because of the issues of management team experience, skills,
competencies and dynamic capabilities which relate to the information held by key
individuals and decision making aspect of the definition, as well as the importance of
continuous learning (knowledge creation) and knowledge sharing (knowledge transfer),
which can be identified with the techniques and tools aspect of the definition of
Knowledge Management. Hence the Knowledge Management view has the potential of
being a new way of thinking about the success of GVC. We shall now explore the
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Knowledge Management theme and show its relevance as a key meta-proposition for
this thesis.
The Knowledge Management view focuses on knowledge as the most strategically
important of the firm's resources and is an outgrowth of the Resource Based View
(Grant, 1996). Spender (1996) states that it is the firm's knowledge and its ability to
generate knowledge that is the core of a more epistemologically sound theory of the
firm. Liebeskind (1996) believes that we are "moving towards an economy where
competitive advantage will be determined by knowledge rather than by access to raw
materials and cheap labour".
Whitehill (1997) called this the Knowledge Management view and identified three
elements of a management team that are necessary for this view:
• the scientific or technical knowledge of the team members;
• their skills and experience of applying that knowledge and;
• the shared knowledge of the whole team built up from the experience of solving
problems together.
The meta-proposition relating to the Resource Based View showed the importance of
the experience of the team, their skills and knowledge base and the importance of
sharing this knowledge with each other. The Core Competence meta-proposition
illustrated the importance of skills and knowledge base, the organisational learning
embedded within the management team (for example from past experience of solving
problems together) and the ability of the team to deliver and execute critical processes
by communicating with all levels of people in the organisation (shared knowledge).
Finally, the Dynamic Capabilities meta-proposition referred to the importance of
renewing firm competencies and skills, mutual and intertwined knowledge (shared
knowledge) and skills acquisition and learning (for example from past experience of
solving problems). Thus the three meta-propositions fulfil Whitehill's (1997) requirements
for a Knowledge Management view and provide the basic impetus to use the elements
within the three meta-propositions to form a single Knowledge Management view as the
main contribution of this thesis. We shall consider this possibility by examining the area
of knowledge management in relation to the three meta-propositions.
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Grant (1995) states that "... knowledge is the key productive resource of the firm in
terms of contribution to value added and strategic significance." He believes that the key
consideration is the extent to which a firm is able to access and utilise the knowledge
embedded within the management team and believes that the primary role of the firm is
the integration of this specialised knowledge. Teece (1998) supports this belief and says
that knowledge, competence and related intangibles are the key drivers of competitive
advantage. This belief is also supported by Kogut & Zander (1993) who found that firms
compete on the superiority of their information and know-how and their abilities to
develop new knowledge by experiential learning. Based on the above, we can see that
our three meta-propositions support the conclusions of these authors. The importance of
knowledge embedded in the management team and their competence (i.e. supported by
our findings for experience, skills and core competencies), integration of specialised
knowledge (knowledge sharing and dynamic capabilities) and experiential learning
(continuous learning) are all supported.
Spender & Grant (1996) state that the issue of knowledge transfer is important not only
between firms but also within firms and this supports the knowledge sharing aspects of
the meta-propositions. They also believe that knowledge integration has implications for
organisational structure, the distribution of decision-making authority and the boundaries
of the firm, addressing aspects of management teams and their independence in
decision-making, thus relating to the proposition of management team independence.
Finally Spender & Grant (1996) believe that "responding to the changes we see going on
around us means bringing a better understanding of managerial and organisational
knowledge and learning into a central place in the field's analyses and theories", alluding
to one key element of our meta-proposition of Dynamic Capabilities - change and the
management of change.
Gold et al. (2001) state that managers seeking to establish effective programs of
knowledge management must balance the content of organisational knowledge with
their capabilities to leverage knowledge. This suggests that not only is skills and
capabilities important, just as important is the process by which the management team
leverages this knowledge through such processes as knowledge sharing, continuous
learning and managing change. This concept is also fully supported by all three meta-
propositions. Knowledge Management is also especially critical during times of great
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change especially during times of unplanned crisis or opportunities. The very
unpredictability of change necessitates different management competencies and
processes (Delargy et al., 2005). This supports the dynamic capabilities meta-
proposition and shows that Knowledge Management and dynamic capabilities are
important elements of management success.
In terms of knowledge and globalisation, Yli-Renko et al. (2000), found that there is a
positive relationship between knowledge-intensity and international growth and also
between foreign market knowledge and international growth and therefore they conclude
that knowledge is a key resource for international growth. They state, "...the very
knowledge-intensity of the firm's core resources may play an important enabling role in
the internationalisation of firms". They define knowledge-intensity as "the extent to which
a firm depends on knowledge inherent in its activities and outputs as a source of
competitive advantage" (Yli-Renko et al., 2000:9). Knowledge intensive is similar to
economists' labelling of firms as capital-intensive or labour-intensive. In a capital
intensive firm capital has more importance than labour whereas in a labour intensive firm
labour has more importance. By analogy Starbuck (1992) states that in a knowledge
intensive firm, knowledge has more importance than all other outputs.
In studying the knowledge-intensity of multinational corporations, Davis et al. (2005)
found that knowledge sharing and management systems and processes in large global
companies need to be integrative and flexible including the ability to integrate local
knowledge with the global knowledge of the corporation in order to be competitive, thus
supporting the findings of Yli-Renko (2000).
In the case of venture capital firms, while they use capital and management and staff are
labour, it is the knowledge that is resident within the firms that is the key to their success.
Hence the knowledge-intensity of foreign venture capital firms is related to the levels of
knowledge that are inherent within the managers of the firm, both the local managers
and their regional and international counterparts. In the globalisation of venture capital
firms, because venture capital is still new in emerging markets, the global firms have
greater knowledge-intensity embedded in their internationally experienced managers
and hence a greater competitive advantage and take advantage of this factor by
investing successfully in emerging markets. The knowledge-intensity of venture capital
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firms gives them a competitive advantage in globalising their firms, supporting the finding
of Yli-Renko et al. (2000) that knowledge is a key resource for successful
internationalisation. However, it is pertinent to note that not all knowledge-intensive firms
are successful. Based on this study such knowledge-intensity must still be coupled with
independent decision-making and knowledge sharing for the knowledge-intensity to flow
to the local managers thereby enabling them to invest successfully. The successful
foreign firms in our study effectively share this knowledge and build on their competitive
advantage but the same was not found among the failed firms. Additionally the
successful foreign firms are continuously learning thereby increasing the knowledge of
the firm, something that is not done by the failed firms.
In the meta-propositions we have determined that the expertise and knowledge base of
the managers and their experience as well as their core competencies are a source of
competitive advantage (or a key aspect of their success). This fits with the definition of
knowledge-intensity mentioned above and leads us to conclude that knowledge is a key
resource for success in the globalisation of venture capital firms.
The premise of Knowledge Management is still quite rare in existing venture capital and
GVC research. Schildt et al. (2005) studied the explorative and exploitative learning of
technological knowledge amongst corporate venture capital (CVC) firms and show a
relationship (albeit a weak one) between CVC investments and explorative and
exploitative learning outcomes. Their findings show that learning and knowledge
sourcing do play a role in the relationship between CVC firms and their investments. De
Clercq & Sapienza (2005) explored the effects of venture capital firm experience and the
venture capital firm - portfolio company knowledge overlap to discover how much
learning venture capital firms achieve through their individual investments. They found
that less experienced venture capitalists learn more from their portfolio companies and
that extensive knowledge overlap limited learning. The main thrust of their research was
in investigating knowledge exchange and learning in the venture capital firm - portfolio
company interfirm relationship and this contributes to new insights on the Knowledge
Management view in venture capital research. In Asia, Lin & Chou (2005) studied
corporate governance mechanisms In the Taiwanese venture capital industry and they
state that for venture capital managers to remain competitive they should adopt the
concept of Knowledge Management in the process of information collection, seeking
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help from consulting institutions and in the accumulation of specific knowledge from their
personal working experience. They believe that Knowledge Management practices can
accelerate business performance and cross-organisation performance between the
venture capital firm and its investees. There is very little specific Knowledge
Management based research in the field of venture capital but as the above three
articles show recent researchers are willing to explore the use of Knowledge
Management in this field, making this an area with great potential for future researchers.
As can be seen from the discussions above, the three meta-propositions all lend support
to a more comprehensive knowledge-based view or as Whitehill (1997) called it a
Knowledge Management view of the firm. Thus we can develop a single meta-
proposition for this thesis as follows:
"The Knowledge Management of the firm, primarily the ability of an
independent management team to build and sustain a knowledge-based,
competitive advantage based on the specialised knowledge of the team,
their skills and experience in applying and sharing that knowledge and the
ability of the team to continuously learn from their experience is positively
associated with firm success in global venture capital investing in the
emerging markets of South East Asia."
This discussion shows that Knowledge Management is a viable and relevant theme for
the success of GVC and moves the research process from the classic view of
'Institutions', 'Environment' or Resources' towards a new area of research based on
'Knowledge'.
We shall now proceed to the next section for a discussion on the conclusions and
implications of this research and some suggestions for future research.
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8. Conclusions and Implications
In the introduction in section 1, we defined global venture capital by adopting Aylward's
(1998) version as "cross-border entry into emerging markets" and used this definition to
explore an area of research in the field that is fairly under-researched. The objective was
to explore the reasons why some global venture capital firms are successful in their
international investments in emerging venture capital markets while others failed. Peng
(2004) called this specific field of enquiry within the international business literature the
"big question in international business research". He stated that, "What determines the
international success and failure of firms?" is a fundamental question that will likely
propel the future of international business literature and is one area of enquiry that will
enhance the status and prestige of the field. Similarly, the question of what determines
the international success and failure of global venture capital firms in the emerging
markets of Asia is one area of research that can contribute much to the study of venture
capital especially since globalisation of venture capital is a fast growing phenomenon in
the world of business and finance.
Existing research, which I have earlier called the classic view of GVC, indicates that
several factors have an impact on global venture capital investing. These include
institutional factors like culture, politics and finance and to a lesser extent resource
based factors such as the experience and expertise of the firm's managers. The main
thrust of prior research is that the environment within which the firm operates has the
greatest impact on firm success in global investing. However, while these studies show
that different factors did impact on successful investing, none of the studies explained
why some firms invest successfully while others don't. If the same factors impact all the
firms equally, then the question that arises is why do some firms succeed while others
fail? As this is a question that remains unexplained in the literature on global venture
capital investing, this dissertation is a first attempt at answering that question.
Based on a study of both successful and failed global venture capital firms in South East
Asia this dissertation identified three meta-propositions that contribute to the
understanding of how to succeed in venture capital investing in the emerging markets of
Asia. While these are important contributions, the key contribution however, is that these
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three meta-propositions enabled us to develop a new Knowledge Management view of
GVC investing. This new view shows that the classic view of GVC, which is based on
'Resources', 'Institutions' and the 'Environment', is not the only way of studying GVC. In
fact this study shows that the classic view of GVC investing is not as relevant as
previously thought and future research should move away from resources, institutions
and the environment and instead should move towards Knowledge Management as the
driver of GVC investment success.
This does not contradict the findings of other researchers in the field who identified the
classic factors that impact on investment success. Those factors are still relevant, but
the difference is that those factors affect all firms equally. Hence any firm that wants to
invest in China needs to be aware of the legal and political institutional factors that will
affect their investments but whether they are successful or not cannot be because of
these factors. There have to be other reasons. This dissertation found that the difference
between success and failure in global venture capital investing resides internally, within
the firm. It is the knowledge that resides within the managers and in the firm and how
this knowledge is managed, shared and utilised that makes the real difference between
success and failure.
The meta-proposition of the Knowledge Management view suggests that GVC firm
success is dependent on several factors. Firstly the global firm must have an
independent management team with the capacity to make investment decisions
independently of the headquarters. The firm must also have the ability to build and
sustain a knowledge-based, competitive advantage based on the specialised knowledge
of the team, their skills and experience. The firm must have the ability in, and processes
for, applying and sharing that knowledge within the managers of the firm as this enables
them to build a knowledge base within the firm and thereby create competitive
advantages. Finally the firm must put in place processes for continuous learning so that
they can acquire new knowledge and renew competences and capabilities especially in
a changing business environment.
The research design adopted in this dissertation is an inductive, explorative, Grounded
Theory methodology using case studies. This research design was adopted because the
study of global venture capital is a relatively new area of research and as it was being
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conducted in a new and emerging venture capital market in South East Asia an
explorative study has the added benefit of enabling discovery of new insights. Also, data
in this area is limited, making it more difficult to use traditional quantitative methods of
enquiry, while researchers have indicated that in Asian culture venture capitalists prefer
face-to-face interviews rather than having to fill up forms.
The second reason for this methodology is that theoretical development in this field is
also relatively underdeveloped. The Grounded Theory methodology enables the
discovery of new theoretical propositions for global venture capital investing and can
thus contribute much more than traditional research. The final analysis does in fact bear
testimony to this, as the Knowledge Management meta-proposition contributes new
thinking to this field of research.
One final reason to justify this methodology is that to adopt the more conventional
hypothesis development and theory testing approach would be to assume that the
western model of global venture capital investing was necessarily the norm and
therefore the benchmark for research in emerging venture capital markets. However, the
approach to this dissertation is a desire not to assume the applicability of a western
model of venture capital especially in the context of the emerging venture capital
markets in South East Asia. The use of the Grounded Theory and case study
methodology therefore fits comfortably within this assumption. Section 8.3 provides a
discussion on the existence of a universal or global model of venture capital in light of
the findings in this dissertation.
The research was conducted in South East Asia among firms that were based in
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand and invested in the greater Asian region, which
included North Asia. In the research design six cases were examined in detail, three
foreign successful firms (one each based in Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand), two
foreign failed firms (both based in Malaysia) and one domestic successful firm (based in
Malaysia). There were multiple interviews with multiple managers in each case and the
interview data were triangulated with other documentary evidence. This format met all
the requirements of both case study design as well as the Grounded Theory
methodology.
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8.1 Contributions of the Research
In line with the objectives of the dissertation, this research made several contributions to
the field of global venture capital. The objective was to discover why some global
venture capital firms were more successful than others in investing in the emerging
markets of South East Asia and this study achieved its objectives. By achieving its
objectives, it makes several contributions to the field.
Firstly it makes a substantial contribution to the methodological area of Grounded
Theory and case study research. This dissertation has enabled the development of a
detailed 'framework' for using case studies in Grounded Theory research. This includes
the development of a new, integrated, process on conducting Grounded Theory
research using case studies, which adopted many of the suggestions of the primary
researchers in the field.
Secondly, in terms of a theoretical contribution, this research provides a new contribution
in terms of a Knowledge Management view of GVC investing, thereby supporting some
recent but as yet still new research in the field. Thirdly, it makes several practical
contributions for venture capital firms operating in and investing in Asia specifically but
also applicable to venture capital investing in general.
Additionally, this dissertation has shown that theories from other areas of management
can make a valuable contribution to venture capital research. We have seen this in
terms of the Resource Based View which has made the cross-over from management to
venture capital but few other management theories have made this cross-over and that
is a gap that needs to be filled by venture capital researchers, to bring venture capital
research in line with other fields of research. Hence the additional contribution that this
dissertation is making by incorporating fne Core Competence and Dynamic Capabilities
views into global venture capital research is a start in filling the gap in the research. By
using these three meta-propositions it enabled the development of a Knowledge
Management view of the firm, which is the most important element for firm success. The
Knowledge Management view has been used in other areas of management but not in
GVC research and this is also a gap in the research that needs to be filled. We shall now
explore the three contributions in detail.
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8.1.1 Methodological Contributions
This dissertation makes a valuable contribution to the Grounded Theory and case study
methodology, in particular a framework for future studies that use this methodology.
While several authors offer suggestions and proposals on how to conduct research
using Grounded Theory and case studies (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, Eisenhardt, 1989,
Yin, 1994 and Locke, 2001), there is a lack of an all-encompassing framework to do this.
Indeed, Grounded Theory is often though of as a difficult and time consuming process
without a defining framework to assist novice researchers.
For example, Partington (2000: 95) states that many doctoral students who start
Grounded Theory research later abandon it because of its "bewildering complexity" and
that in published management research there is "little evidence of the successful
application of any precisely delineated prescribed approach". Backman & Kyngas (1999)
state that the Grounded Theory approach is a time consuming and long process, one
that often surprises researchers by its challenges. They also state that the literature
does not contain many descriptions about the Grounded Theory approach as a process.
Pandit (1996) believes that the Grounded Theory approach does not favour the novice
researcher who is likely to find it more difficult than more conventional methodologies.
Using the Grounded Theory methodology in this dissertation has been a learning
process, which confirms the validity of the statements above. It is not an easy
methodology to use and while there are many suggestions and proposals there are very
few frameworks for effectively adopting and using the methodology. Using the Grounded
Theory methodology together with case studies compounds this as each methodology
has its own requirements. Therefore, it has been necessary to come up with a new
framework that creates a new flow and process for conducting Grounded Theory and
case study research.
Challenges and Strengths of the Grounded Theory and Case study methodology
In conducting this research several issues arise that will be of importance to future
researchers. The first issue that confronts the researcher is the possibility of an
information overload. Due to the open-ended format of Grounded Theory research the
researcher can be burdened with an enormous amount of data, much of which may not
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be of use in the analysis. In this dissertation for example, just using 6 cases alone
created a dissertation that is 100,000 words long. The continuous analytical process
required by Grounded Theory forces a researcher to look at many possibilities and this
creates voluminous data. This is further compounded by triangulation, which adds much
more data to the process. Sifting through this data to look for relevance can be a difficult
and time-consuming process. Hence while 6 cases worked, if a researcher wanted to
extend the process to much more than say 10 cases, then this methodology would not
work, it would not be appropriate as the data and analysis would be extremely
voluminous and complex.
Secondly, when there are several cases and multiple interviews, comparing and
contrasting the data without a proper framework is difficult. The use of matrices and
tables contributes significantly to the understanding and comparison of the data. Without
the use of matrices comparison is difficult. Thus matrix analysis has been extremely
useful in this study and worked well in making the analysis not just easier to conduct but
also easier for readers to follow.
The contributions of the various researchers who used this methodology and provided
guidance was very helpful especially Eisenhardt (1989), Yin (1994) and Locke (2001).
However, these researchers each dealt either with Grounded Theory or Case studies but
not a combination of both, which made the need for a unifying framework necessary.
The unified framework and methodology used in this dissertation has resulted in new
theoretical findings that were not available in this field before this study. Hence as an
exploratory methodology, Grounded Theory using case studies is a very satisfactory and
fulfilling methodology.
New Framework for Grounded Theory and Case Study
As mentioned above, this dissertation has enabled the creation of a very useful generic
framework for Grounded Theory by case studies research. This framework is
represented by Figure 8.1 below (following page), which is a reproduction of Figure 4.1
used earlier. This framework offers a clear 'flow' for future researchers to follow. It
consolidates the different proposals and suggestions into a clear format for Grounded
Theory and case study research.
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The framework has five separate sections that create a process flow to the methodology.
Thus the first section is on developing concepts and categories, as this is the first
requirement of Grounded Theory. This is followed by 'within case pattern matching',
which is a combination of Grounded Theory and Case study analysis. Pattern matching
is a requirement of Grounded Theory while the within case analysis is part of the case
study process recommended by Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1994). The third section is
the 'cross-case pattern match', which allows the researcher to match patterns between
the different cases, thus creating findings that are robust and more generalisable. The
fourth section deals with the need to generate propositions. This is done via the shaping
of propositions from the cross-case pattern matches, matching the propositions to
existing literature and finally reaching closure through theoretical saturation, a Grounded
Theory concept to ensure that enough data has been collected to enable the creation of
robust theory or meta-propositions. The final section deals with the formulation of meta-
propositions, thus completing the research process.
This framework is an easy to follow process that can be used by other researchers, not
only in this field but also in any field that uses a Grounded Theory by case study
analysis, as it is in fact a generic process.
Matrix Analysis
The use of matrix analysis for single data (interviews) followed by meta-analysis for
triangulated data (documentary evidence, etc.) also strengthens the validity of the
results. Matrices are also a valuable tool for matching the patterns that have been
discovered in the data in terms of the categories and concepts found in the Grounded
Theory methodology. Matrices allow the researcher to consolidate data for easy
comparison, thus easing the 'complexity' of the data and allowing the process of
discovery to proceed in a less time consuming manner. By simplifying the process and
making comparison easier, it allows the researcher to look for and find data that
corroborate or contradict findings. It also provides a clear 'view' of the data for external
reviewers and readers.
The framework and methodologies that have been used in this dissertation also allow
future researchers to follow the analysis along the audit trail and enable researchers to
use the same methodology for similar research in different territories or regions. This
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methodology simplifies to some extent the Grounded Theory and case study
methodology for future researchers and adds the 'process', which Backman & Kyngas
(1999) state is missing in Grounded Theory research.
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Figure 8.1: Grounded Theory with Case Study Analysis Process
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8.1.2 Theoretical Contributions
There are two particular limitations in the theoretical aspect of global venture capital
investing. Firstly, theories are limited and secondly none of the existing theories
specifically explore the area of global venture capital firm success and failure and fewer
still in the Asian emerging venture capital markets context.
The two main theories in this field are Institutional Theory and the Resource Based
View. In a recent paper that synthesises research in the area of institutional theory and
global venture capital investing, Bruton et al. (2005: 738) examine 'how the institutions in
the different locales impact venture capital as it spreads from one country to another'.
Their objective was not to explain the level of venture capital activity in different regions
of the world, but rather to gain a deeper understanding of the way venture capital firms
are organised and behave around the world. That has been the basis of research in
institutional theory and global venture capital, an emphasis on the macro aspects of
venture capital firms but not on the micro aspects, on why they are successful or why
they fail. Research on the Resource Based View has also been quite narrow and mostly
covers the need for experience, skills and venture capital specialists. This dissertation
extends the theoretical base of the literature in this field and makes a significant
contribution towards the theoretical understanding of global venture capital success and
failure in terms of the Knowledge Management view of the firm.
A New Knowledge Management View of GVC
The Knowledge Management view focuses on knowledge as the most strategically
important of the firm's resources. Hence, unlike the classical view, it is not the
environment or the resources of the firm, but the specialised knowledge that resides
within the firm that is the key to firm success. As stated by Liebeskind (1996) we are
moving towards an economy where competitive advantage will be determined by
knowledge rather than by access to raw materials or cheap labour (resources) or
elements of the environment within which the firm operates.
The discussion in section 7.6 showed that firm success is based on the ability of the
management team to develop techniques for acquiring, managing and sharing
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information and knowledge within organisations, along with systems designed to help
make best use of that knowledge. The management team is imbued with experience and
skills which make up the knowledge of the team and firm success depends on their
ability to use and share this knowledge, to facilitate decision making and reducing risk
and to obtain competitive advantages in GVC investing. The firm that best manages the
knowledge of the firm and its managers is the firm that will be most successful.
In the cases that we studied, the successful firms had experienced managers with high
level of skills and domain knowledge in their investment areas. They also managed this
knowledge well and shared it among the managers through several processes of
knowledge sharing including through regular meetings, using specialist managers to
evaluate investments and through obtaining knowledge from multiple sources. These
firms also had in place processes for continuous learning, to acquire new knowledge and
skills. The failed firms had inadequate skills and domain knowledge, did not share
knowledge amongst the management teams and did not build competitive advantages
using the firm's knowledge base.
This dissertation makes a substantial contribution to the field of global venture capital in
terms of a new Knowledge Management view which provides us with valuable answers
to our research question and enabled us to further our theoretical understanding of why
some firms are more successful than others in global venture capital investing in the
emerging venture capital markets of South East Asia. Additionally this dissertation also
provides several practical contributions to practitioners in the field of global venture
capital as follows.
8.1.3 Practical Contributions
The Knowledge Management meta-proposition provides considerable practical
contributions to venture capital firms that wish to globalise. By taking this proposition into
consideration in their globalisation strategy, firms have a greater propensity for success
and can avoid some of the causes of failure that was seen in the cases in this study.
The first implication for firms is on the selection of highly experienced partners and
senior managers because such managers will be imbued with higher levels of
knowledge in venture capital and successful investing. The findings of this research
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show that all the successful firms had highly experienced partners and managers. All
four successful firms had partners or senior managers with an excess of 10 years
venture capital experience. In contrast the failed firms had zero venture capital
experience in one firm and the other firms had one manager with venture capital but not
private equity experience, the new business of the firm. Hence his venture capital
experience by his own admission was irrelevant to the firm's new industry focus. The
successful firms also had managers with high levels of industry and domain experience,
another important criterion. Thus to ensure success in the firm's globalisation,
headquarters must ensure that the senior managers of the regional firm have high levels
of both venture capital and industry experience.
The second implication is that the partners and senior managers must have relevant
skills and a wide knowledge base within their industry domain. This is evident in all the
successful firms in this study while the failed firms demonstrated a lack of such skills and
knowledge base. It is also pertinent to note that technological and economic changes do
happen especially in the fast paced technology industry, yet our study shows that
partners and senior managers with relevant domain knowledge and skills have been
able to manage the changes and crises and continue to invest and exit successfully.
The third implication is on the sharing of this knowledge among the managers. The
evidence shows that knowledge sharing is another important criterion for success.
Hence, firms must have procedures or processes for knowledge sharing, including
regular meetings to discuss strategy, industry and market focus, long term planning and
trend setting. There could be other forms of knowledge sharing but evidence from this
study shows that regular, planned face-to-face meetings are very important. Also, firms
must be careful to ensure that there is actual knowledge sharing and that the managers
do not wilfully hold back information or knowledge due to rivalry among managers. The
group's interests must override personal glory and sharing must be in the group's
interest. One of the failed firms in this study had a poor structure where each office was
competing against the other leading to the withholding of information among partners
and ultimately the failure of the group as a whole.
Fourth, the findings also show that continuous learning is a necessary ingredient for
success. As evidenced by the successful firms in this study continuous learning plays an
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important role in enhancing the skills and knowledge of the team. Thus firms must set in
place procedures and processes that enable the team to learn and increase their skill
sets and knowledge base. This includes learning from external experts and formal
learning programs.
Finally the headquarters must endow their regional managers with adequate
independence to make knowledgeable investment and strategic decisions. Similar to
multinational corporations giving their subsidiaries sufficient autonomy to run their
operations, global venture capital firms also have to give the partners and senior
managers of their regional offices sufficient independence to make critical decisions. The
regional managers will have specialist local knowledge, which may not be available to
the managers at the headquarters, thus they must be given the independence to make
decisions based on their local or specialised knowledge. The successful firms in this
study show evidence of such independence while the failed firms show no such
independence.
The Knowledge Management view illustrates the point that the knowledge that resides
within the firm's managers and the firm's ability to generate knowledge is the main factor
that leads to the firm's success. The practical contribution of Knowledge Management in
the globalisation of venture capital firms is as follows:
□ Ensure that the managers and partners of the firm have the required technical
and management skills and knowledge in their relevant domain
□ The firm must also have processes in place to access and utilise the knowledge
embedded within the management team. The primary role of the firm is the
integration of this specialised knowledge
□ The managers must also have the ability and skills to apply this knowledge within
their investment domain and thereby build competitive advantages
□ The firm must therefore ensure that the managers have wide venture capital and
industry experience as this experience is necessary to ensure they are able to
apply the firm's knowledge adequately
□ The firm must ensure that there are procedures and processes in place to share
the knowledge that resides within the firm and its managers. An inability to share
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the firm's knowledge can result in poor decision making and increases the
chances of failure
□ As firms compete on the superiority of their information and know-how, their
ability to develop new knowledge by experiential learning is essential for
success. Hence the firm and managers must have procedures to enable
managers to increase their knowledge through continuous learning.
□ Managers must also establish effective programs of knowledge management and
balance the content of organisational knowledge with their capabilities to
leverage that knowledge
□ Finally Knowledge Management is especially critical during times of great change
especially during times of unplanned crisis or opportunities. The very
unpredictability of change necessitates different management competencies and
processes as well as experience. Hence the firm must not just have
knowledgeable managers but must also ensure adequate diversity and varied
experience among the managers.
8.2 Limitations
This thesis has met its objectives of exploring the reasons why some global firms are
successful in investing in three emerging venture capital markets in South East Asia by
developing a new Knowledge Management meta-proposition to explain this success.
However, there are several limitations in this dissertation that need to be highlighted.
Firstly, one could question the number of cases that were used in the empirical study
and query whether they were sufficient for a study of this type. Six cases were selected
on the basis of theoretical sampling to ensure that they fit the needs of this dissertation.
This is very much in accordance with the case study methodology as prescribed by Yin
(1994) who stated that even one detailed case study would be sufficient for theoretical
sampling. Also, the number of cases fits the range suggested by Eisenhardt (1989),
which was a number between 4 and 10. Hence, methodologically the number of cases is
sufficient. In fact even with just 6 cases, the amount of analysis required was
considerable.
However, it would have enhanced the findings if it were possible to find at least one
failed firm each in Singapore and Thailand. This would have given us greater insight into
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causes of failure. It was however difficult to find failed cases as managers of failed firms
seldom want to talk about failure and getting an interview would be difficult. Two cases
would be pertinent. The first is Transpac Singapore, where two requests to speak to the
Vice President currently in Singapore were politely declined. The second is Techpacific a
Hong Kong firm, which closed its Malaysian and Singaporean offices in 2001. While one
manager from Malaysia agreed to be interviewed the others had left the country and
could not be traced. Hence the one interview was disregarded for this study, as
corroboration was not possible.
The second limitation was that the interviews were only conducted with managers at
their Asian offices. It would have enhanced the findings if interviews could have been
conducted with managers at the parent firms, but distance and cost was a barrier. For
example the headquarters of Walden was in Silicon Valley, H&Q was in Hong Kong and
BCEA only had a loose relationship with its headquarters in the Netherlands. Transpac
also had its headquarters in Hong Kong while SBEM's parent office, Softbank, is in
Japan. Thus distance limited access to the parent offices. It was also difficult to get
access to some of the headquarters managers as attempts to get an interview with Lip-
Bu Tan of Walden failed as he travelled globally and it was not even possible to set a
meeting when he was in Malaysia.
Even within the current cases it was difficult to get multiple interviews with the managers,
as they were always "on the go". For example, it took 4 months of persistent emails and
telephone calls to Peter Chan of BCEA just to get a date for the interview. The meetings
were cancelled on several occasions due to pressure of work. Even in Thailand the
actual interview took several weeks to fix and despite making a special trip to Bangkok
for the interview it was cancelled as Mr. Virapan was called away for urgent negotiations.
It took several calls and hours on the telephone with his secretary just to got another
time for the interview. This will be a problem for future researchers as top-level
managers of venture capital firms are not easy to tie down for meetings and in this
dissertation for each of the cases the top-level managers were interviewed. Multiple
interviews with the managers would have further enhanced the data but this is not
always possible.
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Another limitation of the findings is that the cases were from three emerging Asian
venture capital markets, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand but although these were
emerging venture capital markets, the three countries were not homogenous as each
was at a different level of economic development and this could have had an impact on
the firms located there and their investment strategies. This in turn could have affected
the findings, but this aspect was not considered in this dissertation. However, finding
countries in Asia within close proximity to each other at the same level of economic
development would not be easy in Asia. Singapore would be at a similar level to Taiwan
and Korea but distance and cost would have been a problem for a PhD research.
In terms of the findings, they were based on firms with different parentage, from the US
(Walden and H&Q), Holland-Britain (BCEA), Hong Kong (Transpac), US-Japan (SBEM)
and Malaysia. Being from different geographical regions could also have an impact on
their strategies and operational effectiveness and hence again as they are not
homogenous there could be comparative differences between the firms. It would have
been ideal to study firms at least from similar backgrounds for example US firms or
European firms, although even then there could be some differences. These possible
differences were not taken into consideration in the dissertation.
Another limitation is that although this study was conducted among firms in three
emerging venture capital markets in South East Asia, it may not be generalisable to
other emerging markets like Eastern Europe or South America. Thus the findings should
be taken as limited to an Asian context until further similar studies are conducted in other
emerging markets.
8.3 Is there a Global Model for venture capital?
One issue that was discussed briefly in the introduction in section 1 was the issue of a
global model for venture capital and the fact that researchers in global venture capital
often adopt or use the US model of venture capital investing as a Global Model (Bahn et
al, 2002, Leeds & Sunderland, 2003). However, many, like Megginson (2004) and Leeds
& Sunderland (2003), do recognise that this is primarily because of the lack of a Global
Model. In fact Megginson (2004) concludes that there is no integrated model for global
venture capital and that none is likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. He based his
conclusion on the fact that most national markets remain segmented and on the
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differences in legal systems and regulatory environments. This view finds extensive
support among other researchers like Avnimelech (2004), Bruton et al. (2002b) and
Leeds & Sunderland (2003).
Aylward (1998) also found that there are many differences in regions and among venture
capital firms that makes a generic model difficult to formulate. Regional differences
include different stages of economic growth and different government policies and
among firms differences in fund sizes, governance structures and even the policies of
the fund's investors. Bruton et al. (2002b) have also found that institutional forces differ
among regions including laws, regulations and even cultural norms, making a model
difficult to formulate. Even when institutions, policy measures and regulations are
modelled on the US like in Japan, venture capital in that country has evolved in an
entirely different way compared to the US (Kenney et al., 2004).
Change is also a major issue for venture capital firms not only economic change but also
technological change especially in fast moving industries like the Internet, biotech and
information technology. Acquiring and having adequate knowledge to manage change is
also an issue among the cases in this study, as the successful firms all managed to
overcome crises and continue to prosper while other firms like SBEM blamed the crises
for their failure. Would it be possible to develop a model to manage change globally?
Based on this dissertation it would appear that this would be a major problem even for
large global venture capital groups. Despite SBEM being part of the Softbank group, a
major venture capital investor in the US and Japan, the firm still failed in South East
Asia.
In terms of the findings in this dissertation, we have seen that there are many differences
even among global firms that invest in similar markets The findings of this research
show that different firms have different internal dynamics and structures making it
difficult to employ a global model for every firm. Knowledge Management and human
resources can differ in so many ways and even when there are some similarities for
example in having regular meetings among regional offices to share information and
develop group strategies the system can fail when regional or personal rivalries or even
styles of leadership impact negatively on the firm. Transpac for example had regular
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meetings but rivalries meant meetings were more for networking purposes rather than
for formal planning and strategising.
Despite this there can be an argument that it may be possible to develop a global
venture capital model based on the Knowledge Management view. This dissertation has
however only scratched the surface of the Knowledge Management view and GVC and
as such much more research needs to be done before this can be stated as a fact. It is
however an intriguing possibility and certainly one avenue for future research.
It is also interesting to note that none of the 14 respondents in this dissertation believed
there was or could be a global model of venture capital because of the many differences
cited above and mentioned by the respondents as well. Also when we add the human
component to this it will make a global model even more difficult to develop. Even if we
attempt to develop a global model around the Knowledge Management view, human
frailties and differences will make it an extremely fragile model.
Hence based on both the institutional factors that many researchers mention and the
internal firm aspects of this dissertation, the only viable conclusion therefore is that a
global model of venture capital investing is not a viable proposition at this moment but it
would be remiss to state that such a model is not at all possible in the future.
8.4 Suggestions for future research
This research has identified many different opportunities for further research. Firstly this
research has endeavoured to answer Peng's (2004) "big question" in international
business research on "What determines the international success and failure of firms?"
in this case of global venture capital firms. As there has been very little research in this
important area of venture capital the Knowledge Management meta-proposition offers a
start to future researchers in determining not just the success of global venture capital
firms but venture capital firms in general. It is time to look beyond the environmental
theoretical framework of what affects venture capital investing into the "why" and "how"
venture capital investing can be successful. This dissertation provides compelling
reasons for looking within the firm and not just outside it for valid reasons for success or
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failure and brings it in line with entrepreneurship and international management
literature.
In theoretical terms researchers could now use the Core Competence, Dynamic
Capabilities and Knowledge Management views to study venture capital firms, thereby
extending management theory into venture capital research and enhancing venture
capital research generally. This crossover of management theory into venture capital
theory provides future researchers with plenty of interesting research opportunities. For
example what core competencies or knowledge is required for investing in particular
industries or markets or countries. How do managers handle rapid changes in the
investment environment, how do they tackle crises, who handled it best and why, and
what should firms do in different types of crises? Do Core Competence or Dynamic
Capabilities impact managers of venture capital firms at all and do they impact firms in
developed markets differently from emerging markets. How do managers manage the
varied knowledge and expertise embedded within the firm and what processes are
necessary to share this knowledge among the different offices or managers. These new
theoretical frameworks in venture capital research open up venture capital research to
other possible management theories and can enhance venture capital research in
general and global venture capital research in particular.
Future researchers can also use the Knowledge Management view to determine by
other means, for example quantitatively, whether the findings of this dissertation are
valid. Are firms successful mainly because of their knowledge resources as discovered
here or are extraneous factors more important? Thus future researchers have an
opportunity to prove the correctness of the findings of this dissertation.
There are also some unanswered questions in relation to this research. For example,
this research seems to indicate that venture capitalists place more importance on the
knowledge aspects of management yet the issue of value added, the contribution that
venture capitalists ostensibly provide to their investees (as shown in the venture capital
process in Figure 1.1 above) does not seem to play an important role in the success of
the firms that were part of this study. Does this mean that value added is not an
important aspect of the venture capital process or does this only mean that emerging
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market venture capitalists do not think it is as important as their counterparts in the
West?
Additionally the managers in this study do not mention the importance of their ability to
screen and valuate their investments. Deal valuation can have a significant impact on
the final return on investment, yet none of the managers appear to deem their
knowledge and skills in deal screening or valuation as particularly important in firm
success. Knowledge Management will cover their knowledge and skills in screening and
valuing deals but this was never made explicit by the respondents. Future researchers
should explore this aspect of Knowledge Management and its relevance to firm success.
Much more research using the Knowledge Management view can be done in the field of
GVC. This is still a very new proposition in this field and very few researchers have used
it in venture capital and GVC research, so research in this theoretical stream is ripe for
greater analysis. It is hoped that this is but the beginning of a fruitful stream of research
in this area.
Methodologically, the detailed Grounded Theory and case studies framework that has
been developed here can be utilised for other explorative research not just in global
venture capital research but also in general venture capital research and management
research generally. The flow chart in Figure 8.1 on the Methodological Process provides
a guiding framework for future researchers who wish to use a Grounded Theory and
case study methodology in their research.
This dissertation has explored the use of new methodologies and new theoretical
strands for global venture capital research and has opened up the field to future
researchers and thus provides an opportunity for future researchers to enhance and
expand the field of global venture capital research.
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The following transcripts are highlighted to show their relevance to the categories and
sub-categories of this Dissertation.
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REF NO: A1 RECORDING - NO
GLOBAL VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTING IN THE EMERGING MARKETS OF
SOUTH EAST ASIA
PARTICIPANT NAME: Yong Thian Sze DESIGNATION: Investment Partner
FIRM NAME: Baring Communications Equity Asia Ltd (BCEA)
DATE OF INTERVIEW: 15-10-2004 START TIME: 4.15 pm END TIME: 5.35 pm
PLACE OF INTERVIEW: BCEA Office, Singapore Land Tower, Singapore
TRANSCRIP OF THE INTERVIEW
1) Background
1.1) BCEA
The firm came to Asia in 1996 wanting to replicate what they did successfully in Europe in
1993/1994. They were fairly successful in Europe in the Telecommunications, Media and
Entertainment industries and wanted to replicate this in Asia. They felt that Asiawas moving in
the same direction in 1995/96.
The market liberalisation in Asia in the telecommunications industry also was an attraction to
them. A further attraction to invest in this industry was the convergence of new technologies
especially in the digital, telecommunications and interactive fields.
Furthermore the European market was starting to consolidate and there were less opportunities
as the market started to mature. The communications infrastructure also had been built so there
were fewer opportunities in that area.
However the content industry was starting to grow for example in online travel with companies
like C-Trip of China (funded by Softbank).
1.2) New Fund
They have just set up a new fund for Asia. Non-industry specific and it will invest in late-stage and
pre-lPO companies, as there is now a window of opportunity to invest and take the companies to
market.
Focus area is still Asia because of the current depth in the capital markets especially in
Singapore, Korea, Greater China (including Hong Kong & Taiwan), Malaysia and Thailand.
Partners are confident because of the knowledge base within the firm and their expertise in the
J*, -LPJta. . .. 9 J!l




The firm's success is measured by what is delivered to investors or what is promised. If the
promise is fulfilled then the firm is considered successful.
In these terms, BCEA has gone through cycles because of the Asian crisis, Nasdaq bubble and
9-11 so returns have been so-so (NB: could not give an exact figure). However the fact that "we
are still here" is a sign of success in spite of the difficult times.
2.2) Personal Success for the VC
If the Company they invested in grows to be a recognised name that is a measure of personal
success.
Also if they deliver value to their investors and investors are more willing to re-invest.
When this happens, their personal profile also gets better.
3) Success/Failure Factors
3.1) Key Factors
The key decision for them to invest is the availability of an exit.
There must be an active capital market for either an IPO or a Strategic Acquirer available.
BCEA avoids markets where capital markets are not active and exits are weak. This is the
first and most important criterion for investments, which is why they avoid some markets like
Vietnam and the Philippines, which do not have a viable capital market.
Other factors taken into consideration are:
a) Political and sovereign risks of the country
b) Corporate Governance within the firm
c) Quality of Management
d) Quality of the cash flow
e) Quality of the business
In China for e.g. there is a higher legal risk and corporate governance issues so they pay special
attention to these issues in structuring deals.
3.2) Culture
Culturally, "Guanxi" is no longer a key factor. It is important but not the "be all" of investing.
Political connections do not make a company successful. For example the largest online gaming
company in China didn't have any connections before, he was just a regular entrepreneur. But
now he has connections because he is successful.
Networks],
Their "roots are deep".
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3.3) For the Firm
All the above are important, but more important is the ability of their investment partners to "smell
is also a relevant point for Dealflow],
4) Investment Strategy
Every fund will have a different strategy. For BCEA there is a window of opportunity in their
chosen industries. There is a gap in the market. So they are able to add value to the market.
However, after 9-11 there was a meltdown in the markets.
4.1) Regional Strategy / Regional Model
They have a similar strategy across Asia (i.e. to focus only on the selected industries).
But tactics differ in each market and they focus on particular issues.
For e.g. in China there are issues in Corporate Governance, use of funds and exits.
In Singapore & Malaysia legal issues are good so they are more flexible.
Each market or country has different regulations so they adopt their tactics to the peculiarity of
the market. For e.g. regulations in Korea do not allow a change in ownership 6 months before an
IPO, so they have to structure the deal accordingly. [This is because as VCs they may sell shares
pre-lPO in private placements, or convert one type of security e.g. debentures or Preference
shares to ordinary shares or even hold the shares in a particular fund which is then transferred to
another holding company prior to IPO to take advantage of tax benefits, etc. Hence this rule
requires a different structure so that they can do this].
They depend very much on their people on the ground to look at all these issues.
5) Transferability of Models
6) Global Model of VC
This issue does not arise in BCEA because of their fund structure and independence.
7) Dealing with Investees
BCEA does not take a "portfolio approach" to investing. They would invest in a maximum of 15
companies for a US$ 100 million fund.
They always identify a role for themselves before investing.
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They must have rapport with the founders/managers of the company and see where the company
is heading [i.e. there must be a clear direction for the company].
Culturally in Asia, management resistance is common. Hence the need to identify a role for
themselves before investing. If a role cannot be identified, they will not invest.
Would they remove a CEO? Yes but only for Corporate Governance issues or fraud, not normally
for other reasons. It can turn ugly When they do this but it may be necessary and in one case they
did it & managed to save the company.
8) The Future of Asia
Asia is coming back again & they are more positive on Asia.
Asean is still quite difficult so they are very selective of markets. Malaysia is coming back,
Singapore is ok but the Philippines are a definite no no!
In Vietnam the country's infrastructure is not ready yet e.g. the capital market is not viable, there
are currency issues and the government's approval process is a problem.
9) Investments
Their investment size is minimum US$ 3-5 million.
Late stage investments and the companies must have profit track record of US$ 2 - 2.5 million.
The stake they normally take is 20 to 25%.
Anticipated return is 25% p.a.
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REF NO: A2 RECORDING - NO
GLOBAL VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTING IN THE EMERGING MARKETS OF
SOUTH EAST ASIA
PARTICIPANT NAME: Peter Chan DESIGNATION: Managing Partner
FIRM NAME: Baring Communications Equity Asia Ltd (BCEA)
DATE OF INTERVIEW: 10-1-2005 START TIME: 4.10 pm END TIME: 5.45 pm
PLACE OF INTERVIEW: BCEA Office, Singapore Land Tower, Singapore
***************************************************************************************************
TRANSCRIPT OF THE INTERVIEW
1) Sustaining Firm Success
1.1) What Are The Primary Reasons For Your Firm's Success
a) Team members are the most important. [Emphasis made by Peter],
b) Need to execute, be transparent and ensure there is longevity in the team.
c)|
d) The return on funds is shared with the team, [i.e. there is profit sharing so members of the
team share in the success of the firm],
e) The goal of the firm is to provide a career path for their team members. The idea is to make it a
profession and team "members can [NB: This ties in with the need
to create longevity in the team as it is obviously needed for their firm to succeed],
1.2) How Do You Sustain The Success Of The Firm?
a) Firstly the team members are important.
b) Strategy
The firm must protect the capita! in the fund (capital protective). It is a strategy crafted by Peter &
TS [the firm's original two partners].
It is a defensive strategy:
i) They don't invest in young companies
ii) They invest in more matured companies almost like Private Equity
iii) They only take minority stakes in their investments up to 40% of the investee firm's
capital
iv) They refuse to follow dotcom valuations. Pricing was important. There is a need to
make sure its not too high.
v) Tfhere is support from the extended Barings group including t
partners globally have an agreement to support each other.
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[NB: As mentioned by TS, this is not a fixed arrangement; it is a loose alliance as each fund is
independent. But they do this as it is beneficial to everyone in the group and because of the
strong historical links that they have as well as the relationships that have been built up over a
longer period],
c) Discipline
The team has gone through troughs and peaks and is very committed.
d) Regional Contacts
Peter started with Advent then left to set up BCEA with offices in Taiwan, Singapore, Korea and
Bangalore (now closed). New offices are in Shanghai, Beijing and Jakarta.
BCEA has good regional contacts and validation of the technology within different regions.
Meaning they have successfully invested in their relevant technology focus areas in different
parts of the region.
thoughts 1
1.3) What do vou see as the main threat to future success?
a) Relevance
i) Geographical relevance
BCEA is a South East Asian fund manager. When they mix with the Chinese VC association
members they feel a little irrelevant. This is because Chinese investments are fast paced and
large compared to SEA.
So being regional is very important. Don't be a single country fund, so BCEA will do one ASEAN




they did not invest in such companies they did not suffer major losses,
b) The way of doing deals
There is a need to be adaptable to new investing styles.
How they structure projects has also changed. There are increased efforts towards early exits
and also getting pre-fixed buyers then finding the deals and structure them for a sale.
In Malaysia they have to identify good Bumiputra companies and then fund their IPOs. [NB:
Bumiputras are the indigenous people of Malaysia who are given certain preferences by the
Malaysian government to help them to succeed in business].
There are also innovative deal structures like asset securitisation deals.
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c) Leveraging the fund
Currently the fund size is US$ 50 million which is not enough, so they have to look at leveraging <-
the funds to get at least 30% more for larger investments.
2) Investment Strategy
2.1) Do you use existing strategic models for your firm, e.g. Porter's 5 Forces, SVVOT,
PEST, etc?
They don't use any of the models.
2.2) What strategy do you use to sustain the success of your firm?
[Note: This is in addition to earlier explanation on their strategy].
a) They must have the right people. They don't really evaluate their team but rather look at it from
a "product" angle. What products must you do to differentiate from the other funds? These
products must be supported by the team's expertise.
b) In terms of investment strategy, they (BCEA) must know what they want to do to increase the
value of their investments.
They have an industry strategy or focus - which is on TMT (Technology, Media and
Telecommunications). They wanted sector differentiation so didn't want to do a general fund. The
team also had media experience. This strategy enables them to leverage on their experience.
c) The fund is a value investing or value monetising fund. [This relates back to their strategy of
investing in the later stages of a company's business].
Their focus on TMT also enables them to enhance the value of their investments. This is again related to their experience
in this sector.
The new fund however will be a general fund but will have a theme - value based investing, i.e.
can they uncover value in the deal, show the investee firm's CEO the value and build a
relationship with the company.
d) Productisation
The target return for the fund is an IRR of 25%. It is also projected as a low risk fund.
Their China valuation is 3.5 to 4 times PE (Price to Earnings ratio).
The team is continuously conceptualising and sharpening their product differentiation. This
relates to continuous learning and adapting to the market to keep them relevant.
2.3) Strategically how did you manage changes in the business environment e.g. the
Nasdaq crash, Asian financial & currency crisis, etc.?
There were two pressures during this difficult period.
a) Pressure from their LPs (Limited Partners - their investors) because the LPs were
concerned about their investments. To ease their LPs worries they provided quarterly
communications on what they do and what are the opportunities and threats. They also
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called their key investors every 6 to 8 weeks and personally kept them informed about
their investments.
b) The second pressure was on their team members. The need to keep up the morale of the
team and to ensure that the top management remains unified.
During crisis times, the key was investor communications. Many of the investors also suffered
from the crisis (e.g. the Asian financial crisis) so they will empathise with the firm's management.
It is important to be able to bond with investors and build good relationships.
3) Regional Model of VC
3.1) Do you have a regional model or strategy for VC investing?
The model is localised for each country. The value concepts may be similar but the last mile
implementation is local.
Both the LPs and team members are also all locals. They also use all local partners e.g. local
securities houses. Partners may also be investors or co-investors.
3.2) What are the main factors that can impact on regional investments & how do you
manage these investments?
There are three main factors that can impact on investments. The first two are political factors
and currency exchanges. These cannot be mitigated unlike legal rules, etc where they can use
offshore companies or other countries governing laws in contracts. Politics and exchange rates
are out of their control, hence can affect them.
However these same issues also affect other VC firms.
The third is exits. Since exits are the key to successful investments, every market must have an
exit strategy.
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REF NO: B1 (Transcripts 1 - 3) RECORDING - NO
GLOBAL VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTING IN THE EMERGING MARKETS OF
SOUTH EAST ASIA
PARTICIPANT NAME: Chok Kwee Bee
DESIGNATION: Country Manager/Vice President
FIRM NAME: Bl Walden Sdn Bhd (Walden International Investment Group)
PLACE OF INTERVIEW: 22nd Floor, Menara Dion, Jalan Sultan Ismail, Kuala Lumpur
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW - NO. 1
DATE OF INTERVIEW: 21-10-2004 START TIME: 9.30 am END TIME: 12.30 pm
1) Experience as a VC in Malaysia
1.1) Management Culture
There is a culture of management resistance to VC in Malaysia; the company founders consider
venture capitalists as interfering in their business. The role of VCs is in building companies for
example getting CMM (capability maturity model) certification for their companies. Walden was
fortunate to exit one of their investments, which has such a problem. In another investment there
was a personality issue/clash. The CEO wanted to buy an expensive car worth RM400.000 & the
VC rejected it. With other companies they work closely together and have good rapport. Helped
to hire a CFO.
Taking Jobstreet, one of their investee as an example. The CEO is not flashy, has an old car.
Very disciplined especially in finance and governance. Treats investors very well and even took
salary cuts during bad times. It is still about people. VCs can only do so much. For Jobstreet,
when they started their business in India, they initially used the Walden office and Walden's India
Fund invested in them.
1.2) Local VCs
Sometimes local VCs don't sit on the Board of companies and even when they do they don't
contribute at Board meetings, just listen only. In other cases VCs get too personal with their
investees like MSC Venture Corporation did with Derrik Khoo of G02020 or with Dr. Guna of
Smarttransact (both failed companies).
If the company does well then the shareholders do well. VCs also need to empower the CEO. For
employee share options, other shareholders and VCs don't give good value.
1.3) Co-Investors
Walden is very particular about co-investors. The people must think similarly, for example where
one VC thinks the company is not doing well while another says it is ok, then there is a problem.
Walden is a very reasonable investor and will do the right thing because they only want the
company to be profitable as it is in their (VCs) interest.
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1.4) Integrity is No. 1 priority
Both parties should not take advantage of each other. VCs should give Founders more shares to
incentivise them. Some VC practices are not right, e.g. taking 60% stakes in the Company etc.
Walden is only tough in terms of governance, milestones and performance. To be successful a
strong foundation is necessary.
Entrepreneurship is important and it's the people, they are important. VCs give them discipline,
direction and coaching and bring their experience from other investments to the company.
Walden wants strong Entrepreneurs; VCs would not be in, in the first place without strong
Entrepreneurs. But attitude is important.
2) Success
2.1) Firm Success
a) Being a Tier-1 firm. For example Sequoia is a better firm than Kleiner Perkins because they
have better trophy deals or marquee deals e.g. Sun Microsystems, E-Bay. Walden also has
sustainable and successful companies like Sina.com and Creative Technologies.
b) Flaving good returns - success is having returns of 10 times.
c) Having a good reputation & how Walden operates. Walden stands for integrity, for treating their
partners and investments well, adding value to investments and is perceived as helping their
investee companies and creating financial discipline.
Based on the above Walden is a successful Tier-1 firm in Asia but not yet in the USA.
2.2) Walden's Partners
What does it take to be a Tier-1 VC firm - have the right partners within the firm!
Walden partners are industry people, so they know the industry well.[Note; This is also relevant——"
examp|e their software partner Mary Coleman was from
Baan a leading enterprise software company. All of their partners have built companies.
Walden wants people with domain expertise; Kwee Bee is the only partner in Walden with
financial expertise.
3) Success/Failure Factors
The VC ecosystem is important. The country's legal system is very important for exampie the
filing of patents for R&D must be efficient, bankruptcy laws must be adequate for e.g. in Indonesia
and China where bankruptcy laws are weak. Government support for early stage funding is
necessary. The availability of an exit mechanism is one of the first considerations. For example in
Malaysia the IPO market is good but Malaysia needs to develop the trade sales market especially
for the private equity industry.
Economic growth is also important for example during the financial crisis Indonesia was badly
affected. Walden also looks at the economic cycles and industry cycles. For example in the
semiconductors industry where they have a new investment in Silterra currently which is
expected to do well when the semiconductor market picks up again or in Jobstreet which will do
even better when recruitment picks up.
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The role of government contracts for business is also important for example in the Philippines
payment for government contracts is very slow and unreliable and this affects investee
companies.
4) Investment Strategy
Walden will consider their investments on a country-by-country basis, as in what they can invest
in, in each country. They also look at the core competency of each country. Sometimes the
criteria may be too stringent in Walden or the size of the investment may be too small in
Malaysia, all these will affect their investment strategy.
5) Transferability of Models
Walden doesn't really have a 'model", its more of a strategy, an American strategy which is quite
standard, they look at the technology and the Founders of the firms that they invest in. They learn
from their partners and their experience. For example their investee Sina.com had cash so they
survived the dotcom crash, while others like competitor Catcha.com did not and so did not
survive. The Walden partners knew what was necessary to survive as they learnt from their
experiences in the past.
They also learn from their US counterparts on how to be more holistic and fund adequately, for
example from experience they know that to design a chip requires at least USD 20 million, so any
firm that does not have this sort of funding will not be able to successfully design a chip. They
also learn how to build companies from their American colleagues.
6) Regional Strategy
and
sometimes it changes for example now they look for digital consumer products and mobile
technology. They also invest in semiconductors, software, electronics, communications and
services. They are investing 3 years ahead of what they think future businesses will be.
7) Global Model ofVC
From a global perspective Malaysian deals are too small. Maybe the private equity market is big
here but when benchmarking with Korea and China the deals there are bigger. Malaysia is at the
bottom in terms of size for Walden.
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW - NO. 2
DATE OF INTERVIEW: 22-11-2004 START TIME: 9.00 am END TIME: 11.00 am
1) What if the strategy determined by HQ is not appropriate for Malaysia?
Most strategy is not appropriate for Malaysia. The local fund can do local deals but the US fund is
US$ 600 million. Walden is cutting out country funds. It has 8 country funds since 1988, but now it
is going to have a single global fund and will invest in China and North Asia.
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The problem is can Walden get a big enough deal, a big enough regional deal that can compare
with China and North Asia deals.
For example why would Walden want to invest in Malaysia for 2 times returns when they can get
5 times in other parts of the region (e.g. North Asia)? Returns are not so big in Malaysia but
strategy must fall in line with the global fund.
2) What mechanism does each country use to determine what is appropriate?
Have to compare with other markets to see the deal size and the number of times returns.
3) What does Walden do to re-look strategy if there is a sudden change in the selected
industry for example either an unexpected boom or bust?
They will refocus, for example after the Internet bust they had to refocus.
^p^'Tegularly.ipir QMM,) the Qu|vill look at the dealflow, syndicating, etc. Each manager must also identify 10
contacts that can bring in dealflow. [Note: This is also relevant for the Networks category].
:: ■ : : Vv<
They also de-focus on companies that may not be successful. They will review their portfolio and
look for potential winners and focus on them.
They have quadrants for which companies are the cash-burn types, which are potential IPOs in
18 months time and another for those they need to give bad news early. They have to fit each of
their companies into a particular quadrant.
For e.g. when they had a problem with Chris Chan the CEO of The Media Shoppe an investee, it
was immediately reported to Lip-Bu (CEO of Walden).
The main objective is returns, if there are no returns, there will be no next fund. It is very much
like investment banking. The investments must fit in within their sectors.
4) Is there a difference between global players like Walden and a local fund like MSC
Venture Corporation in investment strategy?
The first is lack of knowledge. The locals don't know how VC firms should be run, the difference is
similar to a local bank and Citibank. Foreign players have better systems and procedures in
plac^Locals alsc) lack the ego^sur^t^^or(t invest in their own training and development for
Local VCs also don't network as much as they should. Also they need to benchmark not just
against VC firms but also against individual VCs. But it is hard to find local VCs to benchmark
against, perhaps Azwar (CEO of Mavcap) and Sarina (former CEO of MSC VC). They also need
to benchmark against people who show results like Mavcap or MSC VC who have successful
IPOs. Asgari (CEO of Intelligent Capital) has some good contacts too.
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They can also benchmark against foreign VCs in Hong Kong and Singapore. In Asia Lip-Bu is
probably the most successful.
5) Is there a global VC firm that has got its strategy right and is doing well in this region?
There are some China and US VCs. TIF Ventures, 3i Pic, Jafco (of Japan) and NEA (a US VC in
China) and Doll Capital (which invested in 51jobs.com a Chinese firm that is listed on Nasdaq).
6) What do you think of Softbank & Transpac, since they both failed in this region?
Softbank was investing during the Internet time but picked the wrong industry and had a poor
strategy. Transpac, the team was not good. External events also affected them and their
dealflow.
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW - NO. 3
DATE OF INTERVIEW: 6-1-2005 START TIME: 9.00 am END TIME: 10.35 am
1) Sustaining Firm Success
1.1) What are the primary reasons for your firm's success & how do you sustain that
success?
The key success factors for investing in China by Lip-Bu (CEO & Founder of Walden) are:
a) Get an experienced CEO
b) Hire a strong CFO, bring in the CFO early
c) Patience - be disciplined. Investment discipline is important to success.
d) Stay focused on the business, the industry and the investments
e) Choose partners (for Walden itself) with good local contacts. Partners must be able to connect
Lip-Bu with all the right people and must have a good network.
1.2) What is the main threat to success?
Dealflow is the main problem and for Walden it is a major problem. If there is no dealflow, then
Walden may leave the country.
For private equity funds they normally look at manufacturing and consumer companies and there
is availability of dealflow in those sectors in Malaysia. SME governance issues are also a
c'naiienge io success.
3) Investment Strategy
3.1) What strategy do you use to sustain the success of your firm?
a) Need to consider what industry to invest in and even which sector within that industry. This
depends on the domain expertise of the partners. For example, in semiconductors Walden is in
the top 5 in the world and number one in Asia.
b) Secondly need to look at which geographical regions to focus on, currently it is North Asia and
China.
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c) The size of the deal - if it is too small Walden will not do it. In Malaysia the minimum size is
US$ 1 million but there is a preference for bigger deals. In Singapore the average deal size is
US$ 2 to 2.5 million.
3.2) Do you use existing strategic models?
No, don't use any particular models.
3.3) How did you manage changes in the Business Environment
a) Finance is the No. 1 issue for Walden, hence the need to get a strong CFO early. Don't
underestimate the finance. However it is easier for Kwee Bee because she is a finance person,
so feels that she can manage things better.
Be focused on making money. Conserve cash during tough times (e.g. Jobstreet an investee did
this, even took pay cuts). The investee must have 18 to 24 months cash reserve, so cash
management is important.
b) The trend in technology is important. Both within the investee firm and Walden itself, they must
have the pe^^^^^stonrv^p^ni^d^^^^^^^^^ind change the business model if
c) Exit opportunity
If necessary they can redeem their preference shares (i.e. exit the investment) or merge the
investee firm with others to ramp up business. They need to have a program to exit their
investments, so that they are not as badly affected in bad times.
d) PATIENCE [Emphasis intended by respondent].
Sometimes they just need the patience to ride out the crisis.
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REF NO: B2 RECORDING-YES
GLOBAL VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTING IN THE EMERGING MARKETS OF
SOUTH EAST ASIA
PARTICIPANT NAME: Cindy Tee
DESIGNATION: Investment Manager (Has left Walden and is now a Consultant)
FIRM NAME: Bl Walden Sdn Bhd (Walden International Investment Group)
DATE OF INTERVIEW: 29-10-2004 START TIME: 12.00 pm END TIME: 1.20 pm
PLACE OF INTERVIEW: Coffee Club Express, Suria KLCC, Kuala Lumpur
*************************************************************************************************
TRANSCRIPT OF THE INTERVIEW
1) Some Background on Walden
Walden is a very bureaucratic organisation and they don't invest in ground breaking technology.
There is a lot of sharing of information between the various partners and they have quarterly




□ Delivering returns of 10 times multiples,
□ Have big winners and
□ Have the ability to spot good opportunities to take to an exit. [Note: Also relevant for
the exit category],
2.2) Personal Success as a Venture Capitalist
Final thing is still returns. Even if you manage to raise funds but cannot get deals and cannot exit,
It defeats the purpose of being a VC.
2.3) Would vou consider Walden as Successful?
Walden International is a successful VC. Bl Walden was a successful VC but times have
changed. Where they are today is because they had enough guts to make the call, good
due diligence and the ability to tap on resources.
in Malaysia VC investors can get 2 times or even 5 times the investment but to get 10 times they
need to get into early stage deals. The fund life is only 5 years so it is hard now to do early stage.
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They are also not 'gutsy' enough now and this is a function of the current leadership. Even in the
US software deals are not giving 10 times. Recent times they do more co-investments.
3) Success/Failure Factors
There are no real factors, but they do look at different industries. Even in China the deals are
structured as BVI (British Virgin Islands) companies to protect against legal issues.
As for success factors they will look at the returns potential - 5 times and above returns. They
also consider a strong co-investor as partner.
To confirm the deal, there has to be buy-in from the Walden industry partners and the Exco.
However going overseas is tricky and the company has to deliver and push for it (going
overseas).
It's all about risk vs. return and the time spent on the deal.
4) Investment Strategy
There is a strategy; it is an "industry focus" strategy.
There are 5 sectors in Walden, each headed by an industry expert and each has its own





□ Services, e.g. Business Process Outsourcing (BPO)
They identify their strategic focus via the history of the group. It started with semiconductors in
Taiwan and Malaysia and evolved into software, Internet and BPO.
The industry heads look at the development of the industry, meet half yearly and perform an
annual review of the industry. There is also a yearly strategy meeting. Individual sub-committees
also meet regularly to share information.
Diversification Strategy
There is Fund diversification by sector, country and stage of investment.
The desired return is double digit IRR.
Walden will even return funds to investors if they feel they cannot get the required IRR.
Dealflow
There is no sufficient dealflow in Malaysia. It is better in Singapore, Hong Kong and China.
Bl Walden also does co-investments and has done deals in the US, Singapore and Taiwan. In
this case another Walden office may do the deal and in Bl Walden they will look into the "fit" of
that investment into their (Bl Walden) investment strategy.
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Regional Strategy
Asian investments do not interest American investors because the deal size is small and not
worth their time.
In the US there are more early stage investments but in Malaysia and Singapore it is more
expansion stage.
There is also more innovation in Singapore on a regional perspective.
5) Transferability of Models
The US gives tips and pointers; it is a 'top-down' approach.
■
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Need to look at what potential talents are in each country.
6) Regional Strategy
It is possible to have a regional strategy for e.g. mobile strategy. Bl Walden looked at Malaysia
and Singapore for this strategy.
; . - C-|
It sounds really good on paper but actually doing it is difficult. Regional deals also make it more
interesting (from a deal perspective). For example China is very interesting.
7) Global Model ofVC
They have standard manuals and must follow processes for e.g. workflow, due diligence and
documentation. In deal origination they have to interact with all parties. When there is a deal then
they have to check out the deal, use their contacts, industry and market players. If it is an early
stage deal then there is a lot of handholding, introduction to potential customers and hiring of staff
(executive recruitment) although they don't do that so often in Malaysia.
As an example they introduced Agenda Malaysia (an investee company) to Mavcap & secured a
deal for them. In Malaysia they rarely have large shareholdings and rarely do executive
recruitment.
8) Dealing with Investees
Demographics in Asia are based on strong individual contacts. The strong Asia - Silicon Valley
connection in Walden made Asian companies successful in the USA.
However this did not apply to Malaysia because it is too competitive in the US. In Malaysia the
companies sell services but in the US it is about licensing.
An example is The Media Shoppe, their investee company. The whole company is concentrated
on Chris Chan, the CEO and Founder. They should have a VP for international sales but they
don't. The management is not strong. They had Dr. Wilson Tay, the COO but he was headhunted
by the Multimedia Development Corporation to head the Technopreneur Development Flagship.
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It is a people business but Walden had a personality conflict issue with TMS.
Americans by nature are very business and performance oriented. If you don't deliver, then off
you go, but this does not happen in Malaysia.
For e.g. in TMS, Darren Chang, their Executive Director stayed on despite non-performance. In
fact maybe even the CEO should be changed because of underperformance. In TMS it is very
paternalistic (with Chris Chan as the head).
Bl Walden left the management of the company to Chris and tried to help. Cindy had a good
relationship with Chris but the Partner (and head of Bl Walden Ms. Chok Kwee Bee) had the final
say and was a stumbling block. Personal emotions got in the way, but this made Chris more
driven. However TMS could have done more.
The TMS management did not have the expertise for foreign entry to do business overseas and
had different ideas on how to grow the company. The Bl Walden partner wanted a more local
focus but the CEO wanted to go overseas. However he needed a person to strategise for the
foreign market but didn't have one.
Other investees were different. For example Jobstreet had a very strong management team and
even got a management coach into the Board, a turnaround specialist.
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REF NO: B3 RECORDING - NO
GLOBAL VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTING IN THE EMERGING MARKETS OF
SOUTH EAST ASIA
PARTICIPANT NAME: Chong Chee Khen DESIGNATION: Investment Manager
FIRM NAME: Bl Walden Sdn Bhd (Walden International Investment Group)
DATE OF INTERVIEW: 18-11-2004 START TIME: 3.00 pm END TIME: 4.45 pm
PLACE OF INTERVIEW: Equatorial Hotel, Kuala Lumpur
*************************************************************************************************
TRANSCRIPT OF THE INTERVIEW
1) Success
1.1) Firm Success
Success is meeting the expectations of investors especially:
Q Good returns (in Malaysia it is 3 times returns)
□ The number of companies that get listed
Also do some nation building including encouraging entrepreneurial activity and creating a pool of
Entrepreneurs. Investing mostly in early stage so returns are 3 times.
1.2) Personal Success as a Venture Capitalist
If the companies that you work with go for a listing or a trade sale then you are a
successful Venture Capitalist. The ability to link people so that they are successful is also a
measure of personal success.
1.3) Would you consider Walden as Successful?
Yes because it met expectations of shareholders (investors) but it is getting harder to meet
expectations yet shareholder expectations are the same.
1.4) Why is Walden Successful
Within each fund there is always a home run deal and Bl Walden has delivered a home run in
Unisem Bhd (a semiconductor manufacturer) with a return of 5 times. Walden as a whole does
not join the hype and has a more balanced approach, for e.g. Softbank went after Internet deals
during the hyped up days (and closed down not long after). But Bl Walden has a mix for e.g.
electronics, software and also some offshore deals.
The main reason why Bl Walden is successful is that the founder Tan Lip-Bu is a long term
visionary and a little bit conservative, unlike Softbank jumping into specific industries and being
very aggressive [herd mentality].
3) Success/Failure Factors
The overseas country offices take the lead because Bl Walden co-invests with each country fund.
So Bl Walden is protected by its own global funds as they have a presence in the country of
investment even if Bl Walden doesn't.
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There are no factor considerations as they go where the deal is and invest in the areas they knovff
li|ff! For example they don't do deals in Vietnam because there are no offices there.
Local fund means there is continuity for e.g. Softbank is a global fund, so in times of
crisis they can just leave the country but Bl Walden has a local fund so it cannot do that.
4) Investment Strategy
The strategy is an "industry focus" strategy. They concentrate on specific focus areas for e.g.
electronics, semiconductors and software. Investment criteria would be the same for all the
industries - market size, management team, strong CEO, etc. criteria common for all VCs.
The strategy is formulated by the respective country heads, the industry experts in the group and
tBScMfflal Sometimes there are 'hot' areas and they can look into these areas, but not lose focus
or abandon their original industry focus.
There are regular meetings to formulate the strategy. Generally the strategy has been effective.
There is also no investment 'model'. The investments are all pure equity investments. The
investment (amount) is normally made in a 'one-off payment; they normally don't do it in
tranches.
5) Transferability of Models
Not always applicable, it has to be adjusted to each local country.
6) Regional/Global Strategy
The investments they make are by industry and not by region or country. Their investment is by
an 'industry focus' even for their global investments.
7) The Difference between foreign and local VCs
The perception is different, for example the foreign VC can take the investee overseas (i.e. help
them to expand their business overseas) and the deal is also perceived to be 'clean' i.e. no 'under
table' money (i.e. no bribes will be given or taken). Operationally though it is the same.
How they look at deals is different because the foreign VCs have better exposure as they can
depend on or have the experience of prior deals done by other global offices to help guide them
The expertise of other offices and partners is used ofter
dge category and Dealflow category],
local office does the same for the overseas offices too.
8) Deal comparisons
Investments in Malaysia compared to say, Singapore, the quality is the same. But the
Singapore government has created a better ecosystem and more networks that help
their companies, this is not happening in Malaysia.
However, this is not applicable everywhere because China for example has a huge domestic
market so it is hard to compare with Malaysia. One of Lip-Bu's strategies is to look at returnees
(for example Chinese returning from the US back to China) because they have better exposure
and a better culture, [which presumably they learnt from the US]. A weakness in Malaysia is that
the ecosystem is not as good, but this is beyond the control of VCs.
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REF NO: C1 RECORDING-YES
GLOBAL VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTING IN THE EMERGING MARKETS OF
SOUTH EAST ASIA
PARTICIPANT NAME: Mr. Virapan Pulges
DESIGNATION: Managing Director FIRM NAME: H&Q Thailand Ltd
DATE OF INTERVIEW: 4-12-2004 START TIME: 8.00 am END TIME: 10.15 am
PLACE OF INTERVIEW: Suite 1207,12th Floor, Sathorn City Tower, Bangkok
***************************************************************************************************
TRANSCRIPT OF THE INTERVIEW
1) Success
1.1) Firm Success
H&Q is better than most VCs in terms of internal return to investors and growth of funds under
management. Previous investors keep investing (in the new funds). [Did not provide actual details
because of confidentiality. Virapan assumes the point that the reinvestment by existing investors
is a measure of success],
1.21 Personal Success for the VC
When he makes good investments and contributes to the country (in terms of the economic
growth of the country). For example, one of the investments he made is Fabrinet Company Ltd,
which is a management buyout of Seagate. The company supplies electronic components to
major companies like Intel, JDS Uniphase and Honeywell and is a major exporter in Thailand and
also a large employer.
2) Success/Failure Factors
2.1) Key Factors
There is a scoring system when they decide to invest and this includes certain factors like:
□ The quality and availability of labour
□ The quality of the engineering staff
□ Language issues (for example exporters must have English speaking management)
□ There must be adequate infrastructure
□ There must also be good Intellectual Property protection (e.g. in Thailand, there is good
Intellectual Property protection for contract manufacturers).
3) Investment Strategy
3.1) Does the firm have a defined investment strategy?
There is a strategy but it changes from time to time. H&Q invests in technology manufacturing
(80% of investments). H&Q has 3 regional funds:
□ In 1992 its first fund was the Asia Pacific Growth Fund - US$ 75 mil.
□ In 1996 the 2nd fund was the Asia Pacific 2 Growth Fund - US$ 230 mil.
□ And in 1999 the 3rd was the Asia Pacific 3 Growth Fund - US$ 750 mil.
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Pre-crisis it used to make minority investments but f
| [This looks like a change in strategy from VC to private equity type investing].
1, for example Fabrinet was US$ 20 million, SVI Public
Company Ltd US$ 70 million and Thaicane was US$ 20 million. Thaicane and SVI are listed on
the Thai stock exchange.
There is no particular industry strategy, they will invest in any good deals but there are 3 areas
they would like to be in:
a) Technology manufacturing
b) Financial services
c) Branded consumer goods
They would like these three areas to constitute 80% of their deals and the balance 20% in
anything else. The dealflow in Thailand for their size deals is not many so they look for more
MBO deals. Sourcing deals is via their networks [Note: This point is also relevant for the
"Networks" category]. In fact all the 3 deals mentioned above were due to personal networks.
3.2) Formulating Strategy
is formulated by an Executive Committej
laging Directors/The MDs meet every off
, . . . ., , .... •basis. Post crisis they decided to mves
MUHSn consists or tne various
Sometimes there is also an Exco
e.g. from Singapore to China],
Migration occurs when firms move operations from one country to another,
4) Investment Models
Whenever there is a change (e.g. in economics like the crisis, or a new fund is started) then they
may look at models like SWOT. The MDs will discuss the SWOT and look at strengthening their
SWOT. It is more of a process plus a strategy and not a "model".
5) Transferability of Models
5.1) Does your parent firm have a specific model or strategy for each market?
fV ■ t«. .> . ...if . . ir - . .
There is a separate regional Investment Committee for the H&Q Asia Pacific Fund which consists
of the US Chief Operating Officer, CEO of H & Q Asia Pacific, MD of Korea and MD of the
Philippines. When making decisions they will do a conference call and if the investment is larger
than US$ 20 mil. then 2 members of the Investment Committee would visit the company. This is
for the regional fund.
For the regional fund, the regional Investment Committee approves about 80 to
90% of the deals.
6) Regional Strategy / Regional Model
There are separate regional funds for e.g. an ASEAN fund (which is smaller in size). Each
country may have a different strategy because each country has a different economic cycle. For
example Singapore more advanced than Malaysia, China more consumer oriented, etc. H&Q is
looking to invest in companies setting up manufacturing plants in China or companies that are
selling to Chinese consumers e.g. selling l-Mode phones in China.
The deal size regionally is US$ 20 to $ 50 million per investment. The regional strategy may
change every time they raise a new fund, which is about every 3 to 4 years. The regional model is
successful because H & Q is based on the following:
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□ Diversifying risk
□ Economies move in cycles
□ Competition within H&Q itself because each country competes with another country
□ They go for the best deal within the region
Other factors like the preference for China however does have an affect on the firm.
7) Global Model of VC
H&Q in the US only invests in the US. The US office invests in different sectors but in 'real'
innovation technology. Tried to do that for a year in Taiwan but it didn't work. The deal success in
the US can be 1 success out of 10 and that still makes it successful because that one successful
deal can return 50 to 100 times the investment. However in Asia, to be successful they need to
have 50 to 60% success because the return rate is not that high, maybe 3 to 6 times only.
For example some of H&Q's returns in companies that went IPO were:
□ Thaicane the return was 2 times,
□ Thaicon (a factory leasing company) it was 4 times,
□ SVI for the first fund was 6 x but the next fund was only 2 x (there were 2 separate
investments made by H&Q)
□ Fabrinet there was an offer to acquire at 3 x
The American style returns of 50 x does not happen in Asia.
For example, Walden invests 30% in the US, 30% in Asia and the balance elsewhere. Most of
their 20 x returns are in the USA.
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REF NO: C2 RECORDING-YES
GLOBAL VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTING IN THE EMERGING MARKETS OF
SOUTH EAST ASIA
PARTICIPANT NAME: Mr. Patan Somburanasin
DESIGNATION: Investment Manager FIRM NAME: H&Q Thailand Ltd
DATE OF INTERVIEW: 3-12-2004 START TIME: 11.00 am END TIME: 12.30 pm
PLACE OF INTERVIEW: Suite 1207,12th Floor, Sathorn City Tower, Bangkok
***************************************************************************************************
TRANSCRIPT OF THE INTERVIEW
1) Background
H&Q Thailand started with a US$ 20 million local fund pre-crisis (before 1997). Most
investments then were in basic manufacturing with Taiwanese and Chinese companies in
seafood, paper, etc. At that time there were less than 10 VCs in Thailand, including Prudential,
H&Q etc. After the crisis H&Q raised a regional fund because post-crisis there was good potential
for larger investments especially in restructuring plays. The deals were also larger, up to US$ 20
mil. per deal. For example they bought a controlling interest of 90% in a bankrupt electronic
manufacturing concern. The average return from those divestments is 2.5 times.
They still own 2 electronic companies from the earlier investments and have more than 50%
stakes in them and are active in the management. They also hired new management after they
took over. The investments are doing very well; one company is doing US$ 200 million in sales
from startup in 1999. Hence H&Q Thailand is different because of their majority stakes in
The culture of the company and the management in the investee company is important in the
decision to take on a majority stake. Some examples of their investments:
a) The first company Fabrinet Company Ltd is doing sales of US$ 200 mil. and is well
run by the CEO.
b) The second company is SVI Public Company Ltd. The CEO retired at the age of 75, so
they hired a new management team.
c) The third is ThaiCane Public Company Ltd, a family owned paper manufacturer. They
discovered fraud after the investment and had to remove the family management and run
the company. They had to recruit a new team and put in place proper corporate
governance. They took over the company and had to negotiate with the bankers (in the
restructuring of the company).
H&Q Thailand is currently fully invested. They are raising a new fund both for Thailand and also
for Asia Pacific. The new H&Q Asia Pacific fund is focused on North Asia, mainly China. There is
also some dealflow in Korea and Japan. In China the opportunities are in commodities,
manufacturing and state-owned enterprises. In Taiwan it is in electronics.
Raising New Funds
H&Q Thailand is raising a new fund. Out of the original regional fund of US$ 750 million, up to
US$ 36 million was invested in Thailand.
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From the earlier US$ 270 million fund, US$ 25 million was invested in Thailand. The new fund
being raised will be used to invest in controlling stakes in buyouts from MNCs, outsourcing
companies and restructuring deals. The Thai government and Lombard (a fund investor) will
jointly invest about US$ 250 million in the new fund. This fund will invest in both large companies,
SMEs (about 1 billion baht size - about US$ 25 million) and in medium sized companies that are
in the Thai recovery fund (set up to restructure crisis companies). The allocation for medium sized
investments is US$ 100 million out of the total fund.
Dealflow
Dealflow in Thailand is quite limited. This is because many family owned businesses prefer to get
loans from banks, as banks are more willing to lend due to the recovery of the economy. However
some of the younger generation who are educated in the USA may consider VC investments.
There are also corporate spin-offs like AMD. The size of H&Q is large so they don't invest in
smaller companies. The minimum investment size is US$ 10 to 15 million.
2) Success
2.11 Firm Success
The reason for the existence of H&Q is to make money for the investor. H&Q is a brand name in
Thailand - people know that it is a premier VC firm. The rate of return is the "hurdle rate" based
on American Treasury Bills about 8% (i.e. this is the minimum that the firm must earn for its
investors per annum), but H&Q is returning 2.5 times (far higher than the hurdle rate).
2.21 Personal Success for the VC
To see the firm's investees be successful companies (e.g. a bankruptcy company turned around
into a successful company). Also to enjoy the work, broaden the vision and to see good and bad
things.
3) Success/Failure Factors
There are two main factors, firstly the industry that they pick to invest in is important [Note: Also
relevant for the "Dealflow" category], -the right industry, right company and at the right price. The
second important thing is the people who run the companies.
3.1)_What happens if the industry strategy is wrong?
The fund period is 10 years so they need to do a good due diligence on the industry, to pick the
right industry. In some industries like high-end electronics, the Intellectual Property is important,
so here the IP is more important than the cost. They also look at the details of customers, their
needs and the competitive advantage of the company. Some niche products and less price
sensitive manufacturing will stay in Thailand and not go to China so they invest in these areas.
Others like software are too small in Thailand.
3.21 Failures of H&Q
Failures are because of industry failure or due to other partners. Sometimes the business model
does not work. Sometimes H&Q does not have a large enough stake to be influential in the
turnaround. In Thailand and Asia family businesses are also not well run. The family gets richer
but the company does not. Also owners do not want to let go of the company even if they cannot
run the company, unlike US managers. The culture is different in Thailand and Asia. Culture is a
factor. Thai companies are mainly Chinese run and they want to control the company. They will
only let go of the company if it has no value. The younger generation is different because many of
them have a western education.
4) Investment Strategy
4.11 Does the firm have a defined investment strategy?
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The original fund was US$ 750 million with a strategy to take majority control or have an influence
on the investee company. The investment sectors for H & Q Asia Pacific were manufacturing,
technology and software. For H & Q Thailand they were to invest in technology manufacturing not
software because in Thailand software companies were only at the early stages.
4.2) Formulating Strategy
The H & Q Asia Pacific strategy is formulated by the management in the USA the CEO and
COO and the various Managing Directors who meet quarterly. They share experiences and fund
performances. [Note: Also relevant for the "Knowledge Sharing" category]
However the local offices will identify their opportunities and dealflow. For example in Japan it
may be software but not in Thailand. However when there is a local fund it can have a different
strategy. It can also be different in terms of fund and investment size but will still look at taking
controlling blocks or influential shareholding especially in restructuring deals.
:■ . y ■ y :y ,
For example if in Asean it is manufacturing,
then in Thailand it will be automotive, electronic and service. However since the automotive
companies are controlled by foreign companies from the US and Japan, they invest in the 3rd tier
Thai companies as there are opportunities there.
H & Q Thailand only invests in Thailand but if an investee company wants to expand then the
other H&Q companies will assist in the expansion. Assistance is also provided in divestment of
interests. Other management staff (from other H&Q offices) also get involved in the investee
companies for example to look at the business, cash flow, etc. The active involvement of H&Q in
the management of investee companies is important for the success of H&Q. But where the CEO
is good and the company is well managed then they (H&Q Thailand) have a lesser degree of
involvement.
5) Investment Models
The investment model is the same as the investment strategy. They make sure their investment
has sufficient influence. They need to find a company that is growing and has a competitive
advantage They have to find value in the company. The intention of the investment is to grow the
company so even though they are investors they will do business development and use their
and "Networks" category].
If the VC has no expertise or uses the wrong strategy then it can also lead to failure. They need
to work with the companies' managers and play Devil's Advocate. Entrepreneurs are always too
optimistic so VCs need to play Devil's Advocate and even prepare the company for bad times if
necessary.
6) Transferability of Models
When they raise funds they rn
country leeway
ay state to the investors the industries that they
o decide on the ind ies
7) Regional Strategy / Regional Model
Each country must adapt to fit its own different culture and different demographics. Not sure
about regions. For example in Thailand they invested in a paper company because they were
investing at the bottom of the cycle. Normally they don't invest in commodity type businesses.
Also the region may be limited. For example the Asean market may be small and the returns may
not be great so returns on high technology investments in the region may not be as good as in
the US.
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REF NO: D1 RECORDING-YES
GLOBAL VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTING IN THE EMERGING MARKETS OF
SOUTH EAST ASIA
FIRM NAME: MSC Venture Corporation - Malaysia
DATE OF INTERVIEW: 4-11-2004 START TIME: 2.00 pm END TIME: 4.00 am
PLACE OF INTERVIEW: MSC VC office, Cyberjaya
*************************************************************************************************




In the Malaysian context MSCVC is very successful. Some examples include Nexus Edge who
they have taken to the US market, Farallon Medical a US medical device manufacturer now
located in Malaysia, in China they have Cosmos Discovery and another successful company is I-
Systems a provider of software for the insurance industry. They have also listed a few
companies on Mesdaq including RedTone, and Karensoft Technologies.
The dealflow is strong especially in the US because of Esmond's networks. There are a lot of big
deals thanks to the "word of mouth" network. [Note: This is also applicable to the "Networks"
category],
1.2) Personal Success as a Venture Capitalist
a) Financial success is the first.
b) This financial success then allows Esmond to attract more deals.
c) Dealflow that is attracted by word of mouth. (This is again the recognition that is given to the
individual VC by the market).
Success also provides more flexibility in time and more dictating power. The Golden Rule is, "He
who holds the gold makes the rule". His personal mission is to develop the VC industry in
Malaysia. So he sets the pace and does the deals, leadership by example. Malaysia is a good
place for business because it has character and quality of life. Global terrorism though is a
problem but Malaysia is a shining example and is prosperous, but it must keep its prosperity.
2) Success/Failure Factors
2.1) Image and government policy
The foreign VCs image of Malaysia is that it is hard to do business here. There are great
marketing stories but they don't stand the test for foreign VCs. Malaysian performance is
measured as follows:
PARTICIPANT NAME: Esmond Goei DESIGNATION: Chief Executive Officer
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□ Productivity improvement is only 3 times
□ The average investment is RM 3.5 million (about US$ 900,000).
However MSCVC's average investment is US$ 3 to 5 million, so their average size is larger than
the norm. Malaysia also has some poor policies for example Biovalley [a biotech initiative that has
floundered], which is foolhardy and delusional. The government hasn't finished the job on IT yet
so they shouldn't go into something new like Biotech. Even in IT you still cannot find qualified
people so what more Biotech.
2.2) Market Size
Another factor is that Malaysia's domestic market is small so why would VCs want to put money
in Malaysia?
2.3) Malaysia's Investment Strengths and Weaknesses
VC investing is not just about money but also about Entrepreneurs. We should also present
Malaysia as a facilitator to address different markets. Mesdaq is the jewel in the crown as
there is a good exit and there is liquidity. However in Malaysia it is like "snatching defeat from
the jaws of victory". It is a great country with a lot of natural resources and friendly people. It is not
like Vietnam a communist country. There is also access to money from the Middle East.
However we will never produce 1 million engineers a year and never match the cost of labour of
other countries. But we do have better governance. So we need long-term policies but at the
moment we have no real objectives. Even in politics the anti-US sentiment didn't help.
3) Investment Strategy
3.1) Develop and benefit Malaysia
a) Use Malaysia as a facilitator, bring deals to benefit Malaysia.
b) Make Malaysia an "entrepot" for technology for example facilitate the connectivity between the
Middle East and say the USA. Malaysia can provide US companies' access to the Middle East
and China.
c) Investors can liquidise their investments through Mesdaq and use that for China and
Middle East.
However there are hurdles with dealing in Malaysia. Taking money out of the country needs Bank
Negara (Central Bank) approval and there are too many holidays here so Malaysia is not so
productive.
3.2) Application Technology
They are looking more at the "application" of existing technology and not just developing
technology because there is mass merchandising appeal and Malaysia is very consumer
oriented.
3.3) Globalisation
Malaysia has low cost resources so for a company that has marketing access in the US they can
use the low cost resources here.
4) Investment Model
There is no investment model. Every deal is different. It is based on the experience and
knowledge of the Venture Capitalist. When they iook at a deaf, they have to "look beyond the
deal". [Note: This is also applicable to the "Expertise and Knowledge Base" and the Dealflow"
category]. For example Cosmos Discovery is not just doing TV programmes but also doing
programmes for China in the Chinese language.
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5) Regional Strategy
It is possible to have a regional strategy but may need to change the focus. Need to look at the
strength of each country and the size of the market. For example Cosmos Discovery is
developing TV programmes for China but they can duplicate that for Thailand.
6) Global Models
There is no "Global Model". The US model is not applicable in Malaysia. The infrastructure and
the ecosystem are different. The key part of the ecosystem is the state of mind, the people in the
Here they look at the magnitude of the investment not the ROI, and they are afraid to
invest money for future returns. For example here when they need to invest US$ 5 million it is like
"wow" 5 million, not how much can it return.
We need to change our state of mind in our approach to the education system, our approach to
Mesdaq and even how we approach the infrastructure. The state of mind condones the breach or
disregard of laws and stifles investment. So they need to change their state of mind.
Globally, there is a poor perception of Malaysia.
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REF NO: D2 RECORDING-NO
GLOBAL VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTING IN THE EMERGING MARKETS OF
SOUTH EAST ASIA
PARTICIPANT NAME: Husni Salleh DESIGNATION: Chief Operating Officer
FIRM NAME: MSC Venture Corporation - Malaysia
DATE OF INTERVIEW: 22-10-2004 START TIME: 10.00 pm END TIME: 12.30 am
PLACE OF INTERVIEW: Austin Chase, Bangsar Shopping Centre, Kuala Lumpur
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□ Having a few home-runs of 10 times returns on at least 3 to 4 investments
□ Make some people millionaires
□ Make yourself a millionaire too (as a VC fund partner)
□ Get these millionaires to reinvest in your future funds
M:i: U k; s - ■ ■ ■ ■ ■: ' V"": i-vC- ' -:i- J . ?
: N''': i k;:iY,:: : : h' V:;; ■ (*,' a,
-Ac:-/ f;- '^pii ::>.VsfoV • ■'' > K ' V Ti s • : I; - ,:: L ■ ■ ■ In
the US and Europe the VC fund managers are already well off. Malaysia also has no regulations
to cover VC partnerships like the Limited Partnerships for investors and the firm's managing
partners like in the US. MSC VC is relatively successful compared to other VC firms in the
industry.
1.2) Personal Success as a Venture Capitalist
Personal success is to be fairly well recognised as a good VC and also to have managed a
successful fund. Would like to have a few million Ringgit in the bank from the rewards of the
current fund and to run an anchor fund in the future.
2) Success/Failure Factors
One of the factors is the ability to find the right deal and the right people - dealflow. Capital
market liquidity and a good exit are important. For example, on Mesdaq you cannot make 10
times returns. M&A is also non-existent so there is no strategic deal making possibility. The big
companies and multinational corporations are not looking at companies here. For e.g. Intel
Capital have no investments here. The local companies buy for market reach not for investment.
Local companies that can buy their investments also do not do any research and development on
the industry, they don't do any analysis, corporate planning is poor and are very political. So this
leads to the poor exit potential for M&As. Even the Government-linked corporations have short-
term thinking.
Among external factors, government policy does not have efficient systems, the system is filled
with bureaucrats not technocrats, and so it does not help the VC industry.
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3) Investment Strategy
timeline; At the beginning you can invest in the early stage deals as you have time to grow these
businesses slowly. However towards the end of the fund you can only invest in the late stage or
mezzanine investments, as you need a quicker return. You cannot wait too long as the fund is
coming to the end of its lifetime.
developments.
The basic strategy is:
□ How to maximise profits
□ Invest in people they know
□ Put in more money into people they know
In the beginning they would look at the different sectors to invest in but at the later stages of their
fund they have look at other factors as well.
4) Transferability of Strategy
relevant to the "Networks" category].
MSCVC have a strategy of investing in regions too and have investments in China, Singapore
and USA. The strategy is the same but the execution is different.
China
For example, for their China investment, the exit may not be in China, so they will
exit outside China for e.g. in Singapore or Hong Kong.
The legal issue is weak in China so structuring of the deal is given more serious consideration.
However, protection is bad elsewhere and if they want to "screw you" they will, anywhere,
anyway. Yet people still invest in China, the China story still sells.
5) Regional Strategy
Technology is still difficult to sell in Malaysia. When they look for technology companies they will
help them to either localise the technology or internationalise it. They do business development
and will even project manage the deals. They also do fund raising for their investee companies.
6) Global Models
The is no "Global Model". VC is a very local phenomenon so they have to adapt to the local
situation. For e.g. Walden is in partnership with a local bank, Bank Industry. [Bl Walden is a
partnership between Bank Industry and Walden International], Others like H&Q and Softbank
failed because they did not have local partnerships. The customs and the networks are all local.
People and management culture are different. For e.g. in China do not put a Chinese in top
management because they are not used to having a company and not used to respecting the law,
corporate governance and don't know accounting.
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REF NO: D3 (2 Interviews) RECORDING-NO
GLOBAL VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTING IN THE EMERGING MARKETS OF
SOUTH EAST ASIA
PARTICIPANT NAME: Alan Tan DESIGNATION: Investment Manager
FIRM NAME: MSC Venture Corporation - Malaysia
DATE OF INTERVIEW: 13-11-2004 START TIME: 10.30 am END TIME: 12.00 pm
PLACE OF INTERVIEW: Austin Chase, Cyberjaya
*************************************************************************************************
TRANSCRIPT OF THE INTERVIEW
1) Success
1.1) Reason for existence of MSCVC
MSCVC is expected to play a developmental role because it exists to fill the gap between the
reason for the Multimedia Super Corridor's existence and the goals to be achieved by the MSC
for example:
a) R&D excellence - attract technology, money etc to the MSC
b) The MSC had everything including policies and infrastructure (hard & soft) except money.
However you cannot attract money in a void, so they started MSCVC.
Technology business cannot grow organically it grows by being aggressive so it needs funds,
especially VC money.
1.2) Firm Success
The shareholders view success as "objective based success", i.e. if it achieves the objectives set
out for it above, i.e. the developmental role. MSCVC is successful to a certain extent, it could
have done more but it was not given the mandate to invest in seed. So it is successful in
everything except seed funding. MSCVC is a pretty successful firm and has already broken
even. On a regional perspective, it is probably one of the more successful.
1.3) Personal Success as a Venture Capitalist
The benchmark for success is financial - IRR. He benchmarks against Silicon Valley prior to the
boom years so an IRR of 10 to 15 is average, 15 to 20 is above average and above 20 is
exceptional. Asian VCs IRR between 1990 and 2000 is - 4% (negative), but Taiwan would be
positive. Personally also he needs a track record of success.
2) Success/Failure Factors
Malaysia has certain strengths.
□ It is very competitive
□ Less bureaucratic
But there isn't sufficient expertise in theJjyfC industry. The government can support the industry by
providing money for foreign VCs to invest here, on a Dollar for Dollar basis either Government to





MSCVC investment strategy depends on a few factors:
□ Good dealflow
□ Good networks
□ And a good sense on how to see the bigger picture. Entrepreneurs don't let go of their
controlling stake and don't want to be diluted. This is the mindset of Entrepreneurs.
The following strategy is used:
□ Invest in things that they understand
□ In companies that they can value-add
□ They must have a network in that field
□ Must be comfortable with the industry
They must be able to pilot the boat when necessary. In Malaysia Entrepreneurs are young first-
best is what we know best". When Entrepreneurs have problems they only want more money but
it is not always about money. They also need a good "fit" with the Entrepreneur.
Entrepreneurs are also not sure about the exit points. They always try and raise their salary upon
VC investments, hoping to cash out at every fund raising point. CEOs view the IPO as an exit
point not as the continuation of the story into a new phase. Entrepreneurs should let professionals
run their company after it matures but this can be costly.
3.2) Change of strategy
The strategy changed 2 times. The strategy at the beginning was to fulfil the role as a catalyst for
the MSC because the missing link for spawning innovative companies was finance. In the US big
corporations and multinational corporations are open to spin-offs. Corporate venturing is however
alien to Malaysia. So there is no corporate venturing, the VC industry is conservative and angel
funding is missing. The original objective was to kick-start the MSC, spawn off companies and
create VCs with expertise in the ICT space. The original strategy was very developmental. But a
developmental VC record does not enable them to raise funds from the private sector. So they
shifted from developmental to profit oriented VC. Developmental role is secondary.
However when Esmond was appointed CEO, the strategy became more capitalist where the
developmental objective is more a by-product of the VC success. Esmond's philosophy is
capitalist but he does have experience working for a Singapore fund. The new strategy is called
"Action Map". Since Esmond's entry it's not just about what they do but how they do it. It's the
depth of experience that Esmond brings.
3.3) Strategy and the Ecosystem
They are trying to portray Malaysia as a Silicon Valley type of ecosystem. Silicon Valley is
successful because of the lifestyle. Entrepreneurs have a happy time living in Silicon Valley as
they make money. Malaysia also has natural beauty and a similar lifestyle. But Malaysia needs to
provide the seed funding for the ecosystem to work. The strategy that they push is a "Malaysian
based ecosystem" not a "Malaysian ecosystem".
Malaysia is also in the right region, Asean and Asia Pacific. Silicon Valley was a hub; people
came from the East Coast and the rest of the world. Similarly Malaysia must be a hub for the
region, it can attract talent and money from the West and Asia Pacific. Malaysia can pool the
talent from anywhere. The strategy is a common sense strategy, not an American strategy or
whatever. The strategy is based on Malaysia's strengths for example its natural beauty.
Malaysians also make good project managers, so we need to use our strengths.
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4) Investment Model
They don't actually have such a thing as a 'model' because the business world is fluid and if they
had a model they will need to be constantly adjusting their model. A myriad number of factors are
contributing to or taking away from a formula for success and changing all the time. A contributing
factor one day may be a detracting factor another day. It may be different in Private Equity or in
regular public listed companies or in mature industries where the changes are not as fast as in
the VC industry.
5) Regional Strategy
Some principles may be a good guide but there are cultural barriers. Successful entrepreneurship
is the ability to build a successful team. Teams need a balance of followers and leaders,
complementing strengths and weaknesses. For MSCVC outside investments must have a tie or a
link to Malaysia, it must benefit Malaysia. For example they funded a US marketing company to
help market one of their Malaysian investee companies Nexus Edge (Nexus Edge owns the Co
and MSCVC funded it via Nexus Edge). So there must be a Malaysian angle.
6) Global Strategy/Models
They don't look at geographic location alone, they also look at legal issues, licensing, taxation,
etc. There are many differences but this does not stop them. There are everyday restrictions but
they deal with them like a global or international VC firm would. The people they deal with also
makes a difference, for example they have a Singapore company but the management is by
French nationals and one of their local companies is run by Chinese & US nationals. Cultural
issues play a big role too, so they are aware of cultural differences including from a corporate
angle.
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW NO. 2
DATE OF INTERVIEW: 17-11-2004 START TIME: 3.30 am END TIME: 4.30 pm
PLACE OF INTERVIEW: Burger King, Sri Hartamas, Kuala Lumpur
1) Early Failures of MSCVC
MSCVC was not actually successful in the early days because of some poor investments. There
were some investments that they didn't want to do but had to do so because of "National
Service". Some examples are:
a) Worldstocks
They didn't trust the CEO and had problems with the Angel investors. The CEO was a "lifestyle
CEO" who liked the title, money and respect but could not deliver. Their networks warned them to
be careful but as Investment Manager his objections were overruled without consultation.
Sometimes it is put to a vote for example another company, eSmartGolf but not in this case.
b) Iris
This was "National Service" and a pre-lPO investment. (It was a national project heavily promoted
by the Government). They rejected it 3 times because the gearing was too high and there was
insufficient cash flow. They only made a small sum on listing about 3% p.a. The CEO was again a
lifestyle CEO and a wheeler-dealer.
c) MLabs
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The valuation in this company was too high but the CEO was very charismatic. However there
was fallout between the CEO and the American CEO (they had an office in America). There were
also Corporate Governance issues. The company actually had a lot of potential especially after 9-
11 because it was in the video conferencing industry. It was a very people oriented business but
problems with the CEO were bad.
d) Smarttransact
Here also there was a problem with the CEO and Corporate Governance issues.
e) Go2020
This company died an honourable death. The business model was a first mover; it was providing
enterprise software via the Internet also known as the Applications Service Provider (ASP) model.
It failed because of greed. There were 3 VCs who were interested in investing further in the
business but there were valuation problems because the Founders wanted more.
2) Wrong Focus
too much focus on
There was
arly days there was a lot of indecision. But Esmond is very decisive and has goc
As the current CEO, Esmond brings a lot of experience from America. fN>
"Knowledge Sharing" *
3) What should be done to be more successful
a) Put their foot down, there should be no interference from their parent company (in the
case of MSCVC it's the Government).
b) They should bring more foreign companies over instead of looking for good local
companies to appear. This will fast track the growth of companies.
c) Their industry focus is ok.
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REF NO: E1 RECORDING - YES
GLOBAL VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTING IN THE EMERGING MARKETS OF
SOUTH EAST ASIA
PARTICIPANT NAME: Ang Yoke-Kee
DESIGNATION: Senior Manager & Regional Associate
FIRM NAME: Softbank Emerging Markets - Malaysia
DATE OF INTERVIEW: 29-9-2004 START TIME: 9.20 pm END TIME: 10.30 pm
PLACE OF INTERVIEW: Megamall, Kuala Lumpur
TRANSCRIPT OF THE INTERVIEW
1) Some Background on Softbank & its potential investments
1.1) About SBEM
Softbank Emerging Markets (SBEM) started in 1999 and is a joint venture between Softbank
Corporation and the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank. The idea was to import
technology into Asia with investments in the emerging markets of South and South East Asia
(SEA), Turkey, Chile and South Africa. It was started with 5 persons in the US and 7 to 8 persons
in SEA. In Malaysia there were 3 main staff, Yoke-Kee as the Senior Manager/Regional
Associate, David Low as the Managing Director and Karan Ponnudurai as Vice President/
Investment Manager.
1.2) Investment Philosophy
The objective was to invest in ICT investments. Softbank did well in developed countries but had
not explored emerging markets.
1.3) Closure of SBEM
& Nasdaq crash in April 2000 also contributed to the decision to close the firm. SBHEe of
closure they were ready to offer terms,to 8 cojrppanief and all the approvals had been secured.
[Note: Also relevant to the "Dealflow" category].
2) Success
2.0 Firm Success
Success is to maximise returns, as this is the overriding yardstick. They would look at 10 times
multiples for their successes so they are prepared to make a few bad investments. So they would
expect high multiple returns from 1 or 2 out of 10 investments to provide the major returns. This is
also dependent on geographic locations as it may be different in different locations but generally
this is the multiple that they expect.
The second measure of success was the ability to import technology from America to emerging
markets, as that was one of their main objectives. This strategy enabled them to attract a lot of
smart people to SBEM because they believed in this concept.
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3) Success/Failure Factors
One of the most important factors is the availability of adequate dealflow, which is driven by the
intensity of technology activities in the markets that they invest in. Government support in making
this happen is very important for e.g. MSC in Malaysia and similar support in Singapore & Hong
Kong. The availability of an exit is also important although because SBEM is global, they
can list their investments elsewhere (other than in Malaysia) so they were not as
concerned. But if an exit was available in each market it would be better.
So there must be good demand and supply in the economy as this ensures that there
will be a lot of deaiflow.
Dealflow at that time (1999 to 2001) was good with many younger companies. But now dealflow
is less and very often they are the same deals that keep being recycled, they are the same
companies still looking for funding.
4) Investment Strategy
Softbank has a huge portfolio of investments so it can benchmark and learn from pre
successes and failures of their portfolio in other markets for example in the US or Korea."
They also look for synergy with their existing investments. They can match their emerging market
investees with others that they have in say US or Korea and can create greater synergies and
grow the businesses.
helps them to benchmark the deals that they have with their existing database of deals as well as
their existing portfolio of investments.
5) Investment Models
There is no particular "model" but they have a methodology. It's a process with a checklist. Its not
a hardcore formula but more a suggested framework or guideline. This includes guidelines for
valuation as well Also important is the role that Softbank plays in the management of the
company. They will influence the company and they believe the path to success will be shortened
for e.g. for Viztel they could have used their contacts to grow the business and achieve greater
success. Viztel is doing well but with their networks and contacts they could have shortened the
time frame for Viztel and done more business as well. SBEM also has networks, expertise and
seasoned professionals who work globally and can advise their companies. [Note: Also relevant
for the "Expertise & Knowledge Base" category],
6) Cultural Issues
Cultural issues are not a problem because he is a local. He lived and studied in Malaysia and
Singapore. But even their foreign partners have worked globally and are seasoned professionals
so they will be able to adjust. Also because they are VCs they can virtually do what they want. If
companies need the money they will take it. Unless if Softbank is looking for government
business then it may be an issue but it is a VC firm so this is not a problem.
7) Main cause of failure
So the ultimate cause of the failure or rather closure of SBEM were the external shocks of great
magnitude within a short span of time - the dotcom bubble and 9-11. This is what caused the
closure and not other issues as they had adequate dealflow and had many potential investments.
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REF NO: E2 RECORDING-YES
GLOBAL VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTING IN THE EMERGING MARKETS OF
SOUTH EAST ASIA
PARTICIPANT NAME: Karan Henrik Ponnudurai
DESIGNATION: Investment Manager
FIRM NAME: Softbank Emerging Markets - Malaysia
DATE OF INTERVIEW: 19-11-2004 START TIME: 10.00 am END TIME: 12.30 pm
PLACE OF INTERVIEW: Celcom Towers - Jalan Gurney, Kuala Lumpur
******************************************************************************************* ******
TRANSCRIPT OF THE INTERVIEW
1) Some Background on Softbank & its potential investments
1.1) About SBEM
Softbank Emerging Markets (SBEM) is a joint venture between Softbank and the World Bank.
The concept was to invest in the emerging markets of Asia and this included India, Thailand,
Singapore and Malaysia. Softbank is an active participant in the Board of their investees. fiSf§
are industry experts. For example VCs in the US were operational people - engineers, people
who developed technology. The difference between Softbank and the competition was the
industry expertise and domain knowledge within Softbank.
1.2) Investment Philosophy
SBEM had an active investment philosophy. They also cannot invest in too many companies.
There were only 5 investment professionals and each would do 4, leading to a total of 20 possible
deals for the firm. Most VC firms were staffed or dominated by finance people, not industry
people, unlike Softbank. In SBEM Malaysia, both Karan and the CEO, David Low had industry
expertise. They had the experience of building ecosystems and networks and were able to
connect with key people. [Note: Also relevant
"Networks" categories]. For example one potential investment was Viztel Telecommunications a
deal that was almost done (except that SBEM closed before it was completed). They could have
grown it to a much bigger company.
1.3) Closure of SBEM
In Malaysia they were
close to completing 5 investments before SBEM was closed. So the main reason for the closure
was to focus on Broadband in Korea and Japan.
1.4) Companies in Malaysia & their Mindset
The philosophy behind the founding of companies has changed. For example when HP was
founded, its philosophy was to build the company and contribute to the community, not to cash
out. They didn't look at the short term opportunity to wealth. Today there is very little intent and
passion for the industry. This is bad for the economy in general. It is different from the old
Chinese mindset of building companies as a legacy not as a "build and flip" concern. For example
ISC Limited makes software for insurance companies. It had a legacy philosophy and did not start
the business just to flip it.
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The CEO of Viztel, Lau Kin Wai, however, did not understand how to grow the company
significantly. VCs in the USA in the early 1970s and 1980s were historically also long term
investors for example HP and Cisco also had long-term view and were not just to flip.
In the National context, Mesdaq has about 50 companies but we do not have a sustainable
ICT industry in Malaysia. More like Entrepreneurs who only create wealth for themselves. The
exuberance of the 1990s has changed the mindset of people, the motivation has changed, its
seen as an easy path to money. Its like "myth creation", understand the psychological aspect of
the company and build a myth of the "rock star" CEO.
2) Success
2.11 Firm Success
The measure of success is:
□ Return on invested capital,
□ The number of deals done (although VCs may invest in stupid deals to reach such target)
For Softbank this target was 10 deals in 2 years per investment manager.
2.2) Personal Success as a Venture Capitalist
The growth in profitability of the firm and the investments.
3) Success/Failure Factors
The ability to scale their investments is a necessity for success. The educational capability of the
nation, which allows the investee to hire enough engineers and to accommodate the organic
growth of the company. The US is successful because they can hire many smart people.
4) Investment Strategy
The strategy is an "industry strategy". SBEM identified 3 areas within ICT for investments:
□ Middleware technology where the focus is in medical and manufacturing i.e. the core
competences in Asia
□ Mobile device technology
□ Speech technology - there is potential in Asia because of the range of languages
Softbank in general didn't have one, but feasedjts strateMMi^siions with individuals in each
Softbank office There is no structured formulation of strategy. This is also the case even in other
VCs e.g. Steve Jurvetson. Vinod Khosla even patents trends that he sees. Karan also speaks
Hebrew thus he understands Israeli technology trends. Israeli companies are mature and
qualitatively well run.
5) Regional Strategy
it is possible to use the same strategy in regions, for example Amoeba in India and dotcom ERP
in Singapore were SBEM investees.
6) Investment Models
There were no investment models used other than standard term sheets. A lot depends on
personal chemistry.
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REF NO: F1 RECORDING - NO
EXPLORING THE FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE SUCCESS OF GLOBAL VENTURE
CAPITAL INVESTING IN THE EMERGING MARKETS OF ASIA USING A GROUNDED
THEORYAPPROACH
PARTICIPANT NAME: Jason Ng
DESIGNATION: Former VP & Country Manager
FIRM NAME: Transpac Capital (Malaysia)
DATE OF INTERVIEW: 17-11-2004 START TIME: 12.30 pm END TIME: 2.15 pm
PLACE OF INTERVIEW: Petaling Jaya
**************************************************************************************************
TRANSCRIPT OF THE INTERVIEW
1) Background
Pre 1997 (i.e. before the Asian Crisis) Transpac was investing in traditional industries. It was
seriously affected by the crisis and had to make a lot of investment write-downs. Post 1997 it was
not really investing. The investments were in matured industries - resource based, technology
and marketing or consumer products industries.
In 1997 shifted focus & decided to build 'platform companies', i.e. making major acquisitions with
majority stakes (like Private equity investments). But VCs have no expertise in this type of
investments. They don't have the experience and the knowledge for such investments. [Note:
This last point is also relevant for "Expertise & Knowledge Base" category]. To make such
acquisitions they must have industry knowledge and domain expertise. [Note: This
Strategy
The firm has in-house experts and worked with multinational corporations or have industry
contacts to source deals. They had to identify key industries and then do research on these
industries including looking at trends, SWOT and identify companies to acquire. It was VCs trying
to do private equity, acquiring controlling blocks but having no expertise. VCs were running the
companies, recruiting people, etc. In China the mentality is quite different. Transpac did badly in
China because of poor management culture and legally the system was not good. The key is the
people [i.e. the managers in their investee companies]. In China the investee company managers
were not loyal to the investors they were more interested in making money on their own.
Transpac was a regional fund. The headquarters would compare the returns, in Taiwan the IRR
was 70% based on projections but in Malaysia the IRR was only 30%, so on that basis Malaysia
looks less attractive. Better to have country specific funds instead of regional funds so that such
comparisons don't have to be made. For example Walden has a country specific fund - Bl
Walden Malaysia.
2) Success
Generally to be successful VCs need to have good industry contacts, sc
duding problems in the industry.' [Note: This point also relevant
for the "Dealflow" and "Networks" category], Walden for example worked with industry people and
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obtained information from these industry people. In investing the people behind the company are
the most important, especially the Founders and the CEO. Transpac didn't have enough domain
expertise as most of the team were electronics based and the new intakes were telecoms based.
During the dotcom days the President didn't understand it so they stayed out of the dotcoms.
They were very brick and mortar based.
2.1) Firm Success
Measure success by the ability to identify investments and then manage to exit profitably.
2.2) Personal Success for the VC
This is measured on how much returns can be generated for investors. To raise further funds,
you need to show profits. In the case of his new fund (Expedient Equity), it is also developmental
so there is a conflict with a pure profit driven, but still the key is to be financially profitable
because to raise future funds you need to show good returns. In future raising funds is going to
be very difficult. Expedient's current investments will be more local with a local exit unlike
Transpac, which had to look at a regional basis.
2.3) Flow deals are done at Transpac
There is a fortnightly deal meeting in Singapore where the investment man;
deals that they bring to the meeting. In Transpac much depends on the Pr<
agers must defend the
esident liking the deal.
waTofdecidingonde SUSS1all! There is pride that in Transpac due diliqence is very thorough, but it is
too tough. There are too many questions and it is too difficult.
3) Success/Failure Factors
3.1) Key Factors
Doing deals in Malaysia is not difficult, but the Entrepreneurs perception of the VC's role is that
the VC wants to interfere. There are also different accounting books and tax avoidance and
evasion issues. The NEP (the Government's New Economic Policy that provides special benefits
to Bumiputras) makes it very difficult for foreign investors. This is especially the case for pre-lPO
or mezzanine funding because on listing 30% of the IPO must be reserved for Bumiputras. This
makes it difficult for foreign VCs except for a Mesdaq listing which does not have such
requirement. But NEP still affects Main and Second Board listings. However, the people behind
the company are still the most important.
4) Investment Strategy
The strategy is a platform investment strategy - take majority stakes and build regional
companies or also known as the 'buy & build' strategy (akin to Private Equity).
4.1) Regional Strategy / Regional Model
Transpac used to have a US outfit but when everyone was investing in the US they pulled out of
the US because they didn't see the growth and thought that Asia was the region to look at. The
President believed that Asia is the place to be, India, China and Malaysia. Transpac had one
straiegy for the Asian region and it works ok as a regional strategy. Buy and build can work on a
regional basis. However Entrepreneurs are different especially management culture but they
must have domain expertise. So a Global Model is more difficult.
5) Investment Model
There is no such model
6) Transferability of Models
This can be done on a regional basis. The buy & build strategy must have internal expertise, if not
chances of failure are high. Transpac people have MNC experience but in small firms it is not the
same.
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Strongsupport. Investment spacefitsteam's experience
Strongsupport- Mgtteamh s wideexperiencein countrieswithin geographicfocus
Strongsupport- multipleofficescover regionb oadlyw th experiencedmgt
Strongsupport. Investmentscov r theregion&fits investmentspace
Strongsupport.Teami veryexperiencedspin theirinvestmentspace.
b)Expertise& KnowledgeBase
Importancefteam's expertise&knowl dg baserelat dtoheir industryfocus emphasised.
Strongsupport.Wide expertiseinfocu industries&strong knowledgebaseith team.
Strongsupport-team workedinmanydiffer t firmsregionally-shows multipleexpertise&w d knowledgebase
Nosupport
Strongsupport- investmentsmatch expertise& knowledgebase
Strongsupport- multiplelistings withindomaf expertise
Strongsupport. Investment spacefitsteam's expertise& knowledgebase
Strongsupport- Mgtteam expertise& knowledgefits geographicfocus
Strongsupport- multipleofficeswith manyexperts
Strongsupport-Mgt teamexpertise& knowledgefits regionalinvestme ts
Strongsupportthat expertise&knowledg basefitinvestm nt portfolio&space
c)Knowledge Sharing
Extensiveknowledg sharingbetwee partners-sharingide , thoughts&pinions investments.







Strongsupport-with widespreadofoff ces propensityt cooperateisstrong
Strongsupport- wideinvolvem ntn regionalinvestme ts showspropensityfor knowledgesharing
Strongsupport. Knowledgesharingi indicatednallrelevant areas
d)Market Knowledge& Continuous Learning
In-depthk owledge, sharpeningofskills& continuouslearningd adaptingtohemarketis reinforcedbythe Partners.
Strongsupport.Teami diversified,wid experience, multilingual.Mult ple qualificationsindic te propensitytcontinue learning.
Strongsupport-team workedinvarietyffirms showingwidemark t knowledgeespimultiple industries.M l iple qualifications&larguages ofteamshowscortinuous learning
Nosupport
Strongsupport- widerportfoliof investments involvedmeans moreark t knowledge
Strongsupportof market knowledgeith severalIPOsin multiple countries
Strongsupport. Investment spacefitsmarket knowledge
Strongsupport- experiencein widergeographic focusincreases marketknowledge
Strongsupport- greaternumberof officesinmany countriesincrease marketknowledge
Strongsupport- greaterexperience
inregional investmentsshow goodmarket knowledge
Strongsupport.Market knowledge&continuous learningisndicatedll thediffer ntcategories
e)Independence ofthe Management Team
Firmisndependentn decisionmak ng.







Moderatesupport. Regionalt amisfairly senior&officesw dely spreadoutbu independencedifficult tovalidate.
NR
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Partnersindicateth importancefdentifying andsecuringde lflow.
Strongsupporthown
byteam'sworkin multiplesuccessful firms&having successfulinvestments atpriorfirms
Strongsupport.Experie ce
indifferentsucc ssfulf rm withsuccessful investments&xitsalso industry
Nosupportf membershipsin different organisations
Strongsupport- largeportfoliof investmentsshow greaterp opensity toidentify&secure deals
Strongsupport- Several successfulIPO &M&As
Strongsupport- largenumberof dealswithintheir investment space
Strongsupport- largenumberof dealswithintheir geographicfocus
Strongsupport-wide networkoffficesw th successful investments
Strongsupport- largenumberof regionalinvestme ts
Strongsupport.Team hasshownabilityt identifya dsecureals regionallyw thsuccessful exits
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b)Availabilityof dealsinthe market




Strongsupport. Largenumb rof portfolio investmentsshow availability
Strongsupport. ManyIPOsand M&Asprovide strongsupportof dealavailability
Strongsupport. Largenumb rof dealswithintheir investment space
Strongsupport. Largenumberof dealswithinthe r geographicfocus
Strongsupport.Wide networkofofficeswith successful investments
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Strongsupport. Largenumb rof IPOsandM&A- showstrong supportofexit viability
Strongsupport.Ma yoftheir investmentmark tshaveviable stockmarketsincluding technologyexchange.
Strongsupport. Successfulexitsby theirregionaloffices.
Strongsupport. Largenumb rof IPOs&M&Ain regionalinv stments
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(Iv)Networks
Valueof Networks
Networksareinvaluable forsuccess- emphasisedbythe phrasetheir"rootsa e deep".
Strongsupport.Team hasworkedinmultiple successfulfirm&ha hadsuccessful investments&xits
Strongsupport.Teamh s experienceindiffe nt successfulfirm
Nosupport.o informationf memberships.
Strongsupport. Investediawide portfoliof investments showinggood networks
NR
NR
Strongsupport.The widenetworkofffic s &multipleinvestments
bytheseoffic s
Strongsupport.The abilitytoinves wideportfoliof regionalinvestments showsg od networks
Strongsupport.There arelotfinvestments withsuccessfulexits& wideorkexperience indicatinggoodnetworks
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Strongsupport. Regional investmentsmatch experienceof managers. Successfulregiona IPOsboostvalidity ofexperience
Yes, especiallyth Founder.
Strongsupport.There
isoverallvalidation. Mgtteamisvery experiencedinVC investing,successful exitsandglobal investments.
b]Expertise& Knowledge Base
Industryk owledge andexpertiseof partnersim ortantf r success&in formulatingstrategy.
Strongsupportof expertiseinfocu industries&strong knowledgebaseith team




Strongsupport. ManyIPOs& M&Aswithintheir expertise- greaterthe supportof expertise& knowledge
Strongsupport. Investmentspace fitsteam's expertise
Strongsupport. Geographicfocus matchesexpertise &knowledge
Strongsupport. Multipleoffices withdiverseteam showsgreater expertise& knowledgebase.
Strongsupport. Regional investmentsmatch expertiseof managers. Successfulregiona IPOsboostvalidity ofexpertise& knowledgebase
Yes especiallyth USoffice
Strongsupport.There soverallvalidationf expertise& knowledge.Multipl exitsglobally& expertiseinfocu industriesvery clear.
c)Knowledge Sharing
Sharingofinf rmation &knowledgeamong thepartnersandei variousofficeis important&donevi regularmeetings.
Strongsupport. Managementtea spreadarounthregion havewidexperience. Unabletoc nfirmregular meetingsbasedod a available.
NR
NR




Strongsupport. Widespreadof officesincreas propensitytshare knowledge
Strongsupport. Wideinvolvem nt regionalinvestme ts showspropensityfor knowledgesharing
No comments
Strongsupport. Diversityoffficesled
byanexperienced Founder.Regula meetingsofgtteam showknowledge sharingintheqroup
d)Market Knowledge& Continuous Learning
Useofexternal opinions&expert showsrelevanceof marketknowledge& expertise&ispartof processofcontinuous learning.
Strongsupport.Teami diversifiedw thid expertise&knowl dge. Multiplelistings multipleco ntries. Multiplequalif cations alsoindicatepropensity forcontinuouslear ing.
Strongsupport. Wideexperience& scopeoffirms workedin.Wid industry experience.
Strongsupport. Leadershippositions
inVCAssnmea s continuouslear ing &moreark t knowledge
Strongsupport. Wideportfoliof investments increasesand showsgreater marketknowledge
Strongsupport. Wideportfolioo IPOsandM&A equatesmor market knowledge
Strongsupport. Wideexperience
intheir investmentspace showsm re market knowledge
Strongsupport. Experiencein widergeographic focusincreases marketknowledge
Strongsupport. Greaternumbeof offices&diverse teamincreases marketknowledge
Strongsupport. Greaterexperience
inregional investmentsshows increasedm rket knowledge
No comments
Strongsupportof marketknowledge andcontinuous learningshown amongmanagement
e) Independence ofthe Management Team
Rolefeachc untry manager&loc l knowledgei formulatingstrategyi important







Strongsupport. Managementh v highranking positions&office widelyspreadout
Nosupport.Unable
toshowifeamh s abilitytomake decisionsforw regionalinvestme ts
No comments




Abilityofpartners& managerside tifying dealflow&expertisein dealmakingimport nt forfirm'ssuccess.
Strongsupport.Ma y yearsofVCexperience& successfulexitsfor seniormgt&Founde . Teamalsoworkedin seniorpositionsin industry.
Strongsupport. Teambothworked
at&reonth boardfmany cos.
Strongsupport. Leadershipofk y associations orovidesextra evenuetoide tify deals.
Strongsupport. Verylarge portfoliof investments showsgreater abilitytoidentif& securedeals
Strongsupport. ManyIPOsand M&Asprovides strongupportin identifying& securingdeals
Strongsupport. Largenumb rof dealswithinthe r investmentspace showsabilityt identify&secure deals
Strongsupport. Largenumberof dealswithintheir geographicfocus showsabilityt identify&secure deals
Strongsupport. Widenetworkof officeswith successful investments indicatesabilityto identify&secure deals
Strongsupport. Largenumberof regionalinvestments showsgreater propensitytidentify&securedeals
No comments
Strongsupport.Firm hasshowngreat propensitytidentif &securedeals.
b)Availability ofdealsinthe market





Strongsupport. Largenumberof portfolio investments showsupportof dealavailability
Strongsupport. ManyIPOs& M&Asindicate strongsupportof dealavailability
intheirmarkets
Strongsupport. Largenumberof dealswithintheir investmentspace issupportofdeal availability
Strongsupport. Largenumberof dealswithintheir geographicfocus
issupportofdeal availability
Strongsupport. Widenetworkof officeswith successful investments indicatesgreater dealavailability
Strongsupport. Largenumberof regionalinvestments showsavailabilityof deals
No comments
Strongsupport.Fi m haslotfdealsin theirspace& geographicfocus
(Ill)Exits
Viabilityof Exitsinthe Market
Theavailabilityofexit mechanism-IPOand tradesal s-i n important consideration.
Strongsupport.Team managedny successfulexitsincluding somefthelargestin HongKong,Malaysia& USA
Strongsupport. Managedtoexit investmentswhile workinginother firms
NR
NR
Strongsupport. Largenumb rof IPOsandM&A isstrongupport ofexitviab lity
Strongsupport.Ma yinvestment marketshavvi blestockts includingate hnolo yexchange.
Strongsupport. Successoftheir officesinIPOs& M&Asshowexit viability
Strongsupport. Largenumberof IPOs&M&Asin regionalinv stments
Firmhas beenlist d onMesdaq. Shows supportof exits





Strength&valueof networkisk yto success.Helped ensuresuccessoftheir Asiancompa iesin USA.Valueofnetwork alsomeasureof personalsuccessfor theVC.
Strongsupport.Country managerisnvestment bankerinvolv d100 IPOs.Partnersh v strongindustrynetw rks &workedinseveral differentfirms.Technical AdvisoryBoardh excellentxperience& networks.
Strongsupport. Experiencein different successfulfirmin VC,finance& industry.
Strongsupport. Leadershippositions
inVCassociations& Founderisevena UniversityTrustee.
Strongsupport. Wideportfoliof investments showsgood networks
NR
NR
Strongsupport. Widenetworkof offices&multiple investmentsby theseoffices showsgreater propensityt network
Strongsupport. Wideportfoliof regionalinv stments showsgood networks
Yesglobally good networks.
Strongsupport.Ma y investmentswith successfulexitand wideorkexperience showinggood networks
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Notmentionedi interviewbut confirmediwr tt n commentstha experienceiscrucial forsuccess
Moderatesupport. Countryteamh snother VCexperience&onlyMD hasseniorindu try experience.Oth r partnershavvast experience.
Somesupport. Teamdidnotw rk
intoomanyfirms buthasindu try experience
Strongsupport.MD
isPastresidentof ThaiVCA.
Moderatesupport. Portfoliof investmentsnThai notwideen ught indicategre ter experience
Strongsupport. Grouphasmany IPOs&M&As showinggreater experience.
Strongsupport. Investmentspacefits team'sexperience
Strongsupport. Geographicfocus matches experience
Strongsupport. Regional managersh v wideexperience.
Strongsupport. Investmentsmatch experienceof regionalmanagers. Manysuccessful regionalIPOs
Strongsupport.Overall thereisvalidationth t experienceisnec ssary forirmsuccess.Thfir overallhasvast experiencethough countryteamexperience
isalittleimited
b)Expertise& Knowledge Base
Notmentionedi interviewbut confirmediwr tt n commentstha expertise& knowledgebaseis crucialforsuc ess
Moderatesupport. Countryteamh sgood engineeringxpertisebut doesnotfullymatchocu industriesb toth r partnershavvast expertise.Advisory committeeprov dextra expertise.
Somesupport.N experienceinother VCfundsbutMD hadighlevel management positioninndustry
Strongsupport.MD
isPastresidentof ThaiVCA.
Strongsupport. Portfoliomatches expertisein engineering
Strongsupport. Griuphasmany IPOs&M&As withintheir expertise.Twoin Thai.
Strong support.lnvestment spacefitsteam's expertise
Strongsupport. Geographicfocus matchesexpertise &knowledge
NR
Strongsupport. Regional investmentsmatch expertiseof managers.M ny regionalIPOs
Strongsupport.Overall validationthatexper ise &knowledgenecessary forsuccess.Thfirmha alotfexper ise& knowledgethou he countryteamexpertiseis somewhatlimited
c)Knowledge Sharing
Knowledgesharingi importanttheir strategyformul ion.
Strongsupport. Managementteaspread aroundtheregion,wide experience&regular meetingsindicate propensitytshare
NR
NR




Strongsupport. Widespreadof officesincrease propensityt shareknowledge
Strongsupport. Wideinvolvem ntn regional investmentsshow propensityfor knowledgesharing
Strongsupport.Therei adequatesupporttha thereisknowledge sharinginthegroup
d)Market Knowledge& Continuous Learning
Thereissom indicationofm rket knowledge&thereis activele rning
Moderatesupport. Countryteamd esno havewidexpertise& knowledgebuthave multiplequalifications.B t otherpartn rshavwid expertise&knowledge.
Somesupport. Scopeofwork experiencenot wide.Mark t knowledgewould belimited
Strongsupport. MembershipofThai VCAcanmean continuouslearning&moreark t knowledge
Moderatesupport. Portfoliof investments involvednotwide
Strongsupport. Grouphaswide portfoliooIPOs andM&Asbut only2inThai
Moderatesupport. Grouphasexperiencein investmentspacebut Thaiexperienceis limited.
Strongsupport. Experiencein widergeographic focusincreases marketknowledge
Strongsupport. Greaternumberof officesincrease marketknowledge
Strongsupport. Teamh sgreater experiencein regional investmentsshows increasedmarket knowledge
Strongsupport. Regionallythefirmhas widemark tkno le ge andshowscontinuous learningmo management
«) Independence ofthe Management Team
Thereisclear management independenceaslocal managersakeall strategicdecisions.







Strongsupport. Regional managersar MDs-highlevel seniormgt experience. Officeswidely spread






Thereisaconscious strategyofidentifying opportunitiesand dealflow
Moderatesupport.Several successfulinvestments& exitsshowsupportof abilitytoident f&secure deals
Somesupport.No muchexperience
indifferent successfulfirms butseniorposition ini dustry
Strongsupport. LeadershipofThai VCassociation providesextra evenuetoide tify deals.
Strongsupport. Largeportfolio showsitcandentify &securedeals thoughnoti Thailandwhichs only3deals
Strongsupport. Grouphasmany IPOsandM&A providesstrong supportin identifying& securingdeals
Strongsupport.G up hasmanyde lsin investmentspacehows abilitytoident f& securedeals
Strongsupport. Grouphasla ge numberofdeals withingeographic focusshowsability
toidentify&secure deals
Strongsupport. Widenetworkof officeswith successful investments indicatesabilityto identify&secure deals
Strongsupport. Largenumberof regional investmentsshow greaterprop nsity toidentify&secure deals
Strongsupport.Firmhas showngreatprope sity
toidentify&secureals thoughdealsinThailand aremoreli it d
b)Availability ofdealsinthe market




Strongsupport. Grouphasla ge portfolioshows supportofdeal availability,though notiThailand whichhasonly3 deals
Strongsupport. Grouphasmany IPOs&M&A indicatestrong supportofdeal availabilityintheir markets
Strongsupport.G up haslargenumberof dealswithinthe r investmentspace- supportofdeal availability
Strongsupport. Grouphaslarge numberofdeals withingeographic focusissupportof dealavailability
Strongsupport. Widenetworkof officeswith successful investments indicatesgreater dealavailability
Strongsupport. Largenumberof regional investmentshow availabilityofde ls
Strongsupport.Firmhas
alotfdealsintheir space&geographic focusthoughdealin Thailandremoreli it
(iii)Ex ts
Viabilityof Exitsinthe Market
MajorfocusnIPO &acquisitionsesp.on amountofretur sn exits.Exiareclearly important.
Strongsupport.Team managednysuccessful exits.
Nosupport.Did notw rkiVC industrypreviously
NR
NR
Strongsupport. Largenumb rof IPOsandM&A isstrongupport ofexitviab lity
Strongsupport.Ma yoftheirmarketsincl Thailandh vev ablestockm rk t
Strongsupport. Successoftheir officesinIPO& M&Asshowexit viability
Strongsupport. Largenumberof IPOs&M&Asin regional investments





Importance&usef networksfosourcing &growing investmentsar mentioned.
Moderatesupport.Th i MDlittleVCexperi nce butotherpartne sh v vastexperience&st ong industrynetworks,worked indifferentfirms.Advisory Committeehasexcellent experience&networks.
Nosupport.Thai teamh slimited experiencein different companies
Strongsupport. Leadershipposition
inThaiVC association
Strongsupport. Grouphaswide portfoliof investments-shows goodnetw rks
NR
NR
Strongsupport. Widenetworkof offices&multiple investmentsby theseoffic s showsgreater propensityt network
Strongsupport. Wideportfoliof regional investmentsshow goodnetworks
Strongsupport.Ma y investmentswith successfulexitsand grouphaswide experienceshowinggood networks
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Strongsupportof managementexperi ncei VCandindustry.
Strongsupport.Team hasworkedinmultiple VCfunds&ico . relatedtoheirfocus. TheCEOwasalso founderofcos.related
toheirf cus.
Nosupport
Strongsupport. Wideportfoliof investmentsn focusareaindicates greaterexperience
Strongsupport. Manysuccessful IPOsdenote greater experience.CEO hasadditionalIPO experience.
Strongsupport. Investmentspace fitsteam's experience
Strongsupport. Geographicfocus matches experience especiallyCEO.
Nosupport. Single office location.
Moderatesupport. Someregional investmentsmatch theexperienceof managersesp.CEO
Strongsupport.Therei overallvalidationf experience.T am&CEO havevastexperienceinVC& industry
b)Expertise& Knowledge Base
Theexpertise& domainknowledgef theVCisan importantfactorn success.
Strongsupportofexpertisein focusindustries&good knowledgebaseitheam
Strongsupport.Team hasexpertiseinth ir focusareash ving workedinthVC industrygloballandi techindustry.Validhe confirmationfexpertise &knowledge
Nosupport
Strongsupport. Portfoliomatches expertiseofsenior managers especiallythCEO
Strongsupport. ManyIPOswithin theirexpertise- showsgreater supportof expertise& knowledge
Strongsupport. Investmentspace fitsteam's expertise
Strongsupport. Geographicfocus matchesexpertise &knowledge
NR
Moderatesupport. Severalregional investmentsshow relevanceofth ir expertise.
Strongsupport.Therei overallvalidationfexpe ise &knowledge.TeamCEO showtrongupportof expertise&knowl dginVC, industry&even entrepreneurship.
c)Knowledge Sharing
Thefirmengagesi knowldegesharing bet.management& alsowithnetworks& policymakers








Nosupport. Single office location.
Moderatesupport.A
fewregional investmentsshow propensityfor knowledgesharing
Moderatesupport.Th ri somesupportfknowledge sharinginthefirmbutast asinglecountryfu dharing
isnotextensive
d)Market Knowledge& Continuous Learning
VCplaysarolein helpingtheirinvestee Cousingthe rmarket knowledge.Th ris supportofcontinuous learning.
Strongsupportasteami diversifiedw thid expertise&knowl dge. Multiplequalif cationsa s indicatepropensityt continuelearning.
Strongsupport.Wider experience&scopof firmsworkedin indicatingprope sityfor greatermark t knowledgeesp.it ch industry.
Nosupport
Strongsupport. Wideportfoliof investmentsd note moreark t knowledge
Strongsupport. Wideportfoliof IPOsandM&As meansore marketknowledge
Strongsupport. Wideexperience
intheirinvestment spacehowsm r marketknowledge
Strongsupport. Widergeographic focusindicates increasedmarket knowledge
Nosupport. Single office location.
Moderatesupport. Someexperiencein regionalinvestme ts showsmarket knowledge
Strongsupport.Thereigo d supportofmarkekn wledge andcontinuousle r ing amongmanageme t
e)Ind pendence ofthe Management Team
Structureof managementte& theautocraticstyleof formerCEOcreated problems. Decisivenessofn w CEOnoted.







Nosupport. Single office location.
Moderatesupport. Thereis independencebutt isasinglecountry localfirm.




Identifyinggood dealflowbcriticalfor thesuccessof firm.
Strongsupport.Teamhas workedinmultiplesuccessful firms&CEOglobally.A so havesuccessfulinvestments &exitsapriorfirm
Strongsupport. Experienceindiff rent successfulfirmbothVC &industrywith successfulinvestments &exits
NR
Strongsupport. Largerportfoliof investmentsshows greaterp opensity toidentify&secure deals
Strongsupport. ManyIPOs providessupport ofabilitytidentif &securedeals
Strongsupport. Largenumb rof dealsin investmentspace showsabilityt identify&s cure deals
Strongsupport. Largernumberof dealsingeographic focusshowsability
toidentify&secure deals
Nosupport. Single country single country fund.
Strongsupport. Largenumberof regionalinvestme ts showsgreater propensitytidentify &securedeals








Strongsupport. Largernumberof portfolio investmentshow supportofdeal availability
Strongsupport. ManyIPOs providesupportf dealavailabilityin theirmarkets
Strongsupport. Largenumb rof dealsintheir investmentspace issupportofdeal availability
Strongsupport. Largenumberof dealswithin geographicfocusis supportofdeal availability
Nosupport. Single country single country fund.
Strongsupport. Largenumberof regionalinvestments showsgreater availabilityofde ls







Strongsupport. Managedtoexit investmentswhile workinginotherfirms
NR
NR
Strongsupport. Manysuccessful IPOs-strong supportexit viability
Strongsupport.Malaysiahviable stockmarketsincludingtechnolo y exchange.
Nosupport. Single office, single country fund.
Nosupport. regionalIPOs& M&Asasitsingle countryfund.




Valueofpersonal networksisak yto successUs networkstogetd als &forexpertadvise beforeinvesting.
Strongsupport.Team workedinmanysuccessful firms&havesuccessful investments&xitsaprior firms
Strongsupport.Team hasexperiencein differentsucc ssfulfirm withsuccessful investments&exit
Nosupport
Strongsupport. Firminvesteda wideportfoliof investments showinggood networks
NR
NR
Nosupport. Single office, single country fund.
Strongsupport. Investediwide portfoliofregional investments-good regionalnetworks
Strongsupport.Ma y investmentswithsucc ssful exitsandwideork experienceshowinggood networks
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Priorexperienceof thefirm&industry experienceof managementte ismportant
Moderatesupport. Teamisfairly experiencedbutin finance&telconot theirdomainfInternet expertise.
Somesupport.Mg workedinndustry& financialse tor.No VCexperience,in Internetoras entrepreneurs. Limitedworkinother techindustryexcept fortelco.
Nosupport
Nosupportas therewerno investments made
Nosupport. Norelated IPOs&M&As
Somesupport. Investmentspace somewhatfits team's experiencesp. telco&wireless butnotInternetas teamh snosuch experience
Somesupport. Teamh s workedinregion butnoti investmentorVC noritheir industryfocus.
Nosupport.Only otherofficein Polandclose withoutany investmentsorreal activity
Nosupport. investments made.
Donotthinkt emgrs haveexperience. Hadproblemswith indecisionofmgrs
Somesupport.Littl supportofmgt experience. Experienceinadequate &onlyifina ce telco.NVCor investmentxperience &esp.noInternet experience,th irfocus area.
b)Expertise& Knowledge Base
Industryexpertise anddomain knowledgeithin thefirmismportant
Somesupport.Team hasexpertiseinteleco butnotitheirfocus industryofInternet& software.Knowledge baseinotevidentfor theirfocusarea.
Somesupport.No experienceinVC fundsorco .related
totheirf cusexcept fortelcoindustry. Insufficientexpertise orkn wledgebase.
Nosupport
Nosupportas therewerno investments made
Nosupport. NoIPOs& M&Aswithin theirexpert se
Somesupport. Investmentspace somewhatfits team'sexperti e eg.t lco& wirelessbutno Internetasteam hasnosuch expertise
Somesupport. Geographic focussomewhat matches expertise& knowledge becauseof earlierwork background
Nosupport.o otherpartnerwith expertisehasb n knowntbeactive
inthefirm
Nosupport. investments made.
Investees unconvincedby expertiseofcountry managersbut believeintheglobal expertise
Somesupport.Therei insufficientexpertise& knowledgeinVCr Interneti dus rytheir focusarea.Only expertiseisnfinance &telco
c)Knowledge Sharing
Extensivesharingof infobetweenmgt, theirUSHQexperts &otherffic s
Nosupport.Team reportstheirUSoffice buttherearnos nior managersspecifically identifiedtoassisthem. Malaysiaisfirstof5 regionalgroupsbutfi m failedbeforeother officeswereprop rlys t up.
NR
NR




Nosupport.Only otherfficeclos d withinmonthsof launching.
Nosupport. investments made.
Nocomments
Nosupportf knowledgesharing. Onlyotherfficei Polandclosewithin months.Noindica ion of therS bank partnersbeingactivein SBEM
d)Market Knowledge& Continuous Learning
Benchmarking& learningfromp ior investments, buildingecosystems &networksconfirm marketknowledge &continuous learning
Somesupport.Teami notadequately diversifiedmostlyonly financial&tel o knowledge. Qualificationsrel tedto finance&telco.N indicationofpropensity tocontinuelearn g.
Somesupport.Ang hasexperiencein investmentbanking, othersintelco,buto VC,entrepreneurialor Interneti dus ry knowledge.
Nosupport
Nosupportas therewerno investments made
Nosupport. Nop rtfoliof IPOsand M&Asson additional market knowledge
Somesupport. Teamh s minimal experiencein theirinvestment space
Somesupport. Teamh s workedinAsia butnotiVCor relevantindustry exceptforT l o.
Nosupport. otheractiveff c .
Nosupport. investments made.
Investeeswere interestednth globalknowledgef parent
Somesupport.Only someindustry knowledgeisrel vant. TherewernoIPOso exits&noknowledge oftheirinvestment spaceinthIntern t industry.
®) Independence ofthe Management Team
Therewasno independence-ail decisionsmadeby USHQ.







Nosupport. indicationof independenceas bothofficesclos d byheadoffice. Staffhadnos yi closuredecision.
Nosupport.o indicationeveof abilitytomake decisionsfortheir ownregional investments
Convincedthatmgrs hadno independence. Investmentdecision wasdependenton parentfirm.Slow decisionmaking.Did nottellthemabt






Abilityto>dentify& securedealfiow notedbuto specifcaly mentioned
Nosupport.Worked onlyinndustryoVC experience.Noprior successinnvesting
Nosupport. experienceinVC industryson experiencein investing
Nosupport. known membershipsin -elevant organisations
Somesupport. Noinvestments butsome identifiedpriorto closure.Sh ws abilitytoidentif deals
Nosupport. NoIPOsr M&As
Somesupport. Somedeals withintheir investmentspace wereidentified. Showss me abilitytoidentif deals
Somesupport. Somedeals identified Malaysia&Indi , withintheir geographicfocus
Nosupport.Only oneth rofficei Polandbutit closedinashort time.
Nosupport. otherregional investments
Bothinves eeswere contadedbyth managersdiredly







Somesupport. Noinvestments butsomewer identifiedpriorto closure.Show supportofdeal availability
Nosupport. NoIPOsr M&As
Somesupport. Somedeals withintheir investmentspace wereidentified showsome supportofdeal availability
Somesupport. Somedeals identifiedwithin theirgeographic focusshows someupportf dealavailability
Nosupport.Only otherfficein Polandclosed downinshorttime
Nosupport. otherregional investments
Noc mment
Somesupport.Team hadidentifiedsome dealspriortoosure. Showsavailabilityf dealsintheirmarket
(ill)Exits
Viabilityof Exitsinthe Market
Irrporance& availabilityofnexit identified& recognitionof Mesdeqthe technaio-j/ exchangein Malaysia
Nosupport.Teami new&hasotmanaged anyexitsll.
Nosupport.Teamdid notmanagetexit investmentswhile workinginotherfirms
NR
NR
Nosupport. Firmhadno IPOsor M&As
Strongsupport.Malaysiahviable stockmarketsincluding technologyexchange.
Nosupport.Only otherofficeclosed beforemakingany investments.
Nosupport.Firm hadnoregi nal investmentsas onlyotherffice closedbef re makingany investments.
Bothfirmsnowl sted
onMesdaq




Theirnetworks& abilitytobuild synergiesi importantTheir globalnetworksare specifcally mentioned.
Somesupport.Mgrs workedinfinance& telcobutnoVC experience.Angworked
inUSpriortoMalaysia sonetworksiMalaysia wouldbeminimal.
Somesupport.Team workedindiffe ent firmsbutonlyin finance&telco industry&noVC.
Nosupport,no knownrelevant memberships
Somesupport. Firmhad identifiedaf w investmentsbu closedbef re makingany.
NR
NR
Nosupport.Only oneth roffice whichdosedithin monthsflaunc .
Nosupport.o regional investments.
Investeeswerek n ontheglobal networksand connectionsf parentgroup
Somesupport. Althoughtherewerno successfulinvestments someweridentified priortodosure.Team alsodidworkinrelated telcoindustry& financesowouldh v somenetworks.
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Moderatesupport. Teamisexperienced butnoitheirdomain ofexpertise.
Moderatesupport.
VPhasexperience
inotherVCfunds& industrybother managerh snoVC experience
Nosupport.
Somesupport. Smallportfoliof investmentsn focusarea
Nosupport. IPOsin Malaysiasince 2000&only oneM&Ai 1994
Nosupport. dear investment space
Nosupport. dear geographic focustomatch experience





Moderatesupport.Team hasVCexperience& someindustryexperience butnootherindicationf overallexp riencesp.in theirinvestmentspace
b)Expertise& Knowledge Base
Onecauseoffail r wasexpecting managerswithout expertiseokn wl dge
tomanage&invest differentindustries
Moderatesupport. Teamh ssome expertiseinfocu industries&some industryk owledge baseievident
Moderatesupport. Teamworkedin manydiffere tfirms butonlyloca lnot regionally
Nosupport.
Nosupport- investmentsdon't matchexpertise& knowledgebase
Nosupport.o IPOsin Malaysiasince 2000&only oneM&Ai 1994
Nosupport.o dear investment space
Nosupport. dear geographic focustomatch expertise& knowledge
Moderatesupport. Wider managementi regionaloff ces indicatemor expertise& knowledqebase.
Somesupport.N newinvestments thoughldnes dosomewhat matchexpertiseof managers.
Doesnotthink muchofthe team
Somesupport. Inadequatesupportof expertise&knowl dgi theirinvestmentspace
c)Knowledge Sharing
Adistinctlackof knowledgesharingdue
toanautocraticstyleof management& decisionmaking&gt rivalry
Nosupport.Teami spreadarounth regionbutth reisn infoontheirCVs.
NR
NR




Moderatesupport. Widespreadof officesincreas propensitytshare butinterview indicates otherwise.
Nosupport.Team haveno involvementn regional investments
Noc mments
Nosupport.Therei inadequatesupportof knowledgesharingith group
d)Market Knowledge& Continuous Learning
Aclearlackofmar et knowledgeith ir investmentfi ld&no continuouslear ing.
Somesupport.N Advisorycommittees
toprovideadditional knowledge.Mgthas someexpertise& knowledge.Multipl qualificationsindica e propensitytcontinue learning.
Moderatesupport.
VPhaswide experiencein investmentmarke butnoind stry whileot ermanager hasindu try experiencebutnone innvestment.Lack ofwholistic knowledge.
Nosupport
Nosupport.Very smallportfoliof investmentsshow nopr pensityt addtomarket knowledge
Nosupport.o IPOsin Malaysiasince 2000&only oneM&Ai 1994
Nosupport. dear investment space
Nosupport. dear geographic focus&no experiencein wider geographic focus
Moderatesupport. Greaternumbeof officesshould increasemarket knowledge
Nosupport.Team haveno experiencein regional investments
Noc mments
Somesupport.Theri somemark tknowledge butoverallinadequ te supportofmarke knowledge&continuous learning.Nodvisory committee
e) Independence ofthe Management Team
Noindependencef r Mgtteamdueo autocraticdecision structure.







Nosupport.Only theCEOname comesupinall newsreports& othercountry managerappears. Indicatespossible autocraticsystem.
Nosupport.There
isnondicationof abilitytomake dedsionsfortheir owninvestme ts &noteinterview points.
Investment dependenton Singapore office.Investee couldnot presentto Singaporehad towaitf rKL office




Theabilitytoident f andsecuredealsi measureofsuccessf r VCs.
ModeratesupportVP hasworkedinoth r successfulfirmthat hadsuccessful investments&xits. Othermanagerh sno suchexperience.
Moderatesupport.
VPhasworkedin VC&investment firmsbutno industry.Other managero lyi industry.
Moderatesupport. Hassome membershipsin different organisations
Nosupport. currentpo tfolio
Nosupport. recentIPOs andM&As
Nosupport.o recentdeals withintheir investment space
Nosupport. recentdeals within geographic focus
Somesupport. Manyofficesshut down.
Somesupport. Therearmany regional investmentsbuall priortoyea2000. Norecentdeals.
Noc mments







Nosupport. recentinvestm ts indicatespossible lackofdeal availability
Nosupport. recentIPOs andM&As indicates possiblelack dealavailability intheirmarkets
Nosupport. recentdeals withintheir investment spacehows possiblelackf dealavailability
Nosupport.o recentdeals within geographic focus
Somesupport.Few officeshav successful investments
Some support.Many regional investmentsbuall madepriortoyear 2000.Norecent deals.
Noc mments




byabilitytoexit profitability.Lackf capitalmarketforexi s impactsonsucces .
Moderatesupport. OnlyCountryManager managedsom successfulexit
Moderatesupport. OnlyCountry Managermanaged
toexitinvestmen s whileorkingin otherfirms
NR
NR
Strongsupport. Firmhasmany previousIPOs andM&As- strongupport ofexitviability atleastinprior years
Strongsupport.Ma yinvestment marketshavviablestock marketsincludingte hnology exchange.g.Malaysia& Singapore.Firmh dmanyIPOs inthesemarkets.
Strongsupport. Regionaloffices hadmany successfulIPO& M&Asshowingexit viability
Strongsupport. Largenumb rof IPOs&M&Asin regional investmentsat leastpriortoyea 2000.
Investeei listedon Mesdaq




Themostimportant lessonfororeigVCs inAsiathatnetworks areinv luable.
Strongsupport.Team workedinmultiple successfulfirms&had successful investments&xitsa priorfirms.Shows supportofgo d networks
Strongsupport. Teamh s experiencein differentsuccessful firmswithsucces ful investments&xits. Showspr pensity forbuildinggood networks
Moderatesupport.
Ngismemberof severalassocns indicatesprop nsity tonetwork
Strongsupport.N investmentsin TranspacbutVP hasshownma y investmentsnhis newfirm.This showsVPhas goodnetworks
NR
NR
Strongsupport. Firmhadwide networkofffices &multiple investmentsby theseoffic sat leastpriortoyea 2000.
Strongsupport. Firmhadinvested
inawideportfolio ofregional investmentsat leastpriortoyea 2000
Didnotknow muchabout networks
Strongsupport.There werealotfinvestments withsuccessfulexits& teamhavewideork experienceshowingg od networks
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Strongsupport.Teamivery experiencedspinth ir investmentspace.
Strongsupport.Thereioverall validation.Mgtteamisery experiencedinVCinv sting, successfulexitsandgoba investments.
Strongsupport.Overallth rei validationth texperienceis necessaryforirmsu cess.Th firmoverallhasva texperience thoughcountryeamexperie ce
isalittlel mit d
Strongsupport.Thereiove all validationofexperience.T am &CEOhavevastexperiencein VC&industry
Somesupport.Therwas insufficientsupportof managementexperience. Overallexperiencew s inadequate&onlyfina c telco.NVCorinvestment experience&sp.noInte n t experience,th rfocusarea.
Moderatesupport.Teamh s
VCexperience&somindustry experiencebutnooth r indicationofverallexp r ence esp.intheirnv stmentspace
b)Expertise&Knowledg Base
Strongsupportthatex ertise& knowledgebasefitinvestm nt portfolio&space
Strongsupport.Thereioverall validationofexpertise& knowledge.Multiplexits globally&expertiseinfocu industriesverycl ar.
Strongsupport.Overallth rei validationthatexpertise& knowledgeisnecessaryf rirm success.Thfirmhalotf expertise&knowl dgthough thecountryteamexpertiseis somewhatlimit d
Strongsupport.Thereiove all validationofexper se& knowledge.Team&CEOshow strongupportofexpertise& knowledgeiVC,dustry& evenntrepreneurship.
Somesupport.Theri insufficientexpertise& knowledgeiVCrIntern t industrytheirfocusarea.Onl expertiseisnfinanc&t l o
Somesupport.Inadequate supportofexpertise& knowledgeith irnvestment space
c)KnowledgeSharing
Strongsupport.Knowledge sharingindicatedall relevantar s
Strongsupport.Diversityof officesledbyanexperienced Founder.Regularmeetingsf mgtteamshowknowledge sharinginthegroup
Strongsupport.Therei adequatesupportthatrei knowledgesharingithgroup
Moderatesupport.Th rei someupportfknowledge sharingint efirmbutast singlecountryfu dharingi notextensive
Nosupport.Thereinsu port
ofanykn wledgesharings theonlytherfficeinP land closedwithinm nths.No indicationoftherS f bank partnersbei gactiveinSBEM either.
Somesupport.Theri inadequatesupportof knowledgesharingithgroup
d)MarketKnowledge& ContinuousLearning
Strongsupport.Market knowledge&continuous learningisndicatedllth differentcategories
Strongsupportofmarke knowledgeancontinuous learningshowmo management
Strongsupport.Regi nallythe firmhaswidemark tknowledge andshowscontinuousle r ing amongmanagement
Strongsupport.Thereigood supportofmarkekn wledge andcontinuouslear ingm management
Somesupport.Onlysome industryknowledgesrelevant. TherewernoIPOsoexits& noknowledgefth ir investmentspacenthIntern t industry.
Somesupport.Theri ome marketknowledgebutv rall inadequatesupportofmark t knowledge&continuous learning
e)Ind pendenceof ManagementTea
Moderatesupport.Teami fairlyseniorwithtrong multinationalteamacrosshe region.Unabletoful yv lidate independenceofmanagement.
Moderatesupport.Difficultto proveinde endenceothertha highranksofmanagers. Interviewdataindicat ssupport ofindependence.
Moderatesupport.Th rei adequatesupportof managementindepend nce
Strongsupport.Thisihowever selfevidentbeitaing e countryfund&onlyreportst
itsnve tors,theGov rnment.
Nosupport.Thereid a lyn supportofmanagement independence.Firmsos dby headoffice&t mnos y inthededsion.












Strongsupport.Teamh s shownabilitytident fd securedealsr gionallyw th successfulexits
Strongsupport.Fi mhassh wn greatpropensitytidentif& securedeals.
Strongsupport.Fi mhassh wn greatp opensitytidentify& securedealsthoughlin Thailandremoreli it
Strongsupport.Thefirmhas clearlydemonstrateditabilit
toidentifya dsecureals
Somesupport.Teamhad identifiedsomeealspriort closurebutfirmedefor anyinvestmentsmade. Regionalofficealsocl ed withoutinvestments.Show someabilitytident fals thoughnonesecur dprior closure
Somesupport.Ve yfewrecent deals,lastonewaiyear 2000.Firmclosedmanyoffices
inDec2001.Butfirmhadmany dealsin1990sndicatingth d theabilityoident f&secure deals,buthasitherlosth t abilityorhasl stthepropensity toinvest.
b)Availabilityofdealsinthe market
Strongsupport.Fi mhasdone aletofd alswithintheirspace &geographicfocusaswell regionally.
Strongsupport.Fi mhaslof dealsintheirspace& geographicfocus
Strongsupport.Firmhaslotf dealsintheirspace& geographicfocusth ughd al
inThailandremoreli it
Strongsupport.Thefirmhas manydealsintheirsp ce& geographicfocusshowing availabilityofde sinthe market.
Somesupport.Teamh d identifiedsomealspriort closure.Sh wsavailabilityf dealsintheirm rket
Nosupport.Therearnw dealsinthelast5years.Only Malaysiandealw s10ye rs ago&l stregionald alw sin year2000.Possibleindication oflackfavailabilityde sin marketorfinabilityfirmt invest.
(HOExits
ViabilityofExitsinthe Market
Strongsupport.Fi mhasma y exitsintheirspace,geographic focus&severaldonebyth regonaloffices
Strongsupportofexitviability. Firmhaslotfexi sintheir space&geographicfocus
Strongsupportofexitviability. Firmhaslotfexi sintheir space&geographicfocus
Strongsupport.Fi mhavema y exitsintheirspace& geographicfocus
Nosupport.Firmdidnohave anyinvestmentspriorto closure.Theirofficwaslocated
inamarketwithvi blestock exchange,butfirmdidnohave opportunitytinvest&exi .




ofinvestmentswithsuccessful exits&wideorkexperience indicatinggoodnetw rks
Strongsupport.Ma y investmentswithsuccessful exitsandwideorkxperience showinggoodnetworks
Strongsupport.Ma y investmentswithsuccessful exitsandgrouph swide experienceshowinggood networks
Strongsupport.Ma y investmentswithsuccessful exitsandwideorkexperience showinggo dnetworks
Somesupport.Althoughther werenosuccessfulinvestments someweridentifiedpriort closure.Teamalsodidwo kin relatedte coindustry&finance sowouldhaves menetworks.
Strongsupport.Therewera lotfinvestmentswith successfulexits&t amhave wideorkexperiencesh wing goodnetw rks
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Appendix D - Venture Capital Associations in Malaysia, Singapore & Thailand &
Members List as at 1st May 2005
1) Malaysian Venture Capital Association 2004/2005 - Website: www.mvca.org
1. Amanah Venture Sdn. Bhd
2. Amazon Plus Sdn Bhd (TH Group)
3. Bl Walden Management Sdn. Bhd
4. BPMB-NIF Modal Teroka Sdn. Bhd.
5. CIMB Private Equity Sdn Bhd
6. Commerce Asset Venture Sdn. Bhd.
7. DTA Capital Partners Sdn.Bhd
8. Expedient Equity Sdn Bhd
9. Kumpulan Modal Perdana Sdn Bhd
10. Lembaga Tabung Haji
11. Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Bhd
12. Malaysia Venture Capital Management Berhad (MAVCAP)
13. Malaysian Ventures Management Inc. Sdn. Bhd.
14. Mayban Ventures Sdn Bhd
15. MSC Venture Corporation Sdn. Bhd
16. MTDC Private Equity Management Sdn. Bhd.
17. Opus Capital Sdn. Bhd.
18. OSK Ventures International Bhd
19. Perbadanan Usahawan Nasional Bhd
20. PFM Capital Holding Sdn.Bhd
21. Pica (M) Corporation Bhd
22. SB Venture Capital Corp Sdn Bhd
23. Spring Hill Management Sdn Bhd
24. VF Capital Sdn Bhd
25. Waterfront Incubator Sdn Bhd
26. AmAssurance Berhad
27. Alam Teknokrat Sdn Bhd (SKALI)
28. BTV Management Sdn Bhd
29. iSpring Venture Management Sdn. Bhd
30. K M Chye & Murad
31. KPMG Corporate Services Sdn. Bhd
32. Navis Investment Partners (Asia) Ltd
33. Perkasa Normandy Managers Sdn Bhd
34. PricewaterhouseCoopers
35. Wong and Partners
36. Zaid Ibrahim & Co
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2) Singapore Venture Capital Association
Website: www.svca.org
1. 3i Investments pic
2. 3V Source One Capital
3. Actis Capital Partners




8. Baring Private Equity Asia
9. Bioveda Capital
10. The Carlyle Group
11 .CLSA Merchant Bankers
12. DBS Capital Investments
13. Draper Fisher Jurvetson ePIanet Ventures
14. EDBV Management
15. Fortune Venture Management
16. GIC Special Investments
17. Giza Venture Capital
18. Global Asset Capital
19. Global Catalyst Management
20. Green Dot Capital
21. H&Q Asia Pacific Venture Management
22. Henderson Global Investors
23. iGlobe Partners
24. Infineon Ventures Asia
25. JAFCO Investment
26. JAIC Asia Capital
27. Juniper Capital Ventures
28. McLean Watson Capital
29. Orix Investment & Management
30. PAMA Group Inc
31. Partners Group
32. Prime Partners Asset Management
33. Raintree Ventures
34. Rothschild Ventures
35. Schroder Capital Partners
36.SEAVI Advent Ventures Management
37. Sirius Capital Holdings
38. Springboard-Harper Investment







46. VPSA Private Ltd
47. Walden International Singapore
48. Warburg Pincus
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3) Thai Venture Capital Association
Website www.venturecapital.or.th
1. Asian Direct Capital Management
2. Business Venture Promotion
3. CDC Capital Partners
4. Darby Asia Investors (HK) Ltd
5. Finansa Co., Ltd
6. H & Q (Thailand) Ltd
7. NAVIS Capital (Thailand) Ltd
8. PAMA Group Inc
9. Rasa Holding
10. Thai Strategic Capital Co., Ltd
11. Vnet Capital Co., Ltd
12. JAIC Asia Holdings Pte. Ltd
13. Access Capital (Thailand) Ltd
14. Bank of Ayudhya PCL
15. CSL Thailand
16. Dharmniti and Truth Limited
17. Mullis Capital Corporation (Thailand) Co.,
18. ERM-Siam Co., Ltd
19. TICON Industrial Connection PCL
20. Trinity Securities Co., Ltd























China,Ho gK g Japan,M laysia, Philippines, Singapore,Taiwan
Lip-BuTan
Kwee-BeeChok (Malaysia)
CindyTee&h e- KhenC o q
US$1.5 billion













































Uncertain(Usedtob manufacturing&serviceswith highgrowthpoten ial)
None
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Appendix F - Open Ended Questionnaire Format
REF NO: RECORDING-








a) What was your background before you became a VC?
b) Tell me a about your experience as a VC
c) Flow about your experience working for a foreign (or local as the case may
be) VC firm?
2) Firm Success
a) Would you consider your firm as successful?
b) Flow would you define "success" for a VC firm or your VC firm?
c) Flow do you measure "success"?
3) Success/Failure Factors
a) What factors lead to success (or failure) for a VC firm?
b) What factors led to your firm's success (or failure)?
c) Can you classify these factors as external (i.e. external environmental factors) or
internal (factors within the firm)?
d) Do external factors such as the external environment impact on your firm's
success (positive & negative)?
e) What are the main ones that you consider crucial?
f) Do internal factors within the firm have a significant impact?
g) What are the main internal factors that you consider crucial?
h) Overall which of these factors are more important to ensure firm success
i) Do these factors impact a foreign firm differently from a local firm
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4) Investment Strategy
a) Is there a particular strategy that can ensure successful investing?
b) Do you employ such a strategy?
c) Is this any different between a foreign & local VC firm?
5) Investment Models
a) Do you use any particular investment model?
b) Is there a particular model used by your parent firm that you adopt in your own
investment markets?
c) Are there any differences or do you use exactly the same model?
6) Transferability of Models
a) Can your parent firm's success in terms of strategies or models be adopted
without significant change in your investment markets?
b) Does your parent firm require the use of their investment models or strategies in
your markets?
c) If there are any changes what are they and why?
7) Global Model ofVC
a) Do you think there is such a thing as a Global Model of VC?
b) How would you define global?
c) Would your firm be using some form of global model based on your parent firm
requirements or strategies for example?
d) If yes what is the model, if not why not?
8) Regional Model of VC
a) If there is no Global Model of VC can there be a Regional Model?
b) What region would it cover?
c) Why can there be a regional model?
9) Any other comments
10) Thank you
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Thefirmca etoAsiain1996wantingteplicateh tyd d successfullyinEurope1993/1994...thTelecommunications, MediaandEnt rtainmenti dustri s
Theteamalsoh dme iaexperi nce.rfocusTMTlso enablesthemoenhancethv lueft irinv stments.
Thereisacl arindicationoftimport ncefexperi ce theirstrategy&tfund.Thdomainexperi nceir l va t toheirsuccess,enablingt molev ragentheirexperience intheFund'si dustryfoc s.
b)Expertise& KnowledgeBase
Partnersrconfidentbecausefthkn wl dgasthintfi m andtheirexpertiseimarketsaindust s.
TeammembersartheostimDo tan .vuh vri h DeoDle.Thevdon'tr al vev lua et ire mburath rl ki froma"product" ngle.Whatproductsmusy utdifferentiate fromthetherunds?T e eproductsmustbsupport dy team'sexpertise.
Theimportancefteam'sexperti erelatedt rindustry focusisemphasi ed.Theknowledgeba&expertise deemedimportantbyo hPartners.
c)Knowledge Sharing
TheycanalsoleverageotheirofficesinSing po e(HQ),Ta i, Beijing,S oulands onh nghai.Ifnecessaryth ydcallt irf ll w fundmanagersorpinions,butnodec skingstr t gic planning.
Theyarlsoincon tanttouchwitheiro terp tsUK, India,USAetc.Thereissupportfromt extend dBari gsgroup includingtheUSandK.T rpartnersgloballyh v aqreementtosupporeachoth
Thereisextensiveknowledgsharingb twe nt rdiff re t countryfundsevethoughitsainf rmalb sisac fundisndependent.Thisallowsth mharei ,t ough s andlsoseekopinionsinvestm nt .
d)Market Knowledge& Continuous Learning
Evenforth irirm,itsmo eimportantnvestmenta n rs have"onthgr und"presence,k owmarketndpl y rs.T dothiseyne dtwork,musthaveskillsnexperi nce. ...butmoreimportantstheabili yft eirinvestmentpa n s" m ll outade l"
Teamcontinuouslyncept alising&sh r eninprod ct differentiation....worryur gotc mb oth tidnhave enoughknowled eaboutICTsp.relatedtInt r et..thah ir knowledgenolo gerrelevant.I t rneti vestingb omuth y lackedknowledgeti v stthatndustry.W rriebe .fl ck knowledgeth ywouldbleftfI ternetgr wthi dus r , (but)thedotcombus&...meltdownea edirworri s.
In-depthknowledgefth irmark tandcontinuous conceptualisingandsharpenifkillsrela stcontinuous learningnddaptingtohemarketke pemr leva .Th possiblelackfknowledgi nemergingfi limphasis d here,especiallyduringthot-comboowh nylack d knowledgeithI ternetbasedi dustry.ThP rtn rs reinforceexperienca dmarketknowledgefthm.
e)Ind pendence ofManagement Team
BCEArunsautonomously.P ewo slythes dh vec mmon InvestmentCommitt eandnAdv soryitteef rlltheirglobal funds,whichmakethinaldecis onone lbutsilo g r thecase.Thpartnersmakellde isionandh veiown InvestmentCommitt e.
Themanagementteisdecentralis da dtfocuse . memberscanke"partner"within5y rs.




...butmoreimportantstheabilityft eirinvestmentpartnerst' m ll outadeal'.
InMalaysiatheyh veoidentifygoodBumipu rac mpaniesn thenfundtheirIPOs
Theabilityto"sm llutdeal" ndanexampleftype dealinMalaysiasignifytheimporta cefidentifyingd securinqdealflow.
b)Availabilityof dealsinthe market
...Europeanmarketst rtingtc nsolidate..le spp tu itiesth marketst t dtoture.Thcommunicationsinfras r urelsha beenuiltsoth rew rfe eropportu itiesinata a.How verth contentindus rywasst rtingtgrowfex mplei nlintravel...i China.Theyhavejusts pnewf dorAsia. ..st ei ow windowofopportunitytinvestandt kehcompaniesma k t.Ther isagapnthemarket.
Don'tbeasi glecountryfu d,oBCEAwi ld eASEANeal foreverytwoChinad als
TheavailabilityofdealflowndtopportunitiesiAsiaet reasonsforsettingupn wfund.NotethateE ropean marketisturingandlac sdequatede lflow.
(iii)Exits
ViabilityofExitsin theMarket
Thekeydecisionforth minvestavailabilityfxi .Th re mustbeanctivecapitalarketforeith rIPOStr egicAcquirer available.Firmvoidsm rketwherc pitalrketsrnotctive& exitsareweak.Thistfirstmo timpor antcriterionf rinvestme s
Sinceexitsarthkeyosuccessfulinvestm nts,v rymarket musthavenexistrat gy
Theviabilityofexitsinchm rkestkeyd cisionf rt m
toinvestaparticularmarketcountry.A ivapi l marketsforbothIPOandM&Asremphasised.
(iv)Networks
ValueofNetworks
Evenforth irfirm,itsmo emportantth irinvestm ntpar n rs have"onthground"presencek owtmarketdpl y rs. Their"rootsaredeep"
BCEAhasgoodregionalcontactsa dv lid tionfthetechnology withindifferentregions.Th yalsou elllocapartn rs.gl l securitieshouses.Partn rmayl obinv sto sco-i vest r .
Thevalueoftheirnetworkssuccessimportantand emphasisedbythephr seir"rootad p".
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WhatdoesittakebTier-1VCfirmhavet rightpartnerswi inthfi m...le mot eir experience...howtbu ldc mpani s.ThWald n partnersknewwhataeces arytosurvive theyleamtfrot eirexp riencesinas .I Transpactheeamwasnotgo d.
Therear5sectorsinWald n,achhea dby
anindustryexpertndachh sitown committee.Theyidentifytheirstra egicf cusv a thehistoryofgr up.Iartedwi h semiconductorsinTa wandMalaysia evolvedintosoftware,I ternetaBPO
ForeignVCshavebett rxpo u e they...haveexperiencofpr ordeals donebyth rglobalffices.BIWald nis alsosuccessfulbecau ethfo nderT n Lip-Buisalongtermvisionary.
Theexperi nceoftpartnersistkeyot ir successincludingthFo nderwhodeem davisionary.
b)Expertise& KnowledgeBase
Waldenpartnersrindustryeiople,sthknow
theindustrywell.Aloft irpartne sh vbui companies.Waldenwantspart erithdo ai expertise.N dtoc nsiderwhatindus ryi v t
in&whichsector.Thisdependsot emain expertiseofthpartners.
Theindustryheadslookttd velopmentf theindustry.ThUSgivesipsandpointers,it' 'top-down'approach.
Thestrategyiformul dbyt respectivecountryheads,thind s expertsinthgroupandbyLip-B .They ...investintheareasyk owbest.The expertiseoftherffic sandpartne sis usedoft n.
Theindustryknowledgeandexp rtisftpartnersis importantf rsuccess&informulatingstrat gy.
c)Knowledge Sharing
Thestrategyitome tregularly,Quar rl Managementeetings.. heywilllooktth dealflow,syndicating,t .Theyalsowe kly conferencealls.The eisalsosharingfvi ws andknowledgemongthpartners.
Industryheadsmeetlfy a ly&performannual reviewofthindustry.T e ealsoy arly strategymeeting.Individualsub-committees meetregularlytoshareinformation.Thal ofsharingfinf rmationbetweetpartn rs.
Therearregularm etingstofo mulate strategy.
Thepartners&managere tregularlytosh re information&dealflow.Thisregularmeetingschedule deemedimportantbyallmanagersssisf r knowledgesharing.Th ril tfharingform tio &knowledgeamongpartnersth ivari uoffic s.
d)Market Knowledge& Continuous Learning
Waldenpartn rsindustryeople,sth ykn w
theindustrywell.Partn rsmlsoh vegood financialbackgrounddmustreaale mllthe time.Th yalsone dogetseconopinionsfr m experts.StaffalsottendthVCIns i ute
Thereisalotfsharingnf rm tiobetwe n thevariousp tner .T irda tyendors ment alsohe psind cidingtonve tieal.
Theexpertiseofth roffices&partn r
isusedoften.Thishelpsal tntdeal making.ForeignVCshavebetter exposureatheycandep ndorh ve theexperi nceofpr ord als
Theusofexternalpinionsa dperts owt relevanceofmarketkn wledg&exp rtisisel cting successfuldeal .Thiincludescontinuoulear ingbytaff attendingthVCInstitute.
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e)Independence ofManagement Team
Theirregionalstrategyibasecoindustr focus.Theyc oosetind tryve .lo k attheroadmapfinvestmentsf rnext35 years.Eachcountrymanagehtdhis
Thestrategymustfiregionalmode&ust workithregionalWaldenpartn rs.However eachcountryneedstform latelo lstr gy andseewhatorksandwhatdoot.W worksintheUSmayotw rkiAsi .
Nomention
Thelongterminvest entstrategya dt olfeach countrymanageriformulatingthisstrategyi port nt asitndicatesthuseoflocalkn wledgei tr t gy developmentvef raforeigVCfi .Th essom independenceforlocalman gers.
(ii)Dealflow
a)Identifyingnd securingdeals
Eachmanagerustlsoide tify10co t ctsth canbringindealflow.
Havethebilityospotgo dopportuni iest k
toanexit....ocheckutt edeal,uset ir contacts,industryandmarketpl ye .
Theexpertiseofth rfficesand partnersisusedof n.Thihelpl ti thedealmaking.Tlocaloff ces thesameforverseasoffico.
Theabilityoftpartners&manageridenti ying dealflowndtheirexpertiseid almakingsmport ntf thefirm'ssucce s.
b)Availabilityof dealsinthe market
DealflowisthemainproblemandforW d nt majorproblem.Iftherisndealf w,nW d n mayleavethecountry.Fr mglobalperspective Malaysiandealsretoosmall.Thprobl mican Waldengetbigenou h...regionald althc comparewithChin&N rAs
Thereisnosuffici ntdealflowiMalaysia.It betterinSingapore,HongK&China.Ev nf youmanagetr isefundsbutcannotgetdeal andca notexit,itd featsthepurpo eofb ing VC.Theyne dtog ti toearlyst ged ls.
Therearenofact rconsiderationss theygowheredealis




Theavailabilityofnexitmechanismisnet firstconsiderations.F rexampleiMal ysiath IPOmarketisgoodbutMalaysianeedstdev lop theradesal sm rk tesp ciallyforprivate equityindustry.
Successis-havethbilityopotgo d opportunitiestakex t.
Successismeetingthexp ctationsof investorsespeciallythnumberof companiesth tgelist d.Ifnies thatyouw rkithgfoalisting tradesalhenyoursuccessfulVC.
TheavailabilityofnexitmechanismbothIPOndtrade salesianimportantconsid rationfinvest g particularcountry.Listingyoinve tme tslso measureofVCsuccess.
(iv)Networks
ValueofNetworks
Choosepartners(fW ld n)withg odlocal contacts.Partnermustbbletc nectLip-Bu withalltherig tpeoplendmusth vgood network.Eachmanagerustalside tify10 contactsthanbringidealflow.
DemographicsinAsiaa eb sednstrong individualcontacts.ThestrongAsi-Silic ValleyconnectioniW ldmadeAsi n companiessuccessfulinthUSA.
...theSingaporegovernmenth s createdabettercosyst mndmore networksthath lpt ircompanies,is isnothappeningM laysia
Thestrength&valueoftnetworkidemonstrat dby theirAsia-SiliconValleyconnectionwhi ha sist d Asiancompaniesinbei guccessfulthUSA.T valueofthenetworkisalsomeasu ep rsonalsuccess fortheVC.
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Successfa tor- ...theindu rytha ypicki v tn
ismportant.IftheVChasnoexp rtiseuswr ng strategythenicleadofailur .Thwilldbusiness developmentandustheirnetworksh lpgrow company.
Nocorroboration
c)KnowledgeSharing
ThestrategyiformulatedbyanExecu iveCo mi t e (Exco)...&theym etquart rl .
TheH&QAsiaPac fic...management. .tqu rterly. Theyshareexperi nc sandfuperformances.
Regularmeetingsandthesharingofexperiences& performancequ teknowledgsharing&imp rtantt strategyformula ion.
d)MarketKnowledge& ContinuousLearning
Pre-crisisH&Qusedtomakeinorityinvestmentsbupo crisis(1997onwards)controlwamo eimp rt nt...it investmentsizelarger.Poscri isth yd c d dinv t inrestructuringcompanies,nowbuy utsrmiqr ion.
H&QThailandisdifferentbecauseoft eirm jority stakesincos.&activeinvolvementth irestments whichisimportantf rtheirsuccess....yilld businessdevelopmenta dustheirnetworksh lp growthecompany.T yalsone dstu y company'smarkets.
Thecontrolftheirinvestmentsgiv st mppor unity
beactivelyinvolvednthrunningfbusiness.O managerclea lystatesth tisiport ntf rt isucce s. Changeistrat gydependingocha geseconomic circumstancesabeaspe tofle rning.
e)Independenceof ManagementTea
Theheadquartersdoesnotplaym chfrolit strategy.ThExcoandtInvestmentCommitteemakes theirowndecisio s.Eachlocalfundh sl lInvestment Committeeandtheyakdecisions.Thstrat gyit havelocalman gersieachcountry.
Localmanagementwilproposethindustrystrat gnd willidentifythediffer ntndustriesovesba d eachcountry....theywillgiveountryleewa decideontheindustriesand'tplaclimitsa h country.
Thereisclearmanagementindep nd nce.Loc lmanagers eachcountryaregiv nthopportunityndd cisiomaki g abilitytoselectth rownindus rytrat qy.
(ii)Dealflow
a)Identifyingndsecuri deals
Theywillinvestnangooddeal .reg nalmodels successfulbecau eH&Qgoforthe td awithinthe region.Lookingtinvestco .s ttiupmanufacturing plantsinChi aorsellingthineseco sumers.S urcing dealsisviatheirnetworks.
Successfa tor- ...theindu rythaypickve
isimportant-therightndustry,righc mpanya rightprice...Thlocalofficeswilidentifytheir opportunitiesandde lflow...tfincompanyhais growing&hascompetitiveadvantag .
Thereisaconscioustrategytpi kinvestmentsndk thebestd als.Thlocalofficesarrequir did ntifyt opportunitiesandthedealflowbyusingthe rnetw rk .
b)Availabilityofdealsinthe market
Thedealflowinh ilandfort eirs zeealstm ny theylookf rmo eMI30deals.
DealflowinTh ilandsquitelim ted.NewH&QA ia PacificfundisocusednNorthA ia,mainlyChina...also somedealflowinKorea&Japan.Alsthregionm yb limitedeg.Aseanmarketybmall
Lackofdealflowintheirmar etscl a lyrecognis d. Geographicfocuschangesi.e.s ortagefde lnThailand leadstofocunN rthAsia.
(iii)Exits
ViabilityofExitsinthe Market
SomefH&Q'sreturnsincompaniesth twentIPOre- Thaicanereturnw s2times,Thaicon...4times,SVIforh firstundwas6time ,hnext2ti es&Fabrinet therewasanoffercqui et3tim .A ericanstyl returnsof50time( oen thapp niAsia.
Theaveragereturnfromth sdivestm nts2.5tim s.
Althought eimportancefexitssnotp cificallyment oned, indirectlytheresamajorfocusonIPOsa dcq isitions especiallyonthamountfretur sonxits.H cex ta clearlyimport nttH&Q.
(iv)Networks
ValueofNetworks
Sourcingdealsisviatheirnetworks.Ifa tll3d l mentionedwerduetopersonaln tw rks.
Theywill...usetheirnetworkoh pgrowc mpany.
Theusofnetworksbothfsou cinginv tmentsand growingthemarem ntioned.Impo ta cethfic nfirm d as3majorde lswereacquir dthro ghnetw rks.
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Investmentmodel...isbasedoth experienceandknowledgfthVC. Whenth ylookatdeal,h ve "lookbey ndthedeal".
Personalsuccessito...havema aged successfulfund.
SinceEsmond'se tryit'sotjuwhatthd buthowtheydoit.I 'septhfx rience thathebrings...f omAmericaH experiencewo kingforaSingaporfund.
Thedepthofxperi nceandkn wl geis criticaltohesuccessffi m.
b)Expertise&Knowledg Base
Investmentmodel...isbasedonth experienceandknowledgfthVC. PersonalmissionitdevelophVC industryMalaysia,sethp cedo deals,leadershipbyxample.
Theydobusin ssdevel pmentandwill evenprojectmanagethde ls.Theyalso dofundraisingf rthe rinvestee companies.
"Whatworksbesisekn west"... investnthingsayu d rstand.I companiesth teyavalue-add.M stb comfortablewi htheindus ry.B tMalaysia thereisn'tsuffici ntexpertiseVC industry.
Domainknowledgeismporta t-"Wha worksbestishateknow,bes ".Th y investnthingsyund rstand.Mub comfortablewi hindustrytheyve tin. Expertise&knowledgfVCisim ortant incl.abilitytoprojecmanagedea s&fu d raising.
c)KnowledgeSharing
Theabilitytobengagedidomestic policy,theirvi wsbeings lic ted policymakersandtherecognitionat theyg t.
Somestrategiescanbtransf rr dut theyne dotalkp oplev rseas, theirnetworks.Theyw llmakeuseof theirnetwo ksofindoutxamplesfthe thingsateircontactsdid.
Asthecurr ntCEO,E mondbringsalotf experiencefromAmer ca.Intharlydays therewasalotfindecision.ButEsmond verydecisiveandh sgooinsti cts.
Thefirmengagesiknowledges ring, betweenthnewCEO&manag ment andlsowiththeirnetworks policymakers
d)MarketKnowledge& ContinuousLearning
Thekeypartoftecosystemi stateofmind,thepeopleinUShav adifferentstateofmi d,th yrno afraidtoventureutinvestmon y forautureretu n.
Investmentstrategy-inv stbas dolif cycleoffund.Deci ehowtcapitaliset eachtimeline.N edtopi kindustry. Biotechtakest ol nggivereturn. Electronicd viceseasytrampup.
Theymustbabletopiloawh n necessary.IMalay iaEntrepr neursr youngfirst-timers.SMSCVCmustbablet solvetheirproblemsifEntrepreneurcan ot.
VCsmu tbecapableofassi tinginvestees
inmanagingtheircompanies&solvin problems.VCsmu thaveanag ent expertise&ca abil ties.Th rissupportof continuouslearning.
e)Independenceofth ManagementTea
Nomention
Itismportantf rVCirmsmakeur theyke pindividuals-t efirm's managers&keyst fftoo.L calVC structureidifferent,nopartnership structure,eniorma age sarns lary& arenotfin nciallystable
OriginalCEOdid 'twatoakehloss. Managementwasrecomme dingt ritoff
theloss...butydidn'tWh nEsmond cameinheutoffallthl ssmakingCos.I theearlydayserewlotfindecisionbut Esmondiverydecisive.
Moderatecorroboration.Thest uctureft managementte&hautocratics ylof
thepreviousCEOc atedobl msf r Firm.ThenewCEOlist nstohteam& decisive.
(ii)Dealflow
a)Identifyingnd securingdeals
Whenth ylookatdeal,h ve "lookbey ndthedeal".





Thedealflowistr nge p ciallynt USbecauseofEsmond'snetwork . Therearlotfbigdealsthank the"wordofmouth"network.
Nomention
Outsideinvestmentsmusthavlinkto Malaysia,mu tbenefialaysia.Eg.fund d USmarketingcompa ythelponf theirMalaysianinvesteecompani sNexus Edge.SothermustbaMalaysianngle




Mesdaqithejew lncrownas thereisagoodexit&thereliquidity. Investorscanliquidisetheirnv tments onMesdaq.Theyhavelsolist df w companiesMesdaqinclu ing RedTone,andKare softT chnol gies.
Forexample,ftheirChinainvestm nt, theexitmaynobiChina,sot eywill exitoutsideChinaf re.g.iSingaporeo HongK q
MSCVCisaprettyucc ssfulfirmandha alreadybrok nev n.Oregio al perspective,itobablyonefthmore successful.
ThevalueofhavingStockM rk tf rexits
isveryimportantandthefirmisc sidered successfulbe ausetheyhavlist ds eral companies.
(iv)Networks
ValueofNetworks
Thedealflowistr ngespeciallynt USbecauseofEsmond'snetwork . Therearlotfbigdealst ankso the"wordfmouth"network.
Theywillmakeorusoft irnetworks
tofindoutexamplesfthehingt ateir contactsdid.Thecustomsandt networksarellloca .
MSCVCinvestmentstrategyd pendso
fewactors-Go dnet orks.Theymu thave anetworkithatfield.
Thevalueofpersonalnetworksik ypa t
ofthesuccessffirm.Th yset networkstoobtaind alandlsoget expertadviseb forinvesting.





Theirforeignpartnersh vework dglobally seasonedprofessionals.Softba kcb nchmark&l m fromprevioussuccesseandfailurefth irportfolios.Al importantsther leatSoftb kpl ysint m n gement ofthecompany.Theywillinflu ncetco...thep th successwillbshort ned.
MostVCfirmswerestaff ddo inabyfinancepeople, notindustrypeople,unlikeSoftban ....b thKarandCEO DavidLowhindustryexpertise.Thehatex ience ofbuildingecosystemsandnetworkswereblt connectwithkeyp ople.
Thepriorexperienceoftfi minu dingsi ilarco p nies, theirindustryexperienceandthbilityob nchmarkngthatexperienceismpo tant.Th irfor ignpartn rsrlso seasonedprofessionalslludingtheirexperiencei industry.
b)Expertise& KnowledgeBas
SBEMalsohasnetw rks,expertisendseas ned professionalswhoorkgl b llyandcadvisetheir companies
Thedifferencebetw enSoftbanka dtcomp titions theindustryexp rtiseanddomainknowledgewithi Softbank.Theyareindustryexp r s.
Industryexpertiseanddomainknowle gei hinthfirmi important
c)Knowledge Sharing
Thereisalsolotfharinginform iobetw ent e r expertsatheirUShe dqua ers
...baseditsstrategyondi cussionswi hindividualne ch Softbankoffice.
Sharingofinfobetweemanag ment&th irUSHQexperts andwithotherff c sisimportant
d)Market Knowledge& Continuous Learning
Softbankhasugeportfoliofinvestm ntsc benchmarkandl afroprevioussuccessesndf iluref theirportfolioinothermark ts.Th s...compa i on&le rni g ...isonefthu fa radvant gestS ftb nkh s.
Theyhadtexperienceofbuil ingecosystemsnd networksandwe ebltco nectithk ype ple.
Theabilitytobenchmarkandl afrprevious investmentsasw lltheirb lityobuildecosystemsan networksalludetoheirmar etk o ledge&continuous learning
e)Ind pendenceof ManagementTea
SBEMwasclosedaft rth2001Sept.11,terroristat ackin NewYork.Attimefclosureh ywerreadyff rt ms
to8companies...
Softbankthepar ntcompanylosedllioperations... focus...onbroadbandinNorthAsia
ThedecisiontoloseoperationsinMalaysia&els where wasm debytheparentfirmevt oughh ydd als secured,indi atinathe ewasnoin oendencef rthrm. Thereisnospecificmentionomanag mentte independence.ThUSoffichadcontroldultimate decision-makingauthority.
(ii)Dealflow
a)Identifyingnd securingdeals
Attheimeofclosureyw rreadyff rterms8 companies.Dealflowtth tti(19992001)wgo d withmanyyounqercompani s.
InMalaysiatheywereclocompl ting5investments beforeSBEMwascl s d
Thefactt a yhadbetw en5-8de lsshowst t wereabltob thidentifya ds curedequateals
b)Availabilityof dealsinthem rket
Oneofthmostimportantfact rsstavailabilityf adequatedealflow...ndmanypotentialinvestments.S theremustbgooddemand<£supplyinthec omyai ensuresthattherwillblofd alflow.




Theavailabilityofnexitislsoimport ntalthoughb cause SBEMisglobal,theycanlistt eirinve tmentslsewhere (otherthaninMalaysia)soyweretconce ned.Butif anexitwasvailablei chm rk ttwou dbee ter.
IntheNationalcontext,Mesdaqasabout50companies
Theimportanceandav ilabilityfexitisd tifi dswe l
astherecognitionofM sdaq,te h logyexcha gei Malaysiaviableexchange
(iv)Networks
ValueofNetworks
SBEMalsoh snetworks...g oballyandcandvisetheir companies.Theyam tchthe rem rgingrketinv st s withothersthatyhaveinsUSKor andcanate greatersynergiesandrowthbusi ss .Th yl olo k forsynergywiththeirexistinginv stm nts.
Theyhadtexperienceofbuil ingecosystemsnd networksandwe ebltco nectithk yp ple.
Theimportanceft eirne worksandt bilitybuil synergiesionmpo tantfactor.Theirglobaltwo ksare specificallym nt oned.
AppendixG6—WithinCasePa ternM chingofInt rvi wData—Tra sp c Category/Namef ParticipantJasonNg




In1997Asiancrisis...shiftedfocus.. obu ld'platform companies'...likPriv teEquityB tth yd thav experienceandthknowl dgf rsuchinv stm ts. Transpacpeopleh veMNCexperiencebutism llfir st notthesame.
Transpachadabout30membersofsta fithenvestm nt teamwithlotfexperienceincludingcross-borderdu rial focus&cross-borderevaluationteam .InheUSVCofte haveentrepren urialxpe iencebutiAs amostVC ex-bankers.
Therewasalackofcongruencebetwe ntman gem nt team'sexperience&hExco'expectationsoft m especiallybyex tingthemoinv st&managedeals outsidetheirscopfexperience.Th slfailurf thefirm.
b)Expertise& KnowledgeBase
Transpacdidn'th vee oughomainexper ise,ostfth teamwereelectronicsbased&hn wint kew re telecomsbased.In1997Asiancrisih yh ftedfo u build'platformcompanies'likePr vateEquity...butthdon' havethexperiencendknowl dgf rsuch investments.Tomakesucht ntsth yusthav industryk owledgeandd mainexp rtis .
Theteamh sochangeadaptmarket....notv ry happywiththisstrategy...theyhouldn tex ec professionalstchangeadaptem rketh ir expertisewanotputuse.Changinglltimant thateydidnotev lopanexp rtisendwh tever theyhadwasasted
Thelackofexpertiseintndust iesyw rexpect do investandtheco stanthangingffocuslemanagers notdevelopingomainknowledge&a sousi gth row expertisetogooduse.Oncausffail rhwa expectingmanagerswithoute ertiseokn wl dgf particularindustriestomanaqe&investsuchdustries
c)Knowledge Sharing
Thereisafortnightlydealm etingwhertinv stm nt managersustdefendl .Muchp doth Presidentlik ngthd al.Quarterlymeeti gsavuseful fornetworking.VCseedthavegooindu tryc ntacts,s thateyc nsh reknowledgeabouti dus ryi c ding problemsinthindustry.
Reasonforailu e...theirmi" nmashow",F u d r PresidentDr.Chri topherL ong.ThExcomakest strategicdecisionsesp ciallythPr ident...andrestof theeamh sofollow.T erewasnomechani mk strategy.Th yh d30membersinthinvest ntt mwith alotfexperience,includingcross-borderindu t ialfo s andcrossbo derevaluationteams.
Therewasalotfexperience&kn wl dgithintt m, butd etohautocratics ylefmanag m nt&ecisio makingtherewasdistinctlacofkn wledgeh ing.Ev thequarterlymeetingsw rus fulonlyfnetworking.
d)Market Knowledge, Continuous Learning&Skills
TheywereinvestinglikPrivatEquitbVCshavno expertiseinthity eofinv stments.T yd n'thav ...knowledgeforsuchinvestments.Tomake investmentsth ymusthaved ryknowledgendd main expertise.
Theyhadabout30membersintnvest nte mwith
lotfexperience,includingcross-borderindu t ialf c san crossbo derevaluationteams.H weverhst a gy adapttomarkeopportunities.Theys ldnexp c professionalstchangeadaptemarketth ir expertisewanotputuse,hatev rh yhad wasasted.
Aclearlackofmarketkn wledgeith investmenfi ldu
toheconstantchangingfstrategyw saausfailur . Therewasalsonocontinu uslear ingbutt eyer expectedtoadaptnychang sinstr gybuthesw re changingtooftenenablelearni .Therew snm ntio ofmarketskills.
e)Ind pendenceof ManagementTea
InTranspacmuchdependsotheP esidentlikingal.t isaveryutocraticwofdecidingnals.Eth countryheadsavenodecision-makingauth rity.Bth Presidentwastoodictatorialandh sus dl tf infightingwit intheeam.
Reasonforailu e...theirmi" nmanshow"T ExecutiveCommi teak sthestrat gicdecision especiallythPr id nt...andrestoft amh follow.Therewasnoparticularmech nismt akst t gy asthiswasleftoeExco.
Thelackofconsensualdeci ion&strategym i g structureledtodissatisfactionwith nhemanag me tt . TheautocraticmannerwithhichtPresidentfirm didnothelpthefirm.T erewasindep n enceoMg team&hiswasonem jorc u effailur .
(ii)Dealflow
a)Identifyingnd securingdeals
Measuresuccessbythabilityoid nt finv stm nt .VC needtohaveg oindustrycontac s,sha ynsh re knowledgeaboutthindus rycl ingproblems industry.
Personalsuccesswa-Thabilitytdgo djoby spottinggoodinvestments,monitorinofthe investmentsandseekingouthb sr turns.




VCsmu tspodealsbInAsiaveryf wdealsts t...he dealflowisverymall.In estinginAsiadifficu t.top managementisexpensivebutthd lflowher .Also Transpac'sminimumde lsizewUS$5million,hi h difficulttoinvesMalay iahatime.Thisli it d numberofdealsth tcouldbed n .
Thisisaslightdifferenceofpi ionbetweeth2ma ag rs. Althoughonebeliev st atd inge liMal ysiawas difficultbecauseofthesmalldesizescomp redth ir preferreddealsiz ,anothermanagers idoinglsi Malaysiaisnotdifficul .Howeverthist ll acknowledgementfthf ctaavailabilityfde lsi themarketiscrucial.
(iii)Exits
ViabilityofExitsin theMarket
Measuresuccessbythbilityoidentifinv stmentsd thenmanageoexitprofit bly.
Exitswerealsofactorbe au e...between1996&2001th Mesdaqmarketforgrowthandtechnologycompaniesw s justformed&wasnotactive.Hencxitserdifficult Transpacdidotman geanyexitssucce swli it d.
VCsmeasureth isuccessbytheirab lityoxitprofitabilit , hencelackofcapitalmar tf rprofitableexitsi pactsn VCsuccess.
(iv)Networks
ValueofNetworks
GenerallytobsuccessfulVCneedhavegooi du try contacts,sothateynh reknowl dgeab utt industryincludingproblemsthi ustry.Thfi mhas. . industrycontactsts ur edeal .Themostimportantl sso -Contactsandnetworksreimportant
Spottingfinvestments-thg odd alc mefrpersonal contacts,fr mtheVCsnetworks.
TobesuccessfulVCn edtohavegoonetworkn contactswhichenablethemfi dgoodd s.Tm t importantlessof rforeignVCsopera inginAth networksareinv luable.
















Contentf Informationf multipleda a sourcesand linkto categories»
TheManagement TeamBiodatawill providedetailsf experience, qualificatonsand expertiseaswell otherpertinentdata
Basedonth experienceof theteam& whetherth y havewid working experiencein VCfundsori industry
Lookf r membershipsin related organisationse.g. VCAssociations, Government committees,etc
Multiple portfoliosin focusindustryn multiple countriesincl.at otherfirms- validates dealflowby regionor country.
Hasgroupor firmlisted investmentsn multiple countries. Validates experience, expertise, dealflow,exits &networks
Investment spaceivery focusedand clearlystated. Mustfittheir experience& expertise.Can alsovalidate dealflow
Geographic focustmatch experience& expertise.If focusdoesn'tit otherinfoeg experience,it canshow unfocusedfirm.
Senior Managementi multipleoffices withde experience providesvalidity fornetworks, experience& expertise.
Investmentsmustfit theirfocusareand statedgeographic focus.Listingin regionalmarkets validates experience&xit strategy.Also showsamountof dealflow.
Provides confirmationnthe firminvest ent focus,experience, expertise,d alflow exitstrategyand networks.Other commentsmaybe relevant
(i)IntangibleResources
a)Management Team Experience
Lookf rexperience withinthe rareaof investmentfocus
Greater experiencein otherVCfunds orincos.related
toheirfocuse morevalidthe confirmationf experience.
Leadership positionsw ll equatemor experience.Not ordinary membership
Thewidertheir portfoliof investmentsn focusareath greaterth ir experience
ThemoreIPOs &M&Asthe greaterth ir experience
Strongsupport where investment spacefits team's experience
Strongsupport where geographic focusmatches experience
Thewidert experienceofth different managersthe greaterthe supportof experience
Mustmatch experienceofth managers.Succes storieslikIPO regionallyboost validityof experience
DoInvesteesthink theVCshave experience
Strongsupportif thereisoverall validationof experience
b)Expertise& Knowledge Base
Wideexpertisein focusindustries& strongknowledge baseintheam stronqupport
Greater experiencein otherVCfunds orcos.relatedt theirfocus•• morevalidthe confirmationf expertise& knowledge
Leadership positionsin relevant organisationsca validateexpertise
Mustmatch expertise
MoreIPOs& M&Aswithin theirexpertise- greaterthe supportof expertise& knowledqe
Strongsupport where investment spacefits team's expertise
Strongsupport where geographic focusmatches expertise& knowledqe
NR
Mustmatch expertiseof managers.Succes storiesofregional IPOsrelatedto expertiseboosts validity
DoInvesteesthink theVCshave expertise& knowledqe
Strongsupportif thereisoverall validationof expertise& knowledqe
c)Knowledge Sharing
Spreadof managementte aroundtheregion, wideexperience& regularmeetings indicatepropensityt share
NR
NR




Widerspreadof officesincreases propensityt shareknowledge
Widerinvolvement
inregional investmentsshow propensityfor knowledgesharing
DoInvesteesthink theVCsdom re knowledgesharing
Strongsupportif thereissupport canshow knowledge sharinginthe group
d)Market Knowledge& Continuous Learning
Strongsupportif teamisdiversified withdeexpertise& knowledge.Advisory committees& external professionals
Thewid rthei experience& scopeoffirms workedinthe greaterth ir market knowledgeesp.
Membershipof associationsca meancontinuous learning&more market knowledge
Widerportfoliof investments involved meansore market knowledge
Widerportfolio
ofIPOsand M&Asmeans moreark t knowledge
Greater experiencein theirinvestment spacehows morearket knowledge
Experiencein wider geographic focusincreases market knowledge
Greaternumbe
offfices increasesmark t knowledge
Greaterexperience
inregional investmentsshow increasedmarket knowledge
DoInvesteesthink theVCshavemor marketknowledge andre continuously learning
Strongsupportif thereismark t knowledgean continuous learningshow among management
400
necessary.Multiple qualificationsls indicatepropensity forcontinuous learning.
if workedn industry.
e) Independence ofthe Management Team







Management independence assumedifthey haveighranking positions&ffice widelyspreadout
Ifthereisan indicationofability tomakedecisions fortheirwn regional investmentsthere independence
DoInvesteesthink theVCsare independentoro theydependoHQ fordecisionmaki g




Workinmultiple successfulfirmor havingsuccessful investments&xits atpriorfirmsis supportofabili yt identify&secure deals
Themore experiencein different successfulfirm withsuccessful investments& exitsissupoort ofabilityt identify&s cure deals
NR
Thelarg rt portfoliothe greaterthe propensityt identify&secure deals
MoreIPOsand M&Asprovides strongupport
indentifying& securingdeals
Thelarg r numberof dealswithin theirinvestment spaceshows abilitytoident f &securedeals
Thelarg r numberofdeals withintheir geographic focusshows abilitytoidentif &securedeals
Widernetwo kof officeswith successful investments indicatesabilityto identify&secure deals
Thelarg rt numberofregional investmentsth greaterthe propensityt identify&secure deals
Ifnvesteesthink theVCshadgood strategy,methodor abilitytoident f theirpotentialdeals thisvalidatest eir abilitytoident f& securedeals





Thelarg r numberof portfolio investments showsupportof dealavailability
IPOsandM&A providestrong supportofdeal availabilityin theirmarkets
Largernumber ofdealswithin theirinvestment spacei supportofdeal availability
Largernumbe ofdealswithin theirgeographic focusissupport ofdeal availability
Widernetworkof officeswith successful investments indicatesgreater dealavailability
Thelarg rt numberofregional investmentsth greaterthe availabilityofde ls
DoInvesteesthink therearlotf dealsfortheirVC investors









ofIPOsand M&As-strong supportofexit viability
NR
NR
Successoftheir officesinIPOs& M&Asshowexit viability
Largernumberof IPOs&M&Asin regional investments- strongsupportof exitviability
Havetheirinveste s beensuccessful exits.Ifye indicatesvi bilityof exits.




Workinmultiple successfulfirmor havingsuccessful investments&xits atpriorfirmsis supportofgood networks
Themore experiencein different successfulfirm withsuccessful investments& exitsissupport goodnetw rks
Membershipof associationsnd leadership positions indicates propensityt network




Thewidert networkofffices &multiple investmentsby theseoffic s showsgreater propensityt network
Theabilitytoinvest
inawideportfoliof regional investmentsshow goodnetw rks
Doinvesteesthink theirVCshavegood networks
Strongsupportif therearlotf investmentswith successfulexits andwideork experience showingg od networks
401






Strongsupport.Teamive y experiencedspinth ir investmentspace.
Strongsupport.Thereioverall validation.Mgtteamisvery experiencedinVCinv sting, successfulexitsandglobal investments.
Strongsupport.Overallth rei validationth texperienceis necessaryforirmsu cess.Thfir overallhasva texp riencethough countryteamexperienceislittl limited
Strongsupport.Thereioverall validationofexperience.T m& CEOhavevastexperi ncein VC&industry
Thereistrongupportthat4 successfulfirmhavev ryexp rienced mgt.MosthaveVC&investment experience&alsovastindu ry experience.Mostal oh vexperience
intheirselectedi v stm ntspace.
b)Expertise& KnowledgeBase
Strongsupportthatex ertise& knowledgebasefit investmentportfolio&space
Strongsupport.Thereioverall validationofexpertise&knowledg . Multipleexitsglobally&e pertisein focusindustriesveryl ar.
Strongsupport.Overallth rei validationth texpertise& knowledgeisnecessaryf rirm success.Thfirmhalotf expertise&knowl dgthoughe countryteamexpertiseiss mewhat limited
Strongsupport.Thereioverall validationofexpertise& knowledge.Team&CEOshow strongupportofex ertise& knowledgeiVC,dustry& evenntrepreneurship.
Thereisalsotr ngupportt aallh firmshaveexpertise&knowledgethat fitstheirinvestmentspace.Mostal o havevastVCexpertisew llIPO &M&Aexpertise.
c)KnowledgeSharing
Strongsupport.Knowledge sharingiindic tedall relevantar s
Strongsupport.Diversityofffices
ledbyanexperiencedFound r. Regularmeetingsofgtt amshow knowledgesharingit egroup
Strongsupport.Thereiad quate supportthatt ereiknowledge sharingint egroup
Moderatesupport.Th ri someupportfknowledge sharinginthefirmbutast singlecountryfu dsharingi notextensive
Generallythereistrongsupportthatal
thefirmsshareknowl dgenregular basis.ThereidiversityintMgt teams&heym etregularlyoshare knowledge&experienc s.
d)MarketKnowledge& ContinuousLearning
Strongsupport.Marke knowledge&continuous learningisndicatedllth differentcategories
Strongsupportofmarkekn wledge andcontinuouslearningshow amongmanagement
Strongsupport.Regio allythefi m haswidemarketknowledgend showscontinuouslear ingm management
Strongsupport.Thereig d supportofmarketknowledge andcontinuouslearningm management
Thereisstrongsupportofwidema k t knowledge&continuouslearning. Marketknowledgeissoobtainedvia industryexpertise&m ltiplxi .
e)Ind pendenceof ManagementTea
Moderatesupport.Teami fairlyseniorwithtrong multinationalteamacrosshe region.Unabletoful yv l date independenceofmanag ment.
Moderatesupport.Difficulttoprove independenceotherthahighranks ofmanagers.Intervi wd ta indicatessupportofin epend nce.
Moderatesupport.Th rei adequatesupportofmanagem nt independence
Strongsupport.Thisihowever selfevidentbitasingle countryfund&nlreportstits investors,theGov rnment.







Strongsupport.Teamh s shownabilitytident fd securedealsregionallyw th successfulexits
Strongsupport.Firmhasshown greatpropensitytiden if&s cure deals.
Strongsupport.Firmhasshown greatp opensitytidentif&secure dealsthoughinThailandre moreli ited
Strongsupport.Thefi mhas clearlydemonstrateditabilityt identifya dsecureals




Strongsupport.Firmhasl f dealsintheirspace&geographic focus
Strongsupport.Firmhaslotf dealsintheirspace&geographic focustho ghdealinThailandre moreli ited
Strongsupport.Thefi mhas manydealsintheirsp ce& geographicfocusshowing availabilityofde lsinthe market.
Allfirmsshowtrongsupportt ahere
isadequateavail bilityofd lsintheir focusmarkets.Mo tfirmh veany dealsintheirinvestmentspace.
(iii)Exits
ViabilityofExitsinthe Market
Strongsupport.Fi mhasmany exitsintheirspace,geographic focus&severaldonebyth regionaloff ces
Strongsupportofexiviabil ty.F rm haslotfexi sintheirspace& geographicfocus
Strongsupportofexiviabil ty.Firm haslotfexi sintheirspace& geographicfocus
Strongsupport.Firmhavemany exitsintheirspace&geographic focus





Strongsupport.Ma yinvestments withsuccessfulexitsandidework experienceshowingg odn tworks
Strongsupport.Ma yinvestme ts withsuccessfulexitsandgro ph wideexperienceshowinggood networks
Strongsupport.Ma y investmentswithsucc ssful exitsandwideorkexperience showinggoodnetworks
Thereistrongupportofgo d networksamongthefir s.Mo t managershavv stworkexperi nce& haveshownt bilityinvesnma portfoliofirmsusingthe rne works.
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Somesupport.Therwasin fficientsupporof managementexpeiience.Ov rallexpe iencew s inadequate&onlyifina ctelco.NVCr investmentxperi nce&sp.noInte netexp ri nce, theirfocusarea.
Moderatesupport.TeamhasVCexperience& someindustryexperiencebnothin ication ofverallexpe iencesp.inth irinvestment space
Onlymoderatetlowexp rienceshownbmanagem nt team.Someindustryexperi nceshown.Tran pacVPhas VCexperiencebutlittlexperiencenth irchangingm rk t space.Lowerlevelsfexperi nceinbothcasesouldh v impactedontheirsu c ss.
b)Expertise&Knowledge Base
Somesupport.Therin ffici ntex ertise& knowledgeiVCrInterneti dus ryth irf cusarea. Onlyexpertiseisfinanc&t lco
Somesupport.Inadequatesu portfexpertis& knowledgeith iri vestmentspace
Somesupportfindus ryexpertisebl wVCex rtise exceptforTranspacVP.Knowl dgebaseknowledgedt beverylowinonecas .
c)KnowledgeSharing
Nosupport.Thereinsupportfanykn wledge sharingastheonlytherfficeinP l ndc os withinmonths.Noindica ionfo erSoftba k partnersbeingactiveinSBEMi her.
Somesupport.Therinadequa esu portf knowledqesharingint egroup
Nosupportfknowledgesharing.Str ngsu portflack sharinginbothcases,confi medyintervi wd ta.
d)MarketKnowledge& ContinuousLearning
Somesupport.Onlyomeindustryknowledge relevant.Th rewenoIPOsoxits&knowledge oftheirinvestmentspacenIntern ti dust y.
Somesupport.Theri omemark tknowledge butoverallinadequ tes pportfma k knowledqe&continuousleaminq
Somesupportshownfadequa earketknowledg continuouslear ing.B thteamh dverylittleexp ri ncef exits&littlemarketknow edqe.
e)Independenceof ManagementTea
Nosupport.Thereicl arlynppo tf managementindependence.Firmsclos dbyh ad office&teamh dnosayihed cision.
Nosupport.Therei n'e oughsu portf managementindepend nce.Closurcisio madewithoutconsultationbyHQ.
Nosupporthown.B thteamsclearlyh ven independenceatlleitherinvestingorci iomaking. Eventhdecisionoloset efirmswam debyexter al partiesttheirHQwithnoinputfromthmanag ment.
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Category/Firm
E)Softbank-BEM|F)TranspacC pit lConclusion (ii)Dealflow
a)Identifyingandsecuring deals
Somesupport.Teamh did ntifi dso eealsrior
toclosurebutfirmdosedeforanyinve tments made.Regionalofficealsod sedwith ut investments.Showmeabilitytide t fa s thoughnonesecuredpriortd s re
Somesupport.Therearveryfewrec ntd als, thelastonewasiyear2000.Firmdo dm ny officesinDec2001.H weverfirmhadmany dealsinthe1990sindicatingt tth dhebility toidentify&secureals,buthasl sth tbility orhasl stthep opensitytinve t.
Thereissomeupportfabilitytid ntifya sbuth caseofTranspacthl testdealswerepriorotdotc m bust.Therewernor centdeals&iT anspacc sethl t Malaysiandealw s10ye rsgo.Bothfirmdidnotke anyinvestmentspriortoclosure.
b)Availabilityofdealsinthe market
Somesupport.Teamh did ntifiedso eealspr or
todosure.Showsavailabilityfe lint eirmarket
Nosupport.Therearnewdealsitl s5 years.TheonlyMalaysiand alw s10ye rsgo &thelastregionald alw sinye r2000. Possibleindicationoflackav ilabilityde s
inmarketorfi abilityfirmtvest.
Somesupport.Therw enr c ntdealsbuSoftba kid identifybetween5-8alsforethd cisionclo eh l Transpacdidh veealsith rlyyears.Th esu port ofdealavailabilitybutnoten ughf rthefirmsshow success.
iii)Ex ts
ViabilityofExitsinthe Market
Somesupport.Firmdidnohavnyinvest ents priortodosure.Theiofficewasl cat dinma ket withaviablestockexchange,butfirmdidnoth v opportunitytinvest&exit.
Moderatesupport.Thefirmhadm nyexi sin theirspace&geographicfocusprioryea2000.
Moderatesupport.WhilSBEMdidnhavny investments&h ncenoxitsTra spacdidithearly years.Itdoeshowth teivi bilityfxitsint ir marketsbuSBEMdidnotgchanceti v ts ow viability.
(iv)Networks
ValueofNetworks
Somesupport.Althoughtherwerns ccessful investmentsomeweridentifi dpriortosur . Teamalsodidworfcinre atedt cindustry&fi n e sowouldhaveomenetworks.
Moderatesupport.Th rwerinvestmentsith successfulexitsinarlyye r&t amh dwide workexperienceshowingg odnetw rksth . Butrecentyearsinv stmenthasbpoor.
Moderatesupport.Trans acdoeshowsu portfome networkswithearlierinv stments&x tbuSof ba kh d lesssupport.Itinoeasyth wh tefirmh dg d networkspriortoclosure.




Thereistrongsupportt a4ccessful firmshaveveryexperiencedgt.Mo tv VC&investmentxperi ncealsovast industryexperienceMo tal oh ve experienceinth irselectedinv stm ntspa .
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Appendix J 1 - Interview Transcript - Christopher Chan
REF NO: J1 RECORDING - NO
Global Venture Capital Investing In The Emerging Markets Of South East Asia
PARTICIPANT NAME: Chris Chan DESIGNATION: CEO
FIRM NAME: The Media Shoppe Bhd (TMS)
DATE OF INTERVIEW: 24-11-2004 START TIME: 12.15 pm END TIME: 1.30 pm
PLACE OF INTERVIEW: Kelana Jaya, Selangor
TRANSCRIPT OF THE INTERVIEW
1) Experience with VCs
Very slow, tedious and very painful. It took 18 months of courting the VCs and only when we
said no the VC said yes. They will very unprofessional in that sense and they even offered us
two Term Sheets before we did the deal. They were very inexperience as a VC. The deal with
SBEM was not very good because of the valuation. They drove down the valuation and this
gave Walden the opportunity to lower the valuation as well. TMS was the first deal for Bl
Walden's new country manager Kwee-Bee Chok. So she was not as experienced. However,
Walden itself was very good.
WE must have seen more than 15 VCs. The VCs are evolving, they are also getting more
experienced these days especially now that there is a good exit with Mesdaq. Our first
investor was more like an angel and we did the investment very fast because they liked the
people and they saw the exit potential.
2) Why did they invest - SBEM/Walden Strategy
The VCs did not tell us their strategy or their focus.
Why SBEM was interested
SBEM was a software distributor so they wanted to distribute our software through their
networks. We were not very happy with this. Eventually SBEM Malaysia was closed and we
did not know why. We rejected them because the valuation was low but if the valuation were
right we would have gone with SBEM because Softbank is a brand name. We were hoping
that they would help us to grow the business outside Malaysia. In the end we were fortunate
that we did not go with them.
Why Walden invested in us
We don't know why they invested but they only did the deal after we rejected their first offer
and started talking to other investors like Mavcap.
Mavcap
Mavcap liked us because we were not a start-up and we already had customers and revenue.
But they were just starting so they were not ready or experienced.
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3) Investment model or process
We understood the Mavcap process but their managers were not qualified enough and there
were bottlenecks along the way and it didn't go to the key decision makers. Walden was a lot
simpler because the top people were involved from the beginning. Kwee-Bee Chok was
involved from the beginning and I also met Lip-Bu. They even brought Amos in and he was
their chief technology expert. He was the most difficult but then in the end he really wanted to
do the deal. He was tough and he scrutinized everything. Lip-Bu was also comfortable with
the people especially Joanne and me. The VPs in Walden were very experienced, they had
run companies before and this is what we were looking for. We wanted to get people who had
done it before and were willing to share the experience with us.
4) Difference between foreign and local VCs
We met some VCs overseas and the encounters were very good but our problem was that we
were in Malaysia very far away from the US. At that time the local market in Malaysia was
also a problem because unlike the US where market size was larger, the market here is very
small. If we were an American company in America we would have got an investment faster
and more money too. Also you cannot compare Malaysia to the US. You cannot just bring the
US method here and expect it to happen the same way. In Malaysia the environment cannot
support big deals like in America. VCs in Malaysia also don't understand because they are
not entrepreneurs to start with and that is the fundamental problem. So they don't see the
opportunities like we do.
5) Do VCs know what they are doing
The local VCs don't know what they are doing. The foreign VCs definitely know what they are
doing because they have the experience. For example, in Singapore the new manager of
Walden Singapore, KO Cheah has the experience because he listed his company Media Ring
on Sesdaq and now is running Walden Singapore. One local VC who knows what he is doing
is Bernard of Mavcap because he listed his company on Nasdaq so he has the experience.
Among the locals I think some of the currently successful entrepreneurs like Redtone and Job
Street will make good VCs in the future.
6) Best/Worst Experience
Our best experience was our first investor who was an Angel investor. We pitched the deal,
he liked it, asked many questions and in 2 weeks the deal was done. We were very surprised
but that was a good experience. MSC VC was a problem because they were still new at that
time and we were part of their learning curve. Walden was a painful experience because
Kwee-Bee Chok was very discouraging and she kept saying we could not list and kept putting
us down. But I took that as a challenge and now we are listed.
7) If you had to it over again.
Unfortunately to grow the business you need money uniess you want to grow organicaiiy.
There is nothing wrong in going to a VC. In the end it depends on the VC that did the deal.
What is more important is the person itself not the brand name. A brand name is good but the
VC, the individual is more important.
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Appendix J 2 - Interview Transcript - Lau Kin-Wai
REF NO: J2 RECORDING - NO
Global Venture Capital Investing In The Emerging Markets Of South East Asia
PARTICIPANT NAME: Lau Kin Wai DESIGNATION: CEO
FIRM NAME: Viztel Communications
DATE OF INTERVIEW: 15-11-2004 START TIME: 2.15 pm END TIME: 3.35 pm
PLACE OF INTERVIEW: 22nd Floor, Tower 2, Petronas Twin Towers, Kuala Lumpur
TRANSCRIPT OF THE INTERVIEW
1) Experience with VCs
Techpacific
David Kim (the Partner of Techpacific) left after 9 months at Techpacific. They were difficult
shareholders trying to set directions for investee companies. They were forcing people to
merge post dotcom crash. The strategy was to merge small start-ups into one large entity. But
they had no expertise and M&A is a tough exercise. The VC firm's original culture is also lost.
We had a good relationship with David Kim who was also a mentor of the firm. After David
Kim Techpacific had mostly junior people. 90% of Techpacific investments turned bad and
their Nirvana Fund was dissolved. Techpacific bought Crosby in Singapore, a corporate
finance firm, and went back to their roots. They have the Hong Kong government Applied
Research Fund but it is not a very active fund.
Softbank Emerging Markets
Softbank went through the term sheet to raise RM20 million for the firm. We were close to
raising the fund but 9/11 happened and Softbank's HQ decided to drop non-core investments
including Malaysia. In dealing with Softbank we dealt with the local management but legal
stuffwas from the US. The terms were more onerous and certain terms were not applicable in
Malaysia because they used US law. The governing law was US law and this is not
acceptable for Malaysian firms. When 9/11 happened the company was kept in the dark and
we didn't know what was happening because Softbank didn't tell us anything. The senior
management of Softbank was trying to salvage the setup.
2) Why They Invested
SBEM probably had a bit of a focus like telecoms but they didn't tell us. We met 40 VCs and it
didn't strike us that anyone knew what they were doing except for Draper Fisher Jurvetson.
We met Tim Draper, he spent just 20 minutes listening to us and then understands the
business. He then tells you what he likes and what he fears. But he is clear that he does not
drive the business, here merely advises. Draper didn't invest because they had no focus in
Asia except for Japan.
Mayban Ventures were one of the most helpful and contributive VCs. We thought it would be
bureaucratic but it was not. The decision process is fast but paperwork may be slow. They
don't meddle in business direction or operation but are active in value added and business
developments. They are hands-off but are active in helping the company. On IPO converting
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the VC special investments make it difficult because of corporate law. Being with a large
group like Mayban is good for branding.
3)Process
Due diligence for local VC is more tedious. With Mayban Ventures it took 6 months to finalise.
Wth SBEM contract negotiation took 2.5 months and had to get US HQ approval. Techpacific
was very flexible. It took only 3-4 weeks.
4) Difference between local and foreign VCs
During the listing process the local VC was more flexible because they understand the
process but foreign VC was more difficult because their legal instruments were not accepted
by Securities Commission and the local Companies Act.
5) Do they know what they are doing
In general the foreign VCs are more risk friendly. Local VCs evaluate based on the old
economy basis. Local VCs are also not friendly with seed funding.
6) Best/Worst Experience
Best foreign
You get into the circle of people and networks in Hong Kong and introduction to key people
from SBEM, Goldman Sachs etc. Networking regionally is also good.
Worst Case
Meddling in the business. The US based VCs are very numbers driven. But they should be in
it not just to make money, it should be a partnership and it should be more than money,
common goals and belief in the business. They also have knee jerk reactions say post 9/11
liquidating the company because of that incident.
Local VCs
Value added a bit more because they are established here. But worst is paperwork.
MSC Venture Capital
First time we took on Techpacific instead of MSCVC because of David Kim. Viztel was not
looking at short-term gains so even though MSCVC money was better we took Techpacific
because of David Kim. The second time around MSC VC wanted to co-invest with SBEM but
when SBEM pulled out MSCVC also pulled out.
Mayban Ventures
They were interested in us because we were in the telephony technology business and not
normal Internet business.
7) Doing it all over again
Would have loved to get money from Angels who could also act as mentors. In terms of VCs
it is better to get at a later stage when the company is trying to grow.
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Appendix K - Biodata of Respondents
Case A - Barings Communications Equity Asia (BCEA)
1) Peter Chan (Managing Partner)
Managing Partner of Baring Communications Equity Asia Management Pte Ltd, a specialised
regional media and communications venture capital fund management company, which he
co-started in 1996. Prior to that, he joined the South East Asian affiliate of the Advent
International Group as one of the pioneers in the regional venture capital industry. His 16-year
experience in the industry includes successfully leading regional venture capital and private
equity investments, managing venture capital/private equity portfolios and IPOs. He was with
Arthur Andersen Singapore from 1984 to 1987. Peter is a Singapore citizen, holds a
Scholarship Award and Bachelor of Accountancy (Honors) Degree from the National
University of Singapore. Certified Public Accountant. Languages: English, Mandarin, Thai and
major Asian dialects.
2) Thian Sze, Yong (Partner)
Formerly Country Director with Singapore Telecom. His 17 years of industry experience
including 7 years of investing in cable/telephony and data communication companies. Yong
has a Bachelors Degree in Electrical and Electronics Engineering from the University of
Manchester Institute of Science and Technology and a Masters in Business Administration
from the Manchester Business School. Languages: English, Mandarin and major Asian
dialects.
Case B - Bl Walden
1) Kwee-Bee, Chok (Country Manager)
Kwee Bee joined Walden International in 2000. Prior to Wl, she was Senior General Manager
and Head of the Corporate Finance Department at Arab-Malaysian Bank, the largest
Merchant Bank in Malaysia. Kwee Bee has wide experience and knowledge in the capital
markets in Malaysia, especially in the areas of fundraising and corporate restructuring. She
has participated in listing over 100 companies on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. Kwee
Bee holds a B.A. with honors in Business from Kingston University in London. She is a
member of the Associate of the Chartered Institute of Bankers. Kwee Bee focuses on
electronics and digital consumer, semiconductors and software & IT services
2) Cindy Tee (Formerly Investment Manager & Assistant Vice President)
Cindy Tee was responsible for both the investment and divestment activities of the firm.
Cindy represented her firm as a director on several companies, including Mesdaq-listed The
Media Shoppe Bhd, Agenda Corporation, Vasa Holdings Sdn Bhd, and Stalheim Industries
Sdn Bhd amongst others. Cindy graduated with a Bachelor of Business, majoring in
Accounting and Finance. Cindy is a member ot the ASCPA and the MACPA.
3) Chee-Khen, Chong (Investment Manager)
Chee-Khen is the Investment Manager at Walden. He received a B. Eng (Hon) in Mechanical
Engineering from UMIST (now known as University of Manchester) in UK in 1994 and has an
MBA from University Malaya, Malaysia (2000). From 1994 to 2000 he worked as a senior
telecommunications engineer at Motorola Semiconductor (now known as Freescale
Semiconductor) and left Motorola to join Bl Walden in 2000.
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Case C - H&Q Thailand
1) Virapan Pulges (Managing Director)
Mr. Pulges is responsible for investments in Thailand. Prior to joining H&Q Asia Pacific, He
was the Assistant Managing Director of Thai Seri Cold Storage Company Limited for six
years, one of the largest Thai seafood processors and exporters. He was also instrumental in
setting up the Thai Venture Capital Association and has served as the President of the
Association. Mr. Pulges obtained his Bachelor of Science with special honours in Electrical
Engineering and Computer Science and a Master's degree in Electrical Engineering from the
University of Colorado in Denver, Colorado with scholarship from IBM.
2) Patan Somburanasin (Investment Manager)
He joined H&Q in 1997. Major responsibilities include: deal sourcing, due diligence, financial
modelling and valuation of new potential investments as well as monitoring and divestment of
existing investments. Previous successful investments include companies in healthcare,
factory development, pulp & paper, electronics and other basic manufacturing sectors.
Patan was also a Research Assistant at the Finance Department of Southern Illinois
University at Carbondale from 1995 to 1997, reporting to the Dean of the Finance Department
with responsibility for assisting in research work as well as for grading and tutoring several
finance courses. Prior to this he was a project and electrical engineer at Engineering System
Consultant Co., Ltd from 1991 to 1995.
He has an M.B.A from Southern Illinois University with a major in Finance He was also the
President of Thai Student Association and a Member of the Advisory Board of International
Students and Scholars office. He also has a B.Eng., from King Mongkut Institute of
Technology Lardkrabang, Thailand.
Case D - MSC Venture Corporation
1) Esmond Goei (CEO)
Mr. Goei is the CEO of MSC Venture Corporation Sdn Bhd. His career spans over 25 years in
the high tech industry. During that time he has co-founded, turned around, and/or invested in
numerous companies including: TranSwitch Corporation, (a leading developer and global
supplier of innovative high-speed VLSI semiconductor solutions to communications network
equipment manufacturers); NHancement Technologies Inc. (an international communications
and CTI systems integrator); Digital Research, Inc., (an Intel based operating systems
company); CliniCom, Inc., (the leading wireless bedside healthcare information system
developer and supplier); and Centigram Communications Corporation (a leader in voice
messaging systems and the first to provide unified messaging and Internet integration).
From 1986 to 1992, Mr. Goei was the Managing Director for Transtech Ventures, an
international, Singapore headquartered, venture capital group with US headquarters in the
heart of Silicon Valley, in Mountain View, California, USA. Mr. Goei is credited with the
majority of Transtech's investment gains at that time.
Mr. Goei obtained his early telecommunications experience at Nortel Networks including
tenures in engineering, marketing, and finance with the digital and electronic central office
switching systems divisions. His last position at Nortel in September 1986 was as Director of
its corporate Venture Capital Division. Prior to Nortel he was a Vice-President of the Venture
Capital Division of the Toronto Dominion Bank, and preceding that, a Senior Systems
Consultant for Touche Ross & Partners. His education includes a bachelor's degree in
Electrical Engineering from Queen's University at Kingston, Canada, and an MBA in
Marketing and Finance from the University ofWestern Ontario, Canada.
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2) Husni Salleh (Chief Financial & Administrative Officer)
Husni joined MSCVC as an Investment Manager in August 2000 and was promoted to Chief
Operating Officer in March 2002. Prior to joining MSCVC, Husni was with Bl Walden, the
Malaysian unit of Walden International, where he was involved with venture capital
investments.
At Bl Walden, Husni was instrumental in the second round investment in Malaysia's first wafer
fabrication foundry, as well as in Malaysia's first fabless semiconductor company. Husni was
also instrumental in the turnaround and workout exercises of a few ICT companies in
Malaysia. He led two project teams in the setting up of a venture capital fund and an incubator
company in the Middle East as well as the setting up of MSCVC's second fund. Husni has in
excess of 14 years of experience in the following: investment analysis, corporate advisory
services and venture capital management.
He was previously a Senior Investment Analyst with Nomura Research Institute, Singapore; a
Director and a Board member of Nomura Advisory Services, Malaysia and a Senior
Investment Analyst and an Assistant Director of Natwest Markets, Malaysia. Husni has
actively marketed investment products and services to fund and asset management
companies in Asia, Europe and North America
3) Alan Tan (Investment Manager and Head Corporate Counsel)
A lawyer by training, Alan comes from one of the top law firms in Malaysia handling multi-
million dollar deals from corporate funding exercises to cross-border joint ventures and
worldwide IPR protection representing national conglomerates.
Alan presently leads and advises the CEO/COO on most of the delicate deal-closing
negotiations with potential investees drawing from his years of experience in legal practice.
He sits on the boards of the investee companies and advises the CEOs of the portfolio
companies on a regular basis. His familiarity with banking and finance and his stint with a top
Hong Kong headhunting firm have made his assistance invaluable to our portfolio companies.
He is also currently involved in the strategic planning of the national Technopreneur
Development Flagship. He speaks regularly at conventions for entrepreneurs, on funding and
venture capital. During his student days, he used to represent the country and the region in
international mooting competitions.
Case E - Softbank Emerging Markets (SBEM)
1) Yoke-Kee, Ang (Regional Associate)
Yoke Kee was the Regional Associate at Softbank Emerging Markets South East Asian
headquarters in Malaysia. He was responsible for the overall investments and operations in
South East Asia. Prior to Softbank, Yoke Kee was an investment banker at Morgan Stanley
and a strategy consultant at the Boston Consulting Group (BCG). He had advised local
conglomerates and multinational companies on market entry strategies, restructuring,
debt/equity raising, mergers and acquisitions, as well as privatisation and deregulation
strategies across multiple industries. Yoke Kee was also part of the pioneering team
responsible for transferring Microsoft's Asia Pacific Operations from Redmond to Singapore.
Yoke Kee holds an MSc in Financial Engineering and a Certificate of Computational Finance
from Carnegie Mellon University and Nanyang Technological University. An ASEAN Scholar
and Tan Lark Sye Scholar, he also holds a BBA Honors in Finance from National University of
Singapore. Proficient in English, Malay and Mandarin, Yoke Kee had interned at Government
Investment Corporation of Singapore and Citibank before working in South East Asia, China
and USA.
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2) Karan Henrik Ponnudurai (Investment Manager)
Karan was Investment Manager and Head of Business Development and Technology for
Softbank Emerging Markets. In this role, Karan led direct equity investment activities and
technology planning in the Asia South region. Previously, he was a founder Director of
Worldwide Engineering in a wireless broadband equipment company, responsible for the
design and development of spread-spectrum and signal processing products that was
acquired and listed on the Australian Stock Exchange.
Karan has had extensive operational and business experience in the communications
industry in various countries and has worked in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Germany, USA and
Malaysia. He is fluent in four languages and is a frequent speaker and writer in
telecommunication industry conferences in the Asia-Pacific region. He holds graduate and
undergraduate degrees in electrical engineering from the University of Malaya, where he was
a Hewlett Packard scholarship holder and Stanford University, USA where he as a Krupp
Foundation Fellow. He also completed the Asian International Executive program for Senior
Management at INSEAD business school.
Case E - Transpac Capital
1) Jason Ng (Vice President & Country Manager)
Jason is currently Chief Investment Officer of Expedient Equity Sdn Bhd, a Malaysian VC firm
investing in the life sciences and biotech areas. He co-founded the firm in 2002 after leaving
Transpac. From 1998 to end 2001, he headed and managed Transpac's investment operation
in Malaysia. He was responsible for identifying, evaluating (including feasibility studies and
due diligence checks), negotiating, structuring and monitoring investment opportunities with
emphasis on management buyouts; restructuring deals; as well as taking strategic blocks in
public listed companies; and traditional venture capital investments in privately owned
companies.
Prior to Transpac between 1996 and 1998 he was Adviser to Allied Phillip Capital
Management Sdn Bhd and was responsible to the Managing Director in advising on unlisted
investments for the Company's private clients fund as well as for the Company's unlisted
portion of the closed end fund. Between 1994 and 1996 he was a Vice President of China
Investment & Development Co (M) Sdn Bhd, heading and managing CIDC's direct equity
investment operation in Malaysia. His earliest post (between 1991 and 1994) was as an
Investment Manager for Bl Walden where he was responsible for marketing, raising and
managing funds for them.
His Professional Qualifications include Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA), USA; Associate
Institute of Investment Management and Research, UK (AIIMR); Certified European
Federation of Financial Analysts Society (EFFAS) Financial Analysts; Associate Chartered
Management Accountants, UK (ACMA) and he is also a Registered Accountant (RA),
Malaysia. He also has a Master of Science in Investment Analysis from University of Stirling,
UK).
His significant achievements at his most recent venture Expedient Equity include investments
and Directorships in:
Company Directorship Target Exit




Skincare and herbal based health food co












2) Tien Kiong, Yeo (Investment Manager)
Yeo was the Investment Manager for Transpac Capital Pte Ltd from 1996 to 2001. Prior to
that he was managing manufacturing companies in the building materials industries. Yeo has
about 10 years of hands on working experience in manufacturing and 6 years of venture
capital experience. He is currently a Mentor of the Cradle Investment Programme of
MAVCAP.
He obtained a Mechanical Engineering degree from University Malaya, Malaysia and an MBA
from Oklahoma City University, USA.
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